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ABSTRACT 
Multi-Level Governance of Agricultural Land in Japan:  
Farmers’ Perspectives and Responses to Farmland Banking 
Maiko Nishi  
This dissertation examines the emergence and implementation of a new intermediary mechanism 
of farmland tenancy in Japan with a focus on farmers’ perspectives. Japan’s government 
introduced the Farmland Bank (FB) program in 2014 in an attempt to avoid further farmland 
abandonment and revitalize the farming industry. By design, the program gives more power to 
prefectural authorities to accommodate new actors and resources in tenancy arrangements even 
without farmland owners’ consent so as to expedite farmland aggregation and generate better 
economies of scale. This is a major turning point since the postwar agrarian reform where 
owners have been given a primary decision-making role in private farmland use. The research 
draws on semi-structured interviews with farmers, government officials and experts, which were 
conducted intermittently between 2016 and 2018. By taking a multi-level governance approach, 
the study shows a change in the farmland governance model from the centralized control of 
individual property to the decentralized, multi-level coordination for collective tenancy 
arrangements, to which farmers actively contributed along with the interlocking institutional 
transitions of farming families and villages. With the decline in the life security function of 
farmland, they have increasingly disengaged from farming and allowed for political and 
conceptual shifts of farmland from owner-oriented to user-driven and from family property to the 
commons of the society. The study finds that despite a massive budget injection, the FB program 
has only marginally facilitated farmland aggregation. Yet, the case study of two communities 
reveals that the program has been driving a ‘soft’ coercion of farmers’ land-use practices via 
economic rationality. Moreover, it has disconnected owners from farmland but failed to enshrine 
tenants’ commitment to long-term farmland management. Complementary attention to 
subjective, intangible and cultural aspects of farmland would help to avoid possible one-time 
profit seeking land-use. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
Worldwide, farmland abandonment has grown significantly since the 1950s and cropland 
expansion has slowed (Cramer, Hobbs, and Standish 2008; Ramankutty et al. 2018). These 
trends involve abandonment somewhere and intensification elsewhere to keep up with the global 
food demand (van der Zanden et al. 2017; Lambin and Meyfroidt 2011). Farmland abandonment 
brings both opportunities and threats. Opportunities include carbon sequestration, regeneration of 
native species, and increase of certain ecosystems if it is passively managed for natural 
succession or actively revegetated, while allowing for urbanization and cultivation of biofuel 
crops if it is exploited (Queiroz et al. 2014; Munroe et al. 2013). Negative consequences involve 
biodiversity loss, reduction of water provision, increase of fire frequency and intensity, 
desertification, and loss of cultural and aesthetic values (Rey Benayas et al. 2007). 
 Agricultural intensification has mostly led to environmental degradation and poses a 
threat to agricultural stability. At the expense of an increase in productivity, negative ecological 
impacts include biodiversity loss, land and water contamination, soil erosion, animal welfare 
decline, and damage of nutrient cycling (Donald et al. 2006; Garnett et al. 2013). Ecological 
degradation can also affect human health and may result in more fragile production systems 
when the systems reach their limits under extreme weather events (Tscharntke et al. 2012). 
Moreover, concentration of agricultural production in certain places cannot guarantee 
distribution of available food and energy, while global reliance on fewer crops has come with 
micronutrient deficiency and nutritional quality decline in some places (Ramankutty et al. 2018). 
 This dissertation examines the emergence and working of the Farmland Bank (FB) 
program in Japan with a focus on farmers’ perspectives on farmland. In an attempt to revitalize 
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the agricultural industry, Japan’s government introduced the FB program in 2014. Farmland 
banks (FBs) are semi-public organizations established at the prefectural level (i.e., the first level 
of administrative jurisdictions) and serve as an intermediary to bring new actors and resources 
into farmland tenancy so as to strategically exploit cross-level opportunities for farmland use. By 
design, the program allows the FBs to accommodate tenants, including business corporations and 
outsider farmers, without the farmland owners’ consent. This was intended to physically 
consolidate farmland and aggregate farm management into large-scale farming independently 
from owners’ interest so as to generate economies of scale. 
 The introduction of this program is a major turning point since the post-World War II 
agrarian reform where farmland owners had been given a primary decision-making role in 
private farmland use. In the postwar era beginning with the land reform that dismantled 
landlordism for farmland redistribution to small farmers, farmers have been typically owner-
farmers but increasingly included owners fully or partially disengaging from farming. They have 
historically exerted political pressure for conservative polices often to protect their vested 
interest in farmland, while providing stewardship to farmland and ecosystems (Mulgan 2005; 
Chouinard et al. 2008). In this vein, why and how have farmers allowed for the emergence of the 
FB program? Do they pursue individual maximization of economic benefits from farmland? Do 
they socially follow the governmental program at the expense of their individual benefits?  Are 
they culturally comfortable to let the authorities to take care of the land? 
 The process of agricultural abandonment is complex and associated with multiple 
trajectories, and thus has made policy responses a great challenge (Munroe et al. 2013; van der 
Zanden et al. 2017). Drivers of abandonment involve both internal (i.e., local) and external (i.e., 
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global or cross-territorial) factors, which vary in time and space (Lasanta et al. 2017). The 
internal factors range from bio-physical conditions and adjacent urban expansion to the features 
of agricultural holdings (e.g., age), while the external ones include market incentives, and 
increased off-farm economic opportunities that trigger rural-urban migration (Rey Benayas et al. 
2007; Brouwer 2004). Agricultural policy also intertwines. Handicap payments in mountainous 
regions could mitigate abandonment with additional income for farmers, but politicians may 
judge them as socially undesirable (Lasanta et al. 2017; Strijker 2005). Structural assistance 
often aims to resolve fragmented land holdings but can homogenize land-use patterns and 
undermine ecological diversity at the expense of economic viability (Sklenicka et al. 2014; 
Chavas 2001). These factors interact with each other, wherein the external drivers trigger or 
exaggerate farmland abandonment whose surface and extent are conditioned by the internal 
factors (Lasanta et al. 2017).  
 In particular, the recent processes of globalization (i.e., planetary “interconnectedness of 
places and people” through global markets, information and capital flows, and international 
conventions) often magnify the external forces and exacerbate farmland abandonment (Lambin 
et al. 2001, 266). The impacts of agricultural abandonment are rarely confined to the abandoned 
area and the local population, but rather have off-farm impacts often as negative externalities 
(e.g., biodiversity, water and air) (Lasanta et al. 2017). Such externalities sometimes bring about 
economic, political and ethical concerns across territorial boundaries (Stoate et al. 2001). The 
globalization processes amplify or abate the driving forces of the land-use changes by 
transcending territorial boundaries in the flows of goods and services (e.g., incorporation of a 
region into the world economy, eco-labeling, better weather forecasts through information 
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technologies) (Lambin et al. 2001). Albeit not always detrimental, such processes can aggravate 
the impacts of abandonment, often leading to unexpected and profound socio-economic and 
environmental consequences (Liu et al. 2013). 
 In Japan, farmland abandonment has grown since the 1960s and exceeded farmland 
conversion since the 1990s. This trend progressed along with urbanization and industrialization 
under increased trade liberalization. The concerns over agricultural abandonment are multi-
dimensional and extend to different sectoral areas ranging from rural development, cultural 
heritage, food security, and biodiversity change to the national economy. In recent decades, the 
recovery of food self-sufficiency has been one of the national policy goals. The country has 
experienced a steep decrease in food self-sufficiency: it produced 79% of its food in caloric 
terms in 1960, but 40% in 2000 (OECD 2013). Despite the political efforts, self-sufficiency has 
remained unchanged over the past decade (MAFF 2018i).  
 Amid a farming crisis, the government launched the FB program as a cornerstone of the 
agrarian structural reform to resolve the fragmented use of farmland based on family-owned 
farms and improve competitiveness in national and international markets. With a mandate to 
facilitate the productive use of farmland, the FBs were designed to lease smaller plots from land 
owners and sublet them to users in a larger and consolidated form for better efficiency and 
productivity. The FBs delegate some of their administrative tasks (e.g,. matchmaking between 
owners and tenants) to the relevant agencies at the municipal level. Building on several 
successive models that have emerged since 1970, this latest tenancy model gives more power to 
the prefectural authorities to openly recruit users and sublet farmland to them. This provides a 
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room for the FBs to freely bring those who they consider are technically and economically 
capable into the farming sector. 
 Despite growing abandonment, farmland still attracts interest. On the one hand, some 
policy-makers, entrepreneurs and business stakeholders emphasize farmland as a precious 
productive resource to be exploited for economic advantage. On the other, many scholars and 
environmentalists advocate for the ecological and cultural contributions of farmland to be 
preserved and handed down to the next generations as heritage. Local managers and city officials 
may connote farmland as a local resource to be nurtured as a communal asset. In the context of 
private land ownership, however, landowners are primarily entitled to farmland and their 
decisions are essential for land-use.  
 In the following sections, I first contextualize the emerging phenomenon of the FB 
program in the literature and explain how this study extends our knowledge about environmental 
governance, property rights, and the values associated with natural resources (Section 1.1). Then, 
I describe the research design and methodological approach I employed to address my research 
questions (Section 1.2). Finally, I outline the organization of the dissertation (Section 1.3). 
1.1 Literature Review 
The FB program is a state project that has been designed and pursued with national legislation 
and budgeted by the national government. Under the policy, prefectural governments have been 
authorized to plan and design its implementation at their discretion to a certain extent, while 
designating a FB as a main implementation agency to mediate tenancy arrangements. At the 
same time, some of the FBs’ tasks have been delegated to municipal agencies to facilitate local 
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arrangements. Alongside this multi-level architecture, farmers either as a landowner or a tenant 
have individually and/or collectively responded to the program.  The focus of the dissertation is 
the interplay of farmers’ value perspectives and their responses to the FB program in the process 
of governing farmland.  
 To situate my questions in the literature, this section discusses two key concepts: multi-
level governance (MLG), and the values associated with farmland. The concept of MLG has 
been widely applied particularly through the enlargement of the European Union (EU) to 
strategically exploit cross-level opportunities in negotiation, deliberation and decisions of policy-
making activities and their implementation. In effect, Japan’s government has adopted the MLG 
model to promote the productive use of farmland through the FB program, whereas the 
involvement of the prefectural and municipal authorities in program implementation is expected 
to deliver more legitimate governance outcomes than the state authoritarianism. In this regard, 
MLG provides a useful theoretical lens to explain the emergence and working of the program.  
 The concept of value perspectives on natural resources has also grown in the past several 
decades with a specific attention to the interactions between humans and nature. In particular, 
politically coined as ‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture, the farmland values have been 
conceptualized in multiple dimensions. Recent scholarship has been more attentive to dynamic 
interactions between the multiple values of nature and the institutions that govern property rights 
and their holders to manage natural resources.  
 This section first discusses MLG as an empirical and theoretical model to explain the 
emerging process and the mechanism of the FB program. Then, it builds on the concepts and 
conceptual frameworks of human valuation of nature to highlight the area to which this study 
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contributes by examining the interplay of farmers’ perspectives in the process of program 
implementation. This is followed by specific research questions to be addressed in the 
dissertation.  
Multi-Level Governance (MLG) 
The concept of multi-level governance (MLG) was widely introduced in the wake of the 1988 
reform of European structural funds and the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992) to analyze 
institutional innovations and explore the fate of the European state restructuring (Marks 1993; 
Stephenson 2013; Papadopoulos 2005). As a way to reallocate ‘authority upwards, downwards, 
and sideways from central states,’ the concept has gained an increased attention from scholars 
and policy-makers (Hooghe and Marks 2003, 233). Yet, the importance of cross-level linkages in 
governance had been recognized in other fields and regions (Gibson, Ostrom, and Ahn 2000; 
Stephenson 2013). In consideration of scholarship developments in different disciplines, Hooghe 
and Marks (2001) postulate that the emergence of MLG is one of the two intellectual responses 
to the recent horizontal and vertical dispersion of authority and decision-making power partly 
through public/private networks: one response has been to generate new concepts (e.g., MLG), 
and the other has been to stretch established concepts over the phenomenal changes (e.g., 
federalism, international relations). 
 As founders of the MLG concept, Hooghe and Marks (2001; 2003) surveyed similar 
concepts and found competing visions of MLG that were distinctive between two types: Type 1 
and Type 2. The common vital feature of these types is a radical departure from the centralized 
state, but they diffuse authority in contrasting ways. Type 1 describes the observed “dispersion of 
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authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions” at a limited number of 
levels, and Type 2 describes malleable governing arrangements that comprises “task-specific, 
intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions” with no limit to the number of jurisdictional levels 
(Hooghe and Marks 2003, 233). The former is exemplified as a typical federal system where 
every citizen is located in “a Russian Doll set of nested jurisdictions’” equipped with a single 
relevant jurisdiction at a particular territorial scale (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 8). The latter is 
observed in metropolitan areas and frontier regions where functional, overlapping, and 
competing jurisdictions form a ‘baroque patchwork’ (Papadopoulos 2005, 317). 
 These distinctive approaches complement each other (Hooghe and Marks 2003). Type 1 
builds on the jurisdictional design by which each jurisdiction conforms with a territorial 
community or encompassing group to voice rather than exit, seek self-rule and express 
communal identities (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2003). By creating inclusive 
jurisdictions but limiting the number of jurisdictional levels to internalize policy externalities, it 
minimizes inter-jurisdictional coordination efforts while maximizing the fit between the 
jurisdictional scale and the optimal scale of public good provision (Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
Largely building on a rationalist account, the Type 1 model is suited to deal with zero-sum issues 
for distributional bargaining or to pursue established goals (e.g., provision of non-excludable 
public goods) (Bache 2010; Marks and Hooghe 2004).  
 Type 2 embraces the task-driven jurisdictions for which membership is conditional and 
often competitive through low barriers to entry and exit to address a limited set of relevant 
problems (Hooghe and Marks 2003). By decomposing decision-making into jurisdictions with 
limited externalities in an insulated manner, it limits the transaction costs of inter-jurisdictional 
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coordination (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Marks and Hooghe 2004). It is 
suited to explore Pareto-optimality or positive sum outcomes, rather than explicit redistribution, 
through pliable socialization and learning (Bache 2010; Hooghe and Marks 2003).  
 Alongside this development of the MLG concept in response to political changes in 
western societies, other social scientists have generated a theory of multi-level, linked 
relationships in environmental governance to address the growing need for interdisciplinary 
work across natural and social sciences (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Gibson, Ostrom, and Ahn 
2000). Environmental problems appear on more or less distinct spatial scales and extents and 
often cut across administrative jurisdictions (Newig and Fritsch 2009).  To adequately deal with 1
environmental issues, rethinking of institutional dimensions has been called for (Newig and 
Fritsch 2009; Young 2002). Today we have ample evidence of governance failures resulting from 
inappropriate accounts of human-environment dynamics and interactions across different spatial 
scales and administrative levels. The examples include collapse of fisheries, outbreak of human-
induced disease, and significant ramifications of biofuel mandate (Cash et al. 2006; Liu et al. 
2013). Even long-lived systems have been increasingly exposed and vulnerable to global change 
(Janssen, Anderies, and Ostrom 2007). 
 Accordingly, MLG has evolved extensively in environmental governance (Stephenson 
2013; Newig and Fritsch 2009). In particular, the study of polycentric governance is a long-
standing tradition in MLG theory. Rooted in the idea of flexible local arrangements rather than 
 I use the term of ‘scale’ defined as the “spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used to measure and study any 1
phenomenon,” and the term of ‘levels’ as the “units of analysis that are located at different positions on a scale” (Gibson, Ostrom, 
and Ahn 2000, 218; Cash et al. 2006, 2). For instance, the phenomena that may occur at different ‘spatial scales’ include those 
within an urban area, within a region, within a nation, or across national boundaries, while different levels of spatial scale range 
from patches, landscapes, and regions to the globe (Gibson, Ostrom, and Ahn 2000; Cash et al. 2006). Also, the term ‘extent’ is 
referred to as the “size of the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions of a scale” (Gibson, Ostrom, and Ahn 2000, 
218). 
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the diffusion of state authority, it has developed with special attention to self-governance 
potentials adaptable to change. Stemming from the 1956 Tiebout’s seminal article that hints at 
competitive local jurisdictions for optimal public good provision, the scholars at the Indiana 
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (i.e., the Ostrom Workshop) have advanced 
the idea of flexible governance arrangements and postulated polycentric governance (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001; Tiebout 1956).  
 Initially introduced as a system of “many centers of decision making” formally 
independent of each other, ‘polycentricity’ is defined as “a system of governance” where 
authorities from overlapping institutions interact in determining “the conditions under which 
these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act 
as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes” (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and 
Warren 1961, 831; McGinnis 2011a, 171). Being multi-level, multi-type, multi-sectoral and 
multi-functional, the system allows for inclusion, learning and policy experimentation on various 
levels, which may lead to overall innovation and effective provision of collective goods 
(McGinnis 2011a a; Goldthau 2014; E. Ostrom 2010). Originating from the local model of public 
good provision, this approach has gained prominence in studies on local and regional common 
pool resources, and has been extended to research on the global commons (Goldthau 2014). 
 Nevertheless, the point of departure of polycentricity was “the concern for matching 
institutions to the physical environment (and to the characteristics of the 
community)” (McGinnis and Walker 2010, 294). Extending the concept of polycentric 
governance that hinted at “the critical importance of local solutions to complex policy 
problems,” E. Ostrom demonstrated the successful management of local commons without an 
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exogenous control either by markets or states (McGinnis and Walker 2010, 295). Thus she 
influentially disproved the conventional economic theory that resource users themselves were 
trapped in overuse and inevitably destroyed common-pool resources unless solutions were 
imposed from outside (E. Ostrom 1990; E. Ostrom 2009). Contrary to the conventional theory 
that resources would be over-harvested in the absence of ‘property rights,’ she proved that 
resource users would find ways to organize themselves for governing the commons (E. Ostrom 
1990; E. Ostrom 2009). 
 Noticing considerable confusion arising from the imprecise presumption that resource 
users had no property rights without ‘alienation’ rights (i.e., a right to sell or lease their property), 
Schlager and E. Ostrom (1992) conceptualized property rights systems in terms of ‘bundles of 
rights’ rather than as a single right, containing: 1) ‘access’ (i.e., a right to enter a specified 
property), 2) ‘withdrawal’ (i.e., a right to harvest the products of a resource), 3) 
‘management’ (i.e., a right to transform the resource and regulate internal use patterns), 4) 
‘exclusion’ (i.e., a right to decide who will have access, withdrawal, or management rights), and 
5) ‘alienation’ (i.e., a right to sell or lease any of the above rights). As empirical studies evidence, 
some resource users do self-organize and create long-enduring common-property systems for 
which the alienation right is not key (E. Ostrom 2009).  
 Moving beyond mainstream economic theories, socio-institutional approaches to property 
rights treat ‘land’ not simply as “a factor of production” but as “a socially structured space-time 
continuum” (Bastiaensen and Merlet 2012, 11). Instead of seeking to clearly define, enforce and 
guarantee land rights either by a state or a market, they consider land rights as evolving from 
dynamic and complex social and political processes where multiple social actors — working 
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individually or collectively— continuously claim and struggle for their rights to a piece of land 
and its resources (Bastiaensen and Merlet 2012; Merlet 2007). As a way of examining ‘internal 
relationships’ among social actors who together construct land rights, rather than a mere focus on 
‘external relationships’ of owners (versus non-owners), the notion of property as ‘bundles of 
rights’ distinguishes different kinds of property rights that are negotiated, redistributed and 
reconstituted among the social actors who share interests in the properties (Alexander 2012, 
1854–1855; Sikor, He, and Lestrelin 2017; Blandy, Dixon, and Dupuis 2006).  
 The system of polycentric governance, then, is an institutional form available to deal with 
arrangements of ‘bundles of rights’ in consideration of dynamic, conditional, contextual and 
diverse features of property rights (Armitage 2007; E. Ostrom et al. 2002). It can be 
interchangeably used as a system of the broadly defined MLG, if it is inclusive of integrative 
institutions beyond public authorities in multi-type governance (E. Ostrom and Janssen 2005; 
Liefferink and Wurzel 2018; Mcginnis 2008).  While cautions about misconception as a panacea 2
were voiced, the normative attractions of polycentric or multi-level governance have been well 
received in studies built on complex adaptive systems (Pahl-Wostl 2009; E. Ostrom 2001; Levin 
1999).  
 In an attempt to address sustainability problems, scholars have elaborated ‘variables’ or 
‘attributes’ of MLG to successfully exploit cross-scale and cross-level opportunities in governing 
human-nature interactions, such as participation, accountability, knowledge co-production, 
mediation, negotiation, leadership, learning and trust (Cash et al. 2006; Armitage 2007; E. 
Ostrom 2009). Taking into account the challenges arising from cross-level interactions such as 
 Some authors argue the distinctions between polycentric governance and multi-level governance (MLG), but they seem to 2
narrowly define or deal with MLG largely as the one categorized in or closer to Type 1 MLG (Pahl-Wostl 2009; Roe 2009). 
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subsidiarity and dependency, they have also proposed various governance architectures including 
co-management (e.g., Adger, Brown, and Tompkins 2005), boundary or bridging organizations 
(e.g., Folke et al. 2005), nested enterprises (e.g., E. Ostrom 1990), and place-based management 
(e.g., Young et al. 2007). These approaches attend to vertical and horizontal interlinkages of 
human-environment interactions to acknowledge, accommodate and bridge the differences 
resultant from multiple levels. Scholars also note that evolution and outcomes of governance 
largely rely on the contexts in which the governance mechanisms are embedded across multiple 
levels (Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young 2009). 
 A major challenge of MLG lies in the continuous coordination of different actors and 
their actions at multiple levels and scales so as to take advantage of the scale flexibility of 
governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001). The barriers to overcome this challenge include the 
transaction costs (e.g., time, effort and other resources to design, establish and maintain new and 
old organizations), the baseline conditions (e.g., resource asymmetries, informal and formal 
rules), abuse of power or inertia of governing authorities (e.g., rent-seeking, ignorance), and 
divergence from checks and balances (e.g., inaccessibility to legitimate coercive power, 
universalistic principles) (Mcginnis 2008; McGinnis 2011b; Stephenson 2013; Blom-hansen 
2005). 
 Specific to the interactions across different scales and levels, three societal obstacles for 
coordination are identified: 1) ‘ignorance’ (i.e., the failure to simultaneously recognize relevant 
scales, levels and their interactions); 2) ‘mismatch’ (i.e., the discrepancy between levels and 
scales in human-environment systems); and 3) ‘plurality’ (i.e., the failure to recognize 
heterogeneous value perspectives to scales held by different actors even at a single level) (Cash 
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et al. 2006, 4). These “scale challenges” essentially arise from multiple cognitive types of scale 
(e.g., spatial, temporal and jurisdictional), each of which is perceived from different levels (e.g., 
local, national and international levels), whereby complexity is added through human-
environment interactions within and across scales and levels (Cash et al. 2006, 4). 
 To address these challenges, the discussions often go back to the variables/attributes of 
MLG or the factors affecting the emergence of new institutions as part of flexible governance. 
For instance, Cash et al. (2006) exemplify such responses to the scale challenges as co-
management (i.e., a set of arrangements to share power and responsibilities between 
governments and local communities) and boundary organizations (i.e., organizations that play an 
intermediary role between different arenas, levels or scales and facilitate the co-production of 
knowledge), while detailing practical tools and strategies including boundary objects (e.g., maps 
and forecasts), accountability and participation of both sides of the boundary, complementary 
expertise, and translation.  
 Rather than specific rules to generate success, however, E. Ostrom (1990) identifies 
‘eight design principles’ as general institutional regularities among the long-enduring property 
rights systems in order to understand why the results of governance processes are robust (i.e., 
adaptable to disturbance) in some cases and fail in others. While most of her design principles 
build on research in local and regional settings, application to higher levels is expressed as the 
eighth principle (i.e., ‘nested enterprises’) where various governance activities are organized in 
multiple layers to accommodate goals and interests of social groups at different levels.  Yet, 3
 The evaluation of the validity of the eight design principles shows considerable usefulness in understanding why some 3
common-property institutions are robust (E. Ostrom 2009). The principles include:1) clearly defined boundaries; 2) congruence 
between local conditions, appropriation, and provision rules; 3) adaptability of collective choice arrangements; 4) appropriate 
monitoring; 5) graduated and implementable sanctions; 6) mechanisms for conflict resolution; 7) recognized rights to organize; 
and 8) nested enterprises. 
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successfully scaling up the design principles is an important challenge, whereas it remains 
understudied how to build social capital to bond governance systems across levels and scales 
(Gruby and Basurto 2013; Brondizio, Ostrom, and Young 2009; Nenadovic and Epstein 2016; 
Petruzzi, Pitt, and Busquets 2016). 
 Given the applicability of the MLG concept to diverse contexts, this dissertation employs 
MLG as an analytical framework to offer insights on how farmers as social agents have 
interacted with other agents, and how through these interactions they have contributed to 
transforming the MLG model for farmland tenancy. The theoretical lens of MLG helps me to 
explain a complex pattern of public/private and formal/informal institutional relations along with 
diffusion of authority within the state. It also directs attention to communal ‘identity’ as a 
causally-powerful factor of formation and transformation of farmland governance, while 
allowing for both rational and sociological accounts for mismatches/tensions between material 
and subjective aspects of governance. In addition, with the challenges of MLG in mind, the study 
attends to dynamic character and operation of powers of farmers and other agents in governing 
farmland.  
 Taking the FB program as an example, the study delineates the concept of ‘nested 
enterprises.’ Rather than highlighting the importance or outcome of sound governance, this study 
sheds light on the process of governance where the value perspectives to farmland held by 
different actors interplay across different levels and scales. Since farmland in Japan has been 
increasingly abandoned, the study also contributes to advancing the concept of the commons in 
the context of resource abandonment rather than resource scarcity. 
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Values of farmland: as perspectives seen from the governing processes 
Governing farmland with the MLG approach involves a ‘bundle of property rights’ associated 
with different obligations or responsibilities (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; E. Ostrom 2009). For 
example, people who hold only access rights (i.e., ‘authorized viewers’) can enjoy the 
agricultural landscape, but cannot harvest anything and have to follow certain rules (e.g., not to 
step in a paddy). Those who have access and withdrawal rights (i.e., ‘authorized users’), for 
instance, to nearby grassland, can harvest grasses for fertilizer or fodder for their own farming 
but may be restricted in the timing and amount of harvest. Those with access, withdrawal and 
management rights (i.e., ‘claimants’) can improve an irrigation facility but have to attain a local 
consent and achieve a goal to ensure better productivity and sustainability. Those who 
additionally have exclusion rights (i.e., ‘proprietors’) have rights and obligations to regulate 
farmland use, invest in the agricultural system, and decide who has access to the system. Those 
who have all the five rights including alienation (i.e., ‘owners’) can sell or lease some or all of 
their rights to someone else, but may have obligations to follow certain rules (e.g., permission 
from an agricultural committee). All these different types of right holders may value farmland 
differently. How do we conceptualize, differentiate and evaluate these values? 
 Farmland values have become increasingly recognized as a set of multiple values. Since 
the early 1990s, the concept of ‘agricultural multifunctionality’ has prevailed to express the 
important role of agriculture in shaping the landscape that provides environmental benefits and 
contributes to the socio-economic viability of rural areas, beyond its primary function of 
producing food and fibre (Maier and Shobayashi 2001; Otte, Simmering, and Wolters 2007). 
Since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, this concept has evolved through the multilateral 
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negotiations between ‘non-trade’ and ‘trade’ aspects of agriculture under the aegis of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) (Wilson 2009; Renting et al. 2009).  In relation to policy support for 4
agriculture versus trade liberalization, approaches to multifunctionaliy have been fragmented in 
the both political and scientific terms, despite efforts to develop integrative frameworks to 
evaluate the multifunctional contributions of agriculture (Wilson 2009; Renting et al. 2009).   5
 In a broad sense, the notion includes four kinds of agricultural functions: 1) green (e.g., 
biodiversity maintenance, landscape amenities), 2) blue (e.g., water quality, flood control), 3) 
yellow (e.g., rural cohesion, historical heritage), and 4) white functions (e.g., food security) (Van 
Huylenbroeck et al. 2007). In Japan, the concept has gained popularity since the OECD 
ministerial discussion of agricultural policies in 1998 and has been taken up in agri-
environmental policies (Amano 2014).  The growth of economic valuations of agricultural 6
multifuctionality in the 1990s was followed by the nationwide economic valuation by Science 
 The concept of agricultural multifunctionality was addressed in the Agenda 21 documents of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 to 4
introduce the sustainable development concept to the agricultural sector, and then gained an important role in scientific and 
policy debates (Renting et al. 2009; Wilson 2009). Although the concept was used implicitly under the Uruguay Round in the late 
1980s, it has become a keyword of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since 1993 to address farm abandonment, 
international trade pressures and biodiversity loss (Hollander 2004). In earlier years, European policy-making took advantage of 
the notion to facilitate subsidy-oriented CAP goals narrowly based on the economic and policy-based approaches to agricultural 
and rural change (Wilson 2008). In due course, ‘Friends of Multifunctionality’ (including Japan, South Korea and the EU) was 
formed to stress ‘non-trade’ aspects of agricultural production, whereas ‘Cairns Group’(comprising 17 agricultural exporting 
countries such as Australia, Brazil and South Africa) offered critical views on it to advocate agricultural trade liberalization in 
multilateral negotiations (Hollander 2004, 302). Following the growth of science and policy discussions, the concept has been 
broaden to be more inclusive of rural development, culture, societal needs, and environmental issues (Wilson 2008; Otte, 
Simmering, and Wolters 2007).
 Renting et al. (2009) trace the concept to different historical roots such as the OECD work, the Food and Agriculture 5
Organization (FAO)’s focus, and the EU’s CAP reform. Also, they delineate four different research approaches to multifunctional 
agriculture (i.e., market regulation, land-use, actor-oriented, and public regulation approaches), and proposed new meta-level 
analytical frameworks.
 Although the notion was implicitly addressed in the Basic Direction of New Policy for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas 6
issued in 1992, the term officially appeared in the Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Act enacted in 1999 (K. Taniguchi 
2000). Following this policy shift, a new scheme called Direct Payment to Farmers in the Hilly and Mountainous Areas was 
introduced in 2000 to ensure multifunctional agriculture by compensating farmers in disadvantageous areas for agricultural 
production (Teranishi et al. 2010). In practice, environmental consideration in agriculture was not new, however, as organic 
farming burgeoned in the 1970s with the movement building on consumer-produce partnerships and has steadily grown 
(Harayama 2001). Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Rio Summit, environmentally-friendly agricultural practices have furthered, 
while ecosystem approach with citizens’ participation has evolved to integrate land, water and living resource management 
(Mizushima 1996).
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Council of Japan (SCJ) for Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) in 2001 
which focused on the limited number of values, largely omitting cultural values (Kunii 2016). 
 Another concept, ecosystem services, has likewise gained currency since the 1990s. This 
is not limited to farmland but inclusive of a variety of ecosystem types, and has been popularized 
as a way to communicate the idea of societal dependence on ecosystems (Boyd and Banzhaf 
2007).  While studies of ecosystem services proliferated with the emergence of ecological 7
economics in the 1990s, the international work of Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) 
spurred research on measuring, modeling and mapping ecosystem services and assessing their 
changes and contributions to human wellbeing, while placing the concept on the policy agenda 
(Fisher, Turner, and Morling 2009).  MA (2005, v) defines ecosystem services as “the benefits 8
people obtain from ecosystems:” 1) provisioning (e.g., food, water and fiber), 2) regulating (e.g., 
climate regulation and flood control), 3) cultural (e.g., recreational, aesthetic and spiritual 
benefits), and 4) supporting services (e.g., soil formation and nutrient cycling). It also introduced 
an integrative conceptual framework to document, analyze and understand the effects of change 
on ecosystems and human wellbeing through the lens of ecosystem services (MA 2005).   9
 Furthering the MA work, the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES), which was established in 2012 as an intergovernmental body (often described 
 The modern history of ecosystem services dates back to the late 1970s with the scholarly effort to boost public interest in 7
biodiversity conservation, and the term was coined in 1981 by Paul and Anne Ehrlich (Braat and de Groot 2012).
 To address the growing concerns of global environmental changes, the MA was conducted between 2001 and 2005 with the 8
involvement of the work of more than 1,360 experts worldwide to meet needs of stakeholders for information concerning the 
consequences of ecosystem change and the scientific basis for actions needed for sustainable development (Pesche et al. 2013).
 In Japan, the concept of ecosystem services has been increasingly used over the past decade in scientific work including a 9
multi-stakeholder assessment employing the MA conceptual framework (Duraiappah et al. 2012). On agricultural landscapes, 
studies have identified, measured and mapped a variety of ecosystem services including provisioning (e.g., rice, vegetables, dairy, 
meat), regulating (e.g., CO2 absorption, flood mitigation, soil erosion control), and cultural (e.g., esthetic, educational and 
recreational values) services (K. Yoshida 2014; S. Hashimoto et al. 2015). 
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as the IPCC for biodiversity), offers a new conceptual framework. This framework is 
comprehensively applicable to synthesize knowledge and information on the linkages between 
people and nature so as to inform policy across different spatial scales, themes, and regions. In 
particular, it embraces different disciplines, diverse stakeholders and their different knowledge 
systems (Díaz et al. 2015).  Its vital contribution is the conceptualization of ‘nature’s benefits to 10
people’ as the ‘perspectives’ seen by people differently depending on their contexts (including 
‘detrimental’ and ‘beneficial’ effects of nature).  
 The IPBES conceptual framework explicitly includes multiple knowledge systems (e.g., 
Western science, indigenous, local and practitioners’ knowledge) to facilitate interdisciplinary 
collaboration. This is based on the recognition that “the representations of human–nature 
relationships may vary across cultures and knowledge systems in relation to specific worldviews 
and cosmologies” (Díaz et al. 2015, 4). In regard to ‘nature’s benefits to people,’ it highlights 
“what is beneficial, detrimental or value-neutral depends on the perspective and context of 
different societies, groups and even individuals” (Díaz et al. 2015, 6).  It also recognizes that ‘a 11
good quality of life’ is “highly value-based and context-dependent” and “multidimensional,” 
given that “perceptions of a good life vary with gender, age, and culture” and reflect the diversity 
of humankind affected by multiple factors (e.g., access to food, equity, cultural identity, freedom 
of choice) (Díaz et al. 2015, 7).  
 In Japan, based on the IPBES conceptual framework, a nationwide comprehensive assessment of biodiversity and ecosystem 10
assessments was conducted under the auspices of Ministry of the Environment (Committee for the Comprehensive Assessment of 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 2016). 
 The IPBES conceptual framework delineates six primary interlinked elements representing the natural and social systems, 11
including: 1) nature; 2) nature’s benefits to people; 3) anthropogenic assets; 4) institutions and governance systems and other 
indirect drivers of change; 5) direct drivers of change; and 6) good quality of life (Díaz et al. 2015).
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 Furthermore, this framework specifies values dependent on how individuals relate to 
nature and with other individuals; i.e., ‘relational values’ distinct from conventional values. It 
differentiates three types of values: intrinsic values (i.e., the values inherent to nature, 
independent of human judgement); instrumental values (i.e., direct and indirect contributions of 
nature’s benefits to achieving a good quality of life); and relational values (i.e., the values 
imbedded in desirable relationships, regardless of tradeoffs to obtain nature’s benefits) (Díaz et 
al. 2015). For the latter two, instrumental values can be readily linked to economic values and 
thus be effectively evaluated and communicated through economic valuation, whereas relational 
values depart from an economic valuation framework and are thus hard to evaluate (Chan, 
Satterfield, and Goldstein 2012). Scholars have been increasingly aware that a mere focus on 
either instrumental or intrinsic values without complementary attention to relational values may 
be neither appropriate nor practical to deal with complex human-environmental systems and may 
even “inadvertently promote worldviews at odds with fair and desirable futures” (Chan et al. 
2016, 1462; Wegner and Pascual 2011). 
 In this connection, some scholars have recently offered critical reflection on institutional 
models of governing the commons, further departing from the idea that people as “rational 
calculators” are driven by their “fully formed” interests (Vasile 2019, 2). They have called for 
reclaiming “plurality through a relational dynamic” to spell out the ambivalent, contradictory and 
fluid nature of humans as being in “an ever evolving process of commoning” (Vasile 2019, 2; 
Velicu and García-López 2018). For instance, Singleton (2017) examines the criticisms of the E. 
Ostrom’s design principles that build upon rational choice-based models and lightly attend to 
social relationships — in respect of macro-level actions, conceptualization of rationality, and 
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power relationships — and suggests that the design principles may effectively assimilate with 
cultural theory. He argues that cultural theory provides the model of ‘plural rationality’ in 
connection with social context by involving frameworks for perceiving what behavior can be 
regarded as rational, in addition to differences in tastes, interests and values. Besides ‘plurality’ 
underpinning institutions, recent scholarship has become more attentive to the contingent, 
emerging and dynamic character of institutions by conceptualizing institutions as “produced in 
the process of unfolding human practice” rather than fetishizing structures (Vasile 2019, 2; 
Beunen and Patterson 2016).  
 Increasing attention has also gone to the socio-cultural dimensions of human-nature 
interactions (Lau and Scales 2016). Importantly, several studies have pointed out that decision-
making on resource use is “highly subjective, and influenced by emotions, relationships, power 
dynamics, and shifting subjectivities” rather than strictly rational (Morales and Harris 2014, 706; 
Nightingale 2013; Sultana 2011). In recent years, rejecting the idea of humans as “hard-wired” 
individuals who maximize net benefits, scholars have advocated for humans as “think-feeling-
relational being[s]” who act “in response to cues” from their social and biophysical environments 
(Singh 2017, 760; Vasile 2019, 4). In respect of motivations for governance, their discussions 
often relate to the two prime concepts of ‘governmentality’ and ‘subjectivitiy.’  
 ‘Governmentality’ is defined as “a historically situated and specific ‘form of power’” and 
seeks to grasp the relationship between different ‘rationalities’ of government (Ahlborg and 
Nightingale 2018, 386; Dean 2010, 24–30; Foucault 1991). More generally, it is the "art of 
government” in which various specific modes of “conduct of conduct” are designated (Ahlborg 
and Nightingale 2018; Fletcher 2010, 173). Such an art has evolved into multiple forms of 
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‘governmentality’ where various institutional actors, not merely the state, can exercise power. 
The concept helps researchers to understand human-environment relationships are not only 
affected but are incorporated in “the shifting grounds of politics, institutions, and subjectivities 
that together characterize the ‘conduct of conduct’” (Cooper and Rosin 2014, 392; Agrawal 
2005, 7).  
 The literature on ‘authority’ also adds important insights on how ‘governmentality’ 
works. It notes that regardless of formal positions and mandate, institutional actors must 
repeatedly exercise their authority “through social relations, institutions and material 
domains” (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018, 386). Albeit not always successfully, these actors 
assert and reproduce their authority to legitimize decisions on resource access and ownership for 
“at least a minimum of voluntary compliance” (Sikor and Lund 2009, 8). 
 The governmenality approach conceptualizes a governmental initiative “as an attempt to 
shape individuals’ conduct” by building a propensity and capacity within subjects to self-govern 
in compliance with governmental aims (i.e., indirectly forging and transforming their 
subjectivities), rather than directly coercing the population or individuals (Cooper and Rosin 
2014, 392; Barnett et al. 2008). It also shows different logics of governmenality as multiple 
governmentalities that can co-exist, complement, assimilate or conflict (Ahlborg and Nightingale 
2018). In contrast with “discipline” as a form of governmentality where government attempts to 
make individuals ‘internalize’ social values and norms towards self-governance, “neoliberal 
governmentality” establishes ‘external incentive structures’ in which incentives are manipulated 
to motivate individuals as ‘self-interested rational actors’ to conduct proper behaviours in 
consistent with the main goal of economic growth (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018, 386–387; 
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Fletcher 2010, 173–174). In either of these forms, the mechanisms which government designs to 
operationalize a program and configure individuals responsible for its operation have been 
deemed “technologies of government” (Cooper and Rosin 2014, 393; Miller and Rose 1990, 75). 
Despite this distinctive articulation of governmental logics, the governmentality approach allows 
for “an empirical mapping of governmental rationalities and techniques,” rather than claiming 
“ideal typification” or implying generalized acceptance or successful implementation (Cooper 
and Rosin 2014, 393; Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006, 99). 
 Yet, it is arguable how the governmentality approach conceptualizes the population or 
individuals. Governmentality is mostly understood to treat the population as its ‘object’ with the 
aim to “improve the human condition” of individuals as “resources to be fostered, to be used and 
to be optimized” (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018, 386; Li 2005, 387; Dean 2010, 29). While it is 
applicable to multiple scales of analysis, it has been extended, for instance, to welfare programs 
where governmentality is performed as the “subjectless” power of the “development apparatus” 
by taking the people as “an undifferentiated mass” (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018, 387; 
Ferguson 1990, 19; Ferguson 1994, 178). In this regard, several scholars caution against a 
narrow focus on technologies of government that marginalize “the very subjects that are to be 
governed” (Prince and Dufty 2009, 1753; Barnett et al. 2008; Gibbon and Ponte 2008).  
 Cooper and Rosin (2014) highlight that most studies have focused on how 
governmentality works but less have attended to governmental failure to remake subjectivities 
and thereby attain desired outcomes, although failure is more common than success. 
Furthermore, noting that the governmentality literature often analytically separates subject 
positions from the cultural politics of resistance to those subjectivities, Nightingale (2018, 695) 
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argues that particular state-subject boundaries emerge from a dynamic process in which “people 
simultaneously accept and refuse the knowledge, discourses, relations and practices” as they 
move through everyday-life contexts, rather than the presumed subjectivation process that 
produces stable and categorized subjects based on dichotomous “relations of domination or 
resistance.” 
 For precise understanding of how individuals situate themselves in the relationships 
between governing and ways of thinking, the concept of ‘subjectivity’ is analytically crucial. 
Subjectivity refers to “the expression of the individuals’ sense of identity, values and practices” 
that emerges from the social context of the subjects existing “within a specific place, time, or set 
of relationships” (Cooper and Rosin 2014, 393; Morales and Harris 2014, 706). Individuals are 
always subject to external forces and contexts that influence their being, but also the active 
subject of being, thinking and acting, and thus subjectivities are “synchronically constructed” by 
the individuals’ “external and internal phenomena” (Cooper and Rosin 2014, 393).  
 Subjectivity may reference a sense of ‘identity’ (i.e., “the external social categories that 
individuals subscribe to” — e.g., gender and occupation), but is shaped in connection with 
context and may change depending on the circumstances of the subject (Lau and Scales 2016, 
138; Morales and Harris 2014, 706). Whereas individuals may turn a sense of identity “into their 
lived choices,” they may “internalize social expectations of what counts as normal or acceptable 
behavior” and even “re-express subordinating norms” in reference to “power-laden aspects of 
context” (Lau and Scales 2016, 138; Morales and Harris 2014, 706; Ahlborg and Nightingale 
2018, 385). As such, ‘subjection’ as the processes of one’s expression and re-expression of 
oneself can be ambivalent, contradictory and paradoxical, for instance, containing the ‘paradox 
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of resistance’ where their “acts of resistance to subjection […] simultaneously confirm and 
reiterate social hierarchies and discriminatory norms” (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018, 385; 
Butler 1990; 1997).  
 Furthermore, differently from ‘individual’ subjectivity, ‘collective’ subjectivity results 
from “the lived experience of ‘togetherness’” within “specific configurations of power” as a 
group (Lau and Scales 2016, 138). In an effort to theoretically link “individual emotions and 
actions” to “collective practices,” Nightingale (2013, 2363, 2366) depicts the emergent and 
dynamic processes of collective subjection in which subjectivities are “relationally” embodied 
through experiences of particular conditions, knowledge and physicality within specific places 
and spaces that contribute to a sense of ability, pride and self-worth. But she also demonstrates 
that such subjectivities greatly change in different power contexts where the same individuals 
find themselves disempowered within different emotional relationships with others (including 
material things). By showing “the ‘ambivalence of the subject’” where a person has 
contradictory feelings about the same resource, policy and place in different realms of power 
relations, she argues that the shifting boundaries between subjects themselves, others and policy 
can “cause different emotional and political outcomes” (Nightingale 2013, 2374). Both 
individual and collective subjectivities are “complex, fluid and multiple” and “vary over time 
and space” (Larner 2012, 360). Yet, collective subjectivities have distinctive social and 
ecological implications in resource management contexts where domination over resources can 
be contested and reinforced (Cote and Nightingale 2012). 
 Despite growing attention to the fluid nature of human actions and relations in 
environmental governance, the literature on institutions related to these aspects is thin (Vasile 
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2019; Morales and Harris 2014). Several studies have explored the institutional meanings 
negotiated in the process of struggles and experiences on the ground where thoughts, feelings 
and emotions individually and collectively interplay (Riedy, Kent, and Thompson 2018; 
Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Velicu 2015). However, such research in the resource-abandonment 
contexts is scarce.  
 In the context of farmland abandonment, some authors have studied actors’ perspectives 
on farmland that has been abandoned and confirmed diverse, complex, multi-dimensional and 
changing perspectives. For instance, Benjamin et al. (2007) found that owners largely perceived 
their land negatively at the scale of the individual property as the land use having the least value 
and being the least appreciated, while Nishihara (2012) demonstrated that with a slight 
probability of land conversion, owners greatly changed their value perspectives and attitude. 
Others note that different types of actors (e.g., locals, tourists) assign different dimensions of 
landscapes (e.g., tradition, nature conservation, profit, and emotion) that coexist even in one 
actor but change through their experiences while sometimes involving spontaneous actions 
(Hunziker 1995; Subirós et al. 2016; Lisec et al. 2014). Few studies have situated subjects 
explicitly in the contexts of multiple power relations.  
Research questions 
The primary goal of the dissertation is to examine how the FB program has emerged and has 
been working as regards farmers’ perspectives. The development trajectory of the FB program is 
a unique opportunity to study the dynamic process of MLG by taking the program as a 
technology of government. At the same time, my focus on farmers’ perspectives contributes to 
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the literature on institutions and property rights in terms of the interplay between institutional 
structures and actors in the contexts of resource abandonment. To achieve the goal, the following 
questions guide the research:  
1) How and why have institutional arrangements in governing farmland changed over the post-
WWII years?  
a) Who has been involved across different levels? What institutions have evolved formally 
and informally? 
b) How have these institutions and their arrangements changed over time? 
c) What were the drivers of change in these institutions and their arrangements? 
2) How and why have farmers individually and collectively responded to the FB program? 
a) To what extent have farmers accepted the program? 
d) What were their motivations for adopting, resisting or ignoring the program? 
e) How and with whom have they interacted in the processes of introducing and 
implementing the program? 
f) How have the subjectivities of farmers changed in the course of program introduction and 
implementation? 
1.2 Research Design and Data Collection 
The dissertation employs a qualitative approach. Taking MLG as an analytical framework, not 
merely a governance model, I probe how farmers have interacted with other social agents in the 
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process of shaping and implementing the FB program. To examine the process of governing 
farmland with a focus on farmers’ perspectives, I used a comparative case study. Two 
communities (i.e., District N and Village U) in Ishikawa Prefecture were selected. The case study 
method is well suited to investigate individual lives, small group behavior, program 
implementation, and institutional relations and changes within a real-life context (Yin 2009). 
Also, small-N case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions, not populations or 
universes, and can produce concrete, practical, context-dependent knowledge that is valuable for 
human development (Yin 2009; Flyvbjerg 2006). 
Case selection 
Out of all 47 prefectures in Japan that have implemented the FB program, Ishikawa Prefecture 
was selected. This prefecture has regional distinctions in the context of land-extensive farming 
for rice production. Rice is a key staple of the Japanese diet and its cultivation has been 
politically and socially protected, but has become no longer a sanctuary for global trade. Paddy 
fields have been the ground of political struggles historically, but have become abandoned or 
diverted for other uses over several decades. Moreover, agricultural policy has promoted 
conversion from rice to other crops to be grown on paddies since the 1970s. As part of one of the 
major rice producing regions, Ishikawa Prefecture also exhibits typical and symbolic agricultural 
landscapes.  In this regard, the prefecture offers an opportunity to study the governing of 12
farmland in the typical Japanese context of land-extensive farming. 
 Ishikawa Prefecture is part of Hokuriku Region which is one of the eight jurisdictions of Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 12
Fisheries (MAFF). Across the country, Hokuriku Region is one of the representative rice producing regions, where the proportion 
of rice paddies to the entire farmland (e.g., 89.5% in 2014) is much larger than national average (e.g., 54.4% in 2014). The 
proportion of rice paddies to the total farmland area in Ishikawa Prefecture was 83.5% in 2014 (Source: Arable Land and Acreage 
Statistics (Kochi oyobi sakutsuke menseki tokei), Statistics Department, Minister's Secretariat, MAFF).
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 Located on the west coast of the Japanese archipelago, the prefecture comprises two 
geographically and culturally contrasting rural regions lying north and south between which the 
urban area extends: the hilly region on the peninsula in the north (Noto region) and the alluvial 
plain formed by the rivers running from the steep mountains in the south (Kaga region) (see 
Figure 1.1).  Although rice production occurs in both regions, the northern agriculture is 13
dominated by family-run, smaller-scale farming compared to the southern one that features 
larger-scale farming often in the form of corporations.  
 In general, the north has experienced more severe population decline and aging, and 
agriculture abandonment.  Thus Noto region presents the typical agricultural features of hilly 14
and mountainous regions, whereas Kaga region displays more productive farming landscapes 
common in flatter regions or urban fringes. Given the adverse conditions in the north, however, 
the local and regional actors (including the prefectural government) have promoted the 
ecological and cultural aspects of farming to sustain agriculture.  The rural landscapes of Noto 15
region were designated as a site for Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS) 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in June 2011. This 
 No specific and formal administration boundaries exist to demarcate the regions, while the regions are differently defined on 13
different occasions. For instance, for the statistical purpose MAFF defines Noto region as nine municipalities located in the 
northern part and Kaga region as the rest of municipalities (10 municipalities) in the southern part (MAFF 2018h, 4). Likewise, 
the prefectural government statistically distinguishes the two regions in the same way (Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2018, 
2), but the officials often presumed that Kaga region excludes one of the five regional jurisdictions located at the center of the 
prefecture given its more urban characters (according to my interviews with the prefectural officials in 2016). In the old 
provisional system, two different provinces existed, called Noto no kuni (in the north) and Kaga no kuni (in the south). Prior to 
the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century,  some parts in the current central jurisdictional region belonged to either of the 
regions differently from the current statistical demarcation.
 In Ishikawa Prefecture, population engaged in farming continuously decreased since 1960s (59.4% decrease from 1960 to 14
2006), and the ratio of elderly farmers at least 60 years old increased from 30.5% in 1983 to 79.8% in 2004 (JSSA Hokushinetsu 
Cluster 2010). Also, the agricultural abandonment ratio (the ratio of abandoned farmland to total farmland) increased from 5.4% 
in 1995 to 8.7% in 2005 in the prefecture (cf. 4.2% in Kaga region, 13.9% in Noto region, and 5.8% on the national average in 
2005) (JSSA Hokushinetsu Cluster 2010). 
 For instance, the prefectural government has been promoting biodiversity management and agricultural heritage revival as part 15
of its development strategy through several programs such as the Ishikawa Biodiversity Strategic Vision (2011) and the formation 
of a cross-sector office to implement this vision (Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2011a).
 !29
designation has drawn international attention to the social and ecological significance of 
agricultural landscapes (Koohafkan and Altieri 2011). 
 
Figure 1.1 Location of Sites for Comparative Case Study 
Note: Data maps were derived from the website (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ishikawa_Prefecture) 
under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License.

 Within Ishikawa Prefecture, two farming communities were selected based on a contrast 
in program adoption: one community, District N, has fully adopted the program on a community-
wide basis, and the other, Village U, retained conventional tenancy arrangements without relying 
on the FB program. District N is located in the central part of Noto region and comprises 







involves 7 villages where the majority of landowners have participated in the program with 
governmental financial support for collective use. The farmland has been sublet mainly to an 
incorporated community-based farming corporation in addition to a few other local farmers. 
Village U is located in the central part of Kaga region and encompasses extensive paddy fields in 
its flat area. Except for a few farmland owners who participated in the FB program, the majority 
of owners have been indifferent. They have mostly continued local tenancy arrangements where 
landowners and local farmers made direct contracts. Local farmers as tenants were either full-
time large farmers who independently managed their farms or part-time and/or small farmers 
who were part of an unincorporated village-based farming organization.  
 The two cases within the same prefecture allowed me to comparatively analyze how 
farmers individually and collectively responded to the program in the distinctive regional 
contexts under the same implementation mechanism. As numerous studies point to co-relations 
between land features and land-use changes (e.g., Sato 1988), it is likely that topological and 
geographical distinctions may affect tenancy arrangements. To explore farmers’ motivations for 
program adoption (or rejection), the distinctive regional features between the cases helped me to 
not merely clarify ‘whether’ but elucidate ‘how’ such biophysical or environmental factors made 
an impact on program implementation in consideration of material, spatial and political 
relationships of the actors. By revealing how different municipal agencies have coordinated the 
local and prefectural levels, I could also better explain the farmers’ interactions with other 
agencies. The contrasting levels of program adoption allowed me to examine how farmers’ 
subjectivities changed (or not) in the processes, leading to different policy outcomes.   
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 Besides the two sites, I also collected data from other places in the prefecture. This 
complemented the information and corroborated the findings from the cases. In particular, my 
preliminary fieldwork, conducted in August 2016, found different types of farmers or farm 
management entities which were acting as tenants. Three major farm types included: 1) village-
based farming organizations, 2) local individual farms, and, 3) outsider/new farms. The two 
cases cover the first two types as tenants who have either adopted the program or not. The third 
type of farms were mostly absent in the two cases. To fill this gap, I interviewed several farmers 
who corresponded with the third type of farms in other locations within the prefecture. In 
addition, to better understand the local context of each case, I interviewed a few farmers residing 
or farming in communities adjacent to District N and Village U. 
Data collection and analysis 
The case study included: semi-structured interviews with farmers (including owners and tenants), 
officials from municipal, prefectural and national agencies, and experts and scholars engaging in 
the issues of farmland use and management in the prefecture; attendance at community meetings 
related to the FB program; qualitative analysis of documents on the program and communities; 
and descriptive analysis of census and national and local survey data. Among these different 
approaches, I gathered key empirical data from my fieldwork in Japan intermittently between 
2016 and 2018. Most primary data collection drew on the semi-structured interviews with 
farmers and other stakeholders.  16
 I received approval from Columbia University’s Institutional Review Board on September 28, 2016 to conduct anonymous 16
interviews.
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 The interviews with farmers aimed to understand their experiences in farming and 
farmland management in relation to the FB program and to identify their perspectives to 
farmland together with their subjectivities. Participants were recruited mainly from the two 
farming communities (i.e., District N and Village U), but complementarily from other parts of 
the prefecture. The total population of farmers who participated in the study was 91 (see Table 
1.1, and Appendix A for details). For the two farming communities, the selection of participants 
covered a variety of relationships between farmers and tenancy arrangements and thus included 
owner-farmers, non-farming owners, and tenant farmers.  
 In District N where the FB program has been adopted, I attended two community 
meetings where farmers discussed their preparation for program adoption. In addition, I 
interviewed three farmers from three different neighboring communities: one community with 
the FB program, and two communities without the program but characterized by different 
topological features. In Village U where tenancy arrangements have conventionally extended 
beyond the village territory, I interviewed three farmers from two neighboring communities: one 
largely involved in the tenancy arrangements with the farmers from Village U, and the other 
independent from such arrangements. The selection of participants from other parts of the 
prefecture was designed to reach out different types of farmers/farms in different contexts, 
particularly in regard to organization forms, so as to corroborate the findings from the two cases.
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Table 1.1 Interviews with Farmers (2016-2018) 
Note: 1) I attended two community meetings, which were voluntarily organized by villagers, on 
December 8, 2016 (Village NC) and December 10, 2016 (Village NF). 2) I attended two community 
meetings, which were organized by the municipal government, on December 15, 2016 (District HK) and 
January 17, 2017 (District WA). 3) I attended one community meeting, which was organized by the farm 
company (i.e., a tenant), on January 13, 2017 at one community in Town G of Noto region.

Cases Municipalities (Regions) Districts/Areas Numbers of Participants
District N City A (Noto) 1) District N (Hilly area) 26
29Neighboring communities 3
Village U City B (Kaga) Village U (Flat area) 24
28Neighboring communities 4
Others City B (Kaga) Hilly area 2 2
City C (Noto) 2) District HK (Hilly areas) 7
25
District WA (Hilly and Flat areas) 14
District HR (Hilly and flat areas) 1
District TD (Flat areas) 1
District SH (Flat areas) 2
City D (Noto) Across the city (both hilly and flat 
areas) 1 1
City E (Kaga) Flat areas 1 1
Town F (Kaga) Flat areas 3 3
Prefecture-wide Across the prefecture (both hilly 
and flat areas) 3) 2 2
Total 91
 !34
 The interviews with other stakeholders aimed to comprehend the actual working of the 
FB program and to explore different perspectives to farmland in connection with their roles and 
responsibilities. The selection of participants was based on the relevance of their agencies and 
expertise to farmland use and management in the prefecture. In total, I interviewed 74 
stakeholders from different agencies across different levels (see Table 1.2, and Appendix A for 
details). Besides the national and prefectural agencies, I selected the relevant agencies within the 
municipal and regional jurisdictions where the focused communities were located. I also 
approached other stakeholders or experts who had knowledge of farmland use and management 
as well as experience in governing farmland from different formal and informal jurisdictions, 
including advocates/activists, scholars and officials from different administrative jurisdictions. 
These interviews helped me to better understand the scope of formal and informal institutions 
beyond public authorities as well as diverse contexts and aspects of agriculture within the 
prefecture. 
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Table 1.2 Interviews with Stakeholders 
Jurisdictions Organizations Number of participants
National Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) - Regional Office 3 3
Prefectural Prefectural Government 8
24
Farmland Bank 4
Champers of Agriculture 3
Unifier of Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) 3
Land Improvement Projects Federation 3
Agricultural Development Corporation 3
Regional Oku-Noto Regional Office (Noto) 2
7
Naka-Noto Regional Office (Noto) 2
Minami-Kaga Regional Office (Kaga) 2
Ishikawa Regional Office (Kaga) 1
Municipal City A (Noto) City Hall 5
30
JA - AW 1
City B (Kaga) City Hall 2
Irrigation/Land Improvement Projects Secretariat 1
JA - BX 1
JA - BY 1
City C (Noto) City Hall 3
Land Improvement Projects Secretariat 1
JA - CS 1
City D (Noto) City Hall 3
Land Improvement Projects Secretariat 1
City E (Kaga) City Hall 2
Town F (Kaga) Town Hall 1
Town G (Noto) Town Hall 1
Town H (Noto) Town Hall 2










 Most of the interviewees were identified through snowball sampling that started with the 
academic and prefectural government contacts. Thus, despite good accessibility to data, 
information and knowledge, the study was constrained by the selection bias. The two cases were 
approachable communities, rather than closed-off ones that may be often the case in rural regions 
of Japan. The complementary interviews with farmers and stakeholders in other jurisdictions and 
territories in the prefecture overcame this constraint to some extent. Also, the access to 
respondents was broadened through the selection criteria to balance different ways of 
involvement in tenancy arrangements as well as program implementation across different 
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional levels.  
 The semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-face mostly with a single 
respondent but sometimes with two or three respondents particularly in the case of public 
agencies. They ranged in length between 60-200 minutes. While granting flexibility in 
accordance with the flow of conversation, the interview schedules were organized around the 
following themes: 1) the background of respondents in farmland use and management; 2) their 
engagement in policies and programs relevant to tenancy arrangements (only asked if relevant); 
3) their roles and responsibilities for farmland use and management (including tenancy 
arrangements); and 4) their perspectives on farmland. The interview questions were customized 
to the respondents’ specific contexts, time and availability, while several respondents allowed 
repeat interviews (see Appendix B for general interview schedules). Most of the interviews were 
audio-recorded with the permission of interviewees under the condition that no proper names 
would be used in any published work resulting from the project.  
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 The data analysis was based on qualitative interpretation of the interview transcripts and 
field notes complemented by archival studies and statistical analysis. To examine respondents’ 
perspectives and their involvement in farmland use and management, I combined an 
ethnoecological approach with narrative valuation. Ethnoecological methods (e.g., interviewing, 
participant observation, and social network analysis) help to deepen insights into how farmers 
conceptualize, value and use their local natural environments, whereas narrative valuation (e.g., 
descriptions offered through interviews) allows for elucidation of the importance of farmland to 
the respondents in their socio-cultural contexts (IPBES 2016).  
 To synthesize different and often incommensurable perspectives held by farmers and 
other stakeholders in relation to tenancy arrangements, I drew on narratives, one of the most 
practical ways to synthesize different values and represent diverse worldviews and value types 
resulting from different geographical and social organizational scales (IPBES 2016). Besides the 
interview results, narratives were drawn from archival studies and descriptive statistics. Archival 
studies were conducted through books, journal articles, policy documents, official website and 
newspapers for the postwar period to reveal historical traits of institutional arrangements, while 
statistical analysis were undertaken to discern the trends and status of farmland use and 
management (e.g., farm population, and farmland area size).  
 Taking narrative approach (i.e., descriptive results from the interviews, textual findings 
from archival studies, and descriptive statistics), I accommodated interview descriptions in 
different socio-cultural contexts and grouped different perspectives. At the same time, I grouped 
different tenancy arrangements in accordance with key variables (e.g., who were involved, when 
an arrangement was made, what were objectives and goals, and what were the requirements, 
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conditions and advantages). Building on the key variables that were to categorize the tenancy 
arrangements, I analyzed commonalities and differences between the value perspectives held by 
different respondents across levels, and then examined the status of their involvement in 
farmland use and management, particularly tenancy arrangements, so as to evaluate the 
performance of alternative tenancy arrangements according to different value positions and 
worldviews. 
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation discusses the process of governing farmland in the context of agricultural 
abandonment with a focus on farmers’ perspectives. In an attempt to revitalize the agricultural 
industry of Japan, the national government introduced the FB program in 2014 to take advantage 
of cross-level opportunities for ‘expediting’ tenancy arrangements. Chapter 2 provides 
conceptual discussions of the institutional transformation in governing farmland for the postwar 
years. Along with the demographic and cultural changes, it frames ‘farming households’ (ie) and 
‘farming communities’ (mura) as key social institutions. By adopting MLG not only as a real-
world phenomenon but also as both prescriptive and theoretical approaches, it introduces three 
postwar MLG models that emerged through agricultural policy reforms. Subsequently, Chapter 3 
describes the emergence of the FB program as the latest (or the fourth postwar) MLG model and 
explicates its design and mechanism. It also shows the administrative implementation of the 
program in Ishikawa Prefecture with a focus on two municipalities where the case communities 
were located. 
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 The comparative case study is then elaborated. Chapter 4 traces the historical trajectories 
of the postwar transformation of the two communities. Encompassing social, economic and 
ecological dimensions of change, it compares the evolution of farming communities (mura) as a 
key institution in governing farmland. Chapter 5 focuses on District N to examine the status and 
drivers of program adoption at the household and community levels, and Chapter 6 focuses on 
Village U to account for the inactive involvement in the program and explicate alternative 
tenancy arrangements. In the both cases, I delve into farmers’ motivations for their choices of 
different tenancy arrangements in connection with their perceptions on farmland and themselves 
as farmers. I also distinguish between individual and collective subjectivities of respondents. The 
findings from the two cases are summarized and compared in Chapter 7. This chapter also 
discusses theoretical and methodological implications as well as policy implications.  
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Chapter 2: Postwar Institutional Transformation in Governing Farmland 
This chapter examines the institutional transformation involved in governing farmland during the 
postwar years which led to the emergence of the Farmland Bank (FB) program. To provide a 
conceptual and theoretical perspective, the study adopts Multi-Level Governance (MLG) not 
only as a real-world phenomenon involving different administrative levels, but also as a 
prescriptive (e.g., top-down and bottom-up) and theoretical (e.g., norms) approach to 
governance. First, the chapter introduces the land reform that laid the groundwork for postwar 
agricultural land policies. This reform was a radical institutional transformation from the prewar 
landlordism, giving birth to the first postwar legal system, the Agricultural Land Act (ALA) of 
1952. At the same time, I elucidate the historical development of farming communities (mura) 
and families (ie), which became the targets of denunciation for the postwar reform but have lived 
through the transformation. Second, the chapter illustrates the changes in the MLG model for 
three subsequent periods: 1) the first stage (1945-1959) readying the second model; 2) the second 
stage (1960-1984) where the second model emerged and came into operation; and 3) the third 
stage (1985-2004) during which the third model was developed and then reshaped. Finally I 
explore the cross-level interactions of social agents in both the public and private sectors that 
have driven the changes in the MLG model. 
2.1 Emergence of the First Postwar MLG Model 
Land reform started following the end of World War II. As part of the postwar reform to 
reconstruct the nation as a democratic state, it was carried out between 1947 and 1951 with a 
goal to dismantle the prewar landlordism and establish a new institution of farmland ownership 
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(Ge 2009; Shimizu 2007). This reform had a three-fold mission to: 1) foster owner-farmers; 2) 
standardize land rent at an adequate level; and 3) democratize the farmland committees (Honma 
2010). To execute this mission, the government acquired land by purchasing from landlords and 
sold it to tenants at an extremely low price, disallowing absentee landlords to hold tenanted land, 
and limiting resident landlords’ holding to 3 ha for owned land and 1 ha for tenanted land 
(Honma 2010).  To implement land acquisition and resale, the farmland committees, which had 17
been responsible for controlling the rights to farmland at the municipal level since 1938, were 
reformed (Honma 2010; Yukitomo 2015). Although the members were previously appointed by a 
governor, those in a new committee were publicly elected to consist of five tenants, three 
landlords and two owner-farmers (T. Morita 2017b). With the involvement of about 70% of 
farmers (i.e., 30% of citizens) nationwide together with the transfer of more than a third of the 
total ownership, the reform resulted in the dominance of owner-farmers: 90% of the nation’s 
farmland was owned by the farmers owning 1 ha on average (Ge 2009; Shimizu 2007). Tenanted 
land decreased from 46 % to less than 10%, whereas the rent reduced from sometimes over 50% 
of farm produce in the prewar era to 1-2 % (Honma 2010; Iwao 1994).  18
 This outcome was institutionalized in 1952 as the Agricultural Land Act (ALA), resulting 
in the first postwar model of farmland governance characterized by strict state control of tenancy. 
With the aim to hamper the revival of landlordism and protect the new owner-farmers, the law 
upheld the “owner-farmer principle” (jisakuno-shugi), stipulating that “the ownership of 
 As an exception in Hokkaido Prefecture, the area was limited to 12 ha and 4 ha respectively for the farmland owned by 17
resident landlords and that tenanted by them (Honma 2010).
 The reform also took a measure to change the rent payment from in-kind to monetary because the monetary payment allows 18
the rice price policy to be producer-oriented while the in-kind one may work advantageously for landlords who can benefit from 
a rice price rise (Fukutake 1977; K. Noda 2006). 
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agricultural land by cultivators themselves is most appropriate” (Article 1) (Honma 2010; 
Shimizu 2007). Accordingly the ALA limited farmland transactions (i.e., buying and selling, and 
borrowing and lending farmland, and converting farmland-use) except for acquisition by the 
existing cultivators. With no stipulation about ownership by corporations, the law limited 
tenancy by resident landowners to 1 ha on average in each prefecture with the rent set at the 
minimum level.  To protect tenants’ rights, it prescribed the ‘legal renewal’ of a tenancy contract 19
by which a contract ‘shall be renewed’ with the same terms as before unless one party reports to 
another within a certain period of time prior to the end of the contract life (Arimoto and 
Nakajima 2010).  A contract could not be canceled or terminated without formal government 20
approval even if the tenant and owner agreed. Thus, the first model took the form of state control 
in transferring all the rights to farmland by politically opting for farm management exclusively 
by owner-farmers in which ownership and usership were united. This excluded other means of 
farm management that might have led to the attainment of the stated objective “to stabilize the 
status of cultivators and boost domestic agricultural production” (Honma 2010). 
 This model emerged from the negotiations to reconstruct the nation state. The major 
external force was the intervention by the US Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the 
General Headquarters (GHQ). The instruction note to the Japanese government also known as 
“MacArthur’s Peasant Liberalization Directive” issued on December 9th in 1945, reinforced the 
state project and vigorously facilitated the move to the reformative goal (T. Morita 2017a; Iwao 
 As an exception in Hokkaido Prefecture, the ALA limited tenancy by resident landowners to 4 ha on average.19
 The ALA (Article 17) stipulates: ”In the case of a lease of cropland or meadow/pasture land with a prescribed term, if either of 20
the parties therein fails to notify the other party of his or her intention not to renew the lease from one year to six months prior to 
the expiration of that term …, it shall be deemed that a further lease has been entered into under conditions identical to those of 
the previous lease.”
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1994). The note described landlordism as “economic bondage” or “pernicious ills” which 
“enslaved the Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression,” and urged the Japanese 
government to exterminate it and revive democratic tenancies.  Besides the mission of state 21
democratization, several domestic and international opinion leaders pointed out the hidden 
agenda of the US occupational forces to strengthen the social foundations of a private ownership 
system in the interest of establishing an “anti-Communist foothold” in Asia under the unfolding 
Cold War (Teruoka 2008; Hoshino 1988).  22
 As an internal force, in October 1945 Japan’s government began the reform, but its initial 
attempt (i.e., the so-called “first land reform”) transformed into another form (i.e., the “second 
land reform”) with the above-mentioned external direction (Honma 2010; Yukitomo 2015; K. 
Noda 2006).  In an attempt to recover national strength in food production, the former was 23
targeted at ‘larger-scale’ owner-farmers to retain an optimal scale of farming and enhance 
community-based organizations through restructuring agrarian communities for owner-farmers 
(K. Noda 2006). The latter focused on ‘smaller-scale’ owner-farmers. With the ideologies of 
democratization and anti-Communism, it downplayed scale optimality and community-based 
 This instruction note (SCAPIN-411) states: In order [...] [to] remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthening of 21
democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of men, and destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the 
Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppression, the Japanese Imperial Government is directed to take measures to insure that 
those who till the soil of Japan shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor. [...] The purpose of this order 
is to exterminate those pernicious ills which have long blighted the agrarian structure of a land where almost half the population 
is engaged in husbandry (Kitamura 2016). This image of Japanese landlordism was also shared through the mass media, as the 
New York Times coverage (October 7, 1945) captures “the semi-feudal system of land tenure” as one of the four pillars supported 
the Imperial structure, which “provided the Empire with its stubborn peasant soldiers who fought willingly to the death in the 
swamps of New Guinea and the mountain caves of the Philippine hinterland.”
 In addition to scholars (Hoshino 1988), the media shared this point. The article in the New York Times covers the Soviet’s 22
criticism on the bill in which Japan insufficiently incorporated Soviet’s proposals, and the press’s questions to the Soviet’s 
delegate about whether the Soviet’s criticism contains Communist propaganda (New York Times, August 25, 1946).
 The initiative of land reform, which Japan’s government first attempted under the Land Reform Bill to prepare for as a 23
revision of the Farmland Adjustment Law of 1938, is called “the first land reform” among the scholars and policy-makers in 
Japan, although it was never implemented (Kawagoe 1999). In contrast, the one, which was executed after the external 
interventions as an alternative version, is called “the second land reform.”
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farming in order to disassemble Japan’s fascism to which landlordism, organized in agrarian 
communities, was considered to have contributed (K. Noda 2006). When agrarian communities 
were populated and relied on labor-intensive farming, the provision of ownership to numerous 
small farmers would have enabled farmers to invest and commit to farming, leading to 
productivity improvement regardless of economies of scale (Kawagoe 1999; Kitamura 2016). 
Japanese politicians, who sought to establish a political base with a greater number of votes in 
agrarian communities, legitimatized the altered form (Kitamura 2016; Ikeda 2016; K. Yamashita 
2014a). 
 The Japan’s state initiative followed a series of previous policy changes and the 
landlordism that was already fraying even before the end of WWII. In response to the heightened 
peasant movements in the 1920s, the government had put in place laws and programs to 
intervene in tenancy conflicts and support tenants (e.g., Tenancy Conciliation Act of 1924, 
Owner Farmer Creation Support Program of 1925) (Wataya 1952; K. Noda 2006). Following 
another series of peasant struggles during the Showa Depression (1930-1931)  and the wartime 24
regime, the government enhanced these policies through control legislation (e.g., Farmland 
Adjustment Act of 1938, Rent Control Act of 1939) (Wataya 1952; K. Noda 2006; K. Sato 2005). 
In the prewar and wartime regimes, these responses did not always give complete advantage to 
tenants due to the reactionary forces of landlords, as observed in the Tenancy Conciliation Act 
that was established through compromising with landlordism (Kurumisawa 2003). Nevertheless, 
with the rise of small owner-farmers, the number of landlords owning farmland larger than 50 ha 
had decreased since the 1920s (K. Noda 2006; T. Morita 2017b). 
 The Showa Depression (1930-1931) was the great depression occurred in the aftermath of the World Depression that started in 24
1929. 
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 The prewar decline in landlordism contradicts the dominant image of a monolithic, 
feudalistic and suppressive agrarian society: hierarchical landlord-tenant relationships governed 
farming villages and families.  The farming village community, called mura in Japanese, was 25
the target of denunciation for postwar democratization. This was based on the understanding that 
mura sustained landlord-rule and nurtured grassroots fascism by suppressing personal 
independence and that it underpinned the imperial state through producing and procuring human 
and material resources for wars (Kurumisawa 2003; Furukawa 2012). Likewise, farming 
families, called ie, were also the target of the reform. They were perceived as a feudalistic and 
patriarchal system that fostered the familistic imperial system and militarism (Tama 1996; 
Sugioka 1994; Kunio Ishihara 1992).  Some scholars argue that horizontal communal 26
relationships reinforced the vertical familistic relationships (e.g., landlord-tenant relations, 
cognation, fictitious filiation) by justifying the top-down orders under the guise of the communal 
peace and order (Ushiomi et al. 1957). However, other scholars consider ie, mura, and the 
relationships between them as being not necessarily oppressive but diverse and dynamic.  
Farming village communities (mura): 
 The concept of “mura” is largely understood negatively even today, as represented by the use of the term “nuclear 25
mura” (genshiryoku mura), which suggests that the stakeholders of nuclear power (e.g., companies, scientists) developed an 
insular community (i.e., mura) isolated from the external world and thus led to the Japan’s 3/11 disasters following the Great East 
Japan earthquake and tsunami in 2011 in the absence of any appropriate preventive measures (Matsuzawa 2016).  As such, the 
term generally connotes the “closed,” “conservative,” and “falsely egalitarian” Japanese society to be overcomed (Kurumisawa 
2003). Likewise, the concept of “ie” is still widely viewed as the one lingering “outdated” and “vicious" habitude, which should 
be modernized or correctly educated (Nagano 2004).
 Japanese agrarian sociology developed the theory of families and communities, called the ie-mura theory, to define the 26
Japanese agrarian society. The theory developed based on the empirical research on the agricultural villages in the late 19th 
century and the early 20th century to explain the logic and structure of Japanese village communities (i.e., mura) in terms of the 
vertical and horizontal relationships of families (i.e., ie) (Matsuoka 2011). It has developed since the prewar era in Japanese 
agrarian sociology, but expanded in the 1950s in the wake of the social demand to democratize the agrarian society, which 
presumed to be semi-feudalistic building on the prewar landlordism (Y. Kawamura 1986).
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Farming villages have played a significant role in governing farmland. Although different 
scholars and disciplines have developed different terms and concepts, the literature considers the 
prototype of a farming village community as what evolved during the early modern era (i.e., the 
late 16th century to the late 19th century) (Matsuoka 2011; Matsuzawa 2016).  With the 27
character of top-down and bottom-up duality, the prototype (hereafter called an early-modern 
village or mura) seems to be still valid to explain contemporary Japanese farming communities. 
 The early-modern villages appeared upon the reform of centralizing power at the 
beginning of the era and stabilized as autonomous communities through the independence of 
small farmers during the 17th century (Ohkama 2006). In an effort to deter the intermediate 
exploitation by local powers (e.g., powerful farmers, temples and shrines, and manor owners), 
the central power conducted nationwide land surveys (kenchi) to assure one farmland for one 
farmer.  It evaluated the volume of rice yield from each village by drawing its boundary to 28
measure the “gross village product” (mura daka) and thereby developed the “one land for one 
lord” policy where each farmer entitled to a piece of land contributed to village-wide agricultural 
produce (Tama 1996, 11). This policy gave rise to a ‘local self-governing system of 
taxation’ (mura-uke sei) by which a feudal load (ryoshu) commanded villages to bear collective 
 Three major terms have developed with similar concepts: 1) natural villages (shizen-son), 2) autonomous villages (jichi-27
sonraku), and 3) feudal administrative villages (hansei-son). The term of shizen-son coined by Eitaro Suzuki, an agrarian 
sociologist, has been popularized to conceptualize a community as a system having a social identity to its naturally-evolved 
social cohesion independently and distinctively from an administrative local public entity (Matsuzawa 2016). The theory of jichi-
sonraku established by Hitoshi Saito, an agricultural economist, highlights the enduringly autonomous nature of Japanese 
agrarian villages that have historically nurtured mutual trust among the members (Matsuzawa 2016; Arimoto 2006). These two 
theoretical concepts commonly recognize that the villages formed in the early modern era have functioned as a community even 
after the administrative reforms following the Meiji Restoration in 1868. This prototypical villages are also called hansei-son 
(i.e., villages under the han or domain system) by many others including those in agrarian sociology and geography (Matsuzawa 
2016; Satoh 1991).
 The reform began with the first nationwide land survey called Taiko Kenchi, which was conducted in the late 16th century 28
under the leadership of Hideyoshi Toyotomi, a preeminent warrior regarded as Japan’s second great unifier (Holmes 1988; Tama 
1996). Through this initiative together with the sword hunt (katana-gari), which was conducted under the policy for separation of 
warriors and peasants (heinobunri), farmers became tied to farmland, while the social class of farmers became separated from 
warrior class (samurai) (Tama 1996; Ohkama 2006).
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responsibility for procuring forced labor and paying an in-kind agricultural tax (e.g., rice) (Tama 
1996; Matsuzawa 2016).  Under this taxation system, a village developed a self-governing 29
institution where farmers made collective decisions, had a division of labor, and chose village 
officials in open elections.  At the same time, farm families constituting a village became 30
largely equalized through agricultural development and peasant movements over the 17th 
century (Tama 1996; Ohkama 2006). Thus, a village evolved into not only an accredited unit of 
tax payment, but also a self-governing body to organize and discipline its constituents in both 
farming and living (Matsuzawa 2016). Each family held rights and responsibilities to their 
farmland, whereas a village shared land and collectively managed natural resources such as 
water.  31
 Rather than a top-down force to develop the early-modern villages, Toishi (2013) and Noda (2005) point to the horizontal 29
relationships between the villages. According to Toishi (2013), the villages, which used to compete and fight with each other 
often by force of arms in the Middle Ages (between the late 12th and late 16th centuries), sought to avoid the enormous cost 
arising from the inter-village conflicts, and shared the responsibilities for work assigned by the authorities in accordance with 
demographic and generational changes. On the other, Noda (2005) notes that the villages in the Middle Ages often confederated 
to protect their interests, while those in the early-modern era also federated to control water particularly along a large river.
 According to Ohkama (2006), the early-modern villages were stabilized over the 17th century. Although the size and structure 30
were diverse at the beginning of the early modern period, the communities underwent restructuring of their functions and 
boundaries based on the local self-governing taxation system (mura-uke sei) for managing farmland and households, and 
implementing administrative projects. While originating from the diverse communities consisting of different types of farmers 
and farm families (e.g., subordinate villagers and large stepfamilies), the constituents became largely equalized through the 
independence of small farmers. This independence progressed through branching of subordinate farmers with the aid of land 
clearing and improved farming productivity, and through the infighting that developed into accusations against the vested 
interests and corruptions of village officials. Although the blood-based subordinate relationships existed between a head family 
(honke) and branch families (bunke), the rights and responsibilities of farm families became largely equalized in these processes. 
 The early-modern villages often used and managed forests and moors as a commonage of one or several villages to procure 31
manure for their collective agricultural tax levying and payments (Matsuzawa 2016). Likewise, some villages developed the 
system to regularly or occasionally recalibrate paddies to level soil fertility, suggesting that villagers shared the notion of 
collective ownership of farmland (Matsuzawa 2016). This self-governing system assured the unity of a community involving 
work, life and religion — from the joint tax liability to the collective natural resource management involving water rights and 
commonage (Tama 1996; Ohkama 2006). The code of conduct featuring self-sufficiency and self-binding control (Yoda 1983; 
Ohkama 2006), became a norm through the mutual surveillance and sanction under the condition of the limited mobility of 
populations (Ohkama 2006). For instance, the rice planting was carried out on specific dates that were determined in each mura. 
Advancing in years was not a personal matter but a matter of mura (mura goto) as a child born in a mura got on in years only 
after giving notice to the elder in the mura (Furukawa 2012).
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 In the years following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the early-modern villages 
experienced two major changes in respect of the administrative and property systems.  First, in 32
its haste to restore a powerful state, the Meiji government carried through a series of 
administrative reforms and established the Municipal Government Act in 1889.  The 33
enforcement of this act accompanied the nationwide municipal mergers and dissolutions, called 
the Great Merger of Meiji (1888-1889). It resulted in the emergence of cities in the metropolitan 
areas with, on average, five early-modern villages merged into one new village (Saitou 2014; 
Matsuzawa 2016). Although the state’s rationale for the reforms has been explained differently 
by different scholars,  the government continued mergers and dissolutions of common village 34
properties and religious symbols even after the Great Merger reforms (K. Noda 2005; Matsuoka 
2011).  Allowing for heterogeneity across the country, the early-modern villages retained the 35
  Meiji Restoration (Meiji ishin) is known as the event that restored practical imperial rule to Japan in 1868 under Emperor 32
Meiji. Following the fall of the longterm feudalism, it placed on the key agenda both the political and economic reforms to 
promote modernization and capitalistic development of the state (Shimamoto 2002).
 Building on the Census Registration Act, which was established in 1871 to register all the citizens, the Meiji Government first 33
established the Large/Small Administrative Districting System (daiku-shoku system) in 1872 to restructure the previous local 
administrative unit (i.e., towns and villages) into the new system where the central government controls the prefectural 
governments, the large districts, and then small districts hierarchically to ensure that the central government policy efficiently 
reach out the local units (Saitou 2014; Arakida 1999). This was followed by several reforms including the passage of the Three 
New Acts (Sanshimpo; including the new four-district system, the rule for prefectural assemblies, and the taxation guidelines) in 
1878, and the establishment of Allied Kocho (district heads) Administered Districts in 1884, resulting in the enactment of 
Municipal Government Act in 1889 (Matsuoka 2011; Arakida 1999).
 For instance, Noda (2005) argues that the Meiji government intended to dissolve the early-modern villages to create a nation 34
state, in light of the political risk of their highly autonomous nature as well as their limited economic and social capacities to 
implement new public projects for modernization and industrialization (e.g., schools, hospitals, industrial roads, and railways). 
On the other, Arakida (1999) argues that the Meiji government designed the administrative reforms to ally and consolidate the 
early-modern villages not only to streamline the administrative practices but also to take advantage of their organized nature. 
 Against the backdrop of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which let the 35
government reinforce the local government finance, the Meiji government integrated the forests owned by the early-modern 
villages into the municipal permanent properties (Burakuyurinya-toitsu-seisaku)(1910-1939) (Yano 2007; Kasahara 1998). Also, 
the government launched the policy of ‘Shrine Merger’ (jinja-goshi) with the banner of one shrine in one municipality 
(1906-1918) for mergers and dissolutions of shrines that had been enshrined and anchored at each early-modern village (Morioka 
1975; Torigoe 1991).
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spirt of self-governance in many cases (Matsuzawa 2016; K. Noda 2005).  Yet, under 36
intensifying state control prior to the end of WWII, the early-modern villages encountered 
tensions between subordination and autonomy, as observed in the cases of village heads’ 
abdication for personal reasons and peasants’ non-cooperation on state projects.  Importantly, as 37
experienced by farmers who internalized the ambivalence of personal aspiration versus social 
responsibility,  the villages were evolving through negotiating their role in governing farmland.  38
 Another reform was the Land Tax Reform (chiso-kaisei) (1873-1881), through which the 
Meiji government authorized private land ownership and abolished the village-based self-
governing system of taxation (mura-uke sei) (Matsuoka 2011; Matsuzawa 2016; Arimoto 
2005).  As part of the fiscal reform to establish the modern state, this involved changes in both 39
measurement and taxables to accord with the evolving commodity economy (Shimamoto 2002; 
Kurauchi 1990). The measurement changed from the in-kind, rice-assessed tax (koku-daka sei) to 
 The early-modern villages remained as a residential organization, called Oaza in some regions such as Kinki and Hokuriku 36
regions, but not in other regions like Kyushu, as the Study on Census of Agriculture and Forestry in 1970 by Sakane (2011) 
shows that the rate of concordance between an agricultural village and Oaza was 87% in Fukui Prefecture of Hokuriku region, 
and 5% in Kagoshima Prefecture of Kyushu region (Toishi 2013).  Tashiro (2008) points out that the studies of agricultural 
history often confuse the agricultural villages in census terms (139,000 in 2010 Census of Agriculture) with the early-modern 
villages (63,000 of autonomous villages) (K. Noda 2011).
 For instance, drawing on the wartime record of Chinai village in Shiga Prefecture, Furukawa (2012) highlights incidents in 37
which the village heads consecutively abdicated their positions for personal reasons despite the position’s cruciality to carry 
through state control, while the village tirelessly procured soldiers, materials, money, and labor forces for the war. Based on the 
case of agricultural policy implementation during the inter-war and wartime periods at Nishime Village (consisting of 10 early-
modern villages) in Akita Prefecture, Ohkama (2006) illustrates the mismatches between the state order and the actual responses 
(e.g., lower-ranking farmers’ non-corporation to the voluntary labor services without pay, and the tenants’ voluntary support for 
the landlords rather than the state project), while the government reinforced the organized work of mura through the policy 
control and subsidies. 
 Drawing on the discourse of the young generation in rural areas in Japan (Noson seinen), Nozaki (1995) argues that 38
agricultural fundamentalism (Nohonshugi), which was popularized during the period between the Meiji restoration and the end of 
WWII, emerged not simply from the anti-urbanism, anti-capitalism and anti-modernism movements of farmers, but in reaction to 
the ambivalent feelings of the rural young generation who accepted and yearned for modernism and modernization as both a 
heartthrob and an enemy. 
 With reference to Fukushima (1968), Ohmori (2001) notes that the Land Tax Reform (chisokaisei) officially started in 1873 39
with the promulgation of the Land Tax Reform Act following the issuance of the initial land certificates in 1872, and officially 
ended with the closure of the executive office of the reform in 1881, although the new taxation after the reform was already 
introduced in 1876. 
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the monetary, uniformly fixed-rate tax (kin-no sei) to better accommodate the shift from the self-
sufficient economy to the commodity one already underway in the Edo era (from the late 16th 
century to the middle 19th century) (Tama 1996; Ohkama 2006; Nakamura 1987; Matsuzawa 
2016).  At the same time, it changed the taxables from the rural land under the feudal system 40
(i.e., the land procuring agricultural tax through the local self-governing taxation system) to all 
the land under the state to deny the feudal lords’ rights to land and to ensure levying rural and 
urban land.  The feudal government had banned the sale of farmland since 1643 to ensure that 41
small farmers are as productive as possible to be levied in-kind taxes (Toshiyuki Miyazaki 
1977).  However, the reform allowed for the market-based transactions of farmland under 42
private land ownership, while transferring both tax-payment responsibility and farmland 
 The previous system standardized the land value with the actual rice yield of a given plot of land (koku-daka) that was defined 40
by the land surveys (kenchi), and determined and levied the amount of tax, which varied depending on the different yields and tax 
rates (men) across different feudal domains and villages (Hayami 1982; Arimoto 2005). In this system, the tax was paid in the 
form of rice and other crops, collectively based on the ‘gross village product’ (mura daka) through the village-based local self-
governing taxation system (mura-uke sei), while it was ultimately levied on the principal farmers (i.e., officially recognized 
farmers as landholders (nauke nin) responsible for taxpaying) whose names were registered on the land register (kenchi-cho) 
(Arimoto 2005; Kurauchi 1990). On the other, the new system determined land value through the new land survey, and levied a 
uniform proportion to that value (started with 3% but reduced to 2.5% later) on a landowner who was given a certificate of land 
title (chiken) and was responsible for individual payment in cash (Ohmori 2001). Although the land survey initially standardized 
the land value with the yield (Makino 2016), the new system allowed the land value to be determined in the land market 
separately from the variation of rice prices (Ohmori 2001).
 The Land Tax Reform denuded the land ownership of multiple actors by divesting the feudal lords of their power of 41
agricultural tax collection (Kurauchi 1990; Ohkama 2006), although their power transformed into the capitalized pension bond 
(kinroku-kosai) that allowed some of those in the high-ranking warrior class and the peerage to invest in buying land and 
establish the national banks (Wakui 2011). The issuance of land certificates imposed land tax also on urban land that used to be 
free from taxation and freely bought and sold in the Edo era (Shimamoto 2002; Makino 2016).
 Given that the best possible way to secure the agricultural tax in the early modern era was to secure small farming, the feudal 42
government issued a permanent prohibition on the sale of arable lands (Denpata-eitai-baibai-kinshirei) in 1643 to support and 
maintain small farming in response to the increase in farmland sale by small farmers (Toshiyuki Miyazaki 1977).
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ownership from ‘cultivators’ to ‘landowners’ (Komori 1996; Shimamoto 2002; Ohmori 2001; 
Wakui 2011).  43
 This reform aligned the policy with the commodification of farmland that had been 
increasingly practiced, but changed the rights and responsibilities of mura to farmland 
management. Even in the late 17th century, the feudal government endorsed the foreclosure of 
farmland in accordance with the increased transactions in the form of pawning a piece of land in 
exchange for loans, which was not banned (Tama 1996). Consequently, landlordism had 
developed along with the amplifying accumulation of farmland under landlords, while the 
paddies had been gradually segmentalized and scattered through spontaneous transactions (Tama 
1996). Nevertheless, the transactions had been based on the shared notion that farmland 
belonged to the farming families and the farming villages. For instance, the sold land was 
restituted to original landholders after a certain period, and the land that lost its holder was often 
held under the village’s management (Kotani 2007; Makino 2016; Ohkama 2006).   44
 However, the reform led to the expansion of ‘parasitical’ landlords who farmed out for 
‘rent' rather than production and built wealth by exchanging ‘in-kind’ high-rate rent for off-farm 
 Prior to the execution of the reform, the Meiji government made legislative arrangements to establish private land ownership. 43
First it authorized owners to freely use land and revenue from it by proclaiming the circular notice on arbitrary farming of arable 
land (Denpata-kattesaku-kyoka) in 1871, and then authorized owners to freely dispose land by lifting the ban of the sale of arable 
lands in 1872 (Komori 1996; Shimamoto 2002). Then, it changed the taxpayers from cultivators (i.e., farmland users) to 
landowners (Ohmori 2001). At the same time, it provided land ownership for landlords including owner-farmers while excluding 
tenants (Wakui 2011).
 In the early modern era, the purchase and sale of land were practiced in the forms of a limited-term sales contract called Nenki-44
uri (i.e., selling the usufruct of land but returning it to an original landholder after an agreed time period such as 10 or 20 years), a 
conditioned sales contract called Honsen-gaeshi (i.e., an original holder bought back the land whenever the sales value was 
repaid), or a foreclosure custom called Shichi-chi ukemodoshi kanko (i.e., an original holder received back the pawned land as 
many as years later if the principal was repaid) (Kotani 2007; Makino 2016). Although such transactions were made in units of 
families (ie), the early-modern villages monitored and accommodated the transactions through the village-based systems 
including the village-based registration and approval of the pawnage of land, the village-base agricultural tax collection, the 
village-based mutual financing associations (called mujin-ko), and the practices called Hyakusho no atoshiki-hozen (i.e., the land 
became under the management and commonage of a village when it lost its holder until someone became available to 
appropriately manage and use it) (Ohkama 2006; Kotani 2007).
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capital (e.g., silk, railroad, and spinning industries) (Furushima 1958; Takashi Watanabe 2007).  45
Along with a widening divide between landlords and tenants, the farming village communities 
experienced the Matsukata Deflation (1881-1884) through which many farmers failed to secure 
revenue to pay the monetary tax due to falling prices. Consequently they sold their farmland, 
resulting in further accumulation by landlords (Kurauchi 1990; Makino 2016). Yet, the self-
governance capacity of mura sustained and enabled the rollback of parasitical landlordism, 
leading to the inclusion of customary commonage of forests and water use in the new legal 
system (Shimamoto 2002; Kurumisawa 2003; Ohkama 2006).  At the same time, some villages 46
observed the owners’ strong expression about private ownership and experienced conflicts 
between new owners and other members of the villages (Matsuzawa 2016).  47
Farming families (ie): 
Another key institution in governing farmland is farming families. As a prototype of farming 
families, the literature hints to a public and private duality and a dependent and independent 
 The ‘parasitical’ landlordism emerged around the beginning of the 18th century and became ubiquitous in the Meiji Era 45
(1868-1912) (Furushima 1958). The parasitical landlords were different from the large landowners called tezukuri jinusi who 
became widespread by the early days of the 18th century but largely decreased by the end of the 19th century. The former farmed 
out most of their land to build up wealth from rent that was collected in agricultural products but changed into money in the 
market, whereas the latter generally farmed out their ‘spare' land to neighboring small farmers (Furushima 1958; Takashi 
Watanabe 2007).The former has been largely characterized as being “feudalistic” and “parasitical” in the sense that the landlords 
exploit small peasants for the sake of off-farm capital, resulting in much lower living standard of peasants who relayed on 
farming but often worked on the side or moved to casual labour (Akimoto 2000; Furushima 1958; Takashi Watanabe 2007).
 Besides the general trend of fading parasitical landlordism since the 1920s (Shimamoto 2002), Kurumisawa (2003) highlights 46
cases where the villages often collectively controlled the behaviors of both landlords and tenants and sometimes even conformed 
landlords with the village’s rules in the period between WWI and WWII. Also, Ohkama (2006) notes that the customary practices 
of commonage of water use and forestry in the early modern era were incorporated in the newly established legislative system, 
while pointing to the historical evidence in which the autonomous system of mura controlled the execution of new private 
property ownership in the Meiji period. 
 Matsuzawa (2016) points to cases in the early Meiji period where local farmers, who intended to clear the land without prior 47
consent of the owners in the state-owned and imperial estate, frequently conflicted with local powers who intended to officially 
manage land with the consent of the owners. With reference to a study showing the relaxation of the village-based governance in 
conserving natural resources in the early Meiji era, he alludes to the declining ability of the early-modern villages to collectively 
manage natural resources, along with the demise of the local self-governing system of taxation (mura-uke sei).
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duality, while underscoring their integrative nature. Farming families have been largely 
conceptualized as a trinity turning over generations: ‘family property’ (kasan), ‘family 
business’ (kagyo) and ‘family name’ (kamei) (Toishi 2016; Hasebe 2016; Arimoto and Nakajima 
2013). By the end of WWII, the pattern of handing down this trinity in many regions became the 
primogeniture of a stem family by which the family headship and the rights to inheritance of the 
entire estate were passed down, typically from eldest son to eldest son (Hirai 2003; K. Noda 
2011). This pattern has not disappeared over the postwar years, but metamorphosed as discussed 
later (Mitsuyoshi 1983). 
 The prototype of a farming family became common in the late 18th century (Hasebe 
2011; 2016). With the development of the local self-governing taxation system (mura-uke sei), 
the farm families, including small ones, became a taxpayer unit called a farmer stock (hyakusho-
kabu) that exercised rights to natural resource use (e.g., water and commonage) and rendered the 
tax-payment responsibility (Toishi 2013; Tama 1996). At the beginning of the early-modern era 
(the late 16th century), the form of families was yet to be standardized, as it included nuclear 
families, step families, and those involving subordinate members (e.g., lower class peasants 
called Nago or Kakae) (Tama 1996; Hirai 2003). These families often adopted (unrelated and 
related) individuals to collectively work and maintain the status in a village over generations 
(Toishi 2013; Tama 1996; Hosoya 2005). During the 16th and 17th centuries, many of these 
families branched through dividing an inherited property, resulting from farmland development 
and population increase (Tama 1996; Hirai 2003).  But since the end of the 17th century, the 48
 There was a customary practice that one of the children stayed at the first home with his or her parents, while the family estate 48
was divided equally among the children in the 16th-17th centuries when the new field development together with the 
advancement of rice-growing techniques largely progressed (Tama 1996; Hirai 2003).
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inheritance system changed from equal division to the primogeniture in response to the low 
economic development under the orders of ‘restriction on parcelling up an estate’ (bunchi-
seigen-rei), which were issued by the feudal government and lords in the late 17th century (Tama 
1996; Hirai 2003; F. Akiyama et al. 1977).  As a result, the ‘family name’ (kamei) associated 49
with the family status (kakaku) became a key component to secure and pass down the ‘family 
property’ (kasan) so as to share the limited environmental resources for farming as ‘family 
business’ (kagyo) (Tama 1996; Hirai 2003; Toishi 2013).  50
 As a unit of governing farmland, the farming families failed to always secure individuals' 
freedom but secured their living. In the absence of social security, the families had to endure the 
unequal sharing among members that undermined their freedom of choice (Kataoka 2007). 
Family members had no other choice but to live together as an extended financial family and rely 
on the family property (Kataoka 2007; Tama 1996). This collective life security applied not only 
to a single family but also to a cognate family (dozoku-dan), which included a head family 
(honke) at its center surrounded by branch families (bunke) in order, to support each other in 
production and consumption (Hasebe 2011). To secure individuals’ livelihood in accordance with 
the norm of the villages, the primogeniture of a stem family inheriting the trinity became the 
code of conduct. 
 Following the land clearing in the 17th century, farming communities faced low economic development resulting from the 49
limit of land clearing, the saturation of technological development, and repeated natural disasters and famines since the beginning 
of the 18th century (Tama 1996; Hirai 2003). Feudal government and lords started to issue the orders of ‘restriction on parcelling 
up an estate’ (bunchi-seigen-rei) to inhibit further subdivision and maintain the existing small farms since the late 17th century 
(Tama 1996; F. Akiyama et al. 1977). In response, farming village communities tightened the limitation on natural resource use, 
while farm families changed the inheritance customs and controlled their marriage and birth rates (Tama 1996).
 Through the change in inheritance, the family status (kakaku) gained a foothold, whereby the ‘family name’ (kamei) became 50
more meaningful to secure stable access to the shared natural resources over generations by following the village rules (Hirai 
2003; Tama 1996; Toishi 2013). The notion of family property also developed to sustain the farming and thereby livelihoods in an 
economically extended three-generation family (Hirai 2003; Tama 1996).
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 This prototype underwent an institutional reform with the Meiji Restoration, leading to a 
systematic change in the trinity. In the process of centralizing state power while negotiating with 
the great world powers, the Meiji government uniformly institutionalized all types of families 
(including farming, fishing and merchant, and warrior families) in the Family Law in 1898 as 
part of the Civic Code (1896) (Hosoya 2005).  For this, the government drew on the 51
'patrilineage’ primogeniture of a stem family which had developed in the elite class (Hosoya 
2005; A. Hashimoto and Traphagan 2009; Koguchi 2012; Nakagawa 2003). Originating from the 
patriarchal system of the aristocracy who leveraged marriages for political purpose, the elite 
class, who had disengaged from primary production, emphasized the headship succession. This 
secured their prestigious status and the associated earning opportunities within their kins (A. 
Hashimoto and Traphagan 2009; Hosoya 2005). Following the elite prototype of families as 
blood relative communities, the government prescribed the family institution as the 'patrilineage’ 
primogeniture by legitimizing the rights to family headship and inheritance accruing to eldest 
son (Nakagawa 2003; Kuwabara 2009). Besides the legal codification, the government promoted 
the Confucian ethics of loyalty, filial piety and moral indebtedness attached to the families 
through the school and social education, leading to the ideological diffusion of the familistic 
nation-state (Kuwabara 2009). 
 The reform of farming families from pragmatically developed to politically 
institutionalized ones led to internal mismatches in regard to gender and economic production. 
The succession of the family headship and the entire estate was not discriminative by gender in 
the previous institution. For instance, in Tohoku and Northern Kanto regions, the custom of 
 To amend the unequal treaties with the great world powers, the government was urged to establish westernized laws and 51
systems including the Civic Code (Chiba 2009).
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succession by the firstborn child regardless of gender was widely practiced to allow for earlier 
succession before the parents lost their physical strength to farm (Hosoya 2005).  However, the 52
Family Law defined women as being incompetent in managing and inheriting the family 
property, intensifying the domestication of women and the sexual division of labor (Nakagawa 
2003; Yonemura 1991; A. Hashimoto and Traphagan 2009). The loss of women’s inheritance 
rights preceded the lowering status of women in farm families where their labour was associated 
with household work that was not socially recognized (Nakamichi 2001). Yet, while actual 
practices were sometimes inconsistent with the prescriptions, farm families internalized the 
changes in the members who experienced legislative and ideological subordination but aspired to 
their own individual fulfillment of life.  For instance, farm housewives were often exploited for 53
both farming and domestic work under the economically lower status (Nakamichi 2001; A. 
Hashimoto and Traphagan 2009), whereas they became aware of the quality of life through the 
infiltration of mass entertainment (Nozaki 1995).  54
 The reform legally separated the ‘business’ component from farming families. Under the 
industrial policy called “Encouragement of New Industry” (Shoku-san kogyo), the government 
promoted the capitalistic business management based on commodification of labour (Hosoya 
2005). To commercialize labour, the government prescribed the business component in the 
 In the early modern era, the level of female servitude as well as the degree of patriarch in farming families varied depending 52
on the family size and the family rank (Nakamichi 2001). In small farm families, the patriarchal power was weaker to sustain a 
family where females supported livelihoods through apprenticeship or daily employment. In high-rank farm families, a family 
head took main responsibility for managing and sustaining the family business, while females had a certain level of authority to 
manage, process and consume farm harvest and supervise housemaids.
 Women sometimes took responsibility for family headship and succession due to the lack of children or the loss or sickness of 53
husbands especially in the wartime (Nakamichi 2001; A. Hashimoto and Traphagan 2009).
 Kuniko Itagaki investigated the livelihoods of agricultural villages in the 1930s and 1940s by analyzing a series of monthly 54
family magazines entitled with Ie no Hikari (Light of Home), and found that the farm housewife population changed their 
consciousness in response to various movements seeking for modernization of farm families when a variety of mass 
entertainment penetrated farming communities (Nozaki 1995).
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Commercial Code (1899) and the remaining aspects in the Civic Code that also stipulated 
individual ownership of family property (Hosoya 2005). Previously, both the productive and 
reproductive functions of farming were integrated in a family, wherein the ownership of family 
property was maintained and inherited canonically (Hosoya 2005; Yonemura 1991). With the 
new legislation, the government urged farm families to pursue individual economic 
independence and sustain the patriarchic family system, though these were contradictory goals 
(Masuhara 1975).  
 The contradiction, which increasingly came to light, was tailored through ideological 
edification (Hosoya 2005; Kuwabara 2009). Yet, the mismatches between individuals and a 
family as well as between families and a village became more prominent towards the end of 
WWII (K. Noda 2006).  The privilege of the eldest sons associated with farmland became 55
disadvantageous in terms of lack of freedom or inaccessibility to urban wealth, as other members 
(e.g., second and third sons) migrated to cities for better economic and cultural opportunities (K. 
Noda 2005). In reaction, the heirs remaining in the villages initiated movements such as peasant 
disputes and cooperative movement for farm families (K. Noda 2005). Such contradictions and 
ambivalent feelings constituted the internal forces to drive the changes in these own institutions 
and then the postwar reform.  
2.2 Institutional Changes and Successive Models 
Prior to the emergence of the Farmland Bank (FB) program, the first postwar model persisted in 
the 1950s, but then institutional changes delivered two successive models. The second model 
 For instance, the mismatch was observed in the wartime when farming villages were struggling under the state control whereas 55
farm families benefited from the special demand of the wartime economy (K. Noda 2006).
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developed between 1960 and 1984. This was followed by a third model that evolved between 
1985 and 2004. Throughout these three periods, the political institutions changed in the 
following respects: 1) the goal of agricultural policy; 2) the principle of farmland management; 
3) the concept of farmland; and 4) the approach to farmland governance (see Table 2.1).  
 Beginning with the reformative goal, postwar agricultural policy increasingly prioritized 
productivity and then broadened its scope to include industrial and rural development to attain 
agricultural multifunctionalitiy. In accordance with these changes, the primary target moved from 
a ‘farm family' as an integrated unit of farming and living to a 'farm management entity’ where 
labor is segregated from family life, while exploring new types of entities capable of efficient 
and stable farm management. Correspondingly, the principle of farmland management changed 
from the ‘owner-farmer principle’ (jisakuno-shugi) to the ‘cultivator-oriented 
principle’ (kosakusha-shugi), increasingly seeking the ‘liberalization’ of farmland transactions 
and allowing for the involvement of new actors. Likewise, the central concept of farmland 
expanded from a farm family’s property to the commons of a farming village and then of a 
broader society. The governance approach to farmland shifted from state control of individual 
tenancy arrangements to decentralized planning for collective tenancy arrangements.  
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Table 2.1 Political Institutional Changes across the Three Periods 
 The changes in farming villages and families across the country reflected the distinctive 
nationwide trends of the agrarian population for the three periods (see Table 2.2). Numerically, 
the decrease in the farming villages, families and population started in the 1960s, following only 
minor changes for the first postwar period (1945-1959). The second postwar period (1960-1984) 
experienced a steady reduction of farm households following a rapid decrease in the agricultural 
workforce, together with the loss of the arable farmland area. The third postwar period 
(1985-2004) experienced a further drop of farm households and workforce and then the decrease 
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of farming villages, alluding to the dissolution of the societal frameworks of farming 
communities and population (Ouchi 2005).  
 Both quantitative and qualitative changes in the social institutions varied across regions. 
In the prewar era, the history of development of these institutions in Hokkaido and Southern 
Kyushu regions differed largely from other regions (Tama 2014). Also, agrarian demographic 
trends were different between the east and western parts of the country. The study focuses on the 
general trends to contextualize the emergence of the nationwide model of the FB program, 
though it points to regional distinctions. The following sections describe the political and social 
institutional changes for each of the three periods to show the narratives and mechanisms of the 
two successive models. 
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Table 2.2 Nationwide Agrarian Demographic Changes across the Three Periods 
Source: Census of Agriculture and National Census 
Note: Figures in the square brackets [**] indicate the number of commercial farm households 
























































































































































































2.2.1 The first postwar period (1945-1959) 
1) Political Institutions 
Building on the land reform (1947-1951) that emancipated the peasants from landlordism, the 
first postwar model was implemented under the legal system stipulated by the Agricultural Land 
Act (ALA) of 1952 until its first amendment in 1962. Setting the ‘owner-farmer principle' as a 
policy goal rather than as a means “to stabilize the status of cultivators and boost domestic 
agricultural production,” the first model took a centralized approach by which the nation state 
disciplined farmland transactions to limit tenancy arrangements so as to hamper the revival of 
landlordism (Imamura 2003). Farmland was presumed to play “a social and public role” in 
serving the “commonweal,” while the possession of farmland was to involve “a societal 
responsibility” (Shoji 2003, 195, 203). These perceptions allowed the state to intervene in 
farmland purchase and sale on extremely preferential terms for tenants and at a disadvantage for 
landlords. Yet, the first model bolstered the notion of farmland as the private property of an 
owner-farmer family by adopting measures to support and nurture family-run farms, where the 
de-facto family members’ rights to ownership and use of farmland belonged to a family head 
(Imamura 2003).  56
 To ensure a public-and-private relationship of farmland, agricultural committees were 
given a role to implement the ALA by coordinating between the state’s public interest and the 
farmers’ private interest (Kurumisawa 2016). On the ground that farmers actively take part in 
farmland administration resulting from the land reform, the government established agricultural 
 The ALA presumes that the family members’ rights to farmland (ownership and use) belong to an owner-farmer (i.e., a family 56
head) even when tenancy arrangements are made between family members within a family, or when some family members leave 
their family temporally (the fifth and sixth clauses of Article 2) (Imamura 2003).
 !63
committees with the Agricultural Committee Act (ACA) in 1951, thereby taking over the 
structure and functions of the farmland committees (i.e., the implementation agency of the land 
reform) (Shoji 2003; Yukitomo 2015). In common with the farmland committees, the agricultural 
committees became administrative committees (ADCOM) that followed the council system to 
authorize administrative regulations but were independent from general administrative bodies 
(Shoji 2003).  Under this system, agricultural committee members (elected by farmers) 57
executed one-parcel-based farmland control at the municipal level as part of the state 
administrative works, while being responsible for pursuing self-management to promote local 
agrarian policy and to represent different farmers’ interests at the local level (Shoji 2003; 
Kurumisawa 2016).  Thus, the agricultural committees were granted power and authority to 58
embody the common interest of the local agrarian society by mediating between the public and 
private interests (Kurumisawa 2016). 
2) Social Institutions 
The first postwar period largely retained the self-sufficient, family-run farming until around the 
mid-1950s. Yet, the styles of farming and living changed into more mechanized and modernized 
ones with the rapid economic growth that began in the late 1950s. Despite agricultural price 
 In accordance with the advancement of capitalism and the increased complexity of the society, the ADCOM system developed 57
particularly in the UK and US to grant quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authorities to a committee so as to address the issues 
beyond the scope of the general legislative and judicial procedures (Shoji 2003). It was introduced to Japan as part of the postwar 
reform for administrative democratization.
 Prior to the establishment of the ALA (1952), a plan of more powerful public intervention in farmland management through 58
the agricultural committees was proposed, but not materialized most possibly because the idea of stronger public intervention in 
private farmland was against the political climate of the day placing emphasis on private ownership in the capitalist society (Shoji 
2003). At the national conference of prefectural managers on farmland, which was held in 1948, an agricultural bureaucrat, who 
felt the pinch of farm management segmentalization, proposed a plan to grant power to the agricultural committees to execute 
tenancy arrangements and coordinate the redistribution of the rights to farmland cultivation. However, his idea was incorporated 
in neither the ALA nor the ACA.
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inflation in reaction to the food shortages after the war and then the stabilization crisis, 
production recovered around 1950 to its prewar level due to the stable procurement of fertilizer 
as well as an increased farm population.  Even after recovery, the government initiated policies 59
to raise food production and self-sufficiency for rice and wheat and allow for the import of 
mechanical equipment and raw materials for the heavy chemical industry (e.g., Ten Year 
Program of Farmland Development of 1951, and Five Year Program of Increase in Food 
Production for 1953-1957) (Ushiyama 2005). The policy supported the owner-farmers through 
tax reduction for farm families, the rise in rice price, and land improvement projects to facilitate 
mechanization and chemicalization.  Together with good weather, these efforts resulted in the 60
record yield of rice in 1955 amounting to 12.38 million tons, which was more than double the 
1945 level (i.e., 5.9 million tons) (Ushiyama 2005).  
 Contrary to the progress in production, however, the government increased the import of 
wheat under the US-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (i.e., Mutual Security 
Agreement: MSA) in 1954 and then substantially constricted the programs that aimed to raise 
food production.  Subsequently, the previously expanded agricultural workforce took a 61
downward turn, precedential to the drastic shift of farming population (Ushiyama 2005). Along 
 The farming communities, particularly those engaging in rice production at urban fringes, experienced the agricultural 59
inflation, which galloped in 1945 and 1946 with the sale of rice on the black market under the food shortage but ended in 1948 
due to the political promotion of rice delivery to the government and the priority production approach to the industrial enterprise 
(keish-seisan hoshiki) since 1947 (Ushiyama 2005). Then, it entered into a slight recession under the influence of the financial 
contraction policy of the Dodge Line, which started from 1949 to gain economic independence of the postwar Japan, but regained 
the agricultural production capacity with the continued fertilizer procurement and the increased farm population (i.e., the number 
of agricultural workforce of 1947 increased by 3.25 million from 1940), resulting in the unit crop yield of 1948 equivalent to that 
of 1933, which was the highest level in the prewar era (Ushiyama 2005).
 For instance, the amendment of Staple Food Control Act in 1952 facilitated the rice price rise through the double rice price 60
system in which the government made up the difference between the higher producer price and the lower consumer price than the 
market price (Ushiyama 2005).
 Following the conclusion of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954, by which the US provided foreign 61
food aid to resolve the excessive domestic production of agricultural products such as wheat, the Japan’s government allowed the 
additional import of 800,000 tons of wheat (Ushiyama 2005).
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with increasing mechanization and chemicalization, the farming lifestyle became gradually 
approximated to the urban one through urbanization and commercialization with urbanized areas 
encroaching on rural areas (e.g., the diffusion of television) (Ushiyama 2005). 
Farming village communities: 
Land reform changed the landlord-tenant relationship in ownership terms but did not change the 
self-governance capacity of a village, which was not necessarily determined by landlordism 
(Ushiyama 2005). The adaptive capacity of a village allowed for relatively peaceful execution of 
reform (Dore 2013; Shoji 2003).  Certainly, villages with differing initial conditions (e.g., the 62
proportion of absentee landlords, the history of tenancy disputes, the scarcity of farmland) 
experienced the reform with differential impacts (e.g., change in the leadership, conflicts 
between landlords and tenants) (Ushiyama 2005; Shoji 2003). Yet, in many cases, a confederated 
network of several farming villages worked with a formally established farmland committee at 
the municipal level to coordinate different actors and facilitated consultation and decision-
making to adapt the government-imposed uniform standards to local realities. Besides the pursuit 
of government regulations, examples of the village initiatives included: 1) combining the 
farmland exchange and consolidation with the ownership transfer to improve farming efficiency; 
2) developing another two-level committee system that involved smaller customary villages and 
a larger administrative village to informally reconcile disputes and facilitate negotiations for a 
formal approval of a farmland committee; and 3) allowing resident landlords to aggregate 
 Dore (2013, 173) evaluated the land reform in Japan as the one in which “the amount of blood spilt per acre was remarkably 62
small” given the fact that “[a]ltogether only 110 incidents between landlords and tenants involving physical violence were 
reported in the two years 1947-8, and not one life was lost.”
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advantageous farmland plots in return for reduction in their owned farmland area (Ushiyama 
2005).  63
 The rationale was to secure individuals’ life through the medium of a farming family. 
Farm families behaved in solidarity with a village to exploit natural resources with rudimentary 
agricultural technologies. Otherwise they faced social sanctions, typically ostracism called 
‘Mura-hachibu,’ by which all the family members were denied subsistence rights in a village 
(Ushiyama 2005). This solidarity system was commonly perceived as a feudal system that should 
be reformed in the postwar state. Following instructions by GHQ, the government passed various 
democratization policies to weigh an individual more than a village community, whereby 
farming villages experienced both procedural and ideological reforms. For many of the 
procedural reforms including land reform and public elections, farming villages often leveraged 
their constitutive capacity to carry out the reforms by internalizing them as a mura events (mura-
goto) in solidarity (i.e., discussing the issues among representative families, collectively dealing 
with the problems) (Ushiyama 2005). 
 Along with ideological reform, farming villages confronted a self-searching of identity, 
leading to the gradual renewal of their qualitative features. For instance, the program of 
Extension Services for Home Living Improvement (Seikatsu-kaizen-fukyu jigyo), which began in 
1948 under the direction of GHQ and the US, facilitated the organization of “Home Living 
Improvement Groups” to reflect on the conduct of farm families that had prioritized the ‘public’ 
sphere over the ‘private' one and to rationalize the reproductive process of workforce for 
 Prior to the active execution of the land reform, a considerable number of landlords divested tenants of farmland (4.2% of the 63
total tenanted area as of August 1st 1945 was divested by March 1st 1949) (Shoji 2003), whereas the limited number of such 
cases came to the surface as disputes (23,809 out of the estimated 250,000 cases between the end of WWII and June 11th 1946) 
(Ushiyama 2005). Most of these divested cases were considered to be tolerated under the self-governing capacity of villages, 
while serving as a safety valve for the smoother execution of the land reform.
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agricultural production (Ichida 2005).  The program encouraged the formation of voluntary 64
‘clubs’ for home living improvement, in clear distinction from the territorial groups associated 
with a general rule of full participation by all the families. These new groups sometimes faced 
friction with the existing territorial female associations. However, they exercised activities which 
often unchained younger females from the stifling relationships between a wife and her mother-
in-law in a typical multigeneration farm family or encouraged females to speak on public 
occasions. 
 The rhetoric of free participation applied to the reform of agricultural cooperatives, but 
twisted its process. As part of the agrarian reform, Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) came 
into being with the establishment of Agricultural Co-operatives Act (ACOA) in 1947 to develop 
a democratic system of agricultural cooperatives to be run and led by owner-farmers (Ushiyama 
2005; Shimizu 2005; JA Project Team 2006). The JA built on the system of Agricultural 
Organizations (Nogyo-kai) established in 1943 as a control system mainly to deliver food to the 
government for war mobilization (Ushiyama 2005; Shimizu 2005).  Under GHQ instructions, 65
the JA started as an autonomous vocational cooperative system following the ACOA rules of 
voluntary, open cooperatives, such as freedom of membership and withdrawal, and not-for-profit 
 To conceptualize this idea at the national level, some bureaucrats called for “surgical therapy” to overcome the smallness of 64
farm production, and others argued for “internal therapy” to democratize the daily life and familial relationships of farmers by 
nurturing “farming thinkers” (Ichida 2005, 42). The latter argument was followed by the program implementation.
 The system of Agricultural Organizations (Nogyo-Kai) was formed through a merger of two systems: 1) Industrial 65
Associations (Sangyo kumiai) and 2) Agricultural Associations (No-Kai). On the one hand, following the enforcement of 
Industrial Association Act in 1990, Industrial Associations were formed across the country as territorial cooperatives involving 
local small and medium farms rather than special vocational cooperatives (JA Project Team 2006). The system developed to 
include various projects such as public welfare works besides the initial credit businesses. On the other, beginning with the state 
project to disseminate agricultural technologies as part of the industrial policy of the Meiji Government, Agricultural 
Associations expanded nationwide to pursue and implement agricultural development policy upon the establishment of the 
Agricultural Associations Act (1899) (Shimizu 2005).
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purposes (JA Project Team 2006).  Despite the initial plan to dissolve the Agricultural 66
Organizations system dominated by landlords, its property and facilities were taken over to avoid 
fiscal problems for the JA (Ushiyama 2005; JA Project Team 2006). Furthermore, the JA allowed 
for provision of a quasi-membership for those not directly engaged in farming so as to secure 
their financial contribution to the JA, and thus featured a territorial cooperative rather than a 
vocational one.  To take advantage of collaboration of farm families for production and sale and 67
daily consumptive improvement, numerous cooperatives were set up with an increase in 
membership in a short period of time (Shimizu 2005; JA Project Team 2006). Each cooperative 
served as a terminal organization of the food supply system to implement the projects of both the 
JA and the government, including the delivery of rice quotas and distribution of agricultural 
resources such as fertilizer (Ushiyama 2005; JA Hokkaido Chuokai 2016). 
 Farming villages went through another reform of the administrative system during the 
first period (1945-1959). Following the enforcement of Local Autonomy Act (1947) based on the 
postwar Constitution of Japan (1946), the nationwide municipal mergers and dissolutions, called 
the Great Merger of Showa (1953-1961), were pursued to fulfill the newly stipulated roles of 
municipalities in serving as a ‘basic autonomous body’ closest to residents (e.g., establishing and 
 In the process of the postwar agrarian reform, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) originally proposed the plan to 66
adopt the farmers’ compulsory membership to follow the previous practice for the Agricultural Organizations system and develop 
the four-level system where the cooperatives at the village level work with their confederations at the municipal, prefectural and 
national levels so as to fulfill the coordinated functions of production involving collective farmland management, farm 
production and cultural activities (Shoji 2003; JA Project Team 2006). However, this plan was rejected and modified through the 
negotiations with GHQ. 
 Although the regular membership was limited to farmers to avoid dominant control by non-farmers, the quasi-membership was 67
given to those not engaging in farm production to grant them all the powers other than a voting right (JA Project Team 2006).
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managing schools, extinguishing fire) (Yokomichi 2006; Saitou 2014).  In particular, 68
municipalities merged based on the population size of approximately 8,000 to streamline the 
foundation and management of junior high schools so as to minimize the financial drain on 
school management (Yokomichi 2006; Morikawa 2012). This Merger reduced the number of 
municipalities to about one third, while enlarging the size of each municipality wherein many 
towns and villages were merged into cities.   69
 Accordingly, municipalities changed their relationships with farming villages in the 
following terms: 1) the lowered representativeness of a farming village within a municipal 
administration; 2) the amplified political challenge to reconcile different interests among 
diversified industrial sectors; and 3) the enhanced sectionalism resulting from the jurisdictional 
subdivision of administrative work with the increased number of officials (S. Sato 1993).  Many 70
agricultural cooperatives under the JA system conformed their jurisdictions with new 
administrative ones and implemented the relevant projects with a municipal agricultural section, 
deepening the sectionalism of the farming sector (S. Sato 1993). The reforms for agricultural 
cooperatives and municipal systems did not dissolve the de-facto structure of farming villages 
 The Great Merger of Showa was pursued with the endorsement of prefectural governors based on the decisions made at the 68
municipal assemblies, differently from the legally-based forcible execution (S. Sato 1993; Yokomichi 2006). Yet, it was carried 
out under the strong leadership of the national government with the nationwide goal to reduce the number of municipalities to 
one third (Yokomichi 2006).
 The number of municipalities decreased from 9,868 in 1953 to 3,975 in 1956 and then to 3,472 in 1961(Yokomichi 2006). The 69
share of the municipalities with the population below 8,000 decreased from more than 80% to less than 40% between 1953 and 
1956 (S. Sato 1993).
 Following the GHQ direction to disband the neighborhood associations (chonai-kai) in urban areas and the farming village 70
associations (buraku-kai) in rural areas as part of the local government reform for societal democratization, the Home Ministry 
issued the announcement to abolish these associations in 1947 (S. Sato 1992). Nevertheless, these associations remained in 
various forms, and through the Great Merger of Showa, became indispensable to fill the widened gap between the enlarged 
municipalities and residents to inform the residents and elicit their collaboration on administrative management.
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but rather allowed them to complement the new systems. Yet, these reforms laid the groundwork 
for the emerging shift of agricultural centrality in the governing systems. 
Farming families: 
Upon the end of WWII, farming families passed through two major reforms in relation to their 
rights to farmland: 1) the land reform for ownership, and 2) the family institution reform for 
succession rights. First, the land reform changed the landlord-tenant relationship by transferring 
ownership from landlord families to tenant families. The ALA rendered equalized relationships 
between these families by controlling farmland transactions. It employed the household-based 
approach by stipulating “a family that shares housing and domestic accounts” as a unit of farm 
management (Ouchi 1995, 9). In particular, agricultural policy based on the ALA upholding 
‘owner-farmer principle’ bolstered the ownership and management by ‘owner-farmers’ who were 
identical with the longstanding farm families as the trinity of ownership, labor and management 
(Harada 2017a; Saiga 1978; Ouchi 1995). Thus, the reform did not change the relationships 
between farm families and farmland but rather allowed for the continuation of family-run farm 
management where family heads (i.e., typically eldest males) owned farmland, led the family 
members in farm management and labor, and represented them at a farming village with their 
farmland registered de jure as their individual private property (S. Kumagai 2006).  This 71
management style matched the farming methods and the way of living, through which farmers 
attained their life goals to own ‘family property’ (kasan), engage in ‘family business’ (kagyo) and 
 According to the results of the “Fact-Finding Survey on Advancement of Female Farmers” (conducted by MAFF in 1999), 71
over 90% of female farmers did not own farmland (S. Kumagai 2006).
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sustain ‘family name’ (kamei) (Ouchi 1995). At the same time, it allowed them to pool and 
flexibly handle ownership, management and labor within a family. 
 Second, farming families experienced a series of reforms that dispelled and democratized 
the patriarchal family institution. The reforms included gender, labor, education, and the re-
institutionalization of families through various legal amendments (e.g., Constitution of Japan in 
1947, Family Register Act in 1947, Labor Union Act in 1945, Basic Act on Education in 1947).  72
In terms of the rights to farmland, amendments to Civic Code in 1947 changed the inheritance 
rights from the family headship succession (i.e., the primogeniture) to equal division (Nakagawa 
2003; Tayama 2010). Over fears of fragmentation of farm property, politicians debated 
exceptions of farmland inheritance at the Diet in 1947 and 1949, though exceptions were not 
legitimized (Tayama 2010; Ando 1994). Yet, farm fragmentation accruing from subdivision did 
not become evident (Harada 2017a). In fact, based on the survey on farmland succession in 
selected villages across 11 prefectures in 1962, farmland proved to be continuously handed down 
as “the last bastion of life security” for farm families to allow for “ie to survive and exist” by 
minimizing the share to family members other than a heir even under the new Code (Tama 2014, 
9; Aruga 1971, 50; Ando 1994).   73
 The reforms also developed the social security system whereby the target of support 
became a ‘household’ rather than a ‘family,’ driving the change in the notion of farm families. 
 Examples include the Constitution of Japan (1947), which stipulated the individual dignity and the sex equality within a family 72
(Article 24), the Family Register Act (1947) which provided a principle of the family register to build on a modern nuclear family 
(i.e., each unit consisting of a husband and wife and any children with the same surname), the Labor Union Act (1945) which 
enabled the labor reforms to promote the social security system to protect laborers from unemployment and accidents, and the 
Basic Act on Education (1947) which facilitated the move to the philosophies of education based on the individual dignity (Saiga 
1978).
 In many cases in the prewar era, farmland was divided among children for handover in advance of the decease of their parents, 73
rather than being inherited singularly by a legitimate son, while the children other than a heir were given smaller shares (Tama 
2014).
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The Residential Basic Book Act (1951) provided the system by which a family was identified as 
a household based on its residential area with a resident card (Chaya 2002; Saiga 1978). The 
Public Assistance Act (1950) offered a framework where a household as a unit of supporters and 
dependents are given public assistance (Saiga 1978). Thus, the reforms replaced the autonomous 
unit of life security from the ‘family' associated with the trinity to the ‘household’ specifically 
associated with a residence. Furthermore, the reforms promoted social, educational and labor 
policies based on the philosophical construct to respect individuals, together with the ideological 
diffusion of a modern nuclear family (e.g., my-home-ism) (Saiga 1978). 
 Along with these institutional reforms, the underemployment of adults other than eldest 
sons of farm families became recognized as a serious social problem in the early 1950s (called ji-
san-nan mondai in Japanese) (A. Morita 2005; A. Ito 2012). After the immediate postwar peak of 
farm population, the underemployment of the young generations (aged between 16 and 25) had 
grown across the country until the mid-1950s.  As drivers of this underemployment, Morita 74
(2005, 77–80) points to the following four factors: 1) the increased redundancy of workforce 
through conventional labor allocation within a farm family that faced the postwar baby boom; 2) 
the decline in the agrarian economy following the end of the immediate postwar inflation; 3) the 
lack of employment opportunities in urban areas under the financial contraction policy in the late 
1940s; and 4) the increased pressure on the children other than a heir due to the bolstered 
ownership of farmland through the postwar reforms.  
 According to Morita (2005), in contrast to the other areas and sectors (e.g., the devastated urban areas, the heavy and chemical 74
industry affected by fuel shortage), the farming villages absorbed the population that increased due to the repatriation and 
demobilization, resulting in the significant increase in agricultural workforce by 3.47 million between 1944 and 1947. The social 
increase in farm population started to be negative from 1946. The fact-finding surveys on underemployment in farming villages, 
which were conducted in various prefectures in the early 1950s, show that most farm population with underemployment status 
(e.g., those engaging in farming only during peak seasons, those engaging in farming less than 6 hours per day) were second- 
and/or third-eldest sons and women between 16 and 25.
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 Prior to the postwar reforms, the children other than a heir hedged the family’s risk to 
complement the workforce depending on agricultural production cycles, life cycles, and needs 
for caregiving in the underdeveloped social security system, while being expected to serve the 
family for free after their apprenticeship until the age of 20 (Orei-boko) (A. Morita 2005). 
Despite the low-cost flexibility of their labor, however, the new family institution made their 
parents feel indebted to those children without inheritance and sufficient rewards, and prevented 
them from having their children actively engaged in the family farm (A. Morita 2005). Besides 
the decline in parents’ expectations of children’s contribution, the demographic and economic 
pressures amplified the recognition of them as a ‘redundant workforce,’ leading to them “staying 
at home, though willing to leave but cannot do so, and willing to stay but cannot do so” (J. 
Ishihara 1992, 149). With the loss of anchorage, these children tumbled into an ambiguous 
situation, resulting in self-destructive behaviors but also a movement for vocational training (A. 
Morita 2005).  Finally, the underemployment problem was resolved in the mid-1950s with the 75
rapid economic growth (A. Morita 2005). 
2.2.2 The second postwar period (1960-1985) 
1) Political Institutions 
The first postwar model branched into two streams, and one of them became the second model as 
the forefront of the policy to actively promote tenancy. The Agricultural Land Act (ALA) 
 According to Morita (2005), the youth associations in farming villages were active in entertainment and other cultural 75
activities immediately after WWII to recover the daily life, but became inactive without a clear identity either to a territorial 
association or voluntary club along with a series of reforms. In particular, depraved and wicked behaviors among those called the 
second- and third-eldest sons became noticeable in farming villages (e.g., gambling, drug abuse, etc.). However, some of the 
youth associations started to contact each other to initiate vocational training projects, which later extended to the national 
programs such as the Program of Dispatching Supplementary Agricultural Workers. 
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remained the mainstay of agricultural land policy, but only passively promoted tenancy. To 
promote the productive use of farmland, the ALA went through repeated amendments since its 
first amendment in 1962 (Imamura 2003; Hori 2011). This series was the stream of 'leasehold 
rights’ (Taishaku-ken) that controlled individual farmland transactions but increasingly allowed 
for tenancy arrangements (Hori 2011). The system of ‘leasehold rights’ continuously upheld the 
‘legal renewal’ of a tenancy contract and other conditions advantageous for tenants (e.g., 
compensation for tenants’ disengagement from farming due to the contract cancellation led by 
landlords) to protect the tenants’ rights to cultivation (Kosaku-ken) (Arimoto and Nakajima 
2010). 
 Another stream vigorously promoted tenancy with ‘use rights’ (Riyo-ken) instead of 
loosening the tenancy controls, giving birth to the second model. The system of ‘use rights’ has 
developed under a new law in 1980 building on the Agricultural Land Use Promotion (ALUP) 
program which started in 1975 (D. Takahashi 2010; Arimoto and Nakajima 2010). The ‘use right’ 
free from legal renewal ceases to be in effect upon the completion of a contract (Arimoto and 
Nakajima 2010). It allowed owners to claim their farmland back in their wills without 
governmental approval of the cancellation (albeit based on the mutual consent between owners 
and tenants to be reported to the agricultural committees). Thus, it enabled owners to lend their 
farmland to other farmers without fear of losing the de-facto land ownership. 
 Based on the Agricultural Land Use Promotion (ALUP) Act (1980) that legitimized the 
‘use right,’ the second model boosted a new principle called the ‘cultivator 
principle’ (Kosakusha-shugi) to prioritize agricultural productivity. At first, the Agricultural 
Basic Act (ABA) of 1961 treated agricultural policy as industrial, setting the goal to improve 
 !75
productivity and redress the income disparities between agriculture and other sectors. This 
preceded a series of ALA amendments since 1962 to adjust the ‘leasehold right’ system to the 
loosened tenancy controls, while leading to the emergence of the ‘use right’ system to promote 
tenancy. Although the original ALA lacked a vision of farm management other than the ‘owner-
farmer principle,’ the dual system brought forth the ‘cultivator principle’ to grant more power to 
‘cultivators’ (who farm land appropriately and efficiently, mostly by residing and farming in 
farming villages) to acquire rights to farmland (Imamura 2003; Higuchi 2009). The ‘use right’ 
system politically pronounced farmland as a commons to be managed by a farming village, by 
adopting the decentralized approach to collective tenancy arrangements to leverage the self-
governing capacity of villages (Imamura 2003). The first model limited the farm scale (i.e., 0.3 
ha-3 ha), and in practice decreased economy of scale along with the progress of informal, ad-hoc 
tenancy arrangements on the historically fragmented rice paddies (Imamura 2003; Sun and 
Tashiro 1990). To resolve this problem, the second model deployed a new approach whereby 
local administrative bodies facilitated tenancy.  
 The remainder of this section details the political institutional changes in governing 
farmland over the second postwar period (1960-1984) in order to explain the emergence and 
operation of the second model. First, it lays out how the first model was extended in the course 
of development of the ‘leasehold right’ system. Then, it illustrates how the second model was 
introduced as another stream for tenancy arrangements. It also describes how the second model 
was operationalized in the political frameworks. 
Agricultural Basic Act (ABA) of 1961 
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In response to agricultural decline along with the progress in the rapid economic growth, the 
government established the Agricultural Basic Act (ABA) in 1961 to direct agricultural policy to 
an industrial one and called for the scale expansion of farm management (Kurumisawa 2016; 
Honma 2010).  With the goal to improve productivity and redress income disparity, the ABA 76
entailed three pillars, including: 1) structural, 2) production, and 3) price and distribution policies 
(Honma 2010). The structural policy offered a vision of ‘economically viable farm management’ 
by defining an ‘economically viable farming family’ (Jiritsu-keiei noka) as a family-run farm 
capable of generating agricultural income equivalent to that in other industrial sectors (Honma 
2010).  To make the agricultural structure dominant by economically viable farms,  this policy 77 78
developed the Agricultural Structure Improvement (ASI) program to physically improve 
farmland for agricultural modernization.  The program was pursued to demonstrate 79
‘economically viable farm management,’ resulting in the development of a few large-scale farms 
 Following the Economic White Paper of 1956 that stated that “[i]t is no longer the postwar period,” the White Paper of 76
Agriculture and Forestry of 1957 cautioned about the “five red signals” of Japanese agriculture, which included: 1) low income 
of farm families; 2) low capacity of food supply; 3) low competitiveness in the international markets; 4) progress in part-time 
farming; and 5) weak structure of agricultural employment (Honma 2010). In response, the government launched an advisory 
body to the prime minister in 1959 to seek an economic rationale of agricultural policy. This provided the recommendations in 
1960 called ‘the Basic Measures to Fundamental Problems of Agriculture,’ which laid out the economic rationale for agricultural 
policy, resulting in the establishment of the ABA in 1961 after a series of Diet deliberations (Kurumisawa 2016; Honma 2010).
 While the ALA of 1952 understated the economy of scale of a family-run farm (other than the loose range between 0.3ha 77
-3ha), the ABA placed the fostering of “economically viable farm management” (Jiritsu-keiei) as the center of its structural 
policy (Fuchino 2003). It initially defined the appropriate scale of farm management as the area under cultivation over 1-2ha, but 
adjusted it to 4-5ha due to the increased average worker wages (Honma 2010). The series of Agricultural White Paper annually 
reported the number of economically viable farm households and its share in comparison with the numerical goals (Fuchino 
2003).
 The ABA set the target to entail 2.5 million economically viable farm households with the farm size over 2 ha and 2.5 million 78
of part-time farm households with the farm size of 0.4ha for the agricultural structure in which the economically viable farms 
would cover 5 million ha out of the total farmland of 6 million ha (Kurumisawa 2016).
 The ASI program facilitated the adoption of large-sized farming machines by funding the land improvement projects which 79
included land consolidation (to 0.3 ha on average) and other infrastructural development (Kurumisawa 2016). With the 
considerable amount of national subsidies, the first series was conducted between 1962 and 1969 as pilot projects at a few sites of 
each municipality across the country (approximately 3,100 municipalities in total) to demonstrate a set of works including land 
improvement as well as the introduction of equipments and facilities for agricultural modernization (Honma 2010). This was 
followed by the second series between 1970 and 1978 and then more extensively under different project names.
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but rather expanding a thin, broad subsidiary route to a vast number of farming communities 
(Iwamoto 1999).  It also initiated the farmland liquidation policy with a focus on the 80
‘ownership’ transfer to allow for larger-scale farming, leading to the first amendment to the ALA 
in 1962.  
 The two other pillars also promoted larger-scale farming. The production policy 
promoted the selective expansion of agricultural production through infrastructural and 
technological investment in selected products based on economic forecasts. Besides false 
predictions of demand-and-supply trends, however, improved agricultural productivity together 
with the expanded employment opportunities resulted in an increase in part-time farming.  The 81
price and distribution policy was intended to support farm households as a supplement to the 
production policy. Yet, it became an income-redistribution program for the existing small farms 
by raising the rice price for government purchase even with the excessive supply and then 
distorting the agricultural market.  Consequently, farmland aggregation for large-scale farming 82
 Following the ABA that also promoted ‘collaborative farming’ (kyogyo) (Article 17), the ASI program facilitated the shared 80
use of agricultural machines in farming village communities, but only as complementary to family-run economically-viable farms 
(Katsura 2006). Many communities adopted the collaborative farms, resulting in a few cases where such farming developed into 
corporate large-scale farms. Nevertheless, most of them were disbanded upon the end of a mechanical life (e.g., machine 
breakdown, needs for upgrading machines), either returning to individual farms or reorganizing themselves into smaller groups of 
interested farmers. 
 The selective expansion policy focused on products with increasing demand to streamline the production in competition with 81
foreign products (the first clause of Article 2 of ABA) (Hirasawa 2017). This made the land-extensive farming products other 
than rice as the staple diet dependent on import, while promoting the production of land-intensive farming products (e.g., 
vegetable, fruits) (Hirasawa 2017). With the infrastructural and technological investment to shift the product composition, the 
supply of the selected products increased for the first 10 years as planned to meet the forecasts that was predicted in the Long-
Term Outlook for Demand and Production of Agricultural Products in 1962 (Honma 2010). However, the increase in demand for 
the selected products slowed down towards the end of the rapid economic growth, whereas the competition with foreign products 
increased (Honma 2010). In particular, the per-capita consumption of rice decreased well ahead of the forecast, compelling the 
production adjustment of rice since 1969 (Honma 2010; Yamamoto 1980). Also, the infrastructural and technological investment 
(e.g., land consolidation, agricultural mechanization) decreased the per-unit-area labour hours, enabling the saved labor to engage 
in other sectors and keep engaging in farming as a sideline, rather than to enhance farm management, given the expanded 
employment opportunities in rural regions under rapid economic growth (Honma 2010; Kurumisawa 2016).
 As intended to supplement the production policy, the measures for the price and distribution policy at the earlier stage were 82
consistent with the selective expansion measures and contributed to the expansion and stable supply of the focused products such 
as livestock products, soybeans and coleseed (Honma 2010). Given the widened income disparities under rapid economic growth, 
however, the policy raised the government rice price despite the excess production to redress the income gap, rather than curbing 
the price to contract the rice production in accordance with the selective expansion policy (Honma 2010).
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limitedly progressed in the land-extensive rice farming (Kurumisawa 2016; Honma 2010; 
Yokoyama 2008).   83
Amendments to the Agricultural Land Act (ALA) (1962 and1970) 
The ABA (particularly its structural policy) guided the first amendment to the ALA in 1962. The 
amendment extended to three fronts: 1) farmland scale, 2) corporate ownership of farmland, and 
3) intermediary of farmland transactions. All of these focused on ownership transfer for large-
scale farming to improve productivity under the ‘owner-farmer principle’ (Honma 2010; Sun and 
Tashiro 1990; Yamamoto 1980; Wajima 2017; Shimamoto 2006). First, it relaxed the upper limit 
of the area of farmland ownership.  Second, it institutionalized ‘Agricultural Production 84
Corporations’ (Nogyo seisan hojin) as a legal person with legitimized farmland ownership.  The 85
incorporation of farmers as a legal person became sanctioned under several conditions (e.g., 
corporation types, business types, members’ engagement), which was limited to the grouping of 
natural persons under the ‘owner-farmer principle’ (Imamura 2003; Honma 2010; Kurauchi 
1998). Third, the revision of Agricultural Co-operatives Act (ACOA) provided a legal basis for 
 The exception was Hokkaido Prefecture. The area of operating cultivated land (Keiei-kochi) per farm household in Hokkaido 83
increased to 4.9 times between 1960 and 2003 from 3.45ha to 17.18ha, whereas that in other prefectures increased to 1.6 times 
from 0.77ha to 1.24ha (Yokoyama 2008).
 Following the ABA’s stipulation on the fostering of economically-viable farm management (Article 15), the amended ALA 84
allowed the family-run farms capable of efficient farm management to own farmland with the area exceeding the upper limit of 
farmland ownership defined by the original ALA (the second clause of Article 3) (Sun and Tashiro 1990; Yamamoto 1980).
 The system of ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ was introduced in response to the initiatives of several farmers in 85
Tokushima Prefecture since the late 1950s where they organized agricultural corporations as a tax-reduction strategy, while 
following the ABA’s promotion of collaborative farming (Imamura 2003; Sekiya 2002).
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the Farmland Trust (Nochi-shintaku) program to allow the agricultural cooperatives to engage in 
loans and sale of trusts under the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) system.   86
 The ALA’s first amendment resulted in the limited progress in farmland transactions 
largely due to the following factors: 1) the saved labor hours through agricultural mechanization 
that allowed small farmers to engage in both farming and other jobs for income security;  2) the 87
farmers’ interests in holding farmland as a ‘family property' with the rising land value;  and 3) 88
the still rigid control of farmland transactions.  Even the introduction of the Farmland Trust 89
program only formalized the existing arrangements without revision of the tenancy controls, 
resulting in limited progress in implementation (Imamura 2003; Sun and Tashiro 1990).  90
 The ALA amendment in 1970 was the first step in departing from the 'owner-farmer 
principle.’ This followed the “Basic Outline of the Structural Policy” (Kozo-seisaku no kihon 
hoshin) of 1967 which added ‘stable supply’ to the ABA’s goal of ‘agricultural productivity’ and 
stated two key actors to be further promoted in later policies: 1) ‘economically viable farms as 
 Under this program, the agricultural cooperatives administered farmland transactions by receiving, managing and transferring 86
either ownership or tenancy rights on behalf of owners. Following the ABA (Article 18), the ACOA amendment in 1962 allowed 
the cooperatives to implement the Farmland Trust program, whereas the ALA amendment authorized the exceptions for its 
control under the program (e.g., permissions of ownership transactions, regulations for tenanted farmland, permissions of contract 
cancellation) (Imamura 2003; Sun and Tashiro 1990).
 Agricultural mechanization allowed farmers to continue farming in mornings and nights and/or over weekends (Kurumisawa 87
2016). At the same time, the expanded job market under economic growth allowed them to gain income from other sectors, but 
failed to generate income as high as to sufficiently subsist, disallowing small farmers to disengage from farming (Kurumisawa 
2016; Wajima 2017; Yamamoto 1980). 
 The ALA’s household-based approach to farmland ownership bolstered farmers’ commitment to handing down farmland as a 88
family property (Kurumisawa 2016; Shimamoto 2002). At the same time, the pressing demand for land (e.g., housing, 
transportation, production and distribution facilities) under the rapid economic growth heightened the land value in particular 
since the late 1960s, resulting in the rise of farmers’ interests in holding farmland for future increase in farmland prices as well as 
their expectations for land conversion (Honma 2010; Wajima 2017; Yamamoto 1980).
 The ‘Basic Outline of the Structural Policy,’ as discussed below, acknowledged the ALA’s control regulations as one of the 89
reasons for limiting the farmland liquidation for larger-scale farming (Imamura 2003).
 For the first five years of program implementation (1963-1967), the areas rendered for loan, sale and sale-loan trusts amounted 90
to 111.9 ha, 511.0 ha and 86.7 ha respectively, and did not substantially increase afterward (Shimamoto 2006).
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core bearers’ (Chukaku-teki ninaite) of agricultural production; and 2) ‘collective production 
organizations’ (Shudan-teki seisan soshiki) involving part-time farmers (Imamura 2003; T. 
Kobayashi 1992).  In addition to the zoning system for agricultural land-use, which was 91
launched with the establishment of the Act on Establishment of Agricultural Promotion Regions 
(EAPR Act) in 1969,  the Basic Outline proposed the revision of the ALA with the recognition 92
of its flawed strong pro-tenant line against the actual socio-economic status of farming.  To shift 93
from the ‘owner-farmer principle’ to tenancy promotion, the revision expanded the ALA’s 
legislative purpose to ‘efficient’ farmland-use.   94
 Accordingly, with more focus on ‘leasehold-right’ transfer, the amendment approached 
three fronts: 1) scale, 2) corporate ownership, and 3) intermediary. First, it substantially relaxed 
 The structural improvement of agriculture was called for by both agrarian and financial sectors in the late 1960s, following the 91
trends: 1) the increasing pressure on agricultural trade liberalization (e.g., the shift of Japan’s status to an IMF Article VIII nation 
in April 1964, the conclusion of the Kennedy Round in 1967); 2) the heightened needs for efficient land-use under the pressing 
demand for land and the sprawling; and 3) the decreasing self-sufficiency since the mid-1960s (Imamura 2003). In response, the 
Basic Outline was published as the Decision of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) in 1967. The term of ‘core 
bearers’ (Chukaku-teki ninaite) of agricultural production started to appear in the Agricultural White Paper in Fiscal 1973, and 
replaced the previous term ‘economically viable farm management’ (Jiritsu-keiei) since 1974, while the issue of ‘collective 
production organizations’ started to be addressed in the Agricultural White Paper in Fiscal 1966 (Imamura 2003).
 In rivalry with to the enactment of the City Planning Act of 1968, which embraced large area in cities by delineating space, the 92
EAPR Act was established in haste in 1969 as the “territorial claim of agricultural policy” to secure farmland (Imamura 2003; 
Harada 2011).
 The Basic Outline presented the direction to loosen the tenancy control, by identifying three factors that hindered farmland 93
liquidation: 1) the strong trend of owners’ holding of farmland as an asset; 2) the minimum progress in farm retirement and scale-
down; and 3) the rigidity of the ALA in controlling tenancy (Imamura 2003; Harada 2011). In addition to these factors, Imamura 
(2003, 21)  notes the political decision of promoting tenancy built on the completion of the post-reform administrative works in 
compensating former landlords. He also emphasizes the ALA with a law full of loopholes given that de-facto, informal 
arrangements for tenancy and contracting farming, which expanded due to the widened technological gap between large and 
small farmers along with the technical advancement that allowed larger farmers to progressively improve productivity.
 With the amendment, the ALA came to include in the judicial purpose (Article 1) a line that states “adjusting relations over the 94
use of such land” to ensure agricultural land is used in an “efficient manner” for farmland liquidation (Harada 2011, 16; Honma 
2010).
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the controls of ownership and tenancy.  Second, it expanded the eligibility for ‘Agricultural 95
Production Corporations’ (Nogyo-seisan hojin) (i.e., legal persons with farmland ownership), but 
added another condition requiring farm managers to regularly engage in farming.  Even without 96
an intention of policy-makers, this took the first step to moving from the ‘owner-farmer 
principle’ to the ‘cultivator principle’ for which property holders should guarantee ‘efficient’ 
farmland use but only with their direct engagement in farming.   97
 Third, two intermediary systems were introduced: 1) the Agricultural Land Holding 
Rationalization (ALHR) program (Nochi-hoyu-gorika-sokushin jigyo) and 2) the Farm 
Management Commission (FMC) program (Nogyo-keiei juitaku jigyo) (Harada 2011; Sekiya 
2002). The ALHR program designated non-profit local authorities (mostly prefectural public 
 The controls were relaxed in the following respects: a) ownership rights (i.e., removal of the upper limit and the increased 95
lower limit of farmland holding, and the loosened restrictions of tenanted-land acquisition); b) leasehold rights (i.e., relaxation of 
regulations of tenancy contract cancellation, such as no requirement for governors’ approval on the cancellation of tenancy 
contracts for the period over a decade and the cancellation based on a mutual agreement in writing); and c) rent (i.e., replacement 
of the rent control with the reference system for standard rents, accompanied with the advisory system for lowering the rent).
(Arimoto and Nakajima 2010; Harada 2011; Honma 2010).
 The original eligibly in the 1962 amendment involved seven categories of conditions (i.e., corporation types, business types, 96
members’ engagement, borrowed land, voting rights, employment, and profit allocation). The 1970 amendment abolished four of 
them (i.e., borrowed land, voting rights, employment, and profit allocation), but added another condition for executive officers 
(i.e., over a half of whom should be those who render their farmland for farm management and regularly engage in farming) 
(Harada 2011; Mamoru Sawada 2008; Sekiya 2002).
 A bureaucrat who was deeply involved in the policy-making process of the 1970 amendment made a retrospective view that 97
policy-makers and the Diet of those days did not have a concept of the ‘cultivator principle’ and only intended to facilitate 
farmland liquidation building on the ‘owner-farmer principle’ in an efficient manner (Harada 2011). He inferred the development 
of the term ‘cultivator principle’ since around the mid-1970s when the financial community started to advocate the farmland 
ownership by stock corporations, while some scholars point to the 1970 amendment as the edge of the ‘cultivator 
principle’ (Harada 2010; 2011; Sawada 2008).
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corporations) to engage in farmland transactions in consideration of local features.  To facilitate 98
farmland liquidation, the ALHR corporations were allowed to buy, sell and sublet farmland 
without official approval, but were limited to intervening in 10-year tenancy contracts due to 
other pro-tenant stipulations in the ALA.  The FMC program built on the Farmland Trust system 99
and allowed the agricultural cooperatives to engage in contract farming for their members (i.e., 
farm management on consignment), which had been prevalent in practice without a legal basis 
(Sekiya 2002).  These programs made limited progress in formal contracts, while informal 100
arrangements progressed for both farmland tenancy and contract farming (Sekiya 2002; Imamura 
2003).  101
Agricultural Land Use Promotion (ALUP) Program (1975) 
 The ALHR program built on the plan of the Agricultural Land Management Agency (ALMA) program (Nochi-kanri jigyo-98
dan), for which the bills were submitted to the Diet sessions in 1965 and 1966 but discarded (Imamura 2003). Similarly to the 
ALHR program, the ALMA program was planned as a direct public intervention in farmland management, whereby a 
government-affiliated corporation was to engage in various administrative works related to farmland transactions (e.g., 
matchmaking, sale and purchase, borrowing and lending, trusts, funding) in order to foster economically viable farms (Sekiya 
2002; Imamura 2003).Yet, the ALMA plan put more emphasis on the ownership transfer with the structure in which a nationwide 
corporation (rather than local ones) was to promote farmland liquidation (Sekiya 2002; Imamura 2003). The reasons for repealing 
the bills were said to include the backlash against the selectivity of the public intervention for larger farms, the lack of integrity 
with other measures (e.g., farm retirement, infrastructural development), and the potential budget inflation accompanied with 
rising land prices (Sekiya 2002; Imamura 2003; Sun and Tashiro 1990). The ALHR program took over the idea of the ALMA 
plan as its “local version” to have local corporations engage in facilitating farmland liquidation (Imamura 2003; Shimamoto 
2006).
 With the ALA amendment in 1970, the ALHR program was established on an exception of Article 3 (Restrictions on the 99
Transfer of Rights to Cropland or Meadow/Pasture Lan) to transfer ownership or establish and transfer relevant rights to farmland 
(e.g., a superficies, farming right, pledge, a right of lease) without official approval by the agricultural committees so as to more 
autonomously buy or borrow farmland from small or retiring farmers and sell or lend it to motivated farmers for stable farm 
management (Takayama et al. 2015). Yet, the ALHR corporations were not exempted from the stipulations protecting the tenants 
(e.g., the legal renewal, and the control of cancellation for the tenancy contracts for the period less than 10 years) (Sekiya 2002). 
Thus, for the intervention in tenancy, the ALHR program limited to the tenancy contracts exclusively for a decade so that the 
ALHR corporations can cancel or end a contract without official approval (Sekiya 2002). 
 The 1970 ALA amendment limited the eligible agencies for contract farming to the agricultural cooperations under the JA 100
system to avoid the legal complexity of the rights related to farm management and to prevent inappropriate farmland use without 
application of the ALA regulations (Sekiya 2002). However, the Agricultural Land Use Promotion (ALUP) Act of 1980 ruled out 
this limitation (Sekiya 2002).
 Imamura (2003) suggests that one of the reasons for the limited progress in formal contracts should be a lingering feeling of 101
resistance to tenancy, which remained among farmers and farming villages that experienced the land reform.
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As a prototype of the postwar second model, the Agricultural Land Use Promotion (ALUP) 
program was introduced in 1975.  In response to the prevalence of part-time farming against 102
the decrease in agricultural workforce  as well as the political and economic turbulence with 103
international relations,  agricultural policy in the 1970s changed its target from ‘economically 104
viable farm families’ (Jiritsu-keiei noka) to ‘core farm families’ (Chukaku noka) with a focus on 
individual farmers rather than an entire farm family.  Following this change, the ALUP 105
program was designed to facilitate farmland aggregation to ‘core farm facilities.’ Initially policy-
makers attempted to have farming villages manage farmland transactions, but found villages 
unable to administer governmental programs due to the lack of legal competence (Sekiya 
2002).  Consequently, the program designated municipalities as authorized bodies to 106
 Soon after the ALA amendment in 1970, the policy consideration for another approach to farmland governance started from 102
the fall of 1972, leading to the introduction to the ALUP Program (Imamura 2003).
 Under the Agricultural Basic Act (ABA) of 1961, which conceptualized ‘economically viable farm families’ (Jiritsu-keiei 103
noka) as those capable of generating agricultural income equivalent to worker wages, agricultural policy continued its structural 
policy to improve farm management based on farm families (Fuchino 2003). However, the number of ‘economically viable farm 
families’ started to decrease after its peak in 1967 (from 12.9 % share of the total farming households in 1967 to 4.4% share in 
1971) (Fuchino 2003). With the increase in part-time farming families that could secure household income equivalent to or even 
more than worker wages despite the decrease in agricultural workforce, the policy shifted its target from the household income to 
the agricultural workforce within a farm family (Fuchino 2003).
 Examples include the soybean crisis in 1973, the oil crisis in 1973, the Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago in 104
1972 (Imamura 2003). The soybean crisis followed the US’s outright ban of soybean export by which the US government 
attempted to control the domestic inflation in summer 1973 and also suggested a possible control of corn export (Hirasawa 2017). 
This export control ended in three months, but raised awareness about the risks of import dependency, leading to the widespread 
use of the term of ‘food security’ since the mid-1970s (Ohga 2010). The Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago ('Nippon 
Retto Kaizo-Ron' or Building a New Japan) was the policy statement proposed by the then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in 1972 
to promote the land development of Japan through industrial decentralization.
 The Agricultural White Paper in 1973 introduced the term ‘core farm families’ (Chukaku noka) (Kurauchi 1998). The term is 105
defined in the White Paper as a farm family involving male ‘core persons mainly engaged in farming,’ while it is statically 
defined as a family having ‘core persons mainly engaged in farming’ who are males aged below 60 and engaged in farming for 
more than 150 days per year (Kurauchi 1998; Honma 2006). This definition suggests key operators of agricultural facilities and 
machines in a farming community (Kurauchi 1998). 
 Even prior to the ALUP program, both policy-makers and scholars frequently discussed the self-governing capacity of 106
farming villages to manage farmland (e.g., collective rice production in the 1960s, and the rice-acreage quota management for 
production adjustment since the 1970s) (Wada 1988). To develop the ALUP program, policy-makers proposed a method of 
‘collective use of farmland’ based on the idea of ‘voluntary control of farmland’ by which a local group of farmland property 
holders would serve as implementation agencies for the program (Sekiya 2002). However, the bill screening process rejected the 
proposed exception of the ALA application for the groups without legal personality on the ground that such groups were not 
qualified to ensure the continuity and publicness of program implementation (Sekiya 2002; Imamura 2003).
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implement the program with the revision of Act on Establishment of Agricultural Promotion 
Regions (EAPR Act) (Sekiya 2002; Imamura 2003). Thus, the program was institutionalized as 
part of administrative land-use planning under the EAPR Act rather than a community-based 
project of farmland management.  
 The ALUP program first introduced the ‘use right’ system to have tenancy contracts 
collectively exempted from the application of the legal renewal of ALA (Sekiya 2002). To effect 
‘use rights’ for tenancy arrangements, the program consisted of three key components: 1) a plan 
of collective tenancy contracts (Noyo-chi riyo zoshin keikaku or Agricultural Land Use 
Promotion Plan); 2) a tenancy contract to be terminated upon its expiration as an exemption; and 
3) municipalities as implementation agencies to administer the program (Sekiya 2002). Given the 
role of municipalities as planning agencies for farmland transactions, this program was different 
from the intermediary programs (e.g., the ALHR and FMC programs, the Farmland Trust 
system). The former authorized municipalities to facilitate tenancy contracts between owners and 
users in a collective manner, while the latter designated the intermediary agencies to directly 
make contracts with the counterparts and engage in farmland transactions (e.g., buying and 
selling, and borrowing and lending) (Sekiya 2002). The ALHR program was making progress 
with the increased number of ALHR corporations and the considerable amount of budget 
allocation, but was separately implemented until both programs were integrated under the new 
law in 1980 (Shimamoto 2006; Sekiya 2002). 
Agricultural Land Use Promotion (ALUP) Act (1980)  
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Building on the ALUP program, the Agricultural Land Use Promotion Act (ALUP Act) was 
established in 1980 to streamline the relevant policy tools and foster 'core farm families’ (Sekiya 
2002; T. Kobayashi 1992).  Despite progress,  the evaluations of the ALUP program 107 108
identified three major limitations: 1) nominal binding of the existing informal contracts in the 
form of a plan without efficacy on collective tenancy arrangements; 2) lack of long-term 
planning of farmland use in farming villages (e.g., program adoption for the sake of grant 
money); and 3) systematic exclusion of the arrangements outside the program target area that 
was limited to the Agricultural Land Zones under the zoning system of the EAPR Act (Imamura 
2003; Kurumisawa 2016). Consequently, an alternative means to ‘collective’ farmland 
management was explored at various levels (e.g., national government, farming communities) to 
overcome these limitations and to follow up the earlier discussions on the role of villages in 
farmland management (Sekiya 2002; Imamura 2003; Wada 1988). The long-standing political 
effort to leverage self-governing capacity of farming villages for tenancy arrangements finally 
evolved into the ALUP Act as its core component, namely the Agricultural Land Use 
Improvement (ALUI) Program.  109
 In political orientation to localism together with the policy goal to foster ‘core farming families’ since the mid-1970s, the 107
term of 'core farm families’ came to take on the meaning of ‘a core of a community’ since then (T. Kobayashi 1992).
 Since the launch of the ALUP program, the area under the tenancy arrangements through the ‘use rights’ establishment 108
rapidly increased from 11 ha in 1975 to 11,131 ha in 1978 and then doubled each year between 1978 and 1980 (24,439ha in 1979 
and 47,521ha in 1980) (Imamura 2003). The program adoption rate of the municipalities achieved 58.6% by 1980 — (i.e., 1795 
out of  3,062 municipalities that developed zoning plans for agricultural land use) (Imamura 2003).
 To move from the ALUP program to ALUP Act, the policy deliberation on a potential role of farming villages began with the 109
concept of ‘Agricultural Land Use Agreement’(Noyo-chi riyo kyotei) (Sekiya 2002; Imamura 2003; Kurumisawa 2016). This 
concept built on the assumption that farmers agree on the norms of farmland management to effectively use farmland in a certain 
small farming community. This is associated with the concept of ‘voluntary control of farmland’ by farming villages, similar to 
the idea that led to the ALUP program. Differently, however, it focused on an ‘agreement’ within a faming village rather than an 
‘agency’ of a village to implement the program, and attended to farmland management in a border sense (including collective 
cropping, contract farming), not merely to management of farmland transactions.
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 To promote farmland management based on farming villages (Sekiya 2002), the ALUP 
Act advanced the ALUP program with three features: 1) administrative decentralization; 2) 
policy integration; and 3) community-based farmland management. First, the ALUP Act placed 
municipal governments at the center of policy implementation for farmland liquidation and 
effective use. Although municipal governments were already implementation bodies for the 
ALUP program, the ALUP Act authorized them as main agencies to administer all the key 
programs in cooperation with other local agencies.  Second, with the municipal 110
administrations, the ALUP Act integrated all the relevant policy tools and mechanisms in the 
scope of farmland beyond the Agricultural Land Zones under the EAPR Act.  As such, the 111
related programs, including intermediary systems (e.g., the ALHR program, the FMC program, 
Farmland Trust system), became streamlined under the ALUP Act. Third, the ALUP Act 
established the Agricultural Land Use Improvement (ALUI) Program (Noyo-chi riyo-kaizen 
jigyo) that institutionalized local groups to pursue collective farmland management. The Act 
authorized an ALUI group, which consisted of more than two thirds of farmland owners in a 
certain small area such as a farming village, to facilitate local consent on collective management 
 The Act on Establishment of Agricultural Promotion Regions (EAPR Act) of 1969 was the first step to center municipalities 110
in facilitating integrative local planning for agricultural promotion under the zoning system of agricultural land use (Imamura 
2003; Sekiya 2002). However, the ALUP Act of 1980 took the definitive step to move from the centralized bureaucratic control 
of farmland management to the decentralized administration for collective planning by giving municipal governments a role to 
facilitate farmland liquidation and effective use (not only use-right establishment but also other farmland transactions, farmland 
use and farm management), which were central to the structural policy under the ABA (Imamura 2003).
 Under the ALUP Act, the Use Right Establishment Promotion (UREP) program followed the method of use-right 111
establishment, which was introduced by the ALUP program (e.g., exemption of legal renewal, planning of collective tenancy 
arrangements), but also expanded the target area and the land types (including municipal areas even outside the urbanization-
promotion zones, and all the types of land for agricultural purposes) and extended to most types of farmland transactions (e.g., 
ownership transfer, contract farming) (Imamura 2003; Sekiya 2002). In addition, the UREP program involved intermediary 
organizations (e.g., ALHR corporations, JAs) to be granted farmland property rights (e.g., use rights, contract farming rights) 
(Imamura 2003).
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and coordinate transactions, whereby municipal governments could endorse group activities and 
execute farmland transactions (including use-right establishment) in municipal plans.  112
 As the flagship of the ALUP Act, this ALUI program represented the key features of the 
second postwar model. First, with the goal to enhance agricultural productivity and stabilization, 
the model took the integrative approach to farmland management, not merely focused on tenancy 
arrangements but more broadly on farmland liquidation and effective use (Imamura 2003). 
Second, under the ‘cultivator principle’ to foster ‘core farm families,’ it built on the ‘use-right’ 
system to collectively establish use rights at a certain area for effective use of farmland in 
accordance with local conditions (Imamura 2003). Third, based on the concept of farmland as a 
commons for a farming village, it took a community-based consensus approach to decision-
making. Finally, it took a decentralized planning approach to farmland use and management 
(Imamura 2003). In particular, the model involved the twofold system for collective tenancy 
arrangements in which local farming groups discussed and agreed on collective tenancy 
arrangements to be officially planned and executed by municipalities as part of a municipal 
administrative plan.  
 The governance mechanisms became complex, involving multiple laws and policy tools 
in addition to this flagship model. Due to the continuous progress in implementation, the ALUP 
program remained with the broadened scope (e.g., the target area, land types), rather than being 
merged into the ALUI program (Kurumisawa 2016; Harada 2017a). Except for some exemptions 
 The program activities by ALUI groups were placed under the umbrella of the municipal program: The municipal 112
governments established practical standards to implement the program and facilitated program implementation, while the ALUI 
groups built consensus on collective farmland use and developed rules to be examined and if appropriate endorsed by 
municipalities (Imamura 2003; Sekiya 2002). Farmland transactions were executed through municipal planning where the ALUI 
groups made proposals of transactions to municipalities and, in response, the municipal governments developed a plan in 
consideration of the proposals and executed transactions.
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under the ALUP Act, the ALA maintained its state control mechanism on each parcel of farmland 
despite a few amendments in 1980 to further relax the rent control to facilitate the use-right-
based tenancy (Harada 2017a). With the new legislation, the agricultural land policy became 
doubled with different focuses and approaches: the ALA focused on land use control in relation 
to other sectors, while the ALUP Act focused on land use adjustment and coordination within the 
farming sector (Harada 2017a; Imamura 2003).  In addition, the Agricultural Committee Act 113
(ACA) was revised in 1980 to clarify the role of agricultural committees in farmland liquidation, 
which had become ambiguous (Harada 2017a). Despite the multiplicity of policy instruments, 
the development of these three laws (Nochi-sanpo) by 1980— including ALA, ACA and ALUP 
Act — seemed to complete a decentralized system for farmland liquidation, letting several 
policy-makers say “The era of policy making ends for now, and it is time to implement 
it” (Sekiya 1981, 5; Harada 2017a; Imamura 2003). 
2) Social Institutions 
Under the influence of the rapid economic growth (from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s), the 
country faced a significant decrease in farming population and farmland, as “cities grabbed 
farmland and labor from farming villages” (Ouchi 1987, 120) (see Table 2.2). Arahi (2005) hints 
to five drivers for rural-urban migration: two pull and three push factors. Two factors pulled 
farming population to cites: 1) the postwar national development plans that skewed toward 
 Drawing on the government statement on the different sectoral focuses of these two laws, Imamura (2003) offers the view of 113
a double feature of the agricultural land policy, where the ALA rendered the nationwide state control of each parcel of farmland 
(particularly for land conversion and asset holding) while the ALUP Act enabled the collective farmland transactions based on 
local autonomy. On the other, Harada (2017a) claims a nested (rather than parallel) feature of the policy, arguing that the ALA 
lays the general ground (special rules of farmland ownership for the Civic Code) based on which specific farmland transactions 
under the program framework of municipalities were exempted from some of the rules.  
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industrial and urban development;  and 2) the diffusion of urban lifestyle (e.g., popularization 114
of home electronics, automobiles and recreation) that attracted rural residents. Three factors 
pushed them from rural areas: 1) the technological advancement that allowed for laborsaving in 
farming; 2) the fall of self-sufficient lives of farmers resulting from the growth of commodity 
economy (e.g., agricultural machines and chemicals) associated with the slump of subsidiary 
businesses (e.g., forestry, charcoal making); and 3) the decline in social and cultural events in 
farming villages that weakened the power to deter outmigration.  
 Over the second postwar period (1960-1984), demographic change was distinctive 
between the two halves: the earlier years (1960 - the early 1970s), and the later years (the early 
1970s - 1985) (Ouchi 2005).  Under the rapid economic growth in the earlier years, the 115
agricultural population sharply declined with population concentrated in cities and depopulated 
in remote areas.  Besides the decrease in the regular, full-time agricultural workforce, the 116
seasonal and temporal outflow became significant (K. Abe and Kitahara 2005). The depopulation 
began in the western mountainous regions with the decline of forestry sideline businesses 
 The postwar political shift “from subsistence to reconstruction of industrial cities" was followed by a series of national land 114
development plans for capital accumulation (Tahara 1964, 209).The Comprehensive National Development Plan of 1962 (The 
First Plan) laid the groundwork for the economic policy in the 1960s (Arahi 2005). With the goal to expand the economic 
capacity of the country, it employed the growth-pole development approach to economic development to disperse dense 
industrial functions and promote economic activities in cities through the development of transportation networks. This furthered 
rural-urban migration from remote ares to old and new cities, and exacerbated depopulation in rural areas. The subsequent 
national development plans (e.g., The Second Plan of 1969 and The Third Plan of 1977) continuously aimed to raise the whole 
economy of the country by developing the growing sectors to be redistributed, resulting in less focus on peripheral areas. 
 With a focus on the policy trends, several studies divide the years after 1970 into the two periods: 1) ‘Comprehensive 115
Agricultural Policy Period’ (1970-1976) during which the policy focused on the production adjustment of rice and the measures 
against the heightened external pressure for agricultural trade liberalization; and 2) ‘Regional Agricultural Policy 
Period’ (1977-1985) for which the policy took the localism approach to policy implementation to leverage the self-governing 
capacities of local agencies (Y. Sato 2011; Akitsu 1996; Odagiri 2005; H. Kumagai 2001). 
 For the years between 1960 and 1975, the agricultural population annually decreased by 743,000 on average (with the total 116
population loss of 11.14 million) (Ouchi 2005). During this period, the urban population radically grew (e.g., the increase rates in 
the three major metropolises recorded 15.6% for 1960-1965, 12.8% for 1965-1970, and 10% for 1970-1975), whereas the rural 
population significantly declined (e.g., the decrease rates in the legally defined depopulated municipalities recorded 12.9% for 
1960-1965, 13.6% for 1965-1970, and 8.8% for 1970-1975) (Arahi 2005). 
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affected by the energy revolution in the early 1960s, but extended to the entire country in the late 
1960s (Arahi 2005). In contrast, under the slow economic growth of later years, the rural-urban 
migration continued, but the decline in farm population slowed along with a stabilized 
population increase in cities, while the farm household size shrank in depopulating areas.   117
Despite further cooling of rural-urban migration with the decreased labor demand in cities by the 
early 1980s, the depopulating areas experienced a transition from a social to a natural decrease in 
population (Arahi 2005; Nagata 1989). 
 These demographic trends involved suburbanization in the metropolitan outskirts on one 
hand and aging in the depopulated areas on the other. Suburbanization became significant at the 
urban fringes since the 1970s after the saturation of cities, resulting in farmland diversion for 
urban and industrial land-uses as well as urban sprawl in agricultural landscapes (Arahi 2005). 
This often provided negative externalities for both farming and non-farming residents, and 
sometimes gave rise to conflicts between these parties.  In the depopulated communities, the 118
upward shift of the gravity center of the age pyramid clouded their reproductive capacity.   119
 For the years between 1975 and 1985, the agricultural population annually decreased by 336,000 on average (with the total 117
population loss of 3.36 million) (Ouchi 2005). Compared to the earlier years, the urban population more slowly grew (e.g., the 
increase rates in the three major metropolises indicated 4.9% for 1975-1980 and 4.3% for 1980-1985), while the rural population 
less significantly declined (e.g., the decrease rates in the depopulated municipalities showed 3.7% for 1975-1980 and 3.1% for 
1980-1985) (Arahi 2005). The decrease rate of farm households in depopulated municipalities between 1970 and 1985 became 
less than in the 1960s (e.g., 1.9% for 1970-1975, 1.7% for 1975-1980 and 0.2% for 1980-1985 compared to around 4% in the 
1960s). Despite the slowed pace, the population in these areas steadily decreased even in the 1970s and onward (e.g., with the 
decrease rates in the depopulated municipalities of 8.8% for 1970-1975, 3.7% for 1975-1980, and 3.1% for 1980-1985) (Arahi 
2005).
 On the one hand, some farmers came to rely on agricultural chemicals, not farmyard compost from nearby forests that 118
became unavailable due to land conversion, and bore additional cost to control agrichemical diffusion for neighbors, while others 
suffered from the interfusion of domestic drainage into agricultural water. Non-farmers, on the other, often depreciated the 
dwelling environment with the drift hazard of agrichemicals (Arahi 2005).
 Along with the rural-urban migration and the demographic structural change (i.e., the decline in birth rates and infant 119
mortality), the age pyramid for the period between 1960 and 1985 changed in three aspects: 1) decline in young population under 
15 years of age (decreased by 65.6%); 2) shrinkage of productive-age (15-64 year old) population (decreased from 7.28 million 
to 5.20 million); and 3) increase in elderly population over 65 years (increased from 0.88 million to 1.38 million) (Arahi 2005).
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 Yet, the farming cohort born during the decade between the late 1920s and the early 
1930s (hereafter called the core cohort) continued to be the agrarian core labor until 2000 when 
they started to retire in their 70s.  This generation was a niche between the one that suffered 120
from the war and those whose life courses were influenced by economic growth. The efflux of 
surplus labor in farming families between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s was followed by the 
drain of heirs since the 1960s (Arahi 2005). The core cohort was in their late 20s or early 30s in 
the late 1950s, and many of them presumably had been married and unable to freely move due to 
familial engagements and social norms (Ouchi 2005). The aging of agricultural population 
progressed with this generation and was less significant than after 1985 but raised concerns of 
successors to farming (Ouchi 2005). Against the backdrop of these changes in agricultural 
population and land, the following discusses the changes in two key social institutions in 
governing farmland during the second postwar period.  
Farming village communities: 
Despite the demographic decline, farming villages decreased less than after 1990 (see Table 2.2), 
but were qualitatively transformed in terms of internal structures and external relations (Ouchi 
2005). The internal composition, which had comprised small owner-farmers, stratified with the 
involvement of part-time farmers since the 1960s and non-farmers particularly since the 
1970s.  First, the farming population was divided into two groups: 1) full-time farmers 121
 The statistics based on the national census show the share of this cohort in the productive-age population engaging in farming 120
continued to be the largest between 1960 (12.2%) and 1995 (20.1%) (Ouchi 2005).
 The results from the national survey conducted between 1955 and 2000 show that the average share of farm households in a 121
faming village decreased from 75.0% in 1955 to 60.9% in 1960, and that after the change in the definition of a faming village in 
1970, it decreed from 45.7%to 23.4% for the period between 1970 and 1980, and then to 15.7% in 1990 and 10.8% in 2000 
(Ouchi 2005).
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engaging in commercial farming, and 2) part-time farmers engaging in subsistence farming 
(Ouchi 2005; Imamura 1979). In land-extensive rice farming, the former increased the farm scale 
to secure profitability by farming the land owned by part-time and non-farmers, leading to 
informal tenancy contracts that flexibly accommodated either partial, temporal or full-time 
farming among owner-farmers (Sasaki 1985; Kawakami 1979; Ohara 1980). To engage in large-
scale farming, full-time farmers became either cooperatives or large family-run farms.  Some 122
cooperative farms stabilized part-time farmers within their organizations, while others resulted in 
the spin-off of large farmers who sought better productivity instead of shared, but limited profits 
(Kikukawa 1979; Kawakami 1969). 
 The tenancy market largely favored lenders (i.e., part-time or non- farmers) over 
borrowers (i.e., full-time farmers) (Kikukawa 1979). Owners’ interest in holding farmland was 
high when the farmland value reflecting large demand for land far exceeded the agricultural 
profitability.  In addition, many of those who seasonally or temporally engaged in farming 123
were reluctant to let others use their land over a fear of destabilization of land conditions 
(Imamura 1979). To secure agricultural profitability, full-time farmers expanded their farms 
through contracts rather than purchases, and often competed to cut prices of contract farming or 
to settle for a higher rent than a legally standardized one (Sasaki 1985; T. Ito 1980; Kawakami 
1969). Consequently, besides the procedural problems, owners’ fears of losing competitive 
 Since the 1950s, many groups of local farmers (nogyo-shudan) mostly in the form of cooperatives had been organized to 122
share the use of agricultural machines and facilities often by adopting the Agricultural Structure Improvement (ASI) program for 
initial investment (Ouchi 2005; Sasaki 1985; Kikukawa 1979). Besides, large family-run farms developed with the popularization 
of middle-sized agricultural machines (T. Ito 1980).
 In reaction to the rising land prices in other sectors, farmland prices went beyond the value of agricultural profits, amplifying 123
a contradiction between the rising land prices and the controlled land rents. These contributed to the progress in de-facto tenancy 
through informal tenancy contracts (Imamura 2003).
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advantages from informal contracts impeded formalization of contracts even after a series of 
legal amendments.  Thus, tenants had a disadvantage of financial cost and a lack of clear 124
prospect for farm management, often hindering their investment for further agricultural 
development (Shinohara 1974). Nevertheless, non-market factors also interplayed in reconciling 
the two parties. Tenants often held non-price competition by enhancing social credibility and/or 
cooperation with other farmers based on kinship or communal trust, boosting their status from 
mere tenants to stewards to allow for long-term contracts (T. Ito 1980; Ohara 1980; 1981). 
 Second, farming villages further stratified with the increased share of non-farm 
households. This fragmented the integrative function of villages. When the majority were owner-
farmers, villagers shared interests in residence and production (Domoto 1987). With many 
disengaged temporally or regularly from farming, production split off from the general function 
of residence.  Even part-time farmers involved in tenancy were not confined to land-based 125
social relations in a village, but became freed from such relations by securing outside income 
sources (Ouchi 2005). Albeit the regional variation in the functional restructuring, the village-
based collective activities associated with farmland loosened as the shared responsibility for 
farmland management became no longer the un-negotiable norm (Imamura 1979).  In many 126
 In addition to the upper limit of farm management scale that was regulated by the ALA before its 1970 amendment (Ouchi 124
2005), several studies point to the procedural barriers against formal contracts, including cumbersome procedures, inflexibility of 
tenancy arrangements, as well as the owners’ fears of losing competitive advantage for land rent and farmer's status (Sasaki 1985; 
Ohara 1980). 
 Both the residential and production functions of villages had been coordinated at a village committee (Buraku-kai) since the 125
prewar era, but since the mid 1950s the agricultural production function has split off from the committee and moved to other 
groups such as administrative districts, farm-household cooperatives, and Land Improvement Districts (Ouchi 2005). The results 
from the survey of agricultural villages based on census in 1970 suggest that the decline in agricultural functions such as 
collective farmland maintenance was affected by the increase of part-time farmer but more definitively by the increase of non-
farming population (Ouchi 2005).
 The functional restructure of farming villages progressed with regional differences reflective of the degrees of urbanization, 126
depopulation, disengagement from farming and development of other industries (Domoto 1987).
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villages, however, although the agricultural production function became limited to a group of 
active farmers, residential and farmland management functions remained in an entire village 
community (Domoto 1987; Ouchi 2005).   127
 The external relations of farming villages changed when agricultural policy shifted its 
focus from a family to a village in the 1970s with an aim to improve productivity.  Yet, this 128
policy shift also followed socio-economic and political changes. First, agricultural activities 
became systematically integrated into broader networks (e.g., administrative, JA, and enterprise 
networks) already in 1960 (M. Takahashi 1982; Ouchi 2005). For instance, agricultural activities 
ranging from production to sale became integrated into a network since the 1950s wherein 
organized farmers at a village often belonged to a specific enterprise of a certain agricultural 
product. As such, farm management became incomplete in a single farm family and can be 
hardly improved independently. Second, the ABA policy urged a farming village to collectively 
engage in agricultural modernization and scale expansion. As a featured program, the 
Agricultural Structure Improvement (ASI) program consisted of three integrated projects — to 
improve land, facilities and management — all of which entailed collective decision-making and 
action (Ouchi 2005). Farmland liquidation under the ABA also involved multiple farmers and 
compelled collective arrangements to facilitate scale expansion (M. Takahashi 1982). Finally, in 
  Among the three elements of a farming village, including farming, farmland management, and living or residing, based on 127
the census data in 1980, Ohuchi (2005) suggests that in many villages the first element moved specifically to a farmers’ group 
whereas the latter two remained in an entire village community.
 The year of 1970 is said to be the first turning point of the agricultural policy under the ABA policy, largely moving from the 128
decade fundamentally building on the ABA, called ‘Basic Act Agricultural Policy Period’ (Kihonho-nosei-ki) (1961-1969), to 
shift the focus from individual farm families to the broader framework of them to improve agricultural productivity (Ouchi 
2005). Several studies divide the years after 1970 under the ABA into the periods: 1) ‘General Agricultural Policy Period’ (Sogo-
nosei-ki) (1970-1976) during which the policy focused on production adjustment of rice in response to the fat harvest for the few 
years since 1967 and the heightened external pressure on trade liberalization; and 2) 'Regional Agricultural Policies’ (Chiiki-
nosei-ki) (1977-1985) for which the policy took the localism approach to policy implementation to leverage the self-governing 
capacities of local agencies (Y. Sato 2011; Akitsu 1996; Odagiri 2005; H. Kumagai 2001).
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response to the noticeable agricultural decline, local movements have developed since the 1960s 
in various parts of the country to revitalize farm businesses based on villages (M. Takahashi 
1982). A prime example was the One Village One Product movement (Isson Ippin Undō) that 
evolved from the New Plum and Chestnut movement (Ume-Kuri Undō) in 1961 in Ohita 
Prefecture (Fukuda 1984). 
 In particular, the production adjustment program has defined farming villages as a unit of 
program implementation since the 1970s to reorient rice-producing farmers from production 
increase to production control. The program bolstered the subsidiary system in which a farming 
village served to attain policy goals, but resulted in contradictory outcomes for farmland 
aggregation.  Beginning in 1969 on a trial basis, but vigorously from 1970 the program 129
imposed a quota on farm families with subsidies to convert crops from rice to others to be grown 
on paddies.  The crop conversion quota was often determined stepwise from prefectural to 130
municipal, village and finally farm-household levels (K. Abe and Kitahara 2005; Nakawatari 
2009; Okura and Mochida 2004; J. Ito 1994). Some villages maneuvered collective means to 
achieve the goal and at the same time rendered effective farmland use (e.g., using program 
subsides for land improvement) (K. Abe and Kitahara 2005). Others encountered some owners 
claiming back their farmland from tenants to receive subsides but often idling the land 
 Several studies attribute the inhibitory program impacts on farmland liquidation to the uniform allocation of quota volume 129
across different areas (J. Ito 1994). Ministry of Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) admitted this defective in its policy 
document “The basic direction of new policies for food, agriculture and rural areas” (1992) and stated the need for improvement 
of the program so that farmers can pursue production adjustment based on their judgements. 
 For the first measure called ‘Rice-crop conversion measures’ (Inasaku-tenkan-taisaku) (fiscal 1971-1975), the quota was set 130
based on the rice yields required for production adjustment (Nakawatari 2009). Since the subsequent measures called ‘Rice paddy 
general use measures’ (Suiden-sogo-riyo-taisaku) (fiscal 1976-1977), the quota has changed to that based on the farmland area to 
be used for crop conversion given the idea that production adjustment should not be a mere means to reduce rice production but 
effectively use farmland for food security. 
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(Shinohara 1974).  Since 1978, the program undertook a new scheme to compel a local 131
community not only to reinforce production adjustment but also to collectively control farmland 
use.  In response, some villages pursued collective farm management for crop conversion 132
through tenancy for which program subsidies supplemented the land rent (Takeshi Miyazaki 
1980). Others faced the throwback against farmland aggregation where owners pulled back their 
land from tenants to secure a higher rate of subsidies than the rent and unproductively conserved 
the land (Ohara 1981). In addition, since the 1970s the program furthered the move from full-
time to part-time farming to compensate for the agricultural income that declined through 
production adjustment in the face of rising living costs (Sasaki 1985; K. Abe and Kitahara 2005). 
Farming families (ie): 
Between 1960 and 1985, farming families experienced vital changes in quantity and structure. 
Besides the quantitative decrease by nearly 30% nationwide (see Table 2.2), farm households 
underwent the shrinkage of household size and the aging and constitutive shift of family 
members engaging in farming (Ouchi 2005).  First, household size reduced in general with the 133
remarkable downscale for the dozen years from 1960, which was followed by the slowed 
 A village in Southeastern Shikoku mountains faced the rise in a movement of landowners to restore their farmland that had 131
been under informal tenancy arrangements, given much higher financial incentives from the program than the land rent 
(Shinohara 1974). The financial incentives of the program amounted to JPY 24,000-29,000 per 0.1ha and JPY 29,000-34,000 
respective for idling rice paddies and for crop conversion, compared to JPY 3,000-4,000 per 0.1 ha of annal land rent. Under the 
program, owners applied to the program for idling of rice paddies and received the financial incentives. 
 The new measures called ‘Rice-paddy use restructuring measures’ (Suiden-riyo-saihen-taisaku) (1978-1986) incorporated the 132
mechanism for farmland liquidation in the program so as to attain both goals of production adjustment (i.e., to resolve the 
excessive rice production and the declining self-sufficiency) and those of structural improvement to accord with crop demands 
through farmland liquidation and improvement (Ohara 1981). The new measures also involved the scheme for local planning of 
collective crop conversion, for which the government offered additional economic incentives (Takeshi Miyazaki 1980).
 The number of farm households decreased by 27.8% between 1960 (6.06 million) and 1985 (4.38 million) (see Table 2.2)133
(Ouchi 2005).
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shrinkage.  This downscale involved the regional difference featured with the salient 134
retrenchment in the depopulating regions and the slight reduction in the suburban regions. With 
the change in the economic basis of farm families, the postwar economic growth counteracted 
the endogenous regional distinctions and mitigated the stark downsizing of suburban farm 
families through part-time farming while furthering the population drain from remote areas.   135
 Second, the composition of farm families transformed in stages during this quarter-
century with the change in age and gender roles in farming. In the 1960s, with the gradual aging 
as well as the drain of young adults, the employment of the middle-aged males in other sectors 
gave rise to the feminization of farming. The phenomena called “San-chan nogyo,” meaning 
farming by “mommy, grandpa and grandma” became popular, whereas the ratio of female 
farmers increased and was the highest at 55.5% in 1970 (Ouchi 2005).  However, this 136
feminization has inverted since around 1975 resulting from the disengagement of younger 
females. This inversion facilitated the expansion of contract farming and tenancy arrangements 
(Ouchi 2005; Kawakami 1979). 
 Regardless of these changes, the functions of farm families associated with the ‘trinity’ 
hardly transformed. As a farm family, the ‘living unit’ where constituents shared subsistence and 
 This downscale of a farm households (per-household members from 5.71 in 1960 to 4.67 in 1972) was even more radical, 134
compared to Western Europe (e.g., France and UK) where it took about a century to downscale a farm family size by one person 
(S. Abe 2005). In Japan, this sharp decrease in the 1960s followed the 1950s during which large farm families (more than 6 
members per household on average) were dominant, and preceded the years since the 1970s for which smaller families (more 
than 4 but not more than 5 members per household on average) steadily but slightly shrank (Ouchi 2005; S. Abe 2005). 
 Since the prewar era, the farm household size had been distinctive between the eastern part of the country with larger families 135
(i.e., about 7 persons per household on average) and the western part with smaller families (i.e., about 5.5 persons per household 
on average) at least by 1955 (Ouchi 2005). However, the regional comparison between 1955 and 2000 suggests that the new 
regional distinctions overrode the previous regional characteristics.
 The ratio of female farmers was the highest for the cohort of 30-34 year-old females in 1970 (63.4% of females compared to 136
36.6% of males). This suggests that the females born in the 1960s who were engaged in childcare and housekeeping filled the gap 
in farming accrued from the farm disengagement of the male cohort born subsequently after those born in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s (Ouchi 2005).
 !98
residence was identified with the ‘farm management unit,’ whereby living and production were 
united (Ouchi 2005). For farm management, the ‘patriarchy’ defined the roles and 
responsibilities of a farm operator in controlling farmland and labor, while the ‘primogeniture’ 
prescribed the inheritance and continuity of the farm body (Ouchi 2005; Toshitani 1987). This 
functional mechanism of the unit for both living and farming remained mostly unchanged even 
with the relative decline of agricultural income (K. Abe and Kitahara 2005). To secure this 
functional mechanism, the off-farm work engagement extended to the entire family to seek off-
farm income, resulting in the popularization of part-time farming and tenancy arrangements (K. 
Abe and Kitahara 2005; S. Abe 2005).  As coping strategies, farm families metamorphosed 137
with generational subdivisions and seasonal off-farm work engagements.  
 A farm family, typically as a multi-generational household, became subdivided chiefly 
between generations in terms of division of labor, lifestyles and accounting.  This subdivision 138
was associated with the changes in household economy. First, their reliance on self-sufficiency 
was reduced. Under the state initiative to develop agricultural production bases (i.e., the selective 
expansion policy prescribed in the ABA), the self-sufficiency, which used to take advantage of 
homegrown and homemade foods (e.g., rice, vegetables, fermented soybean paste), largely 
diminished (S. Abe 2005). Second, the consumption economy became increasingly cash-based 
and commercialized. Due to the new lifestyle relying on consumer products along with the 
progress of part-time farming, the share of cash expenses radically increased for a decade from 
 Following the drain of second- and third-eldest sons to cities, the off-farm work engagement among the family members 137
spread from eldest sons as heirs, to females and then family heads during the period between 1960 and 1985 (S. Abe 2005). This 
process involved the diversification of employment forms, and resulted in more than a half of farm families classified as the 
second-rank classification, in which the main income source came not from farming but from other jobs.
 The residence form also became often subdivided in a three-generation farm family by separating their bedrooms between 138
generations in the forms of a main house and annexes on a same premise (Ouchi 2005).
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1955 (by more than 20%) though stabilized after the mid-1970s.  Third, the farm household 139
economy became broadly socialized. This progressed with the externalization of some domestic 
activities for living (e.g., purchases of ready-made products, use of childcare and nursing-care 
services) (S. Abe 2005). These changes allowed for relative independence of the household 
economy from a family and a village, encouraging individuals to pursue freedom of choice for 
their living. With the diversification of income sources, the farm household economy became 
segmented into larger (generation-based) and smaller (individual-based) pockets within a family 
(S. Abe 2005). Yet, the externalized domestic activities were associated with a fixed and forced 
financial burden in payment for public services, taxes and social security, necessitating each 
member’s contribution to the entire family account (S. Abe 2005). Thus, the household economy 
sustained as a living unit but allowed for individual discretion of financing (S. Abe 2005). 
 Seasonal off-farm work engagement, called ‘Dekasegi,’ also characterized this 
metamorphic transformation of farm families. The phenomenon was limited to certain regions 
and time periods, but reflected the nationwide socio-economic trends for the second postwar 
period. The workforce for seasonal work was procured from the pure agricultural areas located 
far from major cities, where farmers had no other choice that would have allowed for part-time 
farming (Kitahara and Abe 2005).  This phenomenon occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, forming 140
its peaks in 1963 (0.29 million workforce) and 1973 (0.30 million workforce) (Kitahara and Abe 
 The statistics from the survey conducted by MAFF show the remarkable increase in the share of cash expenses in the farm 139
household economy for a decade between 1955 (56.3%) and 1965(78.3%), followed by the stabilization after 1975 at the level 
around 85% (S. Abe 2005). For the period between 1960 and 1985, the in-kind contribution to the household economy decreased 
from 33.2% to 14.7%, while the share of the cash expenses increased from 66.8% to 85.3%.
 Three major regions that procured seasonal off-farm workers included Tohoku, Kyushu (particularly South Kyushu) and 140
Hokuriku regions (Kitahara and Abe 2005). In the rest of the country, some regions (e.g., suburban, Hokkaido, Kyushu Chugoku, 
Shiokoku regions) were largely featured with the exodus of entire farm families, while others (e.g., Kanto, Tokai, Kinki, Sanyo 
regions) were featured with home-based part-time farming (Arahi 2005).
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2005). The demand mechanism for the workers chiefly built on the construction industry where 
the projects under multi-layered subcontracting systems demanded cheap, flexible and casual 
labor (Kitahara and Abe 2005). The supply mechanism stands in the dry-field farming region of 
South Kyushu for the first peak and then on the rice-producing regions for the second peak. The 
former was affected by the decline in dry-field farming under the ABA policy since 1960s, while 
the latter resulted from the agricultural income decrease, the household expenditure increase and 
the labor surplus in rice farms (Kitahara and Abe 2005). The number of these workers took a 
downward turn in accordance with the low economic growth in the early 1970s (Kitahara and 
Abe 2005). The phenomenon led to physical and mental stresses of farm families, and thus 
elicited their interest in hosting enterprises and public works for local employment, which 
facilitated off-farm work for all family members. The cash earnings from off-farm work allowed 
each family to possess farming machines, and then fomented small, family-run farming in 
combination of part-time farming, rather than developing large or collective farming (Kitahara 
and Abe 2005). 
2.2.3 The third postwar period (1986-2005) 
1) Political Institutions 
The third model is linked to the trade liberalization of the mid-1980s. Following the Plaza 
Accord in 1985 and then the eighth round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) between 1986 and 1994, known as the Uruguay Round (UR), Japan’s government was 
forced to reexamine agricultural policy (Horiguchi 1995; Ueda 2018; K. Morita 2004; Kishi 
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2009).  In anticipation of negotiations including the rice market, the private advisory panel to 141
the then Prime Minister Nakasone in 1986 prepared the “Maekawa Report” (Report of the 
Advisory Group on Economic Restructuring), which highlighted a need for change in the price-
support policy and called for structural reform to open Japan’s market (H. Kobayashi and Iiyama 
2001).  In 1988, the Japan-US Agricultural Negotiations also agreed on the gradual expansion 142
of the import ceiling and the removal of the quantity limit for beef and oranges.  
 These trends allowed for the departure from the longstanding regime ruled by Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), leading to the demise of the political relationship called “Iron Triangle” 
between a ruling party, bureaucracy and agricultural cooperatives.  Seeing the agrarian villages 143
as a powerful voting bloc (called hyoden literally meaning “a ballot rice field”), the LDP 
promoted agricultural policy in the interest of agricultural cooperatives to which most farm 
households belonged under the system of Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) (Honma 2010). 
The cooperatives often collectively pressured the political regime to pursue conservative policy 
(Honma 2010). Given the mechanism where most subsidies were given to farmers through the 
cooperatives, they were able to have large number of farmers as members and thus assure 
considerable assets, serving to provide a collective ballot (Honma 2010). The Ministry of 
 The Praza Accord was an agreement between the governments of France, Western Germany, the US, the UK, and Japan to 141
depreciate the US dollar relative to other currencies. The US intended to alleviate the trade deficit with Japan that enjoyed the 
trade surplus from export of industrial goods. Prior to this, Japan had been required since its participation in GATT in 1955 to 
meet the international standards through economic liberalization, and began to liberalize exchange control with the Trade and 
Exchange Liberalization Plan General Rules in 1960. However, Japan had received little attention from the international 
community given the little share of the trade volume in the early 1960s.
 In addition, the growing deficit in the foodstuff control revealed the limitation of the rice price support. The expenses for the 142
foodstuff control increased from JPY 118.2 billion in 1965 to JPY 490.6 billion in 1973, JPY 802.2 billion in 1975 and then JPY 
1,000 billion in 1980 (Kako 2006). 
 The LDP had continuously operated as a ruling party until 2009 since the mid-twentieth century except for a ten-month 143
period in 1993-1994, when a small group split from the LDP to seize power as part of a coalition that did little more than pass an 
electoral reform bill before falling apart (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010).
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Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) also joined the clientelism to secure budget 
procurements. This relationship skewed support for the conservative policies including rice 
policy (Shimomura 2004; Tsuruta 2007; K. Yamashita 2011). However, the LDP lost a majority 
at the Upper House election in 1989 for the first time since its formation in 1955, on the 
contested grounds including the trade liberalization. This was a historic event, as expressed “the 
mountain has moved” by Ms. Takako Doi, a leader of the Social Democratic Party of Japan 
(SDPJ).  It resulted in the formation of a ruling coalition involving three other parties, leading 144
to the fragmentation of the Triangle (Chen 2010; Tsuruta 2007).  145
 Following these changes, the third model took a further multi-layered form to ensure 
farmland’s contribution to the whole society. As a means to outpace global competition, the new 
policies attended to stronger farm management foundations. Replacing the agricultural policy 
based on the ABA (1961), the Basic Direction of New Policies for Food, Agriculture and Rural 
Areas (hereafter called New Policy) was introduced in 1992. It set out the binary goal in its ‘two-
wheel policy’: 1) industrial policy to foster competitive agricultural management, and 2) rural 
development policy to insure agricultural multifunctionality (Ueda 2018, 29). This was followed 
by the reform of the ALUP Act (1980) to establish the Act on Promotion of Improvement of 
Agricultural Management Foundation (PIAMF Act) in 1993, which offered the core mechanism 
of the third model. By design, the former promoted farmland liquidation to any available farmers 
regardless of their entitlement to farmland ownership, and the latter geared farmland aggregation 
 Ms. Doi made this remark, honoring the victory of her party that won a larger number of seats (46 seats) compared to that of 144
the LDP’s (36 seats).
 Besides the LDP, three other parties included the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), the New Komei Party (NKP) and 145
Democratic Socialist Party (DPS). The SDPJ advocated the establishment of a socialist Japan. The NKP advocated 
humanitarianism, while the DPS advocated social democracy and welfare-state development and opposed totalitarianism.
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to farm managers with stronger management foundations. The third model set the target of 
farmland aggregation by ‘certified farmers’ who plan to expand scale and improve management. 
In addition, the third model leveraged the prefectural agencies to coordinate the village-
municipal agencies with national policy goals.   
 This model has metamorphosed throughout the administrative reform since the 1990s, 
involving clashes between the farming and other sectors. In the 1990s, the public increasingly 
criticized the bureaucratic structure of the state when the bubble economy burst with the 
dissolution of the long-lived singular LDP’s ruling.  On the one hand, the Act on the Promotion 146
of Decentralization was established in 1995 to initiate the ministerial-level discussions for 
decentralization.  On the other, the Administrative Reform Committee, the third party 147
organization formed by the government in 1994 to address administrative reform, leading to 
deregulation.   148
 Namikawa (2016, 5–7) explains that the policy discussion of administrative reform originated from the Second Extraordinary 146
Administrative Research Council, which started in 1981. Yet, he notes that the Third Special Administrative Reform Promotion 
Council, which started in 1990 as a private advisory council to the prime minister to redefine the administrative reform upon the 
socio-economic and political turmoils in the late 1980s, set the course to further the discussions on the administrative reform for 
both decentralization and deregulation. Shimizu (2002, 51) calls the 1990s ‘the decade of reform’ by renaming ‘the lost decade’ 
that meant the financial problems after the bubble economy burst in the late 1980s. The reform of political and administrative 
structures progressed throughout the decade particularly after the launch of the eight-party-ruling coalition in 1993, and resulted 
in the institutional restructuring, including the establishment of the Comprehensive Decentralization Law (1999) and 
Administrative Information Disclosure Law (1999), the restructuring of ministries and agencies (2001), and the introduction of 
policy evaluation system (2001).
 The Comprehensive Decentralization Law, established in 1999, involved a large reform of Local Autonomy Act (Shimizu 147
2002; Murayama 2007). Despite several previous policies that took a decentralized approach (e.g., Act on Establishment of 
Agricultural Promotion Regions (1969), Third Comprehensive National Development Plan (1977)), most programs and projects 
relied on the subsidy distribution mechanism called ‘Agency Delegated Function System,’ where local governments as 
subordinate agencies of the MAFF distributed subsidies for policy implementation (Shimizu 2002). The MAFF stood in a 
position to oppose decentralization through the ministerial negotiations, seeing that food security should be under national 
responsibility. Yet, it was forced by the public discourse to direct an attention to “democratization of local autonomy” and 
“streamlining of administrations for efficiency” (Shimizu 2002, 55). 
 Upon the launch of Murayama’s new Cabinet, this committee was initiated against the former prime minister’s initiative of 148
raising tax. The discussion at the committee came to skew towards deregulation under the strong influence of the financial 
community (Namikawa 2016).
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 Consequently, a series of negotiations with the participation of different ministries and 
agencies as well as scholars and experts facilitated both decentralization and deregulation of 
agricultural policy and its administration. The agricultural administrative framework was 
extensively decentralized at the end of the 20th century, shifting some authorities of farmland 
controls from the state to the local governments.  At the same time, the discussion on farmland 149
acquisition by business corporations evolved. It resulted in the conditional involvement of 
business corporations in the farming sector, while maintaining the ‘cultivator-oriented 
principle’ (kosakusha-shugi) to continuously integrate agricultural production and farmers’ 
livelihoods in farmland use. The remainder of this section details the political processes of 
emergence and operation of the third model. 
Basic Direction of New Policies for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas (New Policy) (1992) 
As a keynote to the third model, New Policy was spelled out by the MAFF in 1992 to combine 
both industrial and rural development aspects of agriculture into the ‘two-wheel’ policy (Ueda 
2018, 29). This development followed the trends including: 1) the heightened international 
pressure on the agricultural market; 2) the lowered self-sufficiency rate; and 3) declining local 
communities particularly in areas less favored for profitable farming (Horiguchi 1995). These 
changes were beyond the level that was presumed under the ABA (1961) that merely focused on 
farmers and farming, and thus urged the ministry to stretch its wings to food, rural areas and the 
 As part of Comprehensive Decentralization Law (1999), 76 laws related to the MAFF’s administration were amended along 149
with the abolition of the Agency Delegated Function System (Shimizu 2002). Among others, the Agricultural Land Act was 
amended in 1999 and 2001 to shift the authority of authorizing middle-sized farmland conversion from the national to the 
prefectural levels, and then the authority of authorizing small farmland conversion from the statutory entrusted functions to the 
autonomy self-government functions (Decentralization Reform Expert Committee 2014). Also, the Act on Establishment of 
Agricultural Promotion Regions (EARP Act) was amended in 2000 to shift its prefectural level administration from national 
government’s delegation to the autonomy self-government functions (Shimizu 2002; Decentralization Reform Expert Committee 
2014).
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environment (Horiguchi 1995). With this broader scope, the New Policy involved two major 
schemes: 1) farmland liquidation; and 2) development of hilly and mountainous areas 
(Murayama 2000).  Nevertheless, under the influence of the Uruguay Round (UR) 150
negotiations, the chief goal was to develop ‘efficient and stable farm management entities,’ as 
this was a central theme to implement the latter scheme (Murayama 2000).  With the 151
understanding that the lack of farmers capable of competitive farming was a primary cause of 
agricultural problems, the New Policy favored a selective approach by which agricultural 
production would converge onto ‘efficient and stable farm management’ (Ueda 2018).  152
 The New Policy introduced the notion of ‘efficient and stable farm management entities,’ 
which became the bywords of the subsequent policies (Kishi 2009). With this concept, the 
government discerned ‘management entities’ (keiei-tai) from ‘farm families’ (noka) to illustrate 
the farmers who would be responsible for future agriculture, by defining them in regard to annual 
working hours, lifetime income, independence, management capabilities, and application of 
 The former scheme was enshrined into the Act on Promotion of Improvement of Agricultural Management Foundation 150
(PIAMF Act)(1993), while the latter was legislated as  theAct on the Promotion of the Improvement of Basic Conditions of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Business in Hilly and Mountainous Areas (1993) (Murayama 2000; K. Morita 2004). Morita 
(2004) explains the underlying idea that in response to the policy of opening the agricultural market internationally, the 
government promoted the former scheme to enhance the structural policies for global competitiveness, but applied the latter 
scheme to the disadvantageous areas where improvement of competitiveness was inevitably constrained. 
 Prior to the launch of the UR in September 1986, a private advisory body to the then prime minister Nakasone published a 151
report called “Maekawa Report” in April 1986, which favored trade liberalization of agricultural products as part of the economic 
structural adjustment for international cooperation (Ueda 2018). In response, in November 1986 the Agricultural Policy Council 
presented the policy document called “Basic Orientation of Agricultural Policy towards the 21st Century” in which the direction 
to keep up with the trade liberalization through the improvement of agricultural productivity. Accordingly, the producers’ price of 
rice (i.e., the price rate at which the government purchases rice from producers) was lowered in 1987, as followed by the 
selective approach to agricultural policy in the New Policy of 1992.
 The advisory committee to the New Policy (established in 1992) framed the problems as follows: 1) Japan would no longer 152
rely on agricultural produce from abroad given the plausible stringency in the global food supply demand balance; 2) the 
continuous decline in agricultural workforce was leading to the decline in food availability along with agricultural abandonment 
resulting from the outmigration of young and middle-aged males from agricultural villages; 3) the continued agricultural 
protection would not result in favorable scenarios; and 4) the securement of those motivated and capable to engage in farm 
management would resolve the problems, which would be enabled by the attractiveness and rewarding of farming as a choice of 
jobs (K. Morita 2004; Murayama 2000). Despite the nuanced intention favored for ‘selective’ or ‘concentric’ approach, these 
terms were not used in the New Policy and they appeared first in the First Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, 
which was developed under the New Policy, as it states “various programs and measures are centered on farm management to be 
fostered” (Kishi 2009, 115).
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market competition principles (Honma 2006; Murayama 2000; Kishi 2009).  In addition, the 153
policy discussions for the New Policy developed the idea of incorporation of management 
entities as legal persons and raised the issue of farmland acquisition by business corporations 
(Murayama 2000; E. Seino 2010). The New Policy numerically set the target of land-extensive 
farming for the next 10 years, for which 80% of production would be borne by approximately 
150,000 ‘individual management entities’ and approximately 20,000 ‘organizational 
management entities’ (Honma 2006; Ueda 2018; Kurauchi 1998).  It estimated that the 154
production cost would be reduced to 50-60% by expanding the scale of individual entities to 
10-20ha and that of organizational entities to one or a few several farming villages. As such, it 
typified desirable management entities as those with 10-20ha scale on consolidated farmland 
applicable to middle-sized agricultural machines, but without details of their relations to other 
sectors and local communities to promote farmland liquidation (e.g., relationships between 
efficient farm management and small and/or part-time farming, roles and responsibilities of 
village communities) (Murayama 2000; Horiguchi 1995). 
Act on Promotion of Improvement of Agricultural Management Foundation (PIAMF Act) 
(1993) 
 Although the term ‘management entities’ appeared in the report from the Agricultural Policy Council in 1980 (Basic 153
Direction of Agricultural Policy in the 1980s), the New Policy further specified this term with concrete conditions of such entities 
(e.g., working hours, lifetime income) (Kishi 2009).
 The term of ‘individual management entities’ was meant for those run by an individual person or a household, while that of 154
‘organizational management entities’ was for those run conjointly by multiple persons or households. In either of them, main 
engaged persons were expected to earn the lifetime income equivalent with that of average local corporate employees, amounting 
to about JPY 8 million (i.e., approximately USD70,000) annually (Honma 2006; Kurauchi 1998).
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Following the New Policy, the ALUP Act (1980) was renamed to the Act on Promotion of 
Improvement of Agricultural Management Foundation (PIAMF Act) in 1993. This legal renewal 
involved two major changes: 1) the extension of the goal; and 2) the multi-stratification of the 
implementation agencies (Ueda 2018; Sekiya 2002). First, the renewal added capacity 
development to the goal of farmland liquidation (Sekiya 1997). Though the ALUP Act promoted 
tenancy for farmland liquidation without a specific direction to farmland aggregation, the 
PIAMF Act spelled out the goal of farmland aggregation as a means to capacity development 
(Sekiya 1997; Horiguchi 1995). Second, the renewal added the prefectural governments to 
implementation agencies to pursue farmland aggregation. The governance approach remained 
decentralized to build on the local arrangements so as to reflect local circumstances (Sekiya 
2002). Yet, differently from the ALUP Act that authorized municipalities solely, the PIAMF Act 
set the two-step system where municipalities followed prefectural ‘Basic Principles’ to develop 
municipal ‘Basic Concepts’ for program implementation so as to coordinate with other areas for 
farmland management and agricultural development (Sekiya 2002). With these changes, the 
PIAMF Act introduced three major programs to enhance farm management foundation: 1) the 
System of Certified Farmers; 2) the Agricultural Land Holding Rationalization (ALHR) program 
(Nochi-hoyu-gorika jigyo); and 3) the Program for Promotion of Improvement of Agricultural 
Management Foundation (PIAMF program) (Sekiya 2002).  155
 First, the System of Certified Farmers set ‘certified farmers’ (nintei nogyo-sha) at the 
center of the systems framed by PIAMF Act to demonstrate an ‘end’ of farmland aggregation 
 Besides the schemes to enhance farm management foundation, the PIAMF Act also addressed farmland abandonment, 155
building on the stipulations that were provided by the 1989 amendment of the ALUP Act (Sekiya 2002). To address farmland 
abandonment, the agricultural committees became authorized to provide guidance and advices for the owners of abandoned 
farmland, but there were a few case of implementation.
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(Sekiya 1997). The ‘certified farmers’ were those certified by municipalities as appropriate given 
their plan to improve farm management in accordance with the notion of ‘efficient and stable 
farm management’ (Sekiya 2002). Differently from previous models of farmers (e.g., 
‘economically viable farming families’ and ‘core farm families’), they were qualified in regard to 
improvement of farm management. The eligibilities were not limited to scale expansion, but 
were determined by local agencies rather than by the central government (Sekiya 2002; Honma 
2006; Ueda 2018).  Taking over the ‘use-right’ scheme to collectively establish use rights at a 156
certain area, this system also contained subsidiary measures (e.g., special exception of tax levy, 
finance loan) to foster certified farmers and promote farmland aggregation to them (Sekiya 2002; 
Honma 2006; Ueda 2018).  157
 Second, the PIAMF Act integrated the Agricultural Land Holding Rationalization 
(ALHR) program, which was originally introduced through the 1970 ALA amendment, into one 
of its major programs (Sekiya 2002). As a direct public intervention in farmland transactions to 
politically facilitate tenancy, the original program had made considerable progress since its 
 Under the ABA (1961), the ‘economically viable farming family’ (Jiritsu-keiei-noka) was defined with the unity of three 156
attributes of farmers including family-run farm management, full employment, and income, differently from the certified farmers 
who were qualified based on their plan rather than their attributes (Sekiya 2002). The certification system was originally 
introduced with the 1989 amendment to the ALUP Act to qualify farmers’ plan to expand farm scale, but it was different from the 
new system under the PIAMF Act, which expanded the scope to improvement of farm management not necessarily through scale 
expansion specifically geared at land-extensive farming, but also through agricultural diversification and intensification (Sekiya 
1997; Sekiya 2002; Honma 2006).
 To facilitate farmland aggregation to certified farmers, the government rendered the coordination agencies of tenancy 157
arrangements (e.g., agricultural committees, ALHR corporations) available for certified farmers, and provided economic 
incentives such as tax benefits (e.g., special depreciation of property tax) and low-interest loans (e.g., low-interest loan of long-
term funding, called ‘Super L Fund,’ for agricultural investment such as farmland acquisition and facility development) (Sekiya 
2002; Ueda 2018).
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launch in 1970 (Sekiya 2002).  Yet, it applied merely to exceptions of the ALA controls of 158
farmland transactions (Sekiya 2002).  To make it more broadly applicable, the PIAMF Act 159
stipulated the ALHR program as one of the schemes to enhance farm management foundation 
(Sekiya 2002). The Act prescribed the ALHR corporations as those at the prefectural and 
municipal levels to handle farmland transactions to accord with the prefectural ‘Basic Principles’ 
and the municipal ‘Basic Concepts’ (Sekiya 2002).  It also integrated the four programs into the 160
ALHR program: 1) the farmland transaction program; 2) the farmland trust program; 3) the 
investment and fostering program for ‘agricultural production corporations;’ and 4) the capacity 
development program (Sekiya 2002).  With these programs, the ALHR program was designed 161
to support financing and training of ‘management entities,’ while expanding the categories of 
  By directly purchasing and selling or leasing and lending farmland, the ALHR corporations were assumed their political 158
roles in facilitating tenancy arrangements, which cannot be expected in private transactions (e.g., removing the psychological 
resistance to direct communications between owners and tenants, farmland holding for the duration in absence of tenants or 
buyers, ensuring farmland aggregation and consolidation for the use by management entities) (Sekiya 2002). Given these roles, 
the ALHR corporations were established as a public corporation at the prefectural level across the country, while both the 
municipal governments and the agricultural cooperatives actively engaged in the ALHR program at the municipal level. As such, 
the political importance of the program grew in terms of the quantity of farmland transactions as well as the budget allocation. 
 In addition, the requisites for ALHR corporations to implement the ALHR program were prescribed mostly in the 159
government ordinances, not in a law (Sekiya 2002).
 The Act stipulates that prefectural governments shall develop their ‘Basic Principles’ where they ordain a public corporation 160
to implement the ALHR program in their Agricultural Promotion Regions that they designated under the EAPR Act (Sekiya 
2002). It also stipulates that municipal governments shall develop their Basic Concepts where they ordain a municipal 
government, an agricultural cooperative (only those engaged in credit businesses), or a public corporation to implement the 
ALHR program in their assigned Agricultural Promotion Regions (Sekiya 2002).
 While taking over the farmland transaction program (through which the ALHR corporations purchase or lease, and then sell 161
or lend farmland), the Act additionally established three new programs as part of the ALHR program, including: 1) the farmland 
trust program (the ALHR corporations were entrusted farmland for sale and lent money to entrusters as part of sales price); 2) the 
investment and fostering program for ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ (the ALHR corporations provided farmland, which 
was purchased through the farmland transaction program, as an in-kind contribution to Agricultural Production Corporations, and 
settled its share to corporate members in lots); and 3) the capacity development program (the ALHR corporations provided 
training and other capacity development support so that those interested in engaging in farm management could learn in practice 
about farming techniques and management methods on the land which was purchased or leased through the farmland transaction 
program) (Sekiya 2002). The first new program was intended to facilitate farmland liquidation through farmland purchase and 
sale, while the second one focused on certified farmers to be supported (Sekiya 2002). The third one involved model projects for 
farm management where the agricultural cooperatives as an ALHR corporation were also exceptionally allowed to engage in 
farm management (Sekiya 2002). 
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farmland and the types of farmland transactions.  As such, the program was re-organized to 162
extend the intermediary role to hold and manage farmland in advance of sale and lending to 
ensure farmland aggregation (Sekiya 2002). 
 Third, building on the municipal programs under the ALUP Act, the Act introduced the 
PIAMF program which included 1) the Use Right Establishment Promotion (UREP) program 
and 2) the Agricultural Land Use Improvement (ALUI) program (Sekiya 2002). To promote 
farmland aggregation through collective use rights, the UREP program was extended to most 
types of agricultural land as well as the pre-arrangement processes prior to contracts in program 
implementation (Sekiya 2002).  To implement a locally-based initiative of farmland use as a 163
municipal program, the ALUI program added the system of ‘special agricultural 
corporations’ (tokutei-nogyo-hojin) to demonstrate the use-right setting for the farmland use by 
certified farmers (Sekiya 2002; Kurumisawa 2016). The ‘special agricultural corporations,’ a 
type of the ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ defined by the ALA, were qualified to use-
right setting or contract farming on the farmland owned (individually) by the members of a local 
group (i.e., ALUI group) (Sekiya 2002).  The PIAMF Act allows the ALUI groups, if their own 164
management activities would no longer work well, to designate ‘special agricultural 
 Under the PIAMF Act, the farmland transaction program as part of the ALHR program come to include most types of 162
agricultural land (including mixed land of forest and pasturage and sites for agricultural facilities) (Sekiya 2002).
 The PIAMF Act offered two major prescriptions in regard to the pre-arrangements leading to the development of a farmland 163
use and aggregation plan: 1) the measures to facilitate use-right setting for the farmland use by certified farmers; and 2) the 
measures to have municipalities take into account the requests from Agricultural Land Use Improvement (ALUI) groups, 
agricultural cooperatives, or Land Improvement Districts, if any, to develop a farmland use and aggregation plan (Sekiya 2002). 
As such, the Act incorporated these pre-arrangement processes, which used to be outside the agricultural land system, into the 
system to promote farmland use and aggregation. In addition, the target area for farmland transactions was almost equivalent with 
the scope of agricultural land defined by the Act on Establishment of Agricultural Promotion Regions (EAPR Act), which most 
widely encompassed the land for agricultural purposes (Sekiya 2002).
 Following the New Policy (1992), together with the establishment of the PIAMF Act (1993), the ALA was amended in 1993 164
to relax the prerequisites for ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ (nogyo-seisan hojin) (Sekiya 2002).
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corporations’ as certified farmers to be responsible for farm management, while rending the 
designated corporations eligible for subsidiary support (i.e., tax and financing benefits for 
‘certified farmers’) and exception for tax payment (specifically applicable to ‘special agricultural 
corporations’) (Sekiya 2002). By making support available for such corporations, the PIAMF Act 
offered opportunities to develop community-based farming organizations in addition to its 
mainstay of individual farm management entities for farmland aggregation (Sekiya 2002; Ando 
2008). 
Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Act (New Basic Act) (1999): 
The Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Act (New Basic Act), which was enacted in 1999 
after seven years of the New Policy, served as a bridge between the third and latest models. 
Continuously holding the ‘cultivator-oriented principle’ (kosakusha-shugi) inherited from the 
second model, it bolstered the third model in terms of the concept of farmland. Moreover, it gave 
a foothold for the next model in respect of the notion of farmland users (Kishi 2009; 
Kurumisawa 2016). First, the Act reinforced the perspective of farmland as commons with 
social, environmental and economic functions. Prior to the enactment, the recommendation from 
the advisory body to the prime minister in 1998 emphasized that “farmland is not merely private 
property, but highly public goods to be used by society as a whole” (Kishi 2009). This 
perspective was manifested in the goals of the Act. Following the ‘two-wheel’ agenda of the New 
Policy, the Act denoted multiple values of agriculture, and laid out the four goals to: 1) fulfill 
multifunctional role; 2) secure stable food supply; 3) pursue sustainable agricultural 
development; and 4) develop rural areas (Kishi 2009; Kurumisawa 2016; Ueda 2018). 
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Differently from the previous ABA that merely focused on the economic sustainability, it 
acknowledged the importance of integrating production, life and nature to exert agricultural 
multifunctionality for the benefit of the broader society, as it added ecological and societal 
sustainability (Kurumisawa 2016). 
 Second, the Act stretched the notion of farmland users, albeit adhering to the ‘cultivator-
oriented principle’ that farm managers should engage in farming and reside in the vicinity. It 
defined a village-based farming organization (shuraku-eino soshiki) as a management entity, and 
politically promoted it for the first time for efficient and stable farm management (Takeyasu 
2011).  At the same time, it was a steppingstone to the inclusion of business corporations in the 165
farming sector (Harada 2010, 82). The New Policy raised the possibility of accrediting business 
corporations as one of various management entities to be fostered (Ohshima 2003). In fear of 
speculative asset holding, however, the New Policy disapproved farmland acquisition by 
business corporations, but decided to carefully deliberate possibilities of business corporations as 
a form of ‘agricultural production corporations’ eligible to acquire farmland (Ohshima 2003; 
Kishi 2009; Honma 2006).  Subsequently a series of discussions was held on farmland 166
 Though the New Basic Act placed the family-run farms as a major entity for ‘efficient and stable farm management’ to be 165
fostered, it exhibited two other directions: 1) to secure varied types of farm managers including new farmers, females, and the 
elderly; and 2) to rejuvenate various ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ based on farming villages and facilitate their 
incorporation as legal persons (Takeyasu 2011).The village-based farming organizations had been promoted since the late 1970s 
to sustain farmland without much cost in the critical areas lacking farm managers (e.g., the local agricultural policy special 
program in 1977), but became politically defined as one of diverse farm management entities to be promoted in the Act (article 
28) (Ando 2008). Nevertheless, specific measures to promote village-based farming organizations remained absent (Ando 2008). 
Although some programs facilitated village-based collective actions and led to the organization of village-based farming (e.g., the 
direct payment system for inter-mountainous areas since 2000, the production adjustment program for rice farming between 
2000-2003), it was after the rice policy reform in 2004 that village-based farming was designed to reform the agricultural 
structure (Ando 2008).
 While the issue of farmland acquisition by business corporations had been internally discussed at the MAFF, the New Policy 166
made a declarative statement “Although accrediting business corporations for farmland acquisition is inappropriate due to the 
fear of speculation and asset holding, there is a need to further deliberate whether to allow for farmland acquisition by business 
corporation as a form of an Agricultural Production Corporation, carefully taking into account of possible impacts on agriculture 
and farming villages.” (Honma 2006, 94).
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aggregation in response to the UR conclusions in 1993, whereas the issue of farmland acquisition 
by business corporations was debated to address the critiques from the promoters of a 
deregulated market (Sekiya 2002; Horiguchi 1995; Higashiyama 1995; Godo 1996; Honma 
2006).  In the end, the New Basic Act adhered to the ‘cultivator-oriented principle’ with the 167
understanding that ‘agricultural production corporations’ consisting of farm families could 
ensure agricultural sustainability (Kurumisawa 2016). Failing to reach an agreement, however, 
the policy consideration for the Act noted the potential of relaxing the restrictions to 
‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ to allow business corporations to engage in land-
extensive farming (Sekiya 2002; Kishi 2009; Honma 2006).  168
Amendment to the Agricultural Land Act (2000): 
The amendment to the Agricultural Land Act (ALA) in 2000 conditionally accredited business 
corporations as a form of ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ to engage in farm management. 
This amendment followed the overhaul of agricultural policy in response to the administrative 
  Following the New Policy (1992), and specifically the report from the Agricultural Policy Council in August 1994, the 167
MAFF presented the policy document ‘Overview of the Responses to the UR’ in February 1995 and declared the goal to liquidate 
farmland of 1.5 million ha owned by the farm households engaging in part-time farming or those in the absence of successors by 
2000 and stated the need to accelerate farmland liquidation in a pace of two to three times of farmland liquidation in the past 
decade (Higashiyama 1995; Godo 1996). At the same time, since December 1995 when the Administrative Reform Committee 
(launched in December 1994) submitted a report on deregulation, the stakeholders inside and outside the farming sector had 
discussed the issue of farmland acquisition by business corporations (Honma 2006). Thus, prior to the enactment of the New 
Basic Act, the active discussions were held not only at advisory bodies or policy councils but also in various publications (Sekiya 
2002).
 The final recommendation by the advisory body to the prime minister in September 1998 indicated the unattainable 168
agreement on the involvement of business corporations in the land-extensive farming due to the fears of speculative acquisition 
of farmland and local confusion for water and land management (Honma 2006). It also implied the direction to relaxing the 
system of agricultural production corporations in favor of expeditious and efficient business operation and financial arrangements 
based on the separation between management and ownership to provide employment opportunities and revitalize farming 
villages, noting that business corporations as a form of Agricultural Production Corporations, if they develop workable means to 
address these concerns, can be considered to become a management type of land-extensive farming (Honma 2006; Kishi 2009).
 !114
reform for deregulation (Ohshima 2003).  The amendment mainly aimed to change the system 169
of Agricultural Production Corporations, while further relaxing tenancy controls (e.g., removal of 
fixed monetary rent scheme) (Ohshima 2003; Honma 2010; Sekiya 2002). In accordance with 
the promotion of incorporation of farm management, the system extended the definition of 
Agricultural Production Corporations to encompass business enterprises run outside the 
conventional farming sector, and acknowledged business corporations as a form of agricultural 
production corporations (Sekiya 2002).  Thus, business corporations became eligible for 170
farmland acquisition and farm management as long as they took a form of Agricultural 
Production Corporations based on the ‘cultivator-oriented principle’ as local collective of farmers 
(Sekiya 2002; Honma 2006; Kurumisawa 2016).  Moreover, the Diet proceedings on this 171
amendment added the agenda for future deliberations to secure various types of management 
entities and promote incorporation of farm management in consideration of the progress of 
implementation for the next five years in light of an increase in domestic agricultural production 
(Sekiya 2002). 
 Originating from the policy-making processes for the New Policy (1992), the discussion about farmland acquisition by 169
business corporations was followed by the review of the agricultural policy from the farming sector. This review process was 
reinforced with the government-wide administrative reform for deregulation that started in 1995 in response to the requests from 
the financial community (Ohshima 2003).
 The system of Agricultural Production Corporations was introduced with the ALA amendment in 1962 to allow for farmland 170
acquisition by corporations (i.e., legal persons) which was not defined in the original ALA (Honma 2006). The system narrowly 
applied to a nominal group of natural persons given the owner-farmer principles, but became modified with the ALA amendments 
in 1970, 1980 and 1993 along with the change from the owner-farmer principle to the tenancy promotion to relax the 
prerequisites for Agricultural Production Corporations.
 The amendment to the ALA in 2000 additionally accredited business corporations as Agricultural Production Corporations if 171
they meet the following conditions: 1)  more than a half of the executive officers regularly engage in farm management and 
engage in farming practices for more than 60 days in a year; and 2) their ‘articles of incorporation’ include the need for an 
approval by the board of directors for share transfer (Kenji Ishihara 2009). In accordance with the New Basic Act that alluded to 
the potentials of business corporations only in a form of Agricultural Production Corporations as a locally-based collective of 
farmers, the new system with the 2000 amendment imposed several requirements on Agricultural Production Corporations based 
on the ‘cultivator-oriented principle’ (e.g., farming as a main business enterprise) despite the relaxation (Honma 2006).
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Amendments to the PIAMF Act (2003, 2005) 
The PIAMF Act (1993) was amended in 2003 and then in 2005 to expedite farmland aggregation 
and reinforce the measures against farmland abandonment (Nagasawa 2012). These amendments 
followed progress in the policy discussions on the administrative reform for deregulation, the 
rice policy reform, and the farmland abandonment. First, right after the enforcement of the 
amended ALA in 2001, the Council for Regulatory Reform (i.e., an advisory working group to 
the Prime Minister) proposed to further deregulate the existing systems (e.g., the control of 
capital injection to Agricultural Production Corporations), which was followed by a plan in 2002 
to reexamine the ALA to allow for strategic farm management by business corporations 
(Ohshima 2003). Second, the MAFF’s Outline Plan of ‘Rice Policy Reform’ (2002) positioned a 
village-based farming organization (shuraku-eino soshiki) as an entity to make rice farming 
adaptable to the market and consumer demands, and directed political attention to the future 
incorporation as a legal person and centralized accounting for efficient and stable farm 
management (Nagasawa 2012; Ono 2010).  Third, the area of abandoned farmland rapidly 172
increased in the 1990s after the slowdown in the early 1990s, though the first specific measures 
against farmland abandonment appeared in the amendment to the ALUP Act in 1989.  173
 The MAFF decided the Outline Plan of ‘Rice Policy Reform’(Kome seisaku kaikaku taiko) in December 2002 as a result of 172
the overall review of the production adjustment policy (Nagasawa 2012; Kobari 2018). This review was undertaken by the 
working group that was launched in January 2002 in response response to the rice price depreciation as well as the slumping 
progress in the production adjustment policy in the early 2000. At the same time, the MAFF decided the plan for the amendment 
to the Food Control Law which was enforced in 1995 to liberalize the production and sale of agricultural products (mainly rice) 
by abolishing the Staple Food Control Law (1942) by which the government intervened in the production, distribution and 
consumption of agricultural products for the stability of supply and demand as well as prices. 
 In response to the rapid growth of abandoned farmland (from 135,000ha in 1985 to 217,000ha in 1985), the amendment to 173
the ALUP Act in 1989 introduced measures against farmland abandonment, including the administrative advices and 
recommendations to the owners and the farmland transactions through ALHR organizations (Ogata 2013). These measures were 
taken over and strengthened by the PIAMF Act in 1993, although no penalty was imposed on the owners of abandoned farmland. 
Although the rate of increase in abandoned farmland was slowed down in the early 1990 (an increase by 27,000ha from 1990 to 
1995), it became much faster again (an increase by 43,000ha from 2000 to 2005) as the media reported that the abandoned 
farmland amounted to the area of Saitama Prefecture based on the census data of 2005 (386,000 ha accounting for 9.7% of the 
total farmland area) (Harada 2018a).
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 Introduced through the amendments was the System of Special Agricultural Zones. This 
started in 2003 as a measure to tackle farmland abandonment by allowing business corporations 
to enter into farm management through tenancy in areas where farmland abandonment was 
significant (Harada 2017b; Harada 2018a). The Special Zones (tokku) system in general was 
introduced in 2002 as part of the structural reform led by the Prime Minister Koizumi 
(2001-2006) to demonstrate a model of structural reform for regional economy vitalization, 
leading to the System of Special Agricultural Zones beyond the control of the ALA (Toshiharu 
Watanabe 2007; Harada 2017b). This was followed by the 2003 amendment to the PIAMF Act, 
which expanded the allowable share of the capital injection from business corporations to 
Agricultural Production Corporations as certified farmers (Toshiharu Watanabe 2007).  The 174
Special Agricultural Zone was designated as a zone where local farmers could not resolve the 
extensive farmland abandonment but the municipal governments or ALHR organizations could 
sublet farmland business corporations to resolve it (Harada 2017b). The system became 
applicable nationwide as part of the Special Corporation Loan Program, which was introduced 
by the 2005 amendment to the PIAMF Act (Harada 2017b; Harada 2018a; Toshiharu Watanabe 
2007; Hori 2012; Ogata 2013).  In addition, the 2003 amendment bolstered specific measures 175
against farmland abandonment by imposing additional requirements on owners (e.g., planning 
and reporting obligation for the owners of abandoned farmland) (Ogata 2013; Nagasawa 2012). 
 The allowable share of the capital injection increased from not more than one quarter to not more than a half.174
 The 2005 amendment put in place the Special Corporation Loan Program as a measure against farmland abandonment by 175
limiting the program applicable to the districts with considerable area of abandoned farmland, where the special corporations 
were allowed to manage farm on farmland sublet by municipal governments or ALHR corporations (Harada 2018a; Ogata 2013). 
Harada (2018a) argues that this program was a breakthrough to the liberalization of corporate entry into agriculture despite its 
slogan as a measure against farmland abandonment, given that all the conditions limiting its applicability to the districts with 
abandoned farmland finally came to be removed through the 2009 amendment of the ALA. 
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The 2005 amendment integrated all the relevant measures with further enhancement (e.g., 
forcible administrative arrangements for tenancy), allowing for active public intervention in 
private ownership (Ogata 2013).  
 Another major program was the System of Special Agricultural Organizations (Tokutei 
nogyo dantai), which was introduced through the 2003 PIAMF Act amendment in response to 
the Outline Plan of Rice Policy Reform (2002) to promote village-based farming organizations 
(Ono 2010). This system offered an organizational form of ‘special agricultural organizations’ as 
a stepping stone for village-based farming organizations to develop into ‘special agricultural 
corporations’ as certified farmers, by requiring them to set forth a goal of incorporation in their 
planning (Ono 2010). Village-based farming organizations were further promoted by the 
program of Rice Policy Reform which started in 2004 to orient rice farming more responsive to 
market demand. The program officially positioned village-based farming organizations in 
parallel with certified farmers to be supported if they met certain conditions (Ono 2010). The 
conditions included income level and farm scale (larger than 20ha) in addition to the centralized 
accounting and the future incorporation in their planning (Ono 2010). Moreover, the Basic Plan 
for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas (New Basic Plan), which was decided in 2005 to 
materialize the New Basic Act (1999), specifically set forth village-based farming organizations 
as a target of policy implementation (Honma 2010).  The Plan introduced the non-product-176
specific policy in accordance with WTO agreements to change the previous price policy to the 
 Given some ambiguity of the Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas (New Basic Plan), which was first decided by 176
the cabinet in March 2000, the MAFF started in 2003 to reexamine the Plan (Honma 2010). While the original plan seemed to 
focus on individual farm management entities, the revised plan of 2005 placed emphasis on both individual entities and village-
based collective ones. This change was made given the fact that business farm households (shugyo-noka) were absent in a half of 
rice farming villages nationwide. Policy-makers took this fact seriously, while the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) argued 
for village-based farming in the interest of small farmers (Honma 2010). A business farm household (shugyo-noka) is defined by 
the MAFF as a farm household in which agricultural income accounts for more than 50% of household income with farmers 
below the age 65 engaging in farming for more than 60 days annually.
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income policy with a focus on the capacity of farm managers rather than specific products 
applicable to all farmers (Honma 2010; T. Yoshida 2016). To implement this policy, the non-
product-specific management stabilization program started in 2007, for which village-based 
farming organizations as well as certified farmers were eligible as a recipient of income subsidies 
(Honma 2010). Thus, as long as they exhibited the transition status of development, village-
based farming organizations became politically and financially supported, regardless of their 
present status without legal personality or qualification of certified farmers (Ono 2010). 
2) Social Institutions 
During the period between the mid 1980s and the early 2000s, the farming population shrank and 
aged in terms of individuals, households and communities. The sharp decrease started in the mid 
1980s after the slow decrease under the low economic growth, resulting in a reduced and minor 
share of the agricultural workforce in the nation’s economy (see Table 2.2).  This acute decline 177
involved a remarkable reduction in farm households. It also accompanied the noticeable loss of 
farming villages since the 1990s, while the share of the non-farm households in villages 
increased on average.  Furthermore, the pace of aging has remarkably grown since the 1980s, 178
wherein the agrarian aging extended nationwide due to the aging of the core cohort, differently 
from the localized aging that was previously observed in the absence of successors for the earlier 
postwar periods (Ouchi 2005). The loss of population, households and communities engaging 179
 The share of agricultural workforce reduced to 4.5% in 2000, compared to 8.3% in 1985 (Tabata 2005).177
 The share of non-farm households increased from 77% in 1980 to 89% in 2000 (Tabata 2005).178
 The population aging rate increased by 11.5 points for 15 years between 1985 and 2000, while it increased by 9.1 points for 179
25 years between 1960 and 1985 (i.e., from 8.2% in 1960 to 17.3% in 1985) (Ouchi 2005).
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in farmland management resulted in the rise of farmland abandonment. Yet, new farmers entered 
into the farming sector as this population increased 6.7 times for a decade between 1990 and 
2000, though this is still minor (Egawa 2005). At the same time, the agrarian population involved 
young farmers employing new management methods as well as female farmers processing and 
selling products in addition to farming (Akitsu 2005). 
 These demographic drifts were driven not merely by the economic motivation, but 
increasingly by agricultural multifunctionality. The domestic agricultural production was on a 
downward trend with the price depreciation of agricultural products under growing international 
competition (Tabata 2005). Consequently, the agricultural workforce, particularly young 
workforce, significantly decreased from the mid-1980s.  Yet, to survive in the competitive 180
market, the remaining young farmers increasingly expanded their networks beyond their residing 
villages where fewer full-time farmers remained, and started to communicate and collaborate 
with each other to strive for farm profits (Akitsu 2005). Also, the movement of female farmers 
dominated by the cohort of females in their 50s (who became less occupied with child-rearing) 
started in the mid-1980s in various parts of the country to engage in processing and sale of 
agricultural products (Akitsu 2005). This trend accorded with the agricultural market that no 
longer allowed farm production to automatically lead to sale and thus encouraged farmers to 
depart from conventional ways of farming (Akitsu 2005). 
 Moreover the perspectives on farming life and occupation changed with the degradation 
of urban environment and cases of food contamination, resulting in the societal revaluation of 
agriculture and rural areas. Since the rapid economic growth, the prevalence of food pollution 
 The population of young agricultural workforce decrease to one quarter for the 15 years between 1985 and 2000 (Akitsu 180
2005).
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(e.g., harmful food, contamination with residual agrichemicals) raised consumer awareness of 
qualities of agricultural products, while the food provision system developed in the form of mass 
production and distribution (Shinabe 2005). Also, having experienced the loss of urban green 
resulting from urban sprawl and development as well as the degradation of amenities even after 
resolving the environmental pollution, urban residents became concerned about the progress of 
rural ecological devastation (Shinabe 2005). Against the economic-oriented idea, the phenomena 
of urban-rural interactions emerged in the 1980s to renew the linkages between urban and rural 
areas in consideration of various aspects of farming (e.g., food security and diversity, wild fauna 
and flora, aesthetic landscapes, cultural heritage, traditional arts) (Shinabe 2005). Furthermore, 
the gloomy employment scene after the burst of the bubble economy elicited the interests of job 
seekers to choose farming as an occupation, whereas the political support for new farmers 
progressed at the national and local levels in the 1990s (Egawa 2005). 
Farming village communities: 
With the quantitative decrease of farming villages, they experienced further diversification 
together with personalization in both structural and functional terms (Egawa 2005). Structurally 
two extreme types emerged along with the loss of farming villages particularly in urban as well 
as hilly and mountainous areas in the 1990s.  On the one hand, gigantic farming villages 181
appeared mainly in urban areas with the inflow of non-farm families who acquired houses in 
urban fringes where the cost of land was lower in the post-bubble land market in the late 1980s 
 The data from Census of Agricultural Villages of 2000 shows that the decrease in agricultural villages over a decade between 181
1990-2000 (4,959 villages with the rate of 3.5%) was much larger than that for a decade between 1980-1990 (2,255 villages with 
the rate of 1.6%) (Tabata 2005). In terms of regional differences, the decrease rates between 1990-2000 in urban (6.7%), 
mountainous (4.7%) and hilly (3.1%) agricultural regions were much higher than in flat agricultural region (0.8%).  
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(Tabata 2005). These villages were dominated by the swelling non-farm households. This gave 
rise to an increase of residential groups located within a farming village but organized separately 
from the conventional farming villages to pursue social and administrative activities.  On the 182
other, smaller villages increased in hilly and mountainous areas due to the loss and outflow of 
farm and non-farm households, as the population decline shifted from the social to natural 
decrease in the 1990s (Tabata 2005). The trend endangered the existence of the small and aged 
local communities (i.e., marginal villages called ‘genkai shuraku’) in the hilly and mountainous 
areas.  Besides these two extremes, most farming villages experienced the expansion of the 183
shares of non-farm households holding farmland and part-time farm households (Tabata 2005). 
The number of non-farm households holding farmland continuously increased between 1985 and 
2000, resulting in the considerable share in a village.  Also, the shares of the second-rank 184
classification and the elderly full-time farm households further increased, while those of full-
time and first-rank classification farm-household radically decreased (Tabata 2005). 
 Despite these structural changes, the self-governance functions of farming villages did 
not totally disappear. While some functions became externalized, most farming-related functions 
remained in a group of farm households but often separately from the non-farm, residential 
functions (Tabata 2005). In many gigantic villages with the predominant non-farm population, a 
 The number of agricultural villages within which districts consisting of exclusively non-farm households were located 182
increased from 10,545 in 1980 to 15,432 in 2000, while the number of non-farm households residing such districts increased 1.75 
times over two decades between 1980 and 2000 (from 3.68 million to 6.44 million households) (Tabata 2005).
 Akira Ohno (1991) proposed the notion of ‘genkai shuraku’ (marginal villages) in danger of disappearing with more than half 183
of the population over the age of 65 (Tabata 2005). Three quarters of the smallest villages (i.e., those holding less than 9 
households in total) were located in the hilly and mountainous regions as of 2000 (Tabata 2005).
 The number of non-farm households holding farmland (tochimochi hi-noka), defined as non-farm households owning more 184
than 0.05ha area of farmland in total including both cultivated and abandoned farmland, started to be captured from the 1985 
Census of Agriculture. The number of such households increased from 371,000 in1985 to 690,000 in 1990, 799,000 in1995 and 
904,000 in 2000, resulting in the 22.5% share of the total of farm households and non-farm households holding farmland as of 
2000 (Tabata 2005).
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fraction of farm households continuously maintained agrarian collective actions including 
farmland management (Tabata 2005). In other villages with a lower share of farm households, 
farm households organized themselves to handle the farming-related issues often as a terminal 
organization of the Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) system, whereas the entire village dealt 
with common, residential issues (Tabata 2005).  
 The increased share of part-time and non-farm households with farmland sometimes 
weakened the collective power to engage in agricultural issues given their limited commitment 
(Tabata 2005).  Yet, the collective management of agricultural infrastructure mostly remained as 
before, while farm households often served central roles in facilitating local activities, even non-
agricultural ones (Tabata 2005). The government continued to leverage the self-governing 
capacity of farming villages in policy implementation. Besides the continued production 
adjustment through village-based quota allocations, the government further promoted new 
community-based programs to address agricultural decline and farmland abandonment (Tabata 
2005). Village-based farming (shuraku eino) became politically promoted in the 1990s building 
on the practices in the 1980s in some areas where part-time farming largely progressed (Ono 
2010; Tabata 2005). The Measure of Direct Payment in Hilly and Mountainous Areas, which was 
introduced in 2000, conditioned a village as a recipient of direct payment to make an agreement 
on collective actions for farmland management (Tabata 2005). 
 The occupational diversification among farm families and their members brought in new 
networks where individuals related to each other beyond farming villages. The phenomena 
resulted from the pursuit of personal choice and decision rather than collective ones. The new 
networks were of three types: 1) networks of young farmers; 2) networks of female farmers; and 
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3) urban-rural interlinkages. First, young farmers started to organize themselves since the 
mid-1980s on a scale broader than a village (e.g., municipal and prefectural scales) to pursue 
mutual interests in farm management and businesses, taking advantage of learning opportunities 
(e.g., events organized by agricultural cooperatives or local governments) (Akitsu 2005). Second, 
groups of a dozen female farmers in their 50s started to develop their businesses of processing 
and sale of agricultural products, building on female groups of agricultural cooperatives or life 
improvement groups (Akitsu 2005). Third, urban-rural interlinkages involved the migration of 
new farmers and the inflow of visitors for learning and experiences in farming villages. The 
former came to comprise diverse types of migrating farmers in the 1990s in terms of intentions 
(e.g., farming, lifestyle), ages (e.g., the youth, the elderly) and employment (e.g., self-
employment or corporate employee), following those in the 1980s mostly who aspired after 
ecological lifestyle in farming villages (Egawa 2005). The latter became noticeable in the 1980s 
and prevailed in the 1990s nationwide, particularly in the hilly and mountainous areas, wherein a 
variety of actors at multiple levels collaborated to promote urban-rural interactions on various 
aspects of farming, products and farming villages (Shinabe 2005). 
Farming families: 
Farming families also went through diversification and personalization from the 1980s (Ouchi 
2005). The Census of Agriculture and Forestry in 2000 shows that the share of the previously 
dominant multigenerational families was reduced to less than 40%, resulting from the low 
birthrate and longevity together with the outmigration of heirs (Tabata 2005). This was 
associated with the increase in single-person, one-generation and nuclear-family households 
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(Kawate and Nishiyama 2005). Yet, the rate of multigenerational families were higher in full-
time farm households, suggesting that the prototypical farm families of multigenerational stem 
families remained in the rural areas where the core cohort was aging but still active in farming in 
the 1990s  (Tabata 2005). Nevertheless, despite the lifetime engagement of the elderly in farming 
and social activities, this demographic trend implies that many families without a potential 
capacity for reproduction would become elderly one-generation families in a few decades (Kurita 
2005).  
 The trinity of farm families largely metamorphosed, releasing the element of ‘family 
business’ (kagyo) of farming. Yet, the families preferentially maintained their ‘life-security 
function’ where the constituents personally and discretionally chose their occupations rather than 
being involved in their family business (Egawa 2005). The lifestyles of family members became 
diversified in accordance with gender and ages of individuals, as each member opted for their 
jobs independently from the conventional norms of family succession (Egawa 2005). Thus, 
farming families became diversified and personalized in their working and living. However, they 
did not crumble as a considerable number of multigenerational families still remained in rural 
areas. Rather, they were sustained by allowing for the affective bond of one-generations and the 
individual freedom of choice (Kawate and Nishiyama 2005). 
 One example of the strategies to adapt to members’ needs and interests as well as the 
socio-economic changes was the Family Management Agreement (Kazoku keiei kyotei) as a 
result of which family members discussed and decided on farm management and life (e.g., 
division of labor, compensation, holidays) (Kawate and Nishiyama 2005). The Agreement 
became politically promoted since the early 1990s to support female farmers mostly without an 
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entitlement to farmland and then young farmers lacking experiences and training for farm 
management (Kawate and Nishiyama 2005). This built on the Family Agreement that was 
politically bolstered in the 1960s to encourage heirs for farming, but originated from the 
spontaneous initiatives of young farmers (Kawate and Nishiyama 2005). Referring to the lives of 
the peers of the same generation who increasingly became corporate employees in the postwar 
years, young farmers, who remained as heirs in faming families but aspired to working and 
living styles on a couple basis, took the lead to develop a family agreement so as to 
accommodate their couple-based lifestyle in the multigenerational families (Kawate and 
Nishiyama 2005). The nationwide movement of the Family Agreement declined in the 1970s, 
while some initiatives evolved where female farmers sought for the improvement of their 
working and living conditions (e.g., compensation for housework and child-rearing, maternal 
leaves) (Kawate and Nishiyama 2005). Reflecting the socio-economic status of the days, the 
earlier model (i.e., Family Agreement) was limited to parent-progeny relationships to 
accommodate a one-generation or nuclear family within an entire family and focused on the 
issues related to farm management and inheritance. But the later (i.e., Family Management 
Agreement) involved marital relationships to accommodate individuals in a family and extended 
to broader issues related to work and life (Kawate and Nishiyama 2005). 
 In spite of the growing interest in individual freedom and capacity, family members 
continuously supported each other. The result from the nationwide survey of nursing-care 
insurance in 2002 shows that the subscription rate was lower in the hilly and mountainous areas 
where the share of multigenerational families remained higher (Kurita 2005). The relevant case 
study suggests that this was because of the availability of family caregivers (Kurita 2005). At the 
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same time, a study of the income of the elderly subscribers of nursing-care insurance (fiscal 
2000-2002) indicated that those with higher income were much fewer in the rural area than in the 
urban one, and that the income level was lower in mountainous regions than flat and hilly 
regions within the rural area. This implies that many elderly farmers in hilly and mountainous 
regions were low-income without subscription of nursing-care insurance while relying on family 
caregiving (Kurita 2005). In this regard, the existing social security system may have potential 
mismatches between the needs and capacities of aging farming families. The social security 
system shifted from universal care to caregiving based on the freedom of choice and the benefit 
principle since the late 1980s in accordance with the political interest of the market-based 
modern civil society (Kurita 2005). This shift was based on the aging of urban society where 
nuclear families encountered the low birthrate and longevity (Kurita 2005). But the aging of rural 
society progressed earlier and differently with the outmigration of heirs and the reflux of retirees 
in association with the income level.  
2.3 Conclusion 
The postwar tenancy model transformed from the centralized state control of one-parcel-based 
farmland transactions (the first model) to the multi-level coordination to guide collective tenancy 
arrangements for better economy of scale (the third model), which was built on the decentralized 
planning scheme of ‘use-rights’ setting (the second model). This transformation followed the 
goal changes of agricultural policy from the democratic reform of the nation-state (the first 
model) to the improvement of the farming industry (the second model) and additionally the 
attainment of agricultural multifunctionality (the third model). The underlying assumptions of 
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these goals hinged on the notions of farmland first as a (private) property of a farm family, then a 
commons of a farming village, and finally a commons of a broader society. These conceptual 
changes moved through the continuum of private and public interests as well as roles and 
responsibilities of the actors in private and public sectors. The guiding principle of the models 
altered from the ‘owner-farmer principle’ with a focus on the ownership right to a private 
property to protect private interests of owner-farmers, to the ‘cultivator principle’ with an 
emphasis on the use right to a commons to assure public interests of a society, allowing for 
increasing public intervention in tenancy arrangements. In the third model, the roles and 
responsibilities of corporations were under negotiation between various actors in the private and 
public sectors to discern to what extent they could stretch the ‘cultivator principle.’  
 The transformation of the tenancy model interacted with the changes in social institutions 
involving the two historically developed institutions: farming villages (mura) and families (ie). 
Preceded by demographic movements and aging, these institutions changed. Farming villages 
experienced stratifications largely between fewer farm families and more non-farm ones, 
whereas new farmers and new networks of farmers brought in over the recent decades. Farming 
families sustained the multigenerational structure, but became subdivided across generations and 
individuals with diversified working and living styles. However, farming villages maintained 
collective activities to manage agricultural infrastructure including farmland and to implement 
administrative work and projects, if needed, by reorganizing themselves to separate between 
residential and farming functions in a village. Farming families metamorphosed the trinity by 
releasing the ‘family business’ component, but sustained the life-security function to extend the 
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household economy while increasingly allowing for the pursuit of freedom of choice and 
autonomous decision-making.  
 If we only look at the political institutions, merely external forces and formal 
governmental actors seem to have driven the changes in tenancy model. However, the focus on 
both political and social institutions reveals the powerful driving force of farmers, who 
individually and/or collectively acted on their perspectives through the structures of families and 
villages. Importantly, experiencing and feeling the mismatches between their own needs/interests 
and available choices/options, they not only reacted to changes, but actively adapted mostly 
through the structural changes of ie and mura consciously or unconsciously, so as to sustain the 
key functions, most importantly life-security.  
 So far, active farmers seemed to subjectivize themselves as constituents of farming 
families and villages, and thus acted to productively manage farmland. Such subjectivities 
vigorously contributed to the maintenance or change in the social institutions by motivating 
farmers, often with the involvement of ambivalent feelings to remain or leave their farming 
families and villages. However, the political definition of farmers has been largely changing, and 
the FB program as the latest model was designed to actively bring in new farmers in the farming 
sector. The next chapter examines why and how the latest mode has been introduced and 
designed.  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Chapter 3: Emergence and Working of the Farmland Bank Program 
This chapter addresses how the Farmland Bank (FB) program has emerged and how it works in 
governing farmland. First, it illustrates the processes by which the FB program has evolved as a 
cornerstone of the latest tenancy model. This model builds on the third postwar model, but 
underwent heated political negotiations involving administrative regime changes. The chapter 
also expounds on the mechanism by which FBs have executed the FB program with the legal and 
programatic bases. Second, the chapter explicates how the FBs have collaborated with other 
agencies across different jurisdictional levels. Based on the results from the semi-structured 
interviews with officers from key relevant agencies in Ishikawa Prefecture, I describe horizontal 
and vertical relationships of the stakeholders from local to national levels. Furthermore, with a 
focus on two municipalities, I provide the contexts of the two case studies. 
3.1 Emergence of the FB Program 
The FB program was introduced in 2014 as ‘an ace of the agrarian structural reform’ to 
accelerate farmland aggregation (Ando 2015, 92). Since the late 2000s, the political initiative has 
led to the second postwar agrarian reform, called ‘Heisei Land Reform,’ from which the fourth 
model of farmland governance evolved.  Against the backdrop of further demographic and 185
economic decline in the agrarian sector, the Agricultural Land Act (ALA), which built on the first 
postwar agrarian reform, was radically amended in 2009. Furthermore, the years after 2007 
experienced political fluctuation associated with regime changes. Despite political instability, the 
agricultural policy-making process has been increasingly under the strong influence of the Office 
 Heisei is the Japanese traditional era name for the years between 1989 and 2019.185
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of Prime Minister (OPM) which has ties with the business community. This OPM-led policy 
making processes, involving the negotiations between the agrarian and other sectors, resulted in 
the FB program. 
 The FB program was a keystone of the latest tenancy model that renewed all four aspects 
of the third model (see Table 3.1). First, the latest model followed the two-wheel policy 
combining industrial and rural development policies based on the New Policy (1992), but placed 
further emphasis on economic competitiveness. Second, it relaxed the ‘cultivator-oriented 
principle’ (kosakusha-shugi), which persisted in the third model adhering to the integrity of 
production and residence, and became inclusive of new farmers. Third, it changed the notion of 
farmland from ‘local resources’ to ‘an object of public management.’ Based on the ‘cultivator-
oriented principle,’ the third model dealt with farmland as a commons to benefit the broader 
society by taking advantage of farmland as both ‘production base’ and ‘local resources.’ The 
fourth model handled farmland as a commons, but to extract farmland as ‘production base,’ not 
as local resources, through stronger public management. Fourth, it changed the governance 
approach from the multi-level ‘inducement’ to the multi-level ‘guidance and supervision.’ With 
the notion of ‘local resources,’ the third model authorized prefectural and municipal governments 
to coordinate with farming villages for collective tenancy arrangements. As the object of public 
management, however, the fourth model gave more power to prefectural authorities to be guided 
and supervised by the national government. 
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Table 3.1 Distinctions between the Third and Forth Models 
 To elaborate the emergence of the FB program, the remainder of this section describes 
both socio-economic and political processes. It first illustrates the changes in agricultural land 
and population which indirectly drove the second agrarian reform. Then, it describes the political 
processes directly leading to the emergence of the FB program. In particular, it focuses on the 
development of key policy tools of farmland governance, including the ALA amendment in 
2009, the introduction of the Community Agricultural Mater Plan (CAMP) program in 2012, and 
the establishment of the Farmland Bank (FB) Act in 2013. Finally, it details the mechanism of 
the FB program that is based on the FB Act but also related to other policy tools including the 





1) The goals of 
agricultural 
policy
Improve the agricultural productivity 
and fulfill agricultural 
multifunctionalitiy  (i.e., two-wheel 
policy, including industrial and rural 
development policies)
Improve the agricultural productivity and 
fulfill agricultural multifunctionalitiy:  
further skewed to industrial plolicy




principle’ (kosakusa-shugi) : fostering 
‘certified farmers’ and village-based 
farming organizations as efficient and 
stable farm management entities
Diluted ‘cultivator-oriented 
principle’ (kosakusa-shugi): allowing for 
entries of ‘new farmers’ (e.g., general 
corporations)
3) The concept 
of farmland
A commons of a broader society — as 
both the ‘production base’ and the 
‘local resources’
A commons of a broader society — as ‘an 






Multi-level ‘inducement’ for 
‘collective’ tenancy arrangements: the 
prefectural and municipal governments 
as planning and implementation 
agencies to coordinate with farming 
villages
Multi-level ‘guidance and supervision’ for 
‘competitive’ tenancy arrangements: the 
national and prefectural governments as the 
authorities to promote and evaluate tenancy 
for free and fare competition
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3.1.1 Agricultural land and population 
Farmland use has noticeably declined over the past few decades, resulting in stagnant self-
sufficiency. Despite trade measures on certain agricultural goods (e.g., the tariff of rice), the total 
self-sufficiency ratio in caloric terms fell by half from 79% in 1960 to 40% in 2000, and is yet to 
recover (OECD 2013; MAFF 2018i).  The 2000 New Basic Plan first set the numerical target 186
as a national goal to raise self-sufficiency from 40% to 45% by 2010 (Michiko Morita 2006; 
Honma 2010). Given the failure to attain the goal, the New Basic Plan, which is adjusted every 
five years, has kept extending the target year of achievement (MAFF 2018i; Honma 2010).   187
 Moreover, cultivated farmland decreased by one quarter from its peak in 1961 to 2007 as 
a result of the reduction in farmland development and the loss of cultivated land.  While little 188
farmland was developed over the past two decades, a considerable amount of cultivated land 
decreased mostly due to farmland conversion and abandonment.  In particular, farmland 189
abandonment outperformed farmland conversion around 1995 (MAFF 2004). Abandoned 
farmland sharply increased in the 1990s, and ballooned to 386,000 ha in 2005 that exceeded the 
 Food self-sufficiency (i.e., Production x 100 / (Production + Imports - Exports ± Changes in domestic stock levels)) is 186
concerned with the supply side of food security with a focus on the domestic capacity to produce food in sufficient quantities 
(Clapp 2015). Thus, food self-sufficiency is not exactly an expression of food security, which does not consider the origin of food 
or a country’s capacity to produce it.
 With no improvement of self-sufficiency, the 2005 New Basic Plan set the target ratio to 45% by 2015 with a five-year 187
extension, while reducing the desirable per-capita total caloric intake in consideration of the change in dietary habitat (Honma 
2010). Under the administrative change to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the 2010 New Basic Plan raised the target from 
45% to 50% to be achieved by 2020 (Ueda 2018). Given that self-sufficiency remained 39% in fiscal 2013 and 2014, the 2015 
New Basic Plan aimed at 45% by 2025 (MAFF 2018i). Since the self-sufficiency measure disregards the potential capacity of 
farmland that is used for non-food agricultural production (e.g., flowers), the 2015 New Basic Plan introduced the new concept of 
‘food self-sufficiency capacity’ as an expression of the calorific value available with the maximum use of food production 
capacity of the country (MAFF 2016a). 
 The total area of cultivated land (kochi-menseki) fell from the peak of 6.09 million ha in 1961 to 4.65 million ha in 2007 and 188
then continued to decrease to 4.44 million ha in 2017 (MAFF 2018a).
 On the one hand, farmland development, which had been active until the mid-1970s, greatly declined from the peak of 56,000 189
ha in 1971 to 2,000ha in 2007 and remained small as of 2017 (i.e., 6,060 ha) despite the recent land development in the post-
disaster sites. On the other, the loss of cultivated land decreased from its peak of 113,000 ha in 1971 to 24,000 ha in 2009 and 
remained considerable as of 2017 (i.e., 32,500 ha) (MAFF 2018a).
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area of either Saitama or Shiga prefectures (i.e., about 377,000 ha for each) (Higuchi 2009).  190
Albeit with a slower pace, the volume of abandoned farmland continued to increase, resulting in 
423,000 ha of the abandoned farmland (i.e., the abandoned ratio was 10.9%) in 2015 (see Table 
3.2).  191
 Abandoned farmland (kosaku-hoki-chi) is defined in the Census of Agriculture and Forestry to refer to the cultivated land 190
where its owner(s) did not grow crops for more than a year and plan not to crop in the next few years (Higuchi 2009, 1).
The farmland abandonment ratio (kosaku-hokichi-rtistu) is the proportion of the area of abandoned farmland to the total area 191
including the abandoned farmland and the operating cultivated land. The operating cultivated land (keiei-kochi menseki) means 
the cultivated land managed by agricultural and forestry management entities (Higuchi 2009, 1).
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Table 3.2 Changes in Agricultural Land and Population 
Notes: 1) Source is MAFF, Agriculture and Forestry Census; 2) MAFF, Agriculture and Forestry Census — For the 
‘operating cultivated land’ and the ‘area of farmland under tenancy contracts’ in 1995 and 2000, the data combines 
the values of commercial farm households and farm management entities other than farm households (Hashizume 
2016); 3) MAFF, Agriculture and Forestry Census — The data of commercial farm households is used. The cohort 
born in the late 1920s and the early 1930s corresponds with the population born for the period between February 1st 
1926 and January 31st 1935, while that born in the late 1930s and the early 1940s corresponds with the population 
born for the period between February 1st 1935 and January 31st 1945. (N. Taniguchi 2013); 4) MAFF, Fact-Finding 
Survey on Village-Based Farming — The rate of farmland aggregation by village-based farming organizations is 
referred to Hashizume (2018).  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Area of farmland under tenancy contracts 569 703 (+23.5) 824 (+17.3) 1,063 (+29.0) 1,164 (+9.5)
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Organizational entities - - 28 31 (+10.4) 33 (+6.4)
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together






Subsistence farm households 792 783 (-1.1) 885 (+12.9) 897 (+1.4) 825 (-7.9)








 The causes of farmland abandonment vary over time and place, but it has been largely 
affected by the demographic trends in recent decades (K. Ishida 2011; Tanimoto 2015).  The 192
survey on the causes of farmland abandonment conducted nationwide in February 2004 listed the 
shortage of farm labor force as the largest factor (45%), followed by the low productivity 
(12.8%), the absence of available tenants (11.4%), and the unfavorable land conditions (9.8%).  193
In particular, the core cohort (born in the late 1920s and the early 1930s), who had long 
constituted the major agrarian labor force, was becoming over the age of 70 in 2005. Due to the 
increased longevity and the advancement of small-sized farming machines, this cohort remained 
active in farming in their late 60s or over, resulting in the retaining of small-scale farmers until 
the beginning of the 21st century (N. Taniguchi 2013; Hashizume 2005).  Nevertheless, after 194
becoming over 75 in 2010, the share of this cohort started to decrease (see Table 3.2). This has 
not only accelerated the decline of farm labor force but also changed in the household 
composition of farm families largely from multi-generation to single-generation (N. Taniguchi 
2013; Mamoru Sawada 2013).  195
 Farmland abandonment was also observed in the early years of the postwar era. It first emerged in the reclaimed land with the 192
unfavorable conditions and the mulberry plantation under the declining silk industry (Harada 2018a). This was followed by the 
constant farmland abandonment in the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 3.2), which was facilitated by the rice production adjustment 
policy since 1969 as well as by the farmland holding by the owners who expected farmland conversion without cropping  given 
the growing demand for land in those days (Harada 2018a; Ogata 2018).
 The results from this survey were taken into consideration in March 2007 at the council of advisors to the MAFF, which 193
began in January 2007 to prepare for the agricultural land policy reform (Higuchi 2009, 2).
 The population of the farming core cohort increased from 1990 (1.38 million) to 1995 (1.46 million). It slightly decreased 194
(1.40 million) and its share (36.0%) peaked in 2000 (N. Taniguchi 2013).
 The largest share of farm labor force shifted from the cohort born between 1926-1935 (i.e., the core cohort) (33.0%) in 2005 195
to that between 1935-1945 (30.5%) in 2010, while the population of the latter (0.8 million) in 2010 was about 60% of the former 
(1.1 million) in 2005 (N. Taniguchi 2013). Given the census data showing that many farms run by multi-generation commercial 
farm households consisted of the core cohort and their children in 2005, Sawada (2013) attributes the sharp decrease of two-
generation family-run farms from 2005 (0.69 million) to 2010 (0.48 million) to the farm retirement of the core cohort.
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 To prepare for the mass retirement of the core cohort, the system of ‘certified 
farmers’ (nintei nogyo-sha) began in 1993 to facilitate farmland aggregation for better farm 
efficiency and stability. However, the population of certified farmers, particularly in the form of 
family-run farms, started to decrease in 2011.  Also, the non-product-specific management 196
stabilization measure (hin-moku odan-teki keiei antei taisaku) started in 2007 to support large 
farms, including village-based farming organizations as an eligible recipient of income subsidies. 
This measure resulted in a steep rise in village-based farming organizations between 2006 and 
2008.  This increase involved so-called ‘Edaban’ (branching) management in many cases 197
where organizations were nominally formed as a collective recipient of subsidies consisting of 
small family-run farms independently engaging in farm management (PRIMAFF 2013). 
Furthermore, farmland aggregation to village-based organizations stagnated between 2005 and 
2015, while that to large management entities (larger than 5ha) has slowed down since 2010 (see 
Table 3.2) (Mizuki 2017; Ando 2018).  These trends suggest that despite the steady progress in 198
farmland aggregation, the decline of farm labor force has outpaced the farmland aggregation, 
leading to incremental farmland abandonment (Ogata 2018; Hashizume 2005; Hashizume 2016). 
 The study on the status of certified farmers (MAFF 2012b) shows that the total population of certified farmers first decreased 196
in 2011 by 2,894 and then in 2012 by 8,953, whereas the population of family-run certified farmers greatly decreased though that 
of incorporated certified farmers still increased. It also shows that the number of prefectures with the decrease in certified farmers 
was limited to a few in 2008 and 2009, but the number increased to 37 in 2011 and 43 in 2012. The latest data shows the 
fracturing trends (including the increase in 2015 and 2016) (MAFF 2018b).
 The survey on the status of village-based farming organizations shows that the number of village-based farming organizations 197
increased by nearly 3,000 between 2006 and 2008: an increase by 15.4% from 2006 to 2007 and 8.0% from 2007 to 2008, 
compared to that by 4.2% from 2005 to 2006 and 2.9% from 2008 to 2009 (MAFF 2017a).
 The data from the survey on the status of village-based farming organizations shows that the area of cultivated farmland 198
operated by village-based farming organizations increased by 45.5% from 2005 (253,672 ha) to 2010 (369,149 ha) but by 1.7% 
from 2010 to 2015 (375,505ha), suggesting a slowed pace of farmland aggregation to village-based farming organizations. Also, 
see Table 3.2.
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 These demographic trends have amplified a threat to further abandonment. If no reform is 
undertaken, farmland without registration filed by heirs would be increasingly abandoned. 
Without regulations of farmland inheritance in the ALA, a considerable amount of farmland has 
not been registered by heirs (Ogata 2018)(Ogata 2018). The national survey, conducted through 
agricultural committees in August 2016, found a total of 934,000 ha of farmland presumably 
unregistered by heirs, about 20% of the entire farmland (i.e., 4.47 million ha).  Most of it was 199
still in use by de-facto heirs in a family even without registration.  As transactions cannot be 200
made officially without registration, however, the more time passes, the more complicated and 
costly the formalities become (Ogata 2018).  
 In addition, besides the structural problems, other economic and environmental factors 
have facilitated agricultural abandonment. The survey in 2014 identified the low marketability of 
agricultural products (e.g., weak prices) besides the farm labor shortage.  Moreover, the 201
invasion of wild animals has been a compounding factor: the damages by animal invasions often 
discourage farmers to continue farming whereas abandonment attracts wild animals (Marui, 
Shikano, and Shinogi 2013; Takeyama et al. 2006).   202
 The area of farmland presumably unregistered by heirs (934,000 ha) included 477,000 ha of farmland without registration 199
filed by heirs, and 458,000 ha of farmland which seemed to be unregistered by heirs given the absence of registered persons 
(Harada 2018b).
 Out of the area of farmland presumably unregistered by heirs (934,000 ha), 53,683ha (5.7%) was not in use in 2016 (Ogata 200
2018).
 The national survey of municipalities on farmland abandonment, which was conducted by MAFF in February 2014, found 201
that 39% of responses was related to farm labor force (i.e., aging and lack of workforce, an increase in non-farm households 
holding farmland), which were followed by 20% of responses corresponding to the marketability of agricultural products (i.e., 
weak prices of agricultural products, absence of profitable crops) (MAFF 2016e).
 The national survey of municipalities on farmland abandonment in 2014 also found that 5% of responses was related to the 202
damages caused by wild animals (MAFF 2016e). 
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3.1.2 Political processes 
The trends of agricultural land and population led the government to reform agricultural policy. 
With the understanding that the farming sector could no longer productively use farmland, the 
national government has taken steps in agrarian structural reform since 2007, allowing other 
sectors to join in policy-making. In reaction, however, the government experienced regime 
changes, shifting the ruling party from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009 and again back to the LDP in 2012. Regaining political power but 
also learning from the past failure, the LDP government introduced the FB program in 2014. The 
policy-making process of the FB program was largely led by the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) 
with the strong influence of the business community, while involving negotiations between 
different actors whose power have greatly changed over the past few decades. The following 
illustrates the regime changes in connection with the agrarian reform, and then describes the 
policy-making processes that led to the FB program.   
Regime changes 
Under the LDP regime, the Abe administration (2006-2007) introduced several new measures to 
reform agricultural policy. The year of 2007 was called “the turning point of the postwar 
agricultural policy” (sengo nosei no daitenkan) (MAFF 2007b, 1; Kishi 2009, 105). In this year, 
concrete measures were put in place corresponding to all the three pillars of the New Basic Act 
(1999), including stable food supply, sustainable agricultural development, and rural 
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development (Kishi 2009).  Among others, the non-product-specific management stabilization 203
measure (hereafter called the Management Stabilization Measure) was a keystone of the reform 
with the change in support from market prices to income to follow the WTO guidelines (Godo 
and Takahashi 2012; Tomita 2013). In an attempt to bolster the structural reform, this measure 
took a ‘selective’ approach to income support through direct payments (Kishi 2009; Tsutaya 
2006; Tomita 2013). It limited eligible recipients to two types of farm management entities: 1) 
‘certified farmers’ with a size of 4 ha or more (10 ha or more in Hokkaido exceptionally); and 2) 
village-based farming organizations with the operating size of 20 ha or more (Tsutaya 2006; 
Tomita 2013; Godo and Takahashi 2012).  204
 This selective approach was one of the major drivers of regime change. Pointing to the 
management stabilization measure as a ‘cutoff of small farmers,’ the DPJ proposed the income 
support system for individuals (nogyosha kobetsu shotoku hosho seido) in its manifesto at the 
Upper House election in July 2007 with an emphasis on its support for all the commercial 
farmers regardless of the size (Y. Yamashita 2008; House of Representatives 2007; Wajima 
2017). Following a sweeping victory that evidenced its winning of an agrarian constituency, the 
DPJ pledged to pursue the income support system for individuals in the Lower House general 
election (Y. Yamashita 2008; Hori 2013). This strategy expanded the DPJ’s power base from an 
 Tsutaya (2006, 34) argues that the management stabilization measure alone could be called “an inventory of the postwar 203
agricultural policy” rather than “a turning point” in the sense that the government tackled the longstanding problem of small-scale 
farming with the introduction of direct payments. Yet, he admits calling it “a turning point” in that the government introduced a 
full set of measures including the direct payments and the agri-environmental scheme (Tsutaya 2006, 33).
 Prior to the launch of the management stabilization measure in 2007, its policy outline was introduced in October 2005 to 204
follow the 2005 New Basic Plan that indicated the policy shift from price support to income support (Tomita 2013). The policy 
outline introduced this measure by abolishing the product-specific measure for several products including rice, wheat, and 
soybeans. The new measure consisted of two types of income support: 1) the support, called the padding measure (geta), to offset 
the difference in cost between domestic and import products in consideration of unfavorable conditions for production (for wheat 
and soybeans); and 2) the support, called the smoothing measure (narashi), to relax the fluctuation effect of agricultural products 
(for rice, wheat and soybeans).
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urban constituency to include an agrarian one, resulting in its dominance in the election (Hattori 
2013; Moriguchi 2013; Hoshiro 2011; K. Kawamura 2011; Sasada 2011). Consequently the LDP, 
which had held power almost continuously from its formation in 1955, finally surrendered its 
political power to the opposition DPJ in 2009. 
 Despite the initial momentum in favor of the agrarian constituency, the DPJ’s turn in the 
agricultural policy was limited. Rather, its move to advocate a free trade policy allowed for the 
LDP’s return to power in December 2012. Initially the DPJ’s 2010 New Basic Plan spelled out “a 
diversity of motivated farmers” including small and part-time farmers as the target of political 
support in rivalry with the LDP’s skewness toward large farmers (Tomita 2013; Shogenji 2012a; 
Shogenji 2013).  As promised in the campaign pledge, the income support system for 205
individuals started in fiscal 2010, but its mechanism was intrinsically contradictory. On the one 
hand, the amount of income subsidies, largely determined per unit area, incentivized larger 
farmers, but insufficiently motivated small farmers to improve farm management (Tomita 2013; 
Shogenji 2013).  On the other, it encouraged small farmers to continue small farming rather 206
than to lend their land for farmland aggregation given the relative advantage of the subsidies to 
 Shogenji (2013) attributes the limited turn of the DPJ’s policy to a failure to amend New Basic Act (1999) that aimed to 205
foster ‘efficient and stable farm management entities’ (Article 21).
 One of the two major programs in the income support system for individuals provided subsidies to make up the difference 206
between the production costs and the sales prices for the commercial farm households and village-based farming organizations 
that pursued production adjustment of rice (Tomita 2013). The subsidies consisted of two parts: 1) the fixed amount (i.e., 
JPY15,000 per 0.1ha, equivalent to approximately USD133), and 2) the flux amount (the average sales price over the past three 
years deducted by the sales price of the latest year). For instance, a rice farm household with farmland of 1ha with an annual 
profit of JPY 400,000 (approximately USD 3,500) on average could receive an annual fixed subsidy of JPY 75,000 
(approximately USD 665), because the subsidy was given for the farmland of 0.5 ha after the production adjustment (40%) and 
self-consumption (10%). With this amount, they may need to seek other income sources and would not be motivated to fully 
engage in farm management. On the other, a rice farm household with farmland of 10ha could receive an annual fixed subsidy of 
JPY 885,000 (approximately USD 7,840) for the 0.59ha (after the production adjustment and self-consumption) on top of an 
annual profit of JPY 3,690,000 (approximately USD 32,660) on average. They could also grow crops other than rice for 
additional subsidies on the remaining farmland of 4ha, and thus may be motivated to fully engage and possibly improve farm 
management. 
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land rents (Tomita 2013).  Thus, by design it was contradictory as it promoted and at the same 207
time put a brake on scale expansion.   208
 As the first DPJ administration, the Hatoyama administration (2009-2010) caused a 
political rift between Japan and the US. To recover the international relations and pursue the 
economic revitalization, the subsequent Kan administration (2010-2011) abruptly announced its 
intention to consider Japan's participation in negotiations for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
(Hattori 2013; Miura 2015).  As Kan advocated “the opening of the country in Heisei,” it was 209
meant as a large step to an economic partnership of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
essentially seeking to remove all tariffs among its members (Hattori 2013; Shimizu 2015, 211). 
While the initiative for TPP participation dichotomized public opinion, the next Noda 
administration (2011-2012) sought to join TPP negotiations in November 2011 (Shimizu 2015; 
R. Uchida 2015; Terada 2012).   210
 Landowners would reduce flexibility in land-use if they lend their land to others given a use right to the land (e.g., failure to 207
immediately respond to sales opportunities), while the land rent was not attractively high (e.g., JPY 12,000 (approximately USD 
106) per 0.1ha annually on average as of 2009) —  encouraging owners to continue farming despite the unprofitability of small 
farming (Tomita 2013).
 Hattori (2013) positively evaluated the effect of the first three-year implementation of the income support system in the 208
following respects: 1) the political support from many farmers, 2) the improvement of agricultural income, 3) the reduction of the 
area of rice cropping, 4) the high participation of large farmers in the system, and 5) the increase in rice-crop conversion. Yet, he 
criticized the system in the respect that the fixed amount of the subsidies was still provided even if a sales price exceeded the 
production cost given that subsidies consisted of two separate parts including the fixed and flux amounts. 
 Miura (2015) points to three issues as the motivations for the government to join TPP negotiations: 1) to strengthen the 209
economic cooperation between Japan and the US as its primary partner in balance with other ongoing cooperations with 
European Union (EU), China and South Korea; 2) not to be disadvantageous of the TPP negotiations that had already taken place 
among eight countries under the leadership of the US; and 3) to enhance the Japan-US alliance given the unstable regional 
situations particularly in East Asia. In addition to the intention to redeem the Japan-US alliance that was undermined in the 
previous Hatoyama administration, Hattori (2013) suggests that the Kan administration would have taken advantage of the 
lobbies from the side of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to promote economic strategies as well as from the 
side of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to exercise leadership as the chair of the conference of Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) that was held in Yokohama, Japan in November 2010. 
 The declaration of Noda’s decision in November 2011 was followed by the preparatory negotiations between Japan and US 210
(Hattori 2013; Terada 2012). While Noda faced the disaccord among the cabinet ministers and the persisting criticisms within the 
DPJ, he managed to overcome the opposition by appointing supporters to key leadership posts in the cabinet and party and 
carefully editing the text of his statement of declaration (R. Uchida 2015; Terada 2012). 
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 With the increasing anti-protectionism pitch, the DPJ government also developed the 
Basic Policy and Action Plan in 2011 (hereafter called the 2011 Action Plan) to specifically focus 
on large-scale farming for international competitiveness (Fujino 2014; Ueda 2018; Tomita 2013; 
Shogenji 2012a; Shogenji 2012b).  The inconsistency of the policies resulted in the rout of the 211
DPJ at the Lower House general election in December 2012, ceding power to the LDP.    212
OPM-led agricultural policy-making 
With the regained power, the LDP government restarted agricultural reform as part of the state 
project of economic revitalization from which the FB program developed. Soon after the 
electoral victory, the second Abe administration (2012-2014) floated a policy called 
‘Abenomics,’ a package of economic development measures consisting of ‘three arrows’ (i.e., 
monetary easing, fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms) (Miura 2015). As expressed in the 
Prime Minister’s commitment “My ‘third arrow’ will fell Japan’s economic demons” (Financial 
Times, June 29th 2014), the administration pushed through the structural reform. This involved 
deregulation and liberalization of the agricultural sector to be open to foreign capital (K. 
Yamashita 2014b). Albeit the LDP’s electoral pledge to conditionally ‘disagree,’ its government 
formally announced in March 2013 Japan’s bid to join the TPP negotiations based on the 
 In anticipation of TPP participation, the Kan administration launched the Headquarters for the Revitalization of Food, 211
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (HRFAFF) within his cabinet in November 2010 to take measures for sustainable and 
competitive agriculture (Fujino 2014; HRFAFF 2011). In October 2011, the HRFAFF decided the Basic Policy and Action Plan 
for the Revitalization of Our Country's Food and Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Industries (i.e., the 2011 Action Plan), which 
spelled out the target of the agricultural structure for the next five years to be dominated by the farm management entities with 
farmland of 20-30 ha in flat regions and those with farmland of 10-20ha in hilly and mountainous regions (Fujino 2014; Ueda 
2018; Tomita 2013). The decision of the 2011 Action Plan was followed by the programs to promote farmland aggregation to 
large farmers (e.g., Community Agricultural Master Plan). Thus the 2011 Action Plan is seen as the initial resurgence of the 
selective approach to farm scale expansion (Fujino 2014; Ueda 2018; Tomita 2013).
 Receiving criticism about its violation of various promises including the consumption tax increase in addition to the 212
agricultural policy, the DPJ ended in dismal failure in the Lower House general election in December 2012 and transferred power 
to the LDP ruling by falling itself into one of the opposition parties (Hattori 2013; Sebata 2013; Musashi 2014). 
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clarification at the Japan-US summit that a prior commitment to eliminate all tariffs should not 
be a requirement for participation.  Under the scenarios of the participation in TPP 213
negotiations, the cabinet approved the ‘Japan Revitalization Strategy - Japan is Back’ in June 
2013 as a concrete plan of structural reform, where farmland aggregation through the FB 
program was proposed as a key measure (Fujino 2014; Hattori 2015; Kobari 2014; Minami 
2013). 
 The FB program was first outlined by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) but institutionalized under the leadership of the Office of Prime Minister (OPM). Two 
months after the inception of the new government in February 2013, MAFF’s Minister proposed 
the concept of the FB program to facilitate the ‘Heisei Land Reform’ (Kobari 2014; Harada 
2015).  This concept was soon taken up as a means of the growth strategy for Abenomics and 214
was featured in the Prime Minister’s speech in May 2013 on the policies under the Growth 
Strategy (Kobari 2014). With an aim to turn agriculture into a growth industry, the Japan 
Revitalization Strategy (June 2013) spelled out the goal as a Key Performance Indicator (KPI) 
that “[i]n the next ten years, 80% of all farmland should be used by skilled and diverse 
responsible entities,” for which intermediary institutions will serve to consolidate and re-
distribute farmland for the use by ‘responsible entities’ such as corporate farmers and large-scale 
 The LDP pledged in the general election in 2012 to attain competitive agriculture but to disagree on Japan’s participation in 213
TPP negotiations as long as elimination of all tariffs could be preconditioned for TPP negotiations, going against the DPJ that 
promoted the participation (T. Akiyama 2013; Hattori 2013). Yet, the second Abe administration declared its participation in TPP 
negotiations in March 2013, holding the assurance at the Japan-US summit in February 2013 that participation in the negotiations 
should not presuppose elimination of all tariffs without sanctuary (Kanda and Terabayashi 2013). Japan’s formal entry into the 
negotiations in July 2013 was followed by the negotiations led by the US and Japan (Shimizu 2015).
 The Minister first presented the concept of the FB program at the second meeting of the Council for Industrial 214
Competitiveness (CIC) on the 18th February 2013 as part of the plan to develop competitive agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
(Kobari 2014; Harada 2015). It was introduced as one of the three means to promote farmland aggregation and resolve farmland 
abandonment, including: 1) administrative guidance to landowners to resolve farmland abandonment; 2) intermediacy at the 
municipal level to facilitate matchmaking between owners and tenants; and 3) intermediary holding of farmland at the prefectural 
level when tenancy contracts cannot be made immediately (i.e., the concept of the FB program).
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family farmers (Government of Japan 2013, 17).  This goal presumed that FBs as intermediary 215
institutions would accelerate the pace of farmland aggregation between 2000 and 2010 (i.e., 20% 
increase from 27.8% in 2000 to 48.1% in 2010) even faster for the next decade.  With this 216
ambitious goal, the FBs were established nationwide at the prefectural level in 2014 based on the 
Farmland Bank Act (FB Act) that was promulgated in December 2013 (Kobari 2014).  217
 This expeditious process was led by the OPM in conjunction with the business 
community rather than the conventional political relationship of “iron triangle.” The Abe cabinet 
began to bolster the OPM leadership and robustly pursue the economic policy through 
administrative structuring (see Figure 3.1). To command macroeconomic policies, the 
administration reactivated the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) advisory to Prime 
 In the context of the KPI, the MAFF refers ‘responsible farmers’ (ninaite) as: 1) ‘certified farmers,’ 2) those who meet the 215
standards specified in the municipal ‘Basic Concepts’ (Kihon-koso) (e.g., those who meet the level equivalent to the standards of 
efficient and stable farm management in light of annual agricultural income, farming patterns, and management scale), and 3) 
village-based farming organizations (including unincorporated ones) (Kobari 2015). The area of farmland that is cultivated by 
‘responsible entities’ through farmland transactions (i.e., transfer of ownership or use rights) or contract farming without 
farmland transactions is defined as the area of farmland aggregation (Riyo-shuseki menseki) (Kobari 2015). In general, the term 
of ‘responsible farmers’ has been used in discussions on agricultural policies to mean various types of entities responsible for 
local farm and/or farmland management depending on the contexts and the standpoints of speakers or writers (H. Kobayashi 
2014). In the legal terms, it is defined in the New Basic Act (Article 4) (1999) and the 2005 Basic Plan, as farmers or farm 
management entities who engage in efficient and stable farm management or plan to improve farm management for efficiency 
and stability, often including certified farmers, village-based farming organizations, and corporate farmers (Yamauchi and Iwao 
2011).
 The MAFF explained the ground for this goal at the open review meeting that was held by the Administrative Reform 216
Promotion Council in November 2016 in Osaka with the involvement of external experts. It was explained that the FBs would 
facilitate farmland aggregation 1.5 times as fast as its speed for the decade between 2000 and 2010 given the new mechanism, 
though the decade was followed by the stagnation since 2010 (from 48.1% in 2010 to 48.8% in 2013) (Secretariat of 
Administrative Reform Promotion Council 2016). Besides the goal of farmland aggregation, the Japan Revitalization Strategy 
(2013) sets the goal that in combination with industry efforts, “skilled and diverse responsible entities” reduce “the cost of rice 
production” by 40% compared to the current national average cost (Government of Japan 2013, 17). In light of the consistency of 
these two goals, Hashiguchi (2013) points to a hidden policy goal to develop farm management entities with the standard level of 
the rice cropping area of 20ha which was specified in the previous policy documents, although this was not spelled out in the 
Strategy. The New Policy (1992) spelled out the goal to foster individual farm management entities with the scale of 10-20ha, 
while the 2011 Action Plan under the DPJ regime stated the goal at “agricultural structures in which management entities with the 
farmland of 20–30 ha in case of flat land areas and 10– 20 ha in case of hilly and mountainous areas are the majority“ (Fujino 
2014; HRFAFF 2011, 6). 
 To materialize the FB program, the Japan Revitalization Strategy (2013) outlines the process to detail the scheme by autumn 217
2013 and swiftly institutionalize the measures including the legal system (Government of Japan 2013).
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Minister at the Cabinet Office.  To command microeconomic policies, it newly established the 218
Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization (HJER) consisting of all the ministerial 
colleagues, under which the Council for Industrial Competitiveness (CIC) at the OPM served to 
elaborate growth strategies.  It also restarted the Regulatory Reform Council (RRC) advisory to 219
the cabinet in January 2013 to reinstate administrative reform for deregulation.  As Abe stated 220
“regulatory reform is the centerpiece of the growth strategy” at its first meeting, his government 
designed the RRC, in collaboration with the CIC, to promote economic revitalization rather than 
to curb administrative costs (Asano 2013; A. Noda 2013, 7). As such, the HJER was to act on the 
growth strategies developed through the ‘two councils,’ namely the CIC and the RRC, in 
cooperation with the CEFP responsible for the mid-and-long term economic policies including 
the TPP topics (Asano 2013).  All three councils (i.e., CEFP, CIC and RRC) involved a 221
considerable number of politicians and non-parliamentary economists and entrepreneurs who 
were promoting a market-base economy (Shimizu 2015; Asano 2013). 
 Under this overall structure, agricultural policy-making was led by the OPM rather than 
the MAFF. To address the third arrow of Abenomics, the Abe administration launched two new 
 The CEFP was originally established in 2001 as part of the 2001 Central Government Reform resulting from the 218
administrative reform in the 1990s, and boosted the leadership of the Koizumi cabinet (2001-2006) (Asano 2013). Yet, it 
adjourned upon the launch of the DPJ regime (also see Chapter 2) (Asano 2013).
 The Abe administration launched the HJER in December 2012, under which the CIC began in January 2013 (Miura 2015; 219
Shimizu 2015; Asano 2013).
 The RRC had served since the 1990s to promote administrative reform for deregulation until the start of the DPJ ruling 220
(Nakakita 2015; Asano 2013).
 The second Abe administration followed the conventional LDP policy-making system where the bills from the cabinet were 221
submitted to the Diet as long as they were pre-approved by the Divisions of the Policy Research Council (Seisaku-chosa kai 
bukai), the Policy Research Council Board (Sei-cho shingikai) and the General Council (Somu-kai), and thus involved the 
restrictions on party debate (Togi-kosoku). Nevertheless, differently from the previous regimes, the parties did not necessarily 
exercise a dominant influence on the government policy-making processes, as the administration drew on all the key politicians 
from different political factions into the cabinet (e.g., three former party leaders, two candidates for the party presidency) while 
appointing a free-trade proponent from the trade sector as MAFF Minister, presumably in consideration of potential participation 
in TPP negotiations (Miura 2015).
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headquarters relevant to agricultural policy: the Headquarters for Promoting Competitive 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (HPCAFF), and the Headquarters on Creation of Regional 
Vitality in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (HCRVAFF).  The former was established at the 222
MAFF to develop mid-term visions of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, while the latter was 
headed by Prime Minister at the cabinet to extensively discuss the means to revitalize these 
industries. Despite the stronger relevance of these two headquarters to the farming sector, the 
two councils (i.e., CIC and RRC) exerted considerable influence on agricultural policy-making 
under the cabinet’s initiatives (Yokoyama 2015). With a goal to promote growth strategies 
through regulatory reform, the two councils mostly accorded the agricultural reform with the 
demand from the economic quarters (Yokoyama 2015; Shimizu 2015). Through active 
interventions by the two councils, the scheme of the FB program, initially drafted by HPCAFF, 
was extensively modified as detailed below (Harada 2015; Yokoyama 2015; Kobari 2014).  223
 The administration established the HPCAFF in January 2013 at the MAFF to be led by the Minister of MAFF, and the 222
HCRVAFF at the cabinet in May 2013 (Yokoyama 2015; Shimizu 2015).
 The HCRVAFF developed the ground design of the agricultural policy in December 2013, for which each of the two councils 223
(i.e., CIC and RRC) organized an internal working group to specifically deliberate the issues on agriculture, and actively joined 
the discussions with the HPCAFF at MAFF (Yokoyama 2015). The opinions from the two councils were greatly incorporated in 
the final product. For instance, the HPCAFF proposed the preliminary scheme of the FB program by indicating how it reflected 
the opinions from the two councils at the HCRVAFF meeting in October 2013, and this preliminary version turned into the bill 
with little modification (Yokoyama 2015). The agricultural ground design largely built on Japan Revitalization Strategy, 
including the numerical targets (Yokoyama 2015; Shimizu 2015). The 2015 New Basic Plan, which presents the basic directions 
of agricultural policy based on the New Basic Act, reinforced the pre-determined directions that were decided in the Strategy 
under the OPM’s leadership (Yokoyama 2015; Shimizu 2015).
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Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (HPCAFF) 
• An body at the MAFF to elaborate 
and promote the agricultural ‘two 
wheel’ policy  
• Consist of Minister and executive 
officials of MAFF
Regulatory Reform Council 
(RRC) 
• An advisory body at the 
Cabinet Office to promote 
regulatory reform for economic 
revitalization 
• Consist of 15 non-parliament 
lawmakers
Headquarters for Japan’s 
Economic Revitalization (HJER) 
• A body at the Cabinet Secretariat to 
command microeconomic policies 
• Consist of all ministerial colleagues 
headed by Prime Minister 
Council for Industrial 
Competitiveness (CIC) 
• A meeting body to deliberate 
growth strategies 







Headquarters on Creation 
of Regional Vitality in 
Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries (HCRVAFF) 
• A body at the Cabinet to deliberate 
the agricultural ‘two wheel’ policy 
(i.e., industrial and rural 
development policies) 
• Consist of Prime Minister 
(Director-General), Minister of 
State, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
(Deputy DG), Minister of MAFF 




Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy (CEFP) 
• A body at the Cabinet Office 
advisory to Prime Minister to 
command macroeconomic 
policies 
• Consist of Prime Minister and 
5 cabinet members, Bank of 






Enablers of turn in agricultural policy-making 
Furthermore, the fatal collapse of the so-called iron triangle allowed for OPM-led agricultural 
policy-making. Political clientelism for protectionism has fallen since the 1990s and then lapsed 
in the 2010s. The relationship between the LDP, the MAFF and the Japan Agricultural 
Cooperatives (JA) transformed with: 1) the “farm policy tribe” (norin-zoku) of Diet members 
and 2) the JA system.  
The farm policy tribe: 
The “farm policy tribe,” the block of farm politicians, became even less influential over 
agricultural policy-making. The term ‘policy tribes’ (zoku-giin) is generally referred to a group of 
middle-ranking politicians who exert their expertise and political power in a certain sector 
among the jurisdictions of ministries and agencies, and thus has been the object to which 
bureaucrats and business people lay the groundwork for policy-making (R. Uchida 2015). In the 
farming sector, the policy tribe, one of the largest blocks within the LDP alongside of the 
commerce and construction tribes, formed into the iron triangle in association with the JA and 
the MAFF (R. Uchida 2015). Being sensitive to the interests of these groups through the 
clientelistic relationship in return for electoral votes, the tribe often pressured the government to 
pursue conservative agricultural policies in the form of subsidies, trade protection and other 
measures beneficial for farmers (R. Uchida 2015; Sasada 2008).  224
 For instance, in the 1970s, the ministers from the farm policy tribe succeeded in raising rice prices in response to the request 224
from the JA, while they initiated the production adjustment policy to address the issues of excessive rice and fiscal burden in 
accordance with the request from the MAFF while gaining the cooperation from the JA (R. Uchida 2015). The key figures from 
the tribe had maintained the tariffs and the rice prices to accord with the demands from the JA and the MAFF despite the trade 
liberalization since the end of 1970s. They had promoted the protective policies under the influence of the GATT Uruguay Round 
negotiations since the late 1980s, while sustaining the clientelistic relationships with the MAFF and the JA.
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 The decline in tribal power dates to the electoral reform of 1994, which systematically 
gave more power to the cabinet than the tribes (Ando 2017b). The reform changed the Lower 
House electoral system, which is more powerful than the Upper House.  Under the older 225
system, candidates could win seats with a relatively small proportion of the total vote on the 
malapportioned electoral basis where more seats were allocated to rural regions than urban ones, 
but often faced intra-party competition in one district particularly in large parties like the LDP 
(Sasada 2008; Mulgan 2005; Krauss and Pekkanen 2004). This system encouraged candidates to 
exercise personalized campaigns to appeal to a narrow range of special interests and apply pork-
barrel methods (e.g., higher subsidies to their districts), whereas the rural bias incentivized them 
to benefit the agricultural sector. As such, the older system enabled the tribe to take advantage of 
the clientelistic relationship and accumulate more influence over the sectoral policy than even 
LDP prime ministers. Under the new system where each party naturally placed one candidate in 
a district, candidates no longer had intra-party competition but needed a higher percentage of 
votes to win seats, whereas the electoral bias was moderated (Sasada 2008). This change forced 
candidates to seek support from the broader constituencies and appeal to a wider cross-section of 
the voting public on the quality of their policies (Sasada 2008; Reed, Scheiner, and Thies 
 The reform changed the electoral system of the Lower House from a multimember district system with a single 225
nontransferable vote (MMD/SNTV) to a mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM) with a single-member district (SMD) and 
proportional representation (PR) components. In the older MMD/SNTV system, each voter could cast one single vote for one 
specific candidate on the ballot in their district, and each electoral district elected multiple candidates (between two and six, 
depending on the size of population) (Sasada 2008; Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; Hirano 2002). The new MMM system, which 
was adopted in 1994, was a hybrid system of 300 single-member districts (SMDs) and 200 (reduced to 180 in 2000) proportional 
representation (PR) seats (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; Sasada 2008; Hirano 2006). Under the new system, only one Diet member 
was elected from each SMD in the SMD component (300 SMDs, into which the former 129 MMDs were divided and 
rearranged), while in the PR component Diet members were elected off the party lists in proportion to the number of PR votes the 
parties receive (180 PR seats, which are divided between 11 geographic blocs) (Hirano 2002, 2006; Horiuchi and Saito 2003). In 
the new system, voters were given two votes, one to cast for an SMD candidate and one to cast for a party in the PR system, 
whereas SMD candidates could also have a place on the PR lists (Hirano 2002, 2006).
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2012).  The changed electoral environment diluted the importance of the farming constituency 226
for candidates while making the tribe less influential within the LDP (R. Uchida 2015). 
 Based on the new electoral system, the OPM strengthened power relative to the tribes to 
pursue the structural reform of the LDP that began with its fall to an opposition party in 1993.  227
In particular, Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006) extended the administrative reform, which 
was vigorously pursued under the Hashimoto administration (1996-1998), to the active 
involvement of the business community (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004; Tanaka 2007; R. Uchida 
2015; Wajima 2017).  With the campaign slogan to “change the LDP, change Japan,” he cut 228
back on particularistic spending (e.g., agricultural subsidies, budget transfers to local 
governments) and undercut the LDP’s clientelistic systems to pursue the “reform without 
sanctuary” (Reed, Scheiner, and Thies 2012, 354).  This reform took advantage of the Council 229
on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) advisory to Prime Minister as “the engine of Koizumi’s 
reforms” and several other means to insure the authority of the LDP presidency (e.g., selection of 
Cabinet ministers, clarification of the Prime Minister’s right to initiate policy) (Tanaka 2007, 6; 
 Sasada (2008) cautions that those candidates who run only in a PR system can represent particularlistic interests to win seats 226
because each PR district is several times bigger than single-member districts and particular groups can have sufficient number of 
votes. Yet, he notes that candidates usually run in a single-member district and a PR district simultaneously to increase the 
possibility of winning a seat. He also suggests that politicians have faced an increased difficulty to bring pork-barrel to their 
district due to the government’s efforts to cut down spending to recover from the increasing budget deficits. 
 Following the fall to an opposition party in the Lower House election in July 1993, the LDP initiated its internal structural 227
reform (Wajima 2017). With the launch of the Headquarters of Party Reform in August 1993, it decided the policies to reform the 
organization and operation of the party by December 1994 whereby the central policy-making power was to be strengthened 
through the improvement of advisory councils.
 Upon his accession to the LDP presidency, Hashimoto launched the Headquarters for Promoting Administrative Reform in 228
November 1995 (Wajima 2017). Subsequently, he established several commissions in the area of deregulation and administrative 
reform where former ministerial colleagues and non-parliament experts from the business community discussed the agricultural 
policy as part of the administrative reform.
 For instance, the Koizumi administration reduced the subsides for local governments by about JPY 4 trillion through the 229
restructuring of small municipalities and the revamp of the allocative government grants (Rosenbluth, Saito, and Yamada 2011).
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Nishikawa 2007; R. Uchida 2015).  In reaction to the DPJ’s criticism of the LDP’s agricultural 230
policy and the electoral defeat at the Upper House in 2003, however, the Koizumi administration 
allowed the tribe to moderate the policy to support farmers, but not too selectively.  231
Nevertheless, the landslide victory of the Koizumi LDP in the Lower House election in 2005 led 
to its return to the drastic reform.  232
 The farm policy tribe at the LDP also experienced internal changes in the 2000s, while 
being forced to appeal the policies to consumers rather than narrowly to farmers or agricultural 
cooperatives. The changes included generational turnover with the retirement of its top members, 
the stepping down of MAFF ministers liable for misuse of political funds, and the appointment 
of MAFF ministers in favor of trade liberalization (Miura 2010; Sasada 2008). The regime 
change from the LDP to the DPJ reinforced the OPM-led policy-making in that the DPJ regime 
clarified the roles of politics and bureaucracy under the slogans ‘political leadership’ and 
‘centralization of the Cabinet’ (Miura 2015, 72). Furthermore, the LDP tribes went through the 
regime changes where the intra-party confrontations led to unsuccessful negotiations (e.g., the 
 Under the Koizumi administration, the CEFP exercised strong influence, for instance, over the budget preparation that used to 230
be led by Ministry of Finance, while leading to the postal reform in 2005 that had previously faltered in the face of opposition 
from bureaucrats and policy tribes (Tanaka 2007; Musashi 2010). In particular, extending the proposal from Japan Business 
Federation (Keidanren) that was made in 1997, the CEFP started in 2002 to deliberate the system of Special Agricultural Zones to 
enable business corporations to join in farm management in special zones (see Chapter 2) (Wajima 2017). While the MAFF 
became inclined to take advantage of entries of business corporations for agricultural structural improvement around these days, 
the LDP tribe opposed the idea of this new system to echo the protest from the farm sources who criticized the hasty reform. As 
originally proposed by Japan Business Federation, however, the system was institutionalized in December 2002 for its 
implementation from 2003.
 In the process of developing the 2005 New Basic Plan, different stakeholders debated the scope of ‘responsible 231
farmers’ (Ninaite) who were supposed to be motivated and capable for stable farm management and aggregate farmland through 
several policy tools (Wajima 2017). In line with the agrarian groups such as Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives 
(Zenchu), the DPJ criticized as ‘the cutoff of small farmers’ the narrow scope of ‘responsible farmers’ that was proposed by the 
MAFF and the farm policy tribe. In response, the tribe at the LDP who were concerned of the defeat in the Upper House election 
in 2003 demanded to relax the requirements for ‘responsible farmers.’ Their request was incorporated in the 2005 New Basic 
Plan (2005) as well as the Outline Plan on Stabilization of Farm Management and Income (2005) where special advantage was 
given to the farmers in the regions with unfavorable conditions and those making efforts in management improvement. 
 Subsequently, the MAFF launched the Headquarters for Promoting Agricultural Policy Reform (Nosei-kaikaku suishin 232
honbu) in 2005 to implement the Outline Plan on Stabilization of Farm Management and Income, while the policy arena outside 
the MAFF continued to advocate the reform of agricultural land system for entries of business corporations (Wajima 2017).
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defeat of the LDP, and the self-destruction of the DPJ). Learning from the lessons, the tribe 
adapted to the OPM-led policy-making by embracing anti-protectionism (R. Uchida 2015). In 
addition, even after the LDP’s return to power, they continuously faced decreased farm votes. 
Agrarian communities had already dealigned from the LDP since the Koizumi reform whereas 
the agricultural population continuously declined (R. Uchida 2015).  233
The Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA): 
The system of Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA: Nokyo), another ‘linchpin’ of the triangle, 
has also diminished in power (Bullock 1997; Horiuchi and Saito 2010). The JA is a collective of 
agricultural cooperatives, and has long exploited its dense network to promote conservative 
policy for small and part-time farmers. Nearly all farmers are JA members, although the 
Agricultural Cooperative Act (ACA) guarantees farmers’ freedom of establishment of and 
participation in any types of agricultural cooperatives (Godo and Takahashi 2012).  This is 234
because affiliation with the JA has been almost “a sine qua non“ for farmers to engage in 
farming, whereas the economic incentives of membership are considerable and extend to daily 
 The size and influence of the LDP’s farm policy tribe shrank in tandem with the falling number of farm votes, as many 233
powerful members of the tribe lost their seats particularly in the 2009 election and never returned to the Diet (Honma and Mulgan 
2018). Instead, the LDP’s support base became more evenly spread across the farming and non-farming populations as shown in 
the more balanced electoral performance of the LDP in recent elections across all types of constituencies.
 The number of JA member households remained larger than the number of farm households due to a near 100 % membership 234
rate among farm households and a large number of retired farmers who depended on JA’s financial services and real estate 
business (Horiuchi and Saito 2010; T. Uchida 2003). For instance, in 2015 the total of farm households was 2.16 million 
households (MAFF 2018c) whereas the total of JA’ regular member households reached 3.77 million households (MAFF 2016b). 
Despite the decrease of regular members since the 1970s, the total membership has been still increasing as of 2018 (MAFF 
2017i; JAcom 2018a). This is because of the increase in associate membership, which resulted from the JA’s recent efforts in 
expanding the financial and insurance businesses available for non-farm population (Nikkei Shinbun, May 9, 2015).
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lives (Bullock 1997).  With heavy governmental protection that granted an exception to the 235
antitrust law, the JA enjoyed monopolistic control over agricultural inputs and products and the 
rural financial market.  In return, it served as a vehicle to mobilize farm votes and provide 236
campaign funds to politicians of the tribe (Sasada 2008). With its branches throughout the 
country, the JA has served as a hub of get-out-the-vote activities, taking advantage of self-
governing nature of farming villages.  Its national peak organization, Central Union of 237
Agricultural Cooperatives (Zenchu), not only played “a pivotal role in collective bargaining” 
between the government and farmers but also served as “a pressure group” to advance farmers’ 
interests (Horiuchi and Saito 2010, 430; Sasada 2008, 130). Furthermore, the JA worked as “a de 
facto sub-governmental body” to help the MAFF develop and implement policy (e.g., 
distributing subsidies for farmers) (Godo and Takahashi 2012, 4). With the support from LDP 
politicians, it secured the status of the MAFF that has been continuously criticized for its 
exorbitant sizes of personnel and budget (Godo and Takahashi 2012). 
 JA’s businesses are not only farming activities (e.g., shared-use of agricultural facilities, joint-shipping of agricultural 235
commodities, technical assistance, and easy input purchases) but extend to various services for daily lives (e.g., banking and 
insurance, supermarkets, ceremony halls, gasoline stations, and travel ticketing) (Horiuchi and Saito 2010; K. Yamashita 2009; 
Sasada 2008).
 For instance, the JA was given a monopolistic position in the sale of fertilizers, pesticides and farm machinery as well as the 236
collection of rice harvests (Godo and Takahashi 2012; Horiuchi and Saito 2010). Although some large-scale farmers have 
developed their own supply and distribution channels, small-scale farmers, who dominate the JA membership, have been 
dependent on JA’s services that are easily accessible to them (Godo and Takahashi 2012). Furthermore, the mutual dependency 
between farmers and the JA has been reinforced through the JA’s financial and insurance services and swelled these functions: 
most farmers have borrowed money from the JA at below-market interest rates for their purchase of fertilizers and machinery, 
while part-time farmers banked incomes or revenues from their non-farming activities to the JA that has taken advantage of such 
financial resources for their non-farm business activities (Horiuchi and Saito 2010; K. Yamashita 2011).
 Besides the political interests and dense network of the JA, the literature points to the institutional features of farming 237
communities (e.g., effective coordination, monitoring, compliance, and loyalties) as the factors enabling farmers to be excellent 
campaigners to mobilize the electoral votes for the LDP (Horiuchi and Saito 2010; Sasada 2008; Godo and Takahashi 2012). For 
instance, Horiuchi and Saito (2010) note that farmers, who relied substantively on political discretion, utilized family and 
communal ties to mobilize support for the LDP even by extending such ties to the relatives and family members dwelling in 
cities. They also explicate that senior members of local organizations often monitored the polling stations to secure fairness in 
voting conduct but could even imperfectly identify whom voters casted their ballot for in half-open voting booths, while the rural 
voting environment covering a few hundred households at each voting station allowed candidates to easily estimate who voted 
for whom with surprising accuracy. They argue that these monitoring and enforcement mechanisms enabled the governing party 
to reward farmers who campaigned for the party and punish those who defected.
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 However, the JA has been receding from its privileged position since the 1990s mainly 
on three grounds: 1) electoral reform; 2) financial status; and 3) representation of farmers’ 
interests. First, the 1994 electoral reform undermined JA’s power to mobilize farm votes.  It 
deprived the interests in the clientelistic relationship of both farmers and politicians, since their 
additional efforts would not much alter electoral outcomes.   238
 Second, the JA has faced an increasingly severe financial situation since the 1990s, which 
has further undermined its political power and organizational capacity. In the context of the post-
bubble economy and the shrinkage of farm population, its business enterprises experienced an 
increasingly harsh financial climate, whereas its monopolistic position no longer stands under 
market liberalization and administrative reforms (Mori, Senda, and Iba 2003; Honda 2007).  239
Then, the JA undertook organizational restructuring, including mergers and dissolutions of local 
cooperatives that somewhat improved management efficiency but often reduced farmers’ access 
and collaboration to them (Mori, Senda, and Iba 2003; Onozawa 2005; O. Takada 2006; N. 
Ishida 2008).   240
 Third, the DPJ’s victory in 2009 evidenced that the JA did not necessarily serve the 
interest of farmers. The DPJ successfully gained more seats than the JA-backed LDP by directly 
 On the one hand, farmers became less motivated to campaign for the party in the new system that appeared to be less 238
sensitive to farmers' efforts in political mobilization than the old system, resulting in the drop of turnout in the elections in some 
farming communities (Horiuchi and Saito 2010). On the other, the LDP became mostly indifferent about the political skills of the 
JA that used to divide votes among different lawmakers in the former system (Godo and Takahashi 2012). As such, the 1994 
election reform discouraged both the farmers and the politicians to remain in the clientelistic relationship tied with the JA. In 
addition, it allocated fewer seats to rural areas, furthering the decline of JA’s political power.
 The Ministry of Finance pursued financial market liberalization in the mid-1990s, which deprived the JA of various privileges 239
in its banking and insurance businesses (Godo and Takahashi 2012). The JA often increased its profit margins by investing 
farmers' deposits in nonagricultural sectors while its local organizations were dependent on government relief measures from 
chronic deficits: In 1996 the lax investment of the JA money triggered the jusen (housing loan companies) problems or the 
Japanese predecessor of the subprime crisis (Horiuchi and Saito 2010).
 Takada (2006) shows that not only the members’ utilization rates of the services but also some indicators of management 240
efficiencies declined in accordance with the increase of the management scale of JA’s local cooperatives for the period between 
1990 and 2006 during which the number of the cooperative dropped from 3,500 to 845.
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appealing to farmers with the proposal of the income support system for individuals (Horiuchi 
and Saito 2010; Honma and Mulgan 2018). To implement agricultural policy, the DPJ 
government also bypassed the JA and its network, and thus further debilitated the JA’s 
administrative reach to farmers.  Returning to power, the LDP government declared that it 241
would reform the JA for the benefit of farmers (Honma and Mulgan 2018).   242
3.1.3. Policy instruments 
Along with the political swing heightened since 2007, three major policy developments led to the 
FB program: 1) the 2009 amendment to the Agricultural Land Act (ALA); 2) the 2012 launch of 
the Community Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP) program; and 3) the 2013 legislation of the 
Farmland Bank (FB) Act. First, under the regime of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 
ALA amendment further relaxed tenancy regulations to allow for the entry of business 
corporations into farm management and diluted the ‘cultivator-oriented principle.’ Previously, 
legally qualified tenant corporations were limited to ‘Agricultural Production 
Corporations’ (Nogyo seisan hojin), but the 2009 amendment allowed all types of corporations to 
enter into the farming sector. Second, the government under the regime of the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ) introduced the CAMP program in 2012 to facilitate planning of farmland use with 
 The DPJ’s initiatives to dampen the JA’s political power (e.g., submitting a bill in 2009 to amend the Agricultural 241
Cooperative Act (ACA) for compliance with political neutrality, beginning the income support system for individuals in 2010 for 
direct payments to farmers) resulted in no candidacy from All-Japan Agricultural Policy League (Zenkoku noseiren), the national 
federation of the JA’s political groups, in the 2010 Upper House election where 6 policy-makers of the farm policy tribe stepped 
down (R. Uchida 2015).
 While the second Abe administration took advantage of the evidence shown by the DPJ regime that the interests of the JA and 242
the farmers were not monolithic (Honma and Mulgan 2018), the initiative of the LDP government to reform the JA dates back to 
the commission that was held by the MAFF between April and December of 2000 to discuss the businesses and organizations of 
the JA system (Morozumi 2017).
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a focus on the roles of local actors. Finally, with the LDP’s return to power, the FB Act was 
established in 2013 to expedite farmland aggregation to large farmers. 
Agricultural Land Act (ALA) Amendment in 2009 
The amendment to the ALA in 2009 was a radical change in the agricultural land system, as 
called “Heisei Land Reform” or “the liberalization of tenancy” (Harada 2017b, 104; Hiramatsu 
and Enomoto 2014, 257).  This amendment largely tempered the ‘cultivator-oriented principle’ 243
of the ALA to be inclusive of all types of corporations. Stemming from the policy-making of the 
New Policy (1992), the political agenda on the opening of the farming sector to business 
corporations was discussed as part of the administrative reform for deregulation.  In particular, 244
Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) proposed a stepwise relaxation of farmland controls in 
1997 in the process of developing the New Basic Act (1999). The proposal included three steps 
to expand business corporations’ rights to farmland; first to capital investment, then to tenancy of 
farmland, and finally to ownership of farmland.   245
 The words “Heisei Land Reform” were first used in the document entitled “Agricultural Reform for Consumers” (Shohi-sha 243
no tameno nogyo-kaikaku o) that was submitted by four experts at the CEFP meeting held in May 2008 (Kishi 2009). The reform 
was introduced as one of the policy packages, which included key concepts that led to the 2009 ALA amendment (e.g., the 
separation between ownership and usership). Several scholars evaluated the 2009 ALA amendment as a drastic reform given its 
extraordinary change in the direction, and also pointed out that policy-makers and officials started to use the terms ‘the new law’ 
or ‘the new system’ rather than ‘the amendment.’
 The policy discussion leading to the New Policy (1992) was seen as a turning point in that MAFF declared itself to start 244
considering the farmland acquisition by business corporations as well as that the business community started to discuss the new 
entries of business corporations not only as a means to foster ‘responsible farmers’ but to reform the administration for 
deregulation (see also Chapter 2) (Ohshima 2003; Kenji Ishihara 2009).
 Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), an opinion leader of the business community, has advocated the market liberalization 245
of agricultural produce since around 1978 under the trade friction between Japan and the US as well as the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (Sakurai 2010). It has increasingly intervened in the agricultural policy under the administrative reform for 
deregulation. In the policy-making process of New Basic Act (1999), it aired its opinion that the government must reconsider the 
‘cultivator-oriented principle’ of the ALA in October 1995 (Harada 2017b; Kenji Ishihara 2009). Then in September 1997 it 
published “Proposal on Review of the Agricultural Land Act” where it proposed the three-step deregulation of agricultural land 
system (Kenji Ishihara 2009; Sakurai 2010; Harada 2017b).
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Following these steps, the negotiations among the LDP, the MAFF and the Council on Economic 
and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) attained the liberalization of tenancy but not ownership. Under the first 
Abe administration (2006-2007), the CEFP discussed the farmland system as part of the reform 
agenda to facilitate an economic partnership agreement (EPA) and called for the access to use 
rights by all types of corporations and the liberalization of ownership transactions (Wajima 2017; 
Kenji Ishihara 2009). Both the LDP and the MAFF deliberated the expansion of tenancy but not 
to open ownership. With the rapid decline of power against the pro-farmer pitch of the DPJ since 
2007, the LDP government carefully refused the CEFP’ radical proposal, arriving at a middle 
course between business and agrarian sides.  246
 Nevertheless, the 2009 amendment fundamentally changed the purpose of the law; from 
protection of ownership to promotion of usership (or tenancy). In place of the ‘owner-farmer 
principle’ (jisaku-no shugi), it included two new elements in the purpose: 1) efficient and 
appropriate farmland use, and 2) farmland preservation. Thus it diminished the original ‘owner-
farmer principle’ for the sake of efficiency, but did not totally extinguish the ‘cultivator-oriented 
 Following the failure in the Upper House election in July 2007, the farm policy tribe of the LDP became cautious about the 246
farmland reform and recalcitrated against the proposal from the CEFP (Wajima 2017). The stepping down of Prime Minister Abe 
(who promoted the farmland reform) largely dampened the momentum and then delayed the progress in the reform, while the 
LDP continuously secured the support for the reform under the pretext of stable food supply. 
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principle.’  The roles and responsibilities of ‘cultivators’ were omitted in the bill but revived at 247
the Diet deliberations that took into account their prior contribution to farmland use in harmony 
with ‘local areas’ as well as their status in society.  Consequently, the 2009 ALA gave the 248
meaning of farmland not only as ‘productive resources’ but still also as ‘local resources;’ those 
granted use rights should be preferably ‘cultivators’ who have conventionally engaged in farming 
(D. Takahashi 2013; Harada 2017b). In this regard, the 2009 ALA has a dual nature with the 
(diluted) ‘cultivator-oriented’ approach and a more open-ended approach to efficient farmland 
use, making it difficult to express in one principle.  249
 For the first purpose of efficient and appropriate farmland use, the amendment loosened 
tenancy controls and introduced a new intermediary mechanism (Takayoshi Hashimoto 2009). 
With the relaxed controls, it allowed almost any individual and corporation to acquire ‘use rights’ 
to farmland wherever it was as long as they had labor and technical resources (Harada 2017b; D. 
 The 1970 amendment to the ALA added the role of tenancy in the efficient farmland use to the purpose, and thus was called 247
the shift from the ‘owner-farmer principle’ to the ‘cultivator-oriented principle’ (Ishigaki 2010). Until the 2009 amendment, 
however, the subsequent amendments still kept the wording expressing the ‘owner-farmer principle’ that “the ownership of 
agricultural land by cultivators themselves is most appropriate,” while it held various restrictions about who can lease farmland 
(Kishi 2009). The 2009 ALA deleted the words that exactly expressed the ‘owner-farmer principle’ (D. Takahashi 2013), and 
instead added the words promoting the cultivators’ acquisition of farmland rights and to control farmland conversion and preserve 
farmland with an ultimate goal to ‘stabilize the status of cultivators and boost domestic agricultural production’ (Article 1) 
(Harada 2017b; D. Takahashi 2013). Furthermore, the 2009 ALA additionally included a new provision on responsibility of 
‘persons entitled to cropland’ (Article 2.2) to ensure appropriate and efficient use of farmland, stipulating that “[p]ersons who 
have ownership of or the right of lease of cropland, or any other right to use and derive profit from cropland must ensure that 
cropland is used in an agriculturally-appropriate and efficient manner.” (D. Takahashi 2013; Harada 2017b). Thus the 2009 ALA 
still stressed the important roles and responsibilities of ‘cultivators’ in farmland use. Despite no definition of ‘cultivators’ 
provided in the ALA, the ‘cultivator-oriented principle’ in general means that rights to farmland should be given to cultivators 
who themselves engage in farming in practice and thus reside, live and act as a member of a farming village (Ishigaki 2010; D. 
Takahashi 2013).
 Politicians from three parties at the Lower House (i.e., the LDP, the DPJ and the New Komei Party (NKP)) as well as non-248
parliament experts advocated the revival of the concept of ‘cultivators’ in the 2009 ALA in the course of Diet deliberations (Kishi 
2009; D. Takahashi 2013). The Diet added the following points to the bill in the purpose (Article 1): 1) the invaluable role of 
farmland ownership by ‘cultivators themselves,’ 2) the acquisition of rights to farmland by ‘cultivators,’ and 3) the ‘harmony with 
local areas,’ and 4) the securement of ‘the status of cultivators’ (D. Takahashi 2013). It also additionally included a new provision 
on ‘Consideration of Operations’ (Article 63.2) to ensure that “various agricultural efforts based on independent decisions by 
farmers regarding the type, scale, etc. of agricultural management are respected and that “cropland, which provides precious 
resources for local areas, is put to effective agricultural use in harmony with local areas” (D. Takahashi 2013).
 Different scholars and politicians gave different names to the principle of the 2009 ALA, including ‘new cultivator-oriented 249
principle,’ ‘use principle,’ ‘use-priority principle,’ ‘appropriate and efficient use principle’ and ‘user-oriented principle’  
(D. Takahashi 2013; Kishi 2009).
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Takahashi 2013; Sakurai 2010). However, it placed conditions to ensure that tenants should 
continuously engage in farmland use in harmony with local agriculture.  To ensure and monitor 250
continuous engagement, it expanded the role and responsibilities of agricultural committees, to 
which general corporations as tenants were to annually report the status of farmland use.  At 251
the same time, the amendment relaxed the eligibilities for ’Agricultural Production Corporations’ 
to facilitate the incorporation of village-based farming organizations and to inject non-
agricultural corporations and their capital.  Albeit with the conditions to harmonize with local 252
agriculture, the amendment liberalized tenancy and diversified farmland users to promote free 
and competitive entries of new farmers (Sakurai 2010; Harada 2017b).  253
 Prior to the 2009 amendment, the ALA granted use rights for: 1) individuals who regularly engaged in farming (over 150 250
days annually), 2) ‘agricultural production corporations,’ and 3) ‘special corporations’ (tokutei-hojin) eligible for tenancy only at 
the districts with considerable abandoned farmland under the Special Corporation Loan Program (effective in the 2005 PIAMF 
Act amendment) (M. Takada 2009; Harada 2017b; D. Takahashi 2013). While the first two types remained eligible, the 2009 
amendment allowed general corporations (including business corporations) under the additional conditions to ensure harmonious 
local agriculture, but not limited to certain districts. The additional conditions (Article 3.3) included: 1) the written contract with 
a condition of cancellation in case of inappropriate use (Article 3.3.1); 2) the prospect that tenants would ensure their continuous 
and stable engagement in farm management in collaboration with other local farmers (Article 3.3.2); and 3) the regular 
engagement of one or more of executive officers in farming in case of a corporation (Article 3.3.3) (Harada 2017b; D. Takahashi 
2013; Sakurai 2010; M. Takada 2009). During the Diet deliberations, the second and third conditions were added to the bill to 
ensure the harmony between tenants and local agriculture (Harada 2017b; D. Takahashi 2013). In addition, the Diet deliberations 
added a new stipulation (Article 3.2.7) to mandate tenants to coordinate farmland use with the adjacent areas and otherwise not to 
grant them use rights (D. Takahashi 2013; Harada 2017b). 
 In addition to the conventional roles in screening, permitting and authorizing farmland transactions and conversion, the roles 251
of the agricultural committees extended to include: 1) field survey and reporting to mayors in the case of tenancy arrangements 
with general corporations; 2) monitoring of the status of farmland use after granting general corporations use rights, including 
admonition to violators or cancellation of contracts if the status of farmland use is inappropriate; 3) annual survey of the status of 
farmland use (Sakurai 2010; Harada 2017b; D. Takahashi 2013). Thus, the amendment gave the agricultural committees not only 
additional responsibilities but more authority to ensure local agricultural development and coordinate the relations between local 
and new farmers in consideration of the local status (Harada 2017b). 
 To promote the incorporation of village-based farming organizations, the amendment enabled lenders (i.e., landowners) to 252
have a right to vote as a member of an Agricultural Production Corporation (Article 2.3.2) (Harada 2017b; D. Takahashi 2013). 
To lure general corporations and their capital from outside the farming sector, it relaxed the restrictions that limited the voting 
power of affiliated enterprises of an agricultural corporations (e.g., business corporations), and raised the upper limit of the voting 
power of associated enterprises that collaborated on agricultural businesses with an agricultural corporation (Article 2.3.2) 
(Harada 2017b; D. Takahashi 2013; Sakurai 2010; M. Takada 2009). Consequently, the number of agricultural corporations 
increased 1.45 times for 7 years, from 11,829 in 2010 to 17,140 in 2017 (Harada 2017b; MAFF 2018l). Also, the number of 
general corporations that entered into farm management through tenancy increased five times the trend prior to the 2009 ALA 
amendment, from 427 in 2009 to 3,030 in 2016 (Harada 2017b; MAFF 2018l). 
 The amendment also abolished the standard land rent system, removed the restrictions on ownership of tenanted farmland, 253
and extended the maximum tenancy contract life. Harada (2017b) suggests that these changes were intended to secure free entry 
and competitive market conditions for new tenants.
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 The revision also introduced the Farmland Use Accumulation Facilitation (FUAF) 
Program (nochi-riyo shuseki enkatsuka jigyo) as an intermediary mechanism to enhance both 
farmland aggregation and consolidation through tenancy.  While inheriting the municipal 254
components of the Agricultural Land Holding Rationalization (ALHR) program, the FUAF 
program involved a new project called the farmland owner-understudy project (nochi shoyusha 
dairi jigyo).  This project designated municipal-level organizations as FUAF agencies to be 255
entrusted by owners for ‘unconditional’ farmland transactions to sell or lend farmland on behalf 
of owners to qualified farmers such as certified farmers (Kudo 2010; Harada 2017b; Kenji 
Ishihara 2009).  Similarly to the ALHR program, this scheme enabled the FUAF agencies to 256
aggregate and consolidate farmland in a technically and economically rationale form, as the 
agencies were given ‘unconditional’ authority to identify tenants (Kudo 2010). Differently from 
the predecessors, however, the project, which made direct contracts between owners and users, 
could avoid the risks associated with the interim holding, such as a deficit in selling prices (Kudo 
 The 2005 New Basic Plan (March 2005) put forth the ‘Vision of Agricultural Structure’ (Nogyo-kozo no tenbo) that the area 254
managed by responsible farmers would reach 70-80% of the total farmland mass by 2015. However, the area managed by 
responsible farmers accounted for only 45% (2.1 million ha) in 2007. Furthermore, the farmland managed by each entity was 
fragmented across 29 locations in 2006 despite the increase in the farmland area managed by an entity, making the government 
concerned not only with the slow progress of aggregation but also with the limited improvement of fragmentation (Takayoshi 
Hashimoto 2009). 
 The FUAF program was stipulated in the PIAMF Act that was amended in 2009 along with the ALA amendment (Harada 255
2017b; D. Takahashi 2013). The program consisted of three projects: 1) the farmland resale and sublease project (nochi baibai to 
jigyo); 2) the farmland owner-understudy project (nochi shoyusha dairi jigyo); and 3) the training project (kenshu to jigyo)  
(Harada 2017b; Kobari 2014; MAFF 2011b). While the second project was newly introduced, the first one was basically the same 
as the municipal elements of the ALHR program through which the designated agencies at the municipal level served to purchase 
or lease farmland from owners, make arrangements for farmland consolidation, and then sell or lease out farmland to users 
(Kobari 2014). The farmland, which temporarily held by the agencies through the first project, was used for the third project to 
offer on-site training for those interested in entering into farm management. 
 Under the FUAF program, the designated organizations were called the FUAF agencies: the eligible organizations to engage 256
in the farmland resale and sublease project were limited to municipal governments, agricultural cooperatives of the JA system 
and municipal government corporations, while other non-profit corporations were also eligible as the FUAF organizations to 
engage in the farmland owner-understudy project (Kobari 2014; Kenji Ishihara 2009).
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2010; D. Takahashi 2013; Takayoshi Hashimoto 2009).  The FUAF agencies, over half of 257
which were hosted by the agricultural cooperatives of the JA system (a quarter hosted at 
municipal governments), made a considerable achievement in farmland tenancy until the FB 
program was introduced in 2014 (Harada 2017b).  258
 For the second purpose of farmland preservation, the revision reinforced the controls of 
both farmland diversion and abandonment (Takayoshi Hashimoto 2009). To hamper farmland 
diversion, it tighten the controls in terms of both the permission criteria and the penalty for 
violation (Ishigaki 2010; D. Takahashi 2013). First, it introduced the legal conference system on 
public farmland conversion whereby the ALA additionally obliged the parties (e.g., owners, 
users, developers) to consult with the national or prefectural government in advance of 
conversion for public purposes, which was previously free from any legal approval.  Second, it 259
stiffened penalty for violation, by raising the maximum fines for illegal conversion, allowing for 
administrative subrogation for restitutio in integrum, and tightening the standards of farmland 
 While the ALHR program faced an increasing risk of a deficit in selling prices particularly on the recent trends of farmland 257
price depreciation, it often involved mismatches between users’ needs/interests and available farmland that the ALHR 
corporations purchased or leased from owners (Takayoshi Hashimoto 2009). The ALHR program comprised the entrustment 
project, where the ALHR corporations temporarily received ownership but could systematically avoid the risks associated with 
the interim holding of farmland (Kudo 2010). However, this entrustment project was not well recognized in the farming 
communities.
 The farmland area that underwent transactions in this project (mostly through use-right settings based on the PIAMF Act) 258
increased from 18,000 ha in 2010 to 55,000ha in 2013 also with the aid of subsidies for landowners who participated in the 
project, but has decreased since 2014 when the FB program began: reduced to as much as one third of its peak (around 18,000ha)  
(Harada 2017b).
 Prior to the amendment, the ALA exceptionally allowed for so-called ‘public farmland conversion’ to build public facilities 259
(e.g., schools, hospitals, social welfare facilities) without legal permissions, while an initiative for farmland conversion in 
principle required a permission from the national government (in the case of farmland larger than 4ha) or the prefectural 
government (in the case of farmland not larger than 4ha) (Articles 4 and 5) (D. Takahashi 2013; Takayoshi Hashimoto 2009; 
Ishigaki 2010). However, this exception often sparked off farmland conversion in the adjacent areas. Albeit no need for 
permission, the amended ALA imposed an obligation on the parties (e.g., owners, users, developers) to consult with the national 
or prefectural government even in the case of farmland conversion to build public facilities.
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categorization allowable for conversion.  In addition, with the amendment to the Act on 260
Establishment of Agricultural Promotion Regions (EAPR Act), the zoning system was 
strengthened to ensure that superior farmland (yuryo-nochi) is systematically preserved.  Given 261
the prevalent malpractices (e.g., ex-post statutory ratification, loose statutory interpretation), 
however, concerns remained about the enforceability of the amended law due to the ambiguity of 
several criteria, local authorities’ discretion, and the absence of the secured means to achieve the 
goals (D. Takahashi 2013; Takayoshi Hashimoto 2009; Ishigaki 2010). 
 To redress farmland abandonment, all the related stipulations moved from the Act on 
Promotion of Improvement of Agricultural Management Foundation (PIAMF Act) to the ALA to 
make them applicable to ‘all kinds of farmland’ whereby most control of the municipalities 
moved to the agricultural committees (Harada 2018a; D. Takahashi 2013; Ogata 2013). The 
revision extended the controllable farmland from the municipally-designated areas to all areas 
across the country (Harada 2018a).  Specifically, the 2009 ALA defined abandoned farmland as 262
 The amendment strengthened the penalties for violation to a great extent by: 1) raising the upper limit of the fines for illegal 260
conversion (e.g., from JPY3 million (USD 27,300) to JPY100 million (USD 910,800) in the case of corporations); 2) increasing 
the fines and imprisonment for violating order of restitutio in integrum; 3) conducting the administrative subrogation by the state 
or prefectural governor if the parties did not follow the order of restitutio in integrum for illegal conversion; 4) enabling Minister 
of MAFF to request for correction if local administrative processes for permission of farmland conversion were inappropriate; 
and 5) stiffening the standards of farmland categorization related to farmland conversion (D. Takahashi 2013; Ishigaki 2010; 
Takayoshi Hashimoto 2009).
 The amendment to the EAPR Act obliged the national and prefectural governments to set a goal to preserve farmland in areal 261
terms, while tightening the conditions for exclusion of farmland from the ‘Agricultural Land Zones’ (no-yochi kuiki) where 
farmland diversion is disallowed in principle. With the amendment, Minister of MAFF must set a target of farmland area to be 
preserved in the Basic Direction of Farmland Preservation, and accordingly prefectural governors must set a target of farmland to 
be preserved within each prefecture in the Basic Direction for Establishing Agricultural Promotion Regions (Nogyo-shinko chiiki 
seibi hoshin) (D. Takahashi 2013). The amendment also added another condition (i.e., not to impede responsible farmers from 
aggregating farmland) to the previous conditions to exceptionally exclude farmland from ‘Agricultural Land Zones,’ although 
farmland within the Agricultural Land Zones designated by a municipal Plan for Establishing Agricultural Promotion Regions 
(i.e., superior agricultural land) is not allowed for farmland conversion in principle (D. Takahashi 2013; Takayoshi Hashimoto 
2009; Ishigaki 2010). In addition, the amendment mandated the national or local government to consult with the prefectural 
governor when they initiate any developmental activities within the Agricultural Land Zones (D. Takahashi 2013).
 Previously the 2005 PIAMF Act stipulated the measures against farmland abandonment across the country, but such measures 262
were undertaken as part of the Special Corporation Loan Program (tokutei-hojin kashitsuke jigyo) that only focused on the area 
with farmland to be promoted for agricultural use under the municipal Basic Concepts (kihon-koso) (Harada 2018a). The 2009 
ALA amendment removed this limitation and expanded the scope of the measures to all areas including the area zoned for 
urbanization under the City Planning Act (Harada 2018a; Ogata 2013).
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‘idle cropland’ (yukyu nochi) to be annually evaluated by the agricultural committees and to be 
more systematically addressed for improvement.  To ensure that the ‘idle cropland’ should be 263
consistently handled and systematically resolved, the administrative power moved from 
municipal governments to agricultural committees.  Besides the surveys on cropland and its 264
use, the 2009 ALA mandated the agricultural committees to consistently engage in the entire 
administrative procedures, including coordination with intermediary agencies of tenancy, to 
resolve idle cropland.  Despite the considerable improvement in the measures against farmland 265
abandonment, concerns still remained about the feasibility and enforceability of the measures (D. 
Takahashi 2013). 
 The term ‘idle cropland’ (yukyu nochi) is a legal terminology defined in the 2009 ALA as the farmland consisting of two 263
classes: 1) the cropland that is not currently used for cultivation but presumed to be continuously unused for cultivation (i.e., the 
first class); and 2) the cropland whose use in the agricultural terms is recognized as significantly inferior compared to cropland in 
the adjacent areas (i.e., the second class) (Harada 2018a). This classification is based on the ‘usage survey’ that is annually 
conducted by the agricultural committees to check up the location and status of cropland in their jurisdictions. In addition to this 
legal terminology, three other terms are referred to unproductive farmland as: 1) ‘abandoned cultivated land’ (kosaku hoki-chi) 
(i.e., the statistical terminology defined in the Census of Agriculture and Forestry as the land that was not cultivated over more 
than one year albeit previously cultivated and planned not to be cultivated for the next few years); 2) ‘dilapidated 
farmland’ (kohai nochi) (i.e., the term defined in the ‘dilapidated farmland survey,’ which the MAFF has delegated municipal 
governments to conduct since 2008, as the farmland that is not currently cultivated, resulting in the status under which crop 
cultivation is unable with normal farming practices) 3) ‘non-farmland’ (hi-nochi) (i.e., the term defined in the ‘dilapidated 
farmland survey’ as the land that was formerly farmland but judged by the agricultural committees as unable to recover). 
 With the 2005 PIAMF Act, the municipal governments limitedly implemented the measures against farmland abandonment, 264
as they issued neither notice nor admonition to owners of idle cropland though only provided guidance (Harada 2018a). Harada 
(2018a) points to the grounds for this limitation including: 1) the passive attitude of the public authorities to intervene in private 
property; 2) the limited area for which the municipal governments could take measures under the Special Corporation Loan 
Program; 3) the jurisdictions of the agricultural committees over which they might have be reluctant to appeal to mayors for 
issuance of notices; and 4) the modest tone of the stipulations for mayors to issue an admonition based on his or her discretion. 
 With the amended ALA, based on the classification of ‘idle cropland’ through the ‘usage survey,’ the agricultural committees 265
are to conduct a ‘survey on owners’ intention of use’ to ask owners of (and others entitled to) idle cropland about their intention 
to take action for improvement. (Harada 2018a; D. Takahashi 2013). If this survey fails to identify an owner of idle cropland, the 
prefectural governors were authorized to pursue farmland transactions through the programs (e.g., FUAF program) upon a public 
notice by the agricultural committees — This was for the first time that the third party was authorized to forcefully make tenancy 
arrangements for abandoned farmland with unknown ownership (Harada 2018a; D. Takahashi 2013; Ogata 2013). Furthermore, 
the agricultural committees took over the responsibilities of municipal governments for individual and public notice and 
admonition about idle cropland, which were implemented under the Special Corporation Loan Program (Ogata 2013; Harada 
2018a). By removing the limitation to the Special Corporation Loan Program, the 2009 ALA mandated the agricultural 
committees to consistently administer the processes, ranging from the guidance for appropriate farmland use, the individual and 
(if appropriate) public notices on idle cropland, the screening of use plans and the issuance of admonitions (if plans are 
inappropriately or not developed), the request for the governor’s mediation in conflicts, to the notice of consultation with 
intermediary organizations (e.g., ALHR corporations, FUAF agencies). If anything beyond this scope, municipal or prefectural 
governments were authorized to implement administrative subrogation or correction order (by mayors) or adjudication for 
tenancy arrangements (by governors)(Harada 2018a; D. Takahashi 2013).
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Community Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP) Program in 2012 
Under the regime of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the government introduced the 
Community Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP) program in 2012 to facilitate farmland 
aggregation and consolidation (Harada 2017b; Shogenji 2012a). This scheme had no legal basis 
and thus no binding power, but assumed social movements to advance structural policy at the 
local level (Harada 2017b; Ando 2013). The scheme stemmed from the initiative by the Japan 
Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) to provide a long-term view of farmland use in reaction to the 
2009 ALA amendment (N. Taniguchi 2013). Despite the temporal languishing with the regime 
change, the JA made a proposal for agricultural rehabilitation in May 2011 to overcome adverse 
socio-economic and political effects on agriculture.  This proposal involved the prototypical 266
concept of the CAMP scheme to develop ‘responsible farmers’ (ninaite) with a farm scale of 
20-30 ha in flat regions and 10-20 ha in hilly and mountainous regions at the ‘village’ level (N. 
Taniguchi 2013). This concept was taken up in the 2011 Basic Action Plan (October 2011) which 
the DPJ government developed in parallel with the JA’s initiative to tailor the farming sector to 
the high-level economic partnership.  Based on the 2011 Basic Action Plan, the MAFF 267
 In reaction to the 2009 ALA amendment, the JA’s national peak organization (JA-Zenchu) brought up the Long-Term Vision 266
of Farmland Use in July 2009 as a JA’ local agricultural policy under the LDP regime (N. Taniguchi 2013). With the ensuing 
regime change to the DPJ government, however, it shelved the vision for the time being but revived it with updates in May 2011 
in response to the changes ranging from the Prime Minister Kan’s announcement about TPP negotiations in October 2010 to the 
so-called ‘3/11’ disasters following the Great East Japan earthquake, tsunami and nuclear incident in 2011. 
 Following the Prime Minister Kan’s announcement in October 2010 to consider Japan’s participation in the TPP negotiations, 267
the DPJ government deliberated the ‘Basic Direction for Revitalization of Food and Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries’ (hereafter called ‘Basic Direction’) at the Council to Promote the Revitalization of Food, Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries (CPRFAFF) advisory to the Headquarters for the Revitalization of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (HRFAFF) 
at the Cabinet with an aim to simultaneously pursue the reform of agricultural structure and the participation in TPP (Shogenji 
2013; N. Taniguchi 2013; Manabu Sawada 2014). The concept in the JA’s proposal was first taken up as a local agricultural 
master plan (chiiki nogyo master plan, which was renamed CAMP in January 2012) in the interim proposal from the CPRFAFF in 
August 2011, and then went through the budgetary request from the MAFF within a month to be adopted by the HRFAFF in ‘The 
Basic Policy and Action Plan for the Revitalization of Japan’s Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries’ (i.e., the 2011 Basic 
Action Plan) in October 2011(N. Taniguchi 2013; Shogenji 2012b).
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announced the policy in December 2011 to develop CAMPs across all the concerned 
municipalities in the next two years with a goal to materialize the agrarian structure in the next 
five years where farmland aggregated to ‘responsible farmers’ will account for 80% of the entire 
farmland (cf., approximately 30% as of 2011).  268
 The CAMP program was designed as a municipal planning procedure by which a 
municipal government was to develop CAMPs in certain areas within its jurisdiction (e.g., 
farming villages) based on in-depth, local-level dialogues (N. Taniguchi 2013). Local actors were 
to discuss where and how to aggregate farmland by ‘voluntarily’ classifying themselves into 
three types: 1) ‘central management entities’ (chushin-keieitai) (e.g., individuals, corporations, 
and village-based farming organizations) who would be responsible for local agriculture, 2) 
farmers who would lend their farmland to the central management entities, and 3) the remaining 
farmers (Harada 2017b; N. Taniguchi 2013; MAFF 2012a). The territorial boundary of each 
CAMP was ‘flexibly’ determined depending on local conditions, whereby municipal 
governments were encouraged to regularly review the plans.  Each CAMP was adaptable to the 269
local situation, but was to include three components: central management entities, farmland 
aggregation, and future local agriculture. With the patterned forms and manual given by the 
MAFF, however, most municipal governments followed the nationally-designed formats (N. 
 Following the 2011 Basic Action Plan, the MAFF elaborated the policy in December 2011 to realize sustainable and strong 268
agriculture by resolving the problems of agricultural population and land in an integrated manner. This policy provided specific 
means to the CAMP program, including: 1) to develop CAMPs in the next two years across all the municipalities containing all 
the farming villages concerned of population and farmland; 2) to promote farmland aggregation so that the farmland managed by 
responsible farmers will account for 80% of the entire cultivated land (kochi-menseki) for land-extensive farming in the next five 
years (c.f., approximately 30% as of 2011) (Koike 2013; N. Taniguchi 2013).
 Ando (2013) points out that the flexible approach to bounding the planning area is different from the previous bottom-up 269
approaches to the structural improvement. He suggests that the policy was informed on the recent situation where the scale 
expansion of ‘central management entities’ largely progressed in flat regions and extended across several farming villages, but 
the territorial scope of farmland aggregation varied across different regions.
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Taniguchi 2013). In addition, a municipal commission involving local representatives (e.g., 
village-based farming organizations, large farms, incorporated farms, female farmers) was to 
screen the plans, but a municipal government would make the final decision (N. Taniguchi 
2013). 
 To facilitate farmland aggregation and consolidation, the CAMP program was tied to 
subsidiary programs to provide economic incentives for both owners and users.  Users could 270
receive the subsidies only when they were defined as central management entities in the 
CAMPs.  Owners or lenders of farmland were eligible for the funds only when they 271
contributed to farmland aggregation to central management entities.  Both owners and users 272
 The CAMP program was tied with three types of subsidies: 1) the benefits for junior starters (i.e., income subsidies for junior 270
farmers who started farming); 2) the funds for collaboration on farmland aggregation (i.e., subsidies for contributors to farmland 
aggregation); and 3) the funds for improvement of agricultural management foundation (i.e.,  interest payment relief for certified 
farmers to make agricultural investment) (N. Taniguchi 2013). In particular, the second program adopted the owner-incentive 
approach to ‘expediting’ farmland aggregation, which was different from the previous programs to facilitate farmland 
aggregation, except for the Agricultural Land Use Promotion (ALUP) Program (1975) (N. Taniguchi 2013). In the ALUP 
Program, lenders were eligible for the funds upon their tenancy contracts (i.e., JPY 20,000 per 0.1ha in the case of tenancy 
contracts for over 6 years, and JPY 10,000 per 0.1ha in the case of those for 3-5 years) (Y. Sato 1989a).
  Farmland users who were listed in the CAMPs were eligible for all the aforementioned three types of subsidies. For the 271
benefits for junior starters, junior farmers were eligible to receive income subsidies (i.e., JPY1.5million annually, equivalent to 
approximately UDS13,660) annually for the first 5 years at a maximum after they started farm management, if they were defined 
as ‘central management entities in the CAMPs (N. Taniguchi 2013). For the funds for collaboration on farmland aggregation, 
farmers engaging in major cropping (e.g., rice, wheat, soybean) were eligible for the bonus of scale expansion (i.e., JPY20,000 
per 0.1ha, equivalent to approximately USD182) upon their expansion of cultivating farmland with relaxed requirements, if they 
were ‘central management entities’ of the area where they planned to enlarge their cultivating farmland (N. Taniguchi 2013). This 
bonus system for scale expansion started in fiscal 2011 as part of the income support system for individuals (Yamashita K. 2010), 
while it originated from the Farmland Use Accumulation Facilitation (FUAF) Program that began in fiscal 2010 (Yaguchi 2012). 
As such, the bonus was applicable only to the farmland transactions that were made under the FUAF program that required 
owners to agree on ‘unconditional’ transactions (Yaguchi 2012; Shogenji 2012a). For the funds for improvement of agricultural 
management foundation, certified farmers who were listed in the CAMPs were eligible for the interest payment relief of the loan 
for agricultural investment for the first 5 years (N. Taniguchi 2013).
 The funds for collaboration on farmland aggregation involved two types of funds for lenders: 1) the collaboration funds to 272
reorganize management; and 2) the collaboration funds to resolve farmland fragmentation (N. Taniguchi 2013; Shogenji 2012a). 
For the former, lenders who contributed their farmland to aggregation to ‘central management entities’ in the CAMPs (i.e., 
farmers who reorganized farm management from land-extensive farming to other types of farming, retired farmers, heirs entitled 
to farmland) were eligible for the funds. The municipal governments were authorized to decide the amounts and provide the 
funds through the subsidies from the national government based on the reference standards (i.e., JPY 300,000 per household for 
the area less than 0.5ha, JPY 500,000 per household for the area of 0.5-2.0ha, and JPY 700,000 per household for the area over 
2.0ha). For the latter, the lenders who contributed their farmland to consolidation for efficient farm management of ‘central 
management entities’ were eligible for the funds. Similarly to the former, the municipal governments were authorized to decide 
the amounts and provide the funds based on the reference standards (i.e., JPY 5,000 per 0.1ha). For either of these funds, lenders 
were eligible if they agreed on ‘unconditional’ tenancy contracts for over 10 years under either the FUAF Program or the ALHR 
program (MAFF 2013a; Shogenji 2012a).
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were incentivized to contribute not only to farmland aggregation but also to consolidation. For 
the funds for farmland aggregation, users (i.e., central management entities) were eligible only 
for farmland transactions under the FUAF program, while lenders were eligible only for the 
‘unconditional’ tenancy contracts for over 10 years under either FUAF or ALHR programs 
(Yaguchi 2012; Shogenji 2012a; MAFF 2013a). Given the authority of FUAF (or ALHR) 
agencies to grant use rights for users without owners’ consent, these agencies could make 
tenancy arrangements in a more consolidated form (Shogenji 2012a). With these subsidiary 
opportunities, over 95% of the municipal governments nationwide developed the plans by the 
end of 2014.  273
 By design, the CAMP program took both ‘selective’ and ‘inclusive’ approaches to 
planning, extending the former LDP agricultural policy to a slightly new DPJ policy. On the one 
hand, it continued the structural policy developed under the LDP regime as featured in the 
economic incentives for ‘selective’ farmland aggregation to competitive farmers.  This was 274
because the DPJ regime made no change to the New Basic Act (1999), an anchor of agricultural 
policy, but rather changed the whole ball game upon its announcement to consider the 
participation in TPP negotiations.  On the other, it involved new features that allowed for 275
  The share of the municipalities that developed the CAMPs quickly increased for the first two years from 56% (876) in March 273
2013, to 90% (1,416) in March 2014 (MAFF 2018j).
 For instance, the economic incentives were designed to expedite farmland aggregation selectively to ‘efficient and stable 274
farm management entities’ that were stipulated in the New Basic Act (1999) (N. Taniguchi 2013). This mechanism was seen to 
pursue the structural policy that dates back to New Basic Policy (1992) (Koike 2013). Also, the municipal program 
implementation to leverage local communities was the conventional approach to farmland liquidation, which dates back to the 
Agricultural Land Use Improvement (ALUI) Program (Noyo-chi riyo-kaizen jigyo) (Ando 2013).
 The DPJ regime revised and introduced a few policies and plans that accorded with its manifesto to sustain agriculture and 275
farming environment with involvement of small farm households (e.g., the 2010 New Basic Plan, the income support system for 
individuals), but did not revise the New Basic Act (1999) (N. Taniguchi 2013; Shogenji 2012a). Instead, as elaborated in the 2011 
Basic Action Plan, it increasingly developed policies in favor of larger farmers for agricultural competitiveness in consideration 
of TPP negotiations (N. Taniguchi 2013; Shogenji 2012a; Shogenji 2013).
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‘inclusive’ local discretion on territorial boundaries and actors. This was partly because of the 
practical needs to accord with the increased diversity of local farming situations. But it might 
have been also affected by the regime change to take advantage of local-community initiatives 
inclusive of various actors rather than municipal administrative management.   276
 Yet, the ‘selective’ and ‘inclusive’ approaches (i.e., voluntary ‘selection’ based on 
‘inclusive’ dialogues in local communities) are intrinsically contradictory and have been a 
longstanding challenge to the agricultural structural policy (Ando 2013; N. Taniguchi 2013). 
Thus, Ando (2013, 43) points out that it is infeasible to promote a ‘kinematic policy’ like the 
CAMP program by means of governmental subsidies, nationally-designed scheme and formats, 
and administrative leadership to motivate local communities to act as politically intended. 
Farmland Bank (FB) Program in 2014 
The FB program began in March 2014 to expedite farmland aggregation and consolidation with 
the FB Act (enacted in December 2013). It was put in place as a key measure of the MAFF’s 
‘Four Reforms’ (December 2013) to promote the Japan Revitalization Strategy with a specific 
goal to attain the Key Performance Indicator (KPI) (i.e., 80% farmland aggregation rate by 
 Besides the increased difficulty to uniformly define the areal boundaries due to the different levels of progress in farmland 276
aggregation across farming villages, the government designed the flexible boundaries with an intention to develop the plan in 
accordance with local conditions based local dialogues (Ando 2013). Also, Ando (2013) points to the distinction between ‘central 
management entities’ (chushin keieitai) and ‘certified farmers’ (nintei nogyosha) in terms of the different logics of agrarian 
structural improvement: the former were to be ‘voluntarily’ and ‘locally’ identified on their specific territorial base and defined in 
the CAMPs, while the latter were to be defined and approved by municipal governments regardless of their belonging to a certain 
area within a municipality. Both of them were part of the agrarian structural policy that employed a ‘selective’ approach to 
restructuring. However, the former was more similar to the approach based on the self-governing capacity of local communities, 
which was employed under the ALUP Act (1980), while the latter was extended from the approach to competition for efficient 
and stable farm management within a municipal framework, which was adopted under the PIAMF Act (1993). 
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2023).  Stemming from the proposal by the MAFF in February 2013, the concept of the FB 277
program underwent a two-stage transformation prior to the enactment of the FB Act. First in the 
process of drafting the bill, the MAFF’s proposal radically changed through the intervention 
from the aforementioned two councils (i.e., CIC and RRC). The rule of farmland redistribution 
was changed from local-priority to free and open competition. Second at the Diet deliberations, 
the bill was amended to extend, but limitedly, the role of local actors in program implementation. 
 At the first stage, the MAFF’s proposal was revised mainly in three fronts: 1) limit of 
local interference, 2) focus on competitiveness, and 3) multi-level control. First, the proposal 
included several components to ensure that local actors (e.g., local farmers, agricultural 
committees) should participate in program implementation, for instance by building on the 
CAMP program for farmland redistribution through FBs.  In response to the two councils’ 278
concern about local interference in new entries, all these elements were omitted in the bill 
(Harada 2015). Second, the proposal addressed both farmland abandonment and aggregation 
with the amendment to the PIAMF Act. Yet, to accord with the interest in free and open 
competition with access to superior farmland, the bill promoted new entries through public 
 Following the establishment of the FB Act in December 2013, the MAFF declared the ‘Four Reforms’ in December 2013 to 277
promote ‘competitive agriculture, forestry and fisheries’ (seme-no norin-suisan-gyo), in which it upheld the creation of FBs as a 
top priority of the reforms (Harada 2015; Yokoyama 2015; MAFF 2013b). The ‘Four Reforms’ detailed two of the ‘Four Pillars’ 
of the agricultural ground design, called the Plan of Creation of Regional Vitality in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, which 
was developed and decided at the Headquarters on Creation of Regional Vitality in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries 
(HCRVAFF) within the Cabinet in December 2013 (Yokoyama 2015). This ground design built on the Japan Revitalization 
Strategy, which was developed as the growth strategy of Abenomics under the Headquarters for Japan's Economic Revitalization 
(HJER) and decided at the Cabinet in June 2013 (Yokoyama 2015). As in this national revitalization strategy, the ground design 
specified the FB program as a key measure for one of the four pillars (i.e., strengthening the production base) (Yokoyama 2015; 
Kobari 2014). As such, the FB program was positioned in the sequence from the national revitalization strategy to the agricultural 
ground design, and then to the MAFF’s Four Reforms under the leadership of the OPM (Yokoyama 2015). As specified in the 
national revitalization strategy, the MAFF was mandated to attain the KPI that the share of farmland used by responsible entities 
should increase to 80% (cf., 50% in 2013), in which the FB program was expected to play a key role (Ando 2016).
 The proposal from the MAFF included several elements to ensure that local actors participate in program implementation 278
through: 1) the establishment of the governing system where a multi-stakeholder committee consisting of local representatives 
steers the management of a FB; 2) the legalization of the CAMP program, with which FB’s farmland redistribution plans build on 
CAMPs so that FBs openly seek farmland users only when local farmers are absent; and 3) the involvement of the agricultural 
committees in the farmland redistribution planning (Kobari 2014; Harada 2015).
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recruitment of farmers and prevented FBs from holding abandoned or inferior farmland.  Third, 279
new elements were added to the proposal: giving more power to prefectural authorities under the 
state supervision for program implementation.  With this addition, the notion of farmland 280
changed from production goods to be administered by quasi-government agencies (i.e., FBs) to 
those to be governed by government authorities in the manner of the state-prefectural ladder 
(Harada 2015).  
 At the second stage, the changes were made through the legislation process, making room 
for local coordination in the FB scheme. Following the criticism from bipartisan legislators and 
unsworn witnesses who were concerned with its feasibility without involvement of local actors, 
the Diet deliberations resulted in the addition of a new article (Article 26) together with 15 
collateral resolutions to the bill.  These additions gave an important role to the CAMP program 281
as a basis of the FB program implementation so as to coordinate with local agriculture and the 
existing farmers. It also allowed agricultural committees to intervene in farmland distribution 
planning. Yet, different from the conventional agricultural land systems (e.g., the ALA and the 
 To promote nationwide free and fair competition and take advantage of access to superior farmland, the two councils called 279
for changes in the MAFF’s proposal, for instance, to explicitly promote new entries, to treat outsider or new farmers the same as 
local ones on a fair basis, to publicly seek farmers and determine tenants based on the FBs’ tenancy rules, and to avoid risks in 
holding unfavorable farmland (e.g., abandoned farmland) at FBs (Harada 2015). With the changes to meet these requests, the bill 
was submitted as a new act in the judgement of Cabinet Legislation Bureau (Kobari 2014).
 The two councils requested the addition of several new measures to the MAFF’s proposal, including those to strengthen the 280
power of prefectural governors in overseeing program implementation, to establish an independent committee at each FB to 
neutrally evaluate program implementation, and to indicate the roles and responsibilities of the national government in 
monitoring program implementation, and if needed, request prefectural governments for correction or improvement (Harada 
2015).
 During the Diet deliberations, legislators and unsworn witnesses expressed their concerns of the bill mainly in the following 281
respects: 1) a lack of mechanism and conditions to consort with local agriculture and consult with local stakeholders; 2) a lack of 
attention to sufficient management capacities (e.g., human resources, organizational systems) to promote farmland aggregation; 
3) an importance of building trust among local stakeholders to introduce a new policy; and 4) the excessive intervention by the 
two councils in policy-making process (Kobari 2014). Harada (2015) suggests that this criticism built on not only the backlash 
against the OPM-led agricultural policy-making but also the existing demand from local actors for an intermediary mechanism to 
aggregate farmland. The MAFF acknowledged the expectations from local actors, which were heard in the implementation 
process of the CAMP program, that a trustable intermediary organization would resolve the farmland problems (Harada 2015). 
Such local expectations were also noticed among the policy-makers and scholars (Harada 2015).
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PIAMF Act), the FB Act minimized the role of local actors.  Despite the additional article, the 282
FB Act streamlined and advanced farmland use for better agricultural productivity (Article 1). It 
also gave more power to prefectural governments than municipal ones to control farmland 
redistribution.  This new legislation granted power to the prefectural authorities to publicly 283
recruit capable farmers as users and redistribute farmland to them free from owners’ interest and 
without permission from the agricultural committees (Kobari 2014).  284
 With this legal basis, FBs were established at all the 47 prefectures nationwide to mediate 
tenancy arrangements through the systematic separation between owners and users for farmland 
aggregation and consolidation.  By design, the FBs serve as a semi-public intermediary agency 285
to lease farmland from owners, if needed, improve it, and sublet it to ‘responsible farmers’ in a 
consolidated form (see Figure 3.2). In most cases, it leverages the two-level scheme for 
implementation; aggregating farmland at the municipal level, and redistributing it at the 
prefectural level. This scheme involves five steps: 1) the assessment of local status of farmland 
and farmers (municipal); 2) the public recruitment of users (prefectural); 3) the receipt of 
 The ALA stipulates as one of its purposes to ‘promote the acquisition of rights to cropland by cultivators who make efficient 282
use of cropland while taking into consideration harmony with local areas’ (Article 1). The system of use-rights setting under the 
PIAMF Act also builds on the concept of the ‘autonomous farmland management’ that the coordination among landowners as a 
local group most appropriately facilitates effective farmland use (Sekiya 2002).
 Differently from the preceding programs where the agencies at the municipal level were in charge of farmland redistribution 283
(e.g.,  the ALUP, PIAMF and FUAF Programs), the FB Act authorized the prefectural authorities to sublet farmland for farmland 
aggregation (Kobari 2015).
 To authorize FBs to sublet farmland on behalf of owners irrespective of their wills, the FB Act permits exemption from the 284
application of the Civic Code (Articles 621.1 and 594.2) and grants the FBs an ‘interim management right’ (nochi-chukan kanri 
ken) that involves freedom of sublet to make tenancy arrangements. For tenancy contracts, FBs can acquire either ‘leasehold 
rights’ based on the ALA or ‘use rights’ based on the PIAMF Act (Harada 2017b). With this legal basis, FBs can place new or 
outsider users, who do not have a trust relationship with owners but have economic capacity of farm management, on ‘equal 
footing’ with local farmers for access to superior farmland (Ando 2017a).
 FBs were established in all 47 prefectures by November 2014 (MAFF 2014c; Harada 2017b; Ando 2017a). For the FB 285
program, many of the prefecture renovated the public corporations that used to serve as the ALHR corporations under the ALHR 
program (Harada 2015; Harada 2017b).
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owners’ applications for the program (municipal); 4) the matchmaking between owners and users 
(municipal); and 5) the approval and public notice of farmland redistribution plans 
(prefectural).  Except for those related to the public recruitment of users (i.e., the third step) 286
and the decision of farmland redistribution plans (i.e., the fifth sep), FBs can delegate the tasks to 
qualified agencies at the municipal level (e.g., municipal governments, agricultural cooperatives, 
agricultural committees, FUAF agencies).  In practice, many FBs have delegated most of the 287
tasks to those municipal agencies, particularly the tasks for local coordination between owners 
and users (Kobari 2015).  
 More specifically these steps include the following procedures (Kobari 2015). First, municipal governments assess local 286
status of farmland and farmers through the CAMP program and other means and then share the information with FBs. Second, 
FBs publicly seek farmland users and officially announce the interested parties and their expectations. Third, municipal 
governments or other qualified agencies receive owners’ applications for the program if the applications meet the conditions 
provided by FBs (e.g., farmland quality attractable for users), and then municipal governments make tenancy arrangements 
between owners and FBs through public notice of farmland aggregation plans. Fourth, municipal governments or other qualified 
agencies identify users from the FBs’ list of the interested parties and make a match based on the sublet rules provided by the 
FBs. However, FBs can change users (i.e., subtenants) without owners’ consent, given their ‘interim management right’ to 
farmland which is granted to FBs. In addition, based on the matchmaking, municipal governments often draft farmland 
redistribution plans. Fifth, FBs develop farmland redistribution plans mostly based on the municipal draft, and then governors 
endorse and publicly announce the plans to sublet farmland to users.
 Although the agencies that have conventionally engaged in tenancy arrangements at the municipal level (e.g., municipal 287
governments, agricultural cooperatives, agricultural committees, FUAF agencies) are qualified to be entrusted with the tasks for 
the groundwork of the FB program, only municipal governments are authorized to engage in drafting farmland redistribution 
plans (Kobari 2015).
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Figure 3.2 Farmland Banking Scheme  
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 To implement the program, the national government prepared a massive amount of 
budget especially for the first fiscal year of 2014 to be used for the subsidies to owners and local 
communities, the administration of the FBs and the farmland data management.  Differently 288
from the CAMP program, the FB program was associated with the subsidies for owners and local 
communities (i.e., individual or collective lenders), but not for users (i.e., subtenants).  Lenders 289
were eligible for the funds primarily subject to the tenancy arrangements with FBs on the 
farmland designated within the area defined in the CAMPs to promote both farmland 
aggregation and consolidation.  The funds for individual lenders were applicable only upon the 290
conclusion of sublet contracts between FBs and subtenants (Harada 2015).  This aimed to 291
avoid the risks of keeping farmland at FBs for long (e.g., an increase in management cost), but 
may prevent owners from lending their land to FBs until they can identify available subtenants 
 The program budge for fiscal 2014, including the supplemental budget for fiscal 2013, amounted to JPY70.5 billion 288
(approximately USD643 million). This consisted of three components: 1) the funds for contributors to farmland aggregation (i.e., 
subsidies for owners and local communities) (JPY25.3 billion); 2) the subsidies for the administration of the FBs (JPY31.4 
billion); and 3) the subsidies for the management of farmland data (JPY13.8 billion) (Ando 2014). The amount was much larger 
than that of the previous programs for farmland aggregation and consolidation (Kobari 2015).
 The focus on the economic incentives for owners was presumed to be a prompt and available means to expedite farmland 289
aggregation. As a reason for the absence of economic incentives for users, the MAFF explained that users could take advantage 
of farmland consolidation from the FB program (Harada 2015; Ando 2014; Tsuyoshi Watanabe 2014).
 Exceptionally owners (or heirs) of farmland were still eligible for the collaboration funds on management reorganization even 290
without a tenancy contract with a FB if they made a farming contract on their land with an ‘unincorporated’ village-based 
farming organization as its member for the period over 10 years (Harada 2015; Ando 2014; Tsuyoshi Watanabe 2014). This was 
because FBs could not make a tenancy contract to sublet farmland to an unincorporated organization, but with this funding they 
could contribute to farmland aggregation to village-based farming organizations that may be incorporated in future (Harada 2015; 
Tsuyoshi Watanabe 2014).
 The FB program was tied with three types of subsidies, collectively called the funds for collaboration on farmland 291
aggregation, including: 1) the collaboration fund on management reorganization; 2) the collaboration fund on farmland 
aggregation to cultivators; and 3) the collaboration funds on farmland aggregation to local communities (MAFF 2018d; MAFF 
2018e). The first two types were applicable for individual lenders, whereas the third was for collective lenders. For the first type, 
owners or heirs of farmland were eligible when they lent their entire farmland (except 0.1ha of reserved land for their own 
farming) to FBs for the period over 10 years upon their farm retirement or management reorganization (from land-extensive 
farming to other types of farming) (Harada 2015). For the second one, owners or cultivators were eligible when they lent their 
owned or cultivating farmland adjacent to the land which was already leased by FBs, to FBs for the period over 10 years so as to 
contribute to farmland consolidation and aggregation (Harada 2015).
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and thus limit the FBs’ function of intermediately pooling farmland for aggregation and 
consolidation (Harada 2015).  
 The funds for collective lenders to be used for local agricultural development were 
applicable not necessarily based on the conclusion of sublet contracts, but depending on 
percentage of the area of farmland leased to FBs within a certain geographical area: the larger 
percentage, the higher unit values of funds were applicable.  This condition aimed to facilitate 292
farmland aggregation in a consolidated form in an extended area (Harada 2015). To faster attain 
desirable program performance, the national government offered special bonus to some of the 
funds particularly for the first two fiscal years.   293
 The primary goal of the FB program was to achieve the Key Performance Index (KPI): 
80% share of farmland to be used by ‘responsible farmers’ (i.e., farmland aggregation rate) by 
2023. To attain this goal, the national government set the target to increase farmland aggregation 
annually by 150 thousand ha (Ando 2017a). To monitor the progress, it has measured the 
program performance at each prefecture with the ‘FB’s contribution ratio’ and ranked the 
 For the collaboration funds on farmland aggregation to local communities, the local community in a certain area 292
corresponding to or within the area defined by the CAMPs were eligible when the farmland with a total area above certain 
percentages of the entire farmland in the community (at least over 20%) was leased out to FBs (neither subject to a contract life 
period, nor whether the farmland was leased out to a subtenant) (Harada 2015). The amount of the fund was calculated based on 
the unit values per 0.1ha depending on the three levels of the share of leased farmland (Harada 2015). A recipient of the funds for 
individual lenders could also benefit from the fund for collective lenders, given the different purposes and eligibles (Harada 
2015).
 The faster the eligibles lent their land to FBs, the more amounts were applicable for them for two of the three types of funds 293
under the FB program: 1) the collaboration funds on farmland aggregation to local communities; and 2) the collaboration fund on 
farmland aggregation to cultivators. For the former, for the first two fiscal years (fiscal 2014 and 2015), the unit values per 0.1ha 
were JPY 20,000 if the share was more than 20% but less than 50%, JPY 28,000 if it was more than 50% but less than 80%, and 
JPY 36,000 if it was over 80% (MAFF 2018d). These values were twice as much as the basic unit values that were used from 
fiscal 2018, while the values for fiscal 2016 and 2017 were one-and-a-half times as high as the basic ones. For the latter, for the 
first two fiscal years, the unit values per 0.1ha was JPY 20,000, which was four times as much as the basic unit of fiscal 2018 
onward (MAFF 2018d).
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prefectures relative to this ratio for public disclosure every year.  In addition, it started in 2016 294
to reflect the ranking results on the budget allocation for prefectures to provide more budget for 
the higher rankings.   295
 This ranking-based budgeting has incentivized some prefectures, but does not precisely 
account for the progress. The calculation of ranking did not take into consideration farmland 
aggregation through other means than FBs, while it ignored how farmland aggregation 
contributed to consolidation (Kobari 2015).  Furthermore, prefectural governments have 296
discretionary power to make subsidiary rules within their budgetary limits (Harada 2015). They 
were expected to distribute funds for best possible effects. With the lax guidelines from the 
national government, however, some prefectures took ready-made means to provide funds in the 
interest of the ranking-based budget procurement (M. Akiyama 2015).  For the first two fiscal 297
 The ‘FB’s contribution ratio’ is a ratio of the annual increase in a total area of farmland which is aggregated through the FB 294
program to the annual target of farmland aggregation at each prefecture  
(Kobari 2015). The annual target of farmland aggregation = [the target of farmland aggregation for 10 years]/ 10 years  
(MAFF 2018d). The target of farmland aggregation (for 10 years) =  [the area size of cultivated land in 2013] x [the higher value 
of either of the followings: 1) the farmland aggregation rate in March 2014 x 2.5 (not more than 95% in Hokkaido and 90% in 
other prefectures); or 2) the target rate of farmland aggregation defined in the Basic Policy for Promotion of Improvement of 
Agricultural Management Foundation under the PIAMF Act (Article 5)]. 
 Based on the evaluation of the program implementation for the first fiscal year (fiscal 2014), the MAFF decided in 2015 to 295
start the ranking system for progress monitoring at each prefecture and to develop the system to reflect the ranking results on 
budget allocation (Kobari 2015; MAFF 2015a). Then, based on the evaluation for the second fiscal year (fiscal 2015), the MAFF 
officially announced the policy in 2016 to allocate budget to prefectural governments in accordance with the progress of the FB 
program for the first two fiscal years (MAFF 2016f; National Agricultural News 2016). Based on the evaluations for the first two 
fiscal years, it also developed the budgetary policy to secure funds to support land improvement projects in combination with the 
FB program (MAFF 2015a; MAFF 2016f).
 In addition, Ueda (2017) points out that the ranking system does not take into account the regional diversity given the 296
calculation of the numerical target of farmland aggregation that is largely standardized uniformly across the country. He points to 
the distinction between land-extensive farming and labor-intensive one: the former particularly in the region with favorable 
conditions (e.g., rice farming in flat regions) can take more advantage of farmland aggregation to reduce production cost, whereas 
the latter benefits less from farmland aggregation. 
 For instance, the guidelines provided by the MAFF confirmed that recipients of the funds under the past programs on tenancy 297
arrangements (e.g., the FUAF program) could benefit from the two types of funds under the FB program (i.e., the collaboration 
fund on farmland aggregation to cultivators, the collaboration funds on farmland aggregation to local communities) if the tenancy 
contracts were made with FBs upon the termination of the existing contracts by consent (Ando 2014, 2016). Also, the same 
guidelines confirmed that the eligibles could be given the funds for collective lenders even without a return of the previous funds 
from the past programs (Ando 2014, 2016).
 !177
years, for instance, prefectural governments were allowed to provide funds for collective lenders 
who terminated by consent the existing tenancy contracts between lenders and village-based 
farming organizations and then remade tenancy through FBs even without any additional 
farmland aggregation, though the national guidelines later disallowed such nominal changes.   298
 The FB program made progress but was still far from the KPI goal. The farmland 
aggregation rate increased from 48.7% (2.2 million ha) in 2013 to 55.2% (2.5 million ha) in 
2018, but failed to keep up with the annual target until 2018 (MAFF 2018d).  The FBs’ 299
contribution to the annual target continued to be less than 20%, while that to the actual new 
aggregation remained below half.  The FB program was adopted dominantly in local tenancy 300
arrangements particularly for farmland aggregation to either village-based farming organizations 
or individual certified farmers in the context of land-extensive farming (Ueda 2017; Ando 
 Despite the budget limits, it was technically possible for prefectural governments to offer the funds for collective lenders who 298
terminated by consent the existing direct tenancy contracts between lenders and village-based farming organizations and then 
remade tenancy contracts through FBs even without any additional aggregation but only with paperworks (Ando 2014, 2016). In 
this case, the authorities could give subsidiary opportunities for any initiatives of village-based farming on a non-discriminatory 
basis regardless of the timing of their establishment (Ando 2014). In addition, according to my interview with a national official 
(January 20, 2016), the quintessence of the FB program is to hedge the risks of direct tenancy contracts between owners and 
users where owners without farming capacity might have no choice but to abandon farmland if users return farmland to owners. 
Thus, the involvement of a FB as a counterpart of tenancy contracts even without any other change may reduce future risks of 
farmland abandonment. With concern of the budgetary limitations versus the effects on farmland aggregation, however, the 
national government changed the guidelines to determine the funding amounts based on the area of additional farmland 
aggregation and not to provide the funds for nominal changes in tenancy contracts without any additional aggregation from fiscal 
2016 (Ando 2016; Harada 2015; Tsubaki 2017).
 The farmland aggregation rate increased more rapidly after the launch of the FB program in 2014 compared to the trend 299
between 2010 and 2013 (MAFF 2016c, 2018d). Compared to the annual target of an increase in farmland aggregation (149,210 
ha), however, the additional aggregation was in the range between 40,000-80,000ha between fiscal 2014 and 2017 (Ando 2017a; 
MAFF 2015b, 2016g, 2017g, 2018d).
 Over the past four fiscal years between 2014 and 2017, the rate of the FBs’ contribution to the annual target of farmland 300
aggregation slowed down in the past two years, peaking at 18% for fiscal 2015 (13% for fiscal 206 and 12% for fiscal 2017) 
(MAFF 2015b, 2016g, 2017g, 2018d). The rate of the FBs’ contribution to the actual annual aggregation greatly increased for the 
first two fiscal years (11.7% for fiscal 2014 and 33.5% for fiscal 2015) but somewhat slowed down (30.9% for fiscal 2016 and 
42.0% for fiscal 2017). 
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2017a).  The entry of general corporations increased after the amendment to the ALA in 2009 301
but was still limited.   302
 Based on the progress of the five-year implementation, the MAFF reviewed the FB 
program and revised the policy in November 2018.  Among others, it aimed to address three 303
issues for improvement: 1) more substantial linkage between the CAMP and FB programs; 2) 
better coordination with the FUAF program; and 3) reduction of administration cost and time for 
the FB program implementation (MAFF 2018k; JAcom 2018b).   304
 Based on the progress in the first two fiscal years, Ando (2017a) suggests that the program adoption progressed largely in two 301
cases where: 1) village-based farming had been progressively promoted; and 2) farmland aggregation had been relatively delayed 
due to a relatively large number of responsible farmers. Drawing on his interview surveys, he also suggests that the FB program 
adoption largely built on the previous efforts that the local agencies had made in promoting farmland aggregation through 
preceding programs (e.g., the CAMP program, the FUAF program).
 After the amendment to the ALA in 2009, the number of general corporations that entered in farm management through 302
tenancy grew five times as fast as in the past years between 2003 and 2009 (MAFF 2018l). However, the area of the farmland 
leased by general corporations was very limited (e.g., 0.2% in 2017) (MAFF 2018l; MAFF 2018f). After the removal of areal 
restriction of entries of general corporations upon the 2009 ALA amendment, the entries increased particularly in the suburbs of 
the large metropolitan areas with favorable business conditions in terms of the size and accessibility of market, the logistics, and 
the agglomeration of enterprises (Muroya 2015). In terms of the share of the farmland that FBs sublet to entries (in either an 
individual or corporation form), it was 8.9% for fiscal 2017 in areal terms (MAFF 2018d).
 The FB Act mandates the national government to review the FB program and relevant programs after five years of 303
enforcement and, if needed, to take appropriate measures (Article 2 of Supplementary Provisions). 
 Several studies also point to the obstacles of the FB program implementation mainly in two respects: 1) the considerable 304
administrative cost and time; and 2) the inadequate coordination with the existing tenancy mechanisms. First, tenancy 
arrangements involved large administrative burden not only on administrative agencies but also on subtenants. Subtenants can be 
granted use-rights only after a governor endorsed a farmland redistribution plan that is prepared after the municipal public notice 
of a farmland aggregation plan (Kobari 2015). They must also annually report the status of farmland use to FBs, including all the 
details such as area sizes, crop types, and yields (the FB Act Article 21) (Ando 2017a). FBs must collect and check all these 
reports from subtenants as well as the documents related to the two different types of plans (i.e., farmland aggregation plans and 
redistribution plans) as stipulated in the FB Act (Ando 2017a). As most FBs delegate many tasks to municipal agencies, FBs 
sometimes could not actively promote the program in consideration of the human resources at municipal agencies (Kobari 2015). 
Second, despite the budgetary focus on the FB program, there was little systematic coordination between different mechanisms to 
support and facilitate tenancy arrangements under three laws (i.e., the ALA, the PIAMF Act, and the FB Act) (Kobari 2015). The 
FB program was developed in haste and began soon after the launch of the FUAF Program (Kobari 2015). This relatively abrupt 
change gave local agencies (both at municipal and prefectural levels) the challenges to adapt to the new program with precise 
understanding, while not necessarily taking advantage of the previous efforts made by local agencies (e.g., agricultural 
cooperatives) through the other programs (Kobari 2015; Ando 2017a).
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 Prior to the fifth-year review, the national government also took two measures involving 
legal amendments to improve progress based on the annual reviews.  First, with the 305
amendment to the Land Improvement Act in 2017, a new system of land improvement was 
introduced to exempt beneficiaries from bearing project costs under the FB program (MAFF 
2018d). Second, with the amendment to the PIAMF Act in 2018, FBs were allowed to omit some 
administrative procedures to transact the rights to farmland with complex or unknown ownership 
that had hindered farmland transactions (MAFF 2018d; National Agricultural News 2018).  
3.2 Program Implementation in Ishikawa Prefecture 
To provide substantive details of the program implementation, this section focuses on the case of 
Ishikawa Prefecture. Given the multilevel mechanism of the FB program, it first exhibits 
implementation at the prefectural level, laying out the organizational structure and examining 
progress. Then, it shows implementation at the municipal level with a focus on two 
municipalities in distinctive regional contexts within the prefecture. To highlight the 
commonalities and differences of program implementation at the municipal level, I offer the 
comparative view on the two municipalities in light of their approaches to the program and the 
statuses of program adoption. 
 Based on the progress until fiscal 2016, the MAFF noted that the FB program had taken advantage of the cases to easily 305
adopt the program in the past years, but such cases would no longer be much available for the coming years (MAFF 2017b). Thus 
it planned to develop four measures: 1) to strengthen the local system to promote the program in association with the reform of 
the agricultural committees; 2) to enhance the linkage between the FB program and land improvement projects; 3) to incorporate 
the lessons from program implementation in the fifth-year review of the program (e.g., administrative complication); and 4) to 
give the government-wide consideration to the problems with farmland held by unknown owners. In addition to the legal 
amendments related to the second and the forth issues respectively in 2017 and 2018, the MAFF planed to review the 
administrative procedures of the FB program and coordinate with other means of farmland aggregation with the FB program in 
the fifth-year program review (MAFF 2018d).
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3.2.1 Prefectural Implementation 
Organizational Structure 
In Ishikawa prefecture, a FB was housed at the Ishikawa Agricultural Total Support Organization 
(INATO) in July 2014.  The INATO is an affiliated organization of the prefectural government 306
staffed with the prefectural government officials to serve as a clearinghouse mechanism of 
agricultural human-resource development.  To launch FBs, many other prefectures renovated 307
the ALHR agencies, which are normally public corporations staffed with their own employees 
mainly to deal with farmland ownership transactions.  Although Ishikawa also had an ALHR 308
organization, it took advantage of the INATO’s resources to seek farmland users including new 
entries and promote tenancy arrangements based on close communications among the in-house 
officials trained in intragovernmental coordination.  To ensure communications among relevant 309
agencies, a three-level mechanism was established in 2015 involving the prefectural, regional 
and municipal levels.  
 With the FB Act (Article 4), the INATO was designated as a FB by the governor on the 1st July 2014 (INATO 2014a).306
 The INATO as an affiliated organization was staffed with the officials belonging to the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 307
and Fisheries (DAFF) of the prefectural government. With an aim to address diverse needs of support for farm management from 
any interested citizens, it served as a clearinghouse of internal and external resources to promote agricultural human-resource 
development through providing consultation services, training of farm management, and networking opportunities of farmers 
(INATO 2014a).
 Prior to the FB program, in most prefectures, the public corporations at the prefectural level were responsible as ALHR 308
agencies for buying and selling farmland for farmland liquidation, whereas the ALHR agencies at the municipal level (e.g., 
municipal governments, JAs, and municipal public corporations) were for leasing and lending farmland. The ALHR agencies at 
the municipal level were abolished upon the launch of the FUAF program in 2009 to be replaced with the FUAF agencies with 
the amendment to the PIAMF Act. The ALHR agencies at the prefectural level were abolished upon the launch of the FB 
program 2014 to be replaced with FBs (Nishimura 2013). The ALHR agencies mostly in the form of public corporations also 
receive fixed-term and temporary employees and capital subscription from the prefectural government, but have their own 
employees.
 As in many other prefectures, in Ishikawa, the public corporation at the prefectural level had served as an ALHR agency since 309
1970 to facilitate farmland transactions mainly on ownership, while the agencies at municipal level such as JAs had served since 
around 1993 to facilitate tenancy arrangements. The prefectural public corporation was established 1969 prior to the ALHR 
program (1970) to acquire farmland for farmland development projects but started to engage in the ALHR program in 1970. After 
the ALHR program was abolished upon the launch of the FB program, the corporation has engaged in managing and selling the 
farmland that had acquired under the ALHR program among other tasks. 
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 At the prefectural level, the prefectural government has held a biannual conference to 
convene representatives of relevant agencies for information exchange.  Within the prefectural 310
authority, three sections have been in charge of program implementation, including one section 
of the INATO, and two sections at the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) 
of the prefectural government. The office at the Agricultural Policy Division (APD) of the DAFF 
has developed policies of implementation to be primarily followed by the responsible section at 
the INATO, but if infrastructural development such as land improvement is desirable or 
appropriate, the Agricultural Infrastructural Division (AID) of the DAFF has collaborated on the 
FB program.  At the regional level, five regional offices of the DAFF have coordinated 311
between the FB and the municipal agencies. Each of the regional offices is responsible for 
technical and administrative support and information exchange with the municipal agencies in its 
jurisdiction. At the municipal level, municipal governments have been delegated by the FB to 
implement the program often with other local agencies. Among others, the municipal tasks have 
included the review of the CAMPs, the matchmaking of farmland owners and users, and the 
coordination of land improvement. 
 The participants include the representatives from the relevant departments and sections within the prefectural government, the 310
INATO, the JA prefectural Unifier, JA prefectural headquarters of the marketing and supply business sector, the prefectural 
Chamber of Agriculture, and the prefectural Land Improvement Projects Federation.
 The executives of both at the INATO and the DAFF have made final decisions on the implementation policies: the INATO 311
has been directed by the executives consisting of the governor as the director and a few former top officials of the DAFF 
(Interviews with prefectural officials on August 23 and December 6, 2016). The group leaders from the three sections have kept 
close communications and often worked together to build public relations with stakeholders in the prefecture and beyond. At the 
working level, however, the three sections have specific roles and responsibilities. The APD office has served to organize the data 
on agricultural land and human resources, in addition to drafting implementation polices and budgeting for the FB program. 
Following the policies prepared by the ADP office, the responsible section at the INATO has coordinated with regional and local 
agencies and has pursued all the administrative tasks for tenancy contracts (paper work, collection and payment of rents). Also 
with the MAFF’s notice to promote the FB program implementation in combination withe land improvement, the AID n of the 
DAFF has followed needs for land improvement from local actors as well as others interested in new entries, and supported land 
improvement projects combined with the FB program (Interviews with prefectural officials on August 3 and 4 and December 6, 
2016).
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 Among the relevant agencies at the prefectural level, two organizations have historically 
engaged in tenancy arrangements: Prefectural Unifier of Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA), 
and Prefectural Chamber of Agriculture.  With an institutional focus on farm management and 312
farming, the JA Prefectural Unifier as a prefectural peak organization of JAs, has supported 
tenancy programs in various ways.  In parallel with the FB program, all the 17 JAs in the 313
prefecture have continuously served as FUAF agencies to mediate tenancy arrangements under 
the FUAF program.  Despite the slowed pace of increase, considerable volume of farmland 314
transactions still have been made under the FUAF program.  Furthermore, some of the JAs 315
sponsored the establishment of Agricultural Production Corporations to directly manage farms 
on farmland owned by cooperative members who were not fully capable to engage in farming.  316
 In addition, the Land Improvement Projects Federation has played a role in structural improvement of farmland at the 312
prefectural level, not directly to facilitate tenancy arrangements, but to facilitate land improvement projects that may involve 
tenancy arrangements. 
 Historically the JAs as local agencies have supported tenancy arrangements with either the ALA or the PIAMF Act 313
(Interviews with JA officials on August 5, 2016). For the ‘leasehold-right’ setting with the ALA, the JAs have often helped their 
cooperative members if requested to make a match between owners and users and coordinated with the agricultural committees, 
drawing on their knowledge and information of local farming, although such tasks were not legally bound. For the ‘use-right’ 
setting with the PIAMF Act, all the 17 JAs used to serve as the ALHR agencies (abolished with the launch of the FUAF program) 
at the municipal level to engage in tenancy arrangements by directly leasing farmland from owners and subletting it to users. 
With the launch of the FUAF program, the JAs have served as the FUAF agencies to additionally engage in tenancy 
arrangements by making contracts on behalf of owners. 
 Under the FUAF program, all the 17 JAs in addition to one municipal government were designated as FUAF agencies in 314
fiscal 2010 (Interviews with JA officials on August 5, 2016). In one municipality where the municipal government has served as a 
FUAF agency, the agricultural committee took an initiative to engage in the FUAF program within its municipal territory, which 
is part of the jurisdiction of one JA. After the launch of the FB program, the parties of tenancy (i.e., owners and users) can use 
either the FB program or the FUAF program. Subsidiary opportunities shifted from the FUAF program to the FB program, but 
the FB program is limited to the farmland within the Agricultural Promotion Regions (i.e., superior farmland), while the FAUF 
program is applicable to all kinds of farmland. 
 The volume of farmland transactions through the FUAF agencies greatly increased until fiscal 2013 under the FUAF program 315
that provided economic incentives for the parties, as the volume annual transactions increase by 76.3% from fiscal 2011 to fiscal 
2013. Since fiscal 2014, the volume remained almost unchanged, but still amounting to over 3,200 ha annually until fiscal 2017 
(Interviews with JA officials on August 5, 2016 and August 24, 2018).
 As of 2016, out of the 17 JAs, 7 JAs engaged in sponsoring ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ in a form of their 316
subsidiary corporations or village-based farming corporations (i.e., 14 corporations in total) to engage in farm management with 
tenancy and/or contract farming (Interview with JA officials on August 5, 2016). After the amendment to the ALA in 1993, which 
allowed JAs to sponsor ‘Agricultural Production Corporations’ the number of corporations with the JA sponsorship increased (T. 
Uchida and Kobari 2015).
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In addition, with the increased political pressure to reform the JA system, the Prefectural Unifier 
created a new office, called Farming Strategy Office, in December 2015 to lead the self-reform 
for agricultural promotion.  This Office has been in charge of the issues of farmland use as part 317
of the support to foster ‘responsible farmers.’  Differently from the FB, however, it aimed at 318
more inclusive support of ‘diverse responsible farmers’ as cooperative members including 
elderly and smaller farmers besides large ‘responsible farmers.’  319
 With an institutional mandate to preserve superior farmland, the Prefectural Chamber of 
Agriculture has served as a prefectural federation of the agricultural committees that administer 
farmland transactions at the municipal level. Under the FB program, the role of the agricultural 
committees was relatively small in tenancy arrangements, but large in farmland data 
 Since December 2015, the Farming Strategy Office has served as a focal point of the self-reform of the JA group in Ishikawa 317
to share information and knowledge related to training and guidance on farm management and farming within the JA group in 
Ishikawa. While the self-reform is a nationwide theme of the JAs, the group in Ishikawa declared the basic strategy to make 
progress in its activities for three years between 2016 and 2018 with a three-fold goal: 1) to increase the income of farmers; 2) to 
expand agricultural production; and 3) to revitalize local communities.
 Over more than two decades, the Prefectural Unifier has joined efforts with the INATO to implement the agricultural 318
structural policy in several respects such as the support of incorporation of farm management entities and the facilitation and 
coordination of farmland use (Interview with JA officials on August 5, 2016). In particular, it had dispatched four officers to 
INATO to ensure collaboration and communications, but halved the dispatch upon the creation of the Farming Strategy Office to 
put more effort into the self-reform. As part of its services to support responsible farmers including village-based farming 
organizations, the Office has supported the local coops on the issues on farmland use, while it has collaborated with the 
prefectural government and the Prefectural Chamber of Agriculture to hold seminars to inform the JA officers on the new 
agricultural land policies and systems. 
 Differently from the recent national agricultural policy, the JA prefectural unifier has fostered and supported ‘diverse’ 319
responsible farmers in consideration of different local conditions within the prefecture (Interview with JA officials on August 5, 
2016). As part of the basic strategy of self-reform, it has bolstered the Team of Agricultural Corporate (TAC) program that has 
developed to enhance the communication between local coops and large farmers and reflect their needs on the JA’s activities. 
Rather than promoting farmland aggregation to large farmers, however, it has made efforts to make the agricultural land systems 
available for any interested cooperative members and also supported small and part-time farmers, for instance, through the 
support of incorporation of village-based farming organizations.
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management.  Also, due to a systematic reform, the agricultural committees have been 320
undergoing restructuring since 2016 to halve the number of committee members but add 
‘coordinators’ at each committee to promote farmland use.  With this new structure, the 321
agricultural committees have been increasingly encouraged to collaborate on implementation of 
the FB program at the local level where new ‘coordinators’ were expected to play a larger role in 
taking stock of the local status and informing local actors on the program.  Differently from the 322
FB, however, the Chamber of Agriculture federates the agricultural committees, which are often 
called ‘guardian of farmland,’ to preserve farmland based on the status-quo of the land rather to 
promote farmland liquidation (Yukitomo 2015). 
Progress in Implementation 
Ishikawa prefecture has made much better progress in farmland aggregation than the national 
average. The farmland aggregation rate increased by 15.7% over the first four years between 
2014 and 2018, which is the highest among all the prefectures.  In terms of the FB program 323
 The conventional tenancy contracts require the permissions by the agricultural committees under either the ALA (for 320
individual arrangements) or the PIAMF Act (for collective arrangements), though the role of the agricultural committees is larger 
in farmland transactions based on the ALA than those based on the PIAMF Act: The agricultural committees table and endorse 
each of the farmland transactions based on the ALA, while they decide the municipal farmland use and aggregation plans to make 
them effective for public notice. However, the FB Act allows tenancy contracts between FBs and users to be made by the 
governors’ approval of farmland redistribution plan for which the agricultural committees are only consulted, while tenancy 
contracts between owners and FBs still needs to go through the approval by the agricultural committees. With the amendment to 
the ALA along with the launch of the FB program, the agricultural committees were mandated to update and organize the data of 
farmland ledgers in an electronic form through considerable budget allocation in order to render the farmland data and 
information available for a wide variety of interested parties across different regions.
With the amendment to the Agricultural Committee Act (ACA) in 2016, the electoral system of the agricultural committees 321
was also replaced with the appointive system where mayors appoint committee members on the consent of municipal assemblies 
(Yukitomo 2015). This was mostly because of fewer farmers motivated or capable to become committee members along with the 
decline in the farm population (Yukitomo 2015).
 While the agricultural committees have worked with the FBs based on the surveys on farmland and owners’ intent about 322
abandoned farmland (with the 2009 ALA), the national government has promoted more active collaboration between FBs and the 
agricultural committees since fiscal 2017 (Ando 2017a, 2017b, 2017e).
  The farmland aggregation rate increased from 42.6% (18,193ha) in March 2014 to 58.3% (24,194ha) in March 2018. 323
 !185
performance, the FB contribution ratio was 28% cumulatively for the first four years, ranking in 
the top three in the country. These high rankings stood in competition with those of the 
neighboring prefectures. In respect of the four-year FB contribution ratio, Fukui Prefecture, 
which borders the south of Ishikawa, ranked first (37%), while Toyama Prefecture, which 
borders the north, ranked fifth (25%). In addition, Niigata Prefecture, another prefecture in the 
same jurisdictional region of the MAFF (i.e., Hokuriku region), ranked sixth. An official of the 
INATO attributed the high performance of these prefectures to the large share of rice paddies 
across the region and the implicit competition among the prefectures. 
 First, rice paddies can take more advantage of farmland aggregation than dry fields. 
Land-extensive rice farming requires larger land for better profits than labor-intensive dry-field 
farming that can be profitable without much land. Furthermore, the recent increase in retirement 
of rice farmers through aging and the rice price depreciation has made more rice paddies 
available for tenancy arrangements. Given the large share of rice paddies in Hokuriku region 
(i.e., 90% compared to 54% on average nationwide in 2015), the prefectures could more easily 
improve the FB contribution ratio if they promoted the FB program (MAFF Hokuriku Regional 
Office 2017). Second, the hierarchical rankings seemed to push for the best achievable 
performance in these prefectures. In this regard, the official mentioned (Interview with a 
prefectural office on August 4, 2016): 

“The degree of interest in the program varies across the country. Some prefectures 
many not recognize the needs for the FB program, and others may be in different 
settings. … In Hokuriku region, ostensibly we can say each administration has found 
meaning of the program in its own context and actively engaged in implementation. 
But honestly in assessing, these prefectures competed against one another. Without the 
rankings, we may not have given it our all. … Across the country, the rankings largely 
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led to a split between high and low performers. Some prefectures interested in the 
program actively promoted the program to procure the budget and take advantage of it 
for regional development, but others indifferent about the program did not take much 
action. Such an interest seems to express itself as the rankings.” 
 Despite the commonalities, these prefectures took different approaches to the program. In 
terms of farmers, Ishikawa brought outside farmers into areas with a lack of local farmers. Other 
prefectures largely built on the existing agrarian population (e.g., individual management entities 
in Niigata, and village-based farming organizations in Toyama and Fukui).  The FB in 324
Ishikawa has also prioritized local farmers as it has delegated the matchmaking tasks to 
municipal agencies to take advantage of local resources for program adoption. If the 
intragovernmental communications found a good fit for new entries, however, the FB actively 
facilitated the entries of outsider farmers in collaboration with municipal agencies. Specifically, 
with the aid of regional financial agencies, the prefectural government created a fund in 2014 to 
provide five-year interest-free loans for the corporations that entered in farm management on a 
large scale in the unfavorable areas in an attempt to revitalize the declined farming 
communities.  At the same time, it vigorously sought the corporations interested in farm 325
 Farmers as subtenants of the program were largely categorized into three types of management entities: 1) village-based 324
farming organizations; 2) local individual entities; and 3) outsider entities. Since before the launch of the FB program, Niigata 
has been featured with a larger share of individual entities (e.g., full-time farmers or corporations as certified farmers), whereas 
Toyama and Fukui have been characterized by a larger share of village-based farming organizations (Tabayashi and Kikuchi 
2016). Accordingly, larger share of farmland aggregation has been geared to individual entities in Niigata, and to village-based 
farming organizations in Toyama and Fukui (Tashiro 2018; Miyatake 2010). Ishikawa has been in between these two extremes: 
less heavily relying on village-based organizations and thus holding a little larger share of certified farmers compared to Toyama 
and Fukui prefectures (Tabayashi and Kikuchi 2016). In either form of individual entities or village-based organizations, 
farmland has been aggregated largely into the local farm management entities across all these prefectures.
 As a means to support farm management for new entries, the prefectural government established a fund amounting to JPY 14 325
billion (approximately USD 127,568,000) with an aid of the JA group and financial agencies in Noto region, which was a first 
kind of Japan (Hosokawa 2015). Taking advantage of profits from the fund, it developed a new program that provides five-year 
interest-free loans for corporations to enter into or expand farm management on a scale larger than the certain prescribed scale 
and contribute to addressing farmland abandonment in the unfavorable areas with a lack of responsible farmers (i.e., hilly and 
mountainous regions and the region designated as a GIAHS site (Hosokawa 2015).
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management and pursued outreach activities. This resulted in several cases where outsider 
corporations were brought in from different regions in the prefecture and even beyond.  
 Yet, Ishikawa’s strategic focus on new entries was somewhat discouraged by the lax 
national policy to allow for almost nominal changes in local tenancy arrangements. Accordingly, 
the prefectural government adjusted its implementation policies to broaden the scope of tenancy 
arrangements, as an prefectural official detailed (Interview with a prefectural office on August 
23, 2016): 
“When the national government introduced the program, they were saying a farmland 
bank was to collect farmland as much as possible in a prefecture and distribute them 
without local consent to responsible farmers whoever are technically capable. … But, 
our executives said ‘Don’t do exactly what the national government says.’ We all knew, 
otherwise local communities would break up. So we designed our policy to strategically 
use the program with a focus on new entries and support the area lacking local 
farmers. …But sometime after the program began, the national government said 
‘Prefectural performance are ranked, and the more contracts are made through FBs, 
the more budget is allocated.’ Then, we came not to limit the program to a good fit for 
new entries in the area short of farmers. The national government could even go so far 
as to say once that the subsidies could be given for the cases where the program was 
adopted upon terminating the existing contracts by consent. Initially we did not accept 
such nominal, paper-based arrangements, but other prefectures increasingly accepted 
such cases and attained good performance. Then, the national government correctly 
restated the contract renewal could be counted as long as it involved additional 
farmland aggregation. So we publicly informed on such policy and started to accept the 
cases where the tenancy is re-arranged through the FB as long as the area of 
aggregated farmland can increase even with one paddy.” 
 In terms of farmland, the prefectures took advantage of land improvement opportunities 
to promote the FB program, but differently depending on the status of farmland across and 
within the prefectures. All the prefectures have been increasingly encouraged by the national 
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government to combine land improvement projects with the FB program.  Despite better 326
progress in Hokuriku region than the national average, Ishikawa has lagged behind the 
neighboring prefectures in land improvement, and thus pulled considerable budgetary and human 
resources in facilitating land improvement in combination with the FB program.  In particular, 327
it held a few unique cases in which farmland was improved upon new entries to make good-
quality farmland available for outside corporations.  
 Within Ishikawa Prefecture, the status of farmers and farmland varied across different 
locations as did the approaches to the FB program. As a whole, there were two regional 
distinctions: 1) hilly and mountainous areas in Noto region faced with harsher agricultural 
abandonment, and 2) flat areas in Kaga region characterized by a larger share of responsible 
farmers.  To fill the gap, the prefectural government has made a stronger effort in the FB 328
program with land improvement in Noto. In particular, Naka-Noto region in the south part of 
 The MAFF issued a notice in October 2014 to prioritize budget allocation for the land improvement projects associated with 326
the FB program (MAFF 2017f). Furthermore, with the amendment to the Land Improvement Act in May 2017, the national 
government introduced a new program of land improvement in combination with the FB program in fiscal 2018, by which 
prefectural governments are authorized to conduct land improvement projects without requests, agreements and cost share by 
beneficiaries of the projects.
 In terms of the progress rate of land improvement (i.e., the share of farmland with land improvement projects for a plot larger 327
than 0.3ha in the cultivated land), as of 2016 Hokuriku region (69.2%) progressed better than the national average (64.7%) 
(MAFF 2018g). In the region, the rate of Ishikawa (60.3%) was mostly equivalent with that of Niigata (60.4%) but much less 
than that of Toyama (84.7%) and Fukui (91.0%) (MAFF 2018g). 
 Noto region as a whole is mostly disadvantageous in agriculture due to its geographical conditions, compared to Kaga region. 328
On the one hand, Noto largely encompasses hilly and mountainous areas unfavorable for large mechanized farming, and thus 
agricultural abandonment has rapidly progressed, leading to the larger share of abandoned farmland. On the other, Kaga, except 
for the area in the vicinity of Mount Hakusan, comprises flat areas with the improved irrigation systems, maintaining farm labor 
force through farmland aggregation to local farmers in the past decades albeit not necessarily through farmland consolidation. In 
2015, the farmland abandonment rate was 26.7% (4,099ha) in Noto and 11.0% (1,718ha) in Kaga whereas that of the prefecture 
on average was 18.7% (5,817ha) (Source: Census of Agriculture and Forestry). Also, the proportion of certified farmers to 
commercial farmers was 11.4% in Noto and 22.7% in Kaga, suggesting that a larger share of responsible farmers in Kaga.
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Noto region had the largest room for land improvement among the five jurisdictions and thus has 
gained more administrative resources.   329
 In addition, the administrative leadership of municipal agencies also affected program 
performance at the municipal level. For instance, Town J actively facilitated local discussions 
under the mayor’s initiative, and brought in outside corporations by improving previously wasted 
farmland for consolidated dry fields. Such examples of local administrative leadership were 
mostly found in Noto where agricultural abandonment was more serous, though not all 
municipalities in the region acted so ardently. As the existing superior farmland was usually in 
local demand, the approaches to the FB program (e.g,. combination with land improvement, new 
entries) were largely contingent on the present status of farmland and farmers. 
 As the scheme was based on the status of farmers and farmland, the CAMP program was 
to serve as a substantial basis of planning farmland aggregation, but in practice served as a tool 
to take advantage of governmental subsidies. This was mainly because of the timing of program 
introduction and the subsidiary mechanisms associated with these programs. Prior to the FB 
program, the CAMP program was introduced in 2012 in tie-ups with the subsidiary programs. In 
this setting, municipal governments were urged to list all responsible farmers (i.e., mostly 
certified farmers) in each plan corresponding to a certain area so as not to let eligibles miss out 
  Since the mid 1960s, land improvement projects started largely with relatively cohesive groups of paddies (e.g., 200ha) in 329
the plane fields of Kaga region, but were yet to be conducted in many parts of Noto region in 2015 (Ishikawa Prefectural 
Government 1986; Hirota 1999). In particular, the area to be improved in Naka-Noto region remained largest among the five 
jurisdictions in the prefecture (particularly in consideration the progress in land improvement relative to the regional target). Thus 
the Naka-Noto regional office of the DAFF was better staffed and budgeted for land improvement projects in recent years 
(Interview with prefectural officials on August 26, 2016). Yet, many paddies in Kaga had been improved in the early days mostly 
for the size of 0.3ha, but not for the size of 1 ha or more that became popularized in the flat fields over recent decades (Hirota 
1995). With such a paddy size, farmland has been aggregated to fewer local farmers on an ad hoc basis, and thus became 
fragmented across different large farmers.
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on subsidiary opportunities.  This hasty process resulted in 206 plans across all the 19 330
municipalities at the end of fiscal 2012, where most municipalities demarcated their jurisdiction 
into several areal blocks to cover all subsidiary eligibles, rather than facilitating close dialogues 
at local communities for their voluntarily selection of central management entities.   331
 Upon the introduction of the FB program in 2014, the prefectural government began to 
enhance the CAMP program to meet the national subsidiary conditions, while taking advantage 
of the CAMP program in matchmaking for new entries.  This resulted in refinement of the areal 332
demarcation to produce 607 plans across all the municipalities as of March 2016, through which 
an original area was often subdivided to take best advantage of FB subsidiary opportunities.  333
3.2.2 Municipal Implementation 
 When the CAMP program began in 2012, the prefectural government initiated its own measure to marshal the mapped data 330
on farmland under the initiative of Director of General of the DAFF (Interview with prefectural officials on August 23, 2016). 
The idea was to take advantage of the planning process of the CAMP program to develop prefectural policy on zoning by 
organizing the farmland data in respect of whether it should be preserved or could be naturalized for the long run based on local 
discretion. This initiative resulted in the municipal responses that covered about 60% of the entire farmland, which was 
insufficient to develop the policy at the prefectural level. 
 Most municipalities initially divided a municipal jurisdictional area into several blocks, for instance, based on the school 331
districts, the jurisdictions of JA branches, or other administrative boundaries (Interview with prefectural officials on August 23, 
2016).
 Following the national policy, the FB has made tenancy contracts based on the CAMPs to implement the FB program, as this 332
process allowed for subsidiary provision (Interview with a prefectural official on August 4, 2016). In addition, to search a good fit 
for new entries, the FB has sometimes used the CAMP program, in which the municipal governments can identify the areas short 
of responsible farmers (Interview with prefectural officials on August 23, 2016).
 For instance, when a local community engaged in a land improvement project, the project area was clipped off from a broader 333
original area of a CAMP so as to achieve the threshold of farmland aggregation rate as subsidiary conditions for collective 
lenders (Interview with a prefectural official on August 3, 2016). Also, the original areal demarcation was redefined in 
accordance with the coverage of responsible farmers so that more relevant actors could better communicate, particularly when 
new farmers entered in the area short of responsible farmers or when village-based organizations were incorporated (Interviews 
with prefectural officials on August 3 and 23, 2016). As such, some plans were improved with refined areal demarcation, but 
others remained nominal lists of responsible farmers and thus unused (Interview with a prefectural official on August 4, 2016). As 
the municipal governments were to annually review the plans, the prefectural government has provided guidance for the 
municipal governments to review the plans particularly upon adopting the FB program.
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Under the program implementation at the prefectural level, municipal governments have dealt 
with the tasks which the prefectural government has delegated. This section focuses on two 
municipalities located in different regions of the prefecture: City A in Noto region, and City B in 
Kaga region. To expose how similarly or differently these two municipalities have pursued the 
program, the following provides comparative visions on the approach to local communities, and 
the status of program adoption.  
Introduction to local communities: 
With the start of the FB program, the two city governments differently approached the local 
communities: City A directly informed the representatives of local communities on the new FB 
program, while City B continued to leverage the JAs. On the one hand, City A government gave 
the program a fresh start.  For the first fiscal year, city officials informed the representatives of 334
all 226 production associations (i.e., local farming organizations mostly on a scale of a farm 
village) at the biannual meetings, and then followed up if any needs arose.  For the tenancy 335
arrangements other than the FB program, the JA covering the city’s jurisdictional area has been 
serving as the FUAF agency, but its role in tenancy arrangements largely moved to the city 
 When the city government started to engage in the FB program in 2014, it coincidentally started to chair the Noto Regional 334
Association for GIAHS Promotion and Cooperation, and then divided one section into two: 1) Secondary Forest and Coastal 
Promotion Division (SDCPD); and 2) Agricultural and Forestry Division (AFD) (Interview with city officials on November 30, 
2016). The SDCPD took a responsibility for the tasks related to the FB program, while taking up those of the CAMP program and 
the Agricultural Promotion Region Planning program. The AFD continued as before to engage in a wide variety of tasks related 
to agricultural promotion, including infrastructural and human-resource development, among which it dealt with the conventional 
tenancy arrangements based on the PIAMF Act. In addition, as part of the AFD, the Secretariat of Agricultural Committee (SAC) 
continuously facilitated the activities of the agricultural committee.
 City officials initially attended the meetings where the representatives from the total of 226 associations across the city were 335
present, but if any needs arose, they visited certain local communities given that the program mechanisms were hardly 
comprehensive for many of the representatives whose knowledge of agricultural policy largely varied (Interview with city 
officials on November 30, 2016).
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government with the FB program.  Historically the main actor to administer ‘farmland use’ has 336
been the city government, whereas the JA has served to promote ‘farm production.’ Though the 
JA was given more responsibility for tenancy arrangements only after the FUAF program (2010), 
it came back to the original professional province of ‘farm production’ along with the subsidiary 
shift from the FUAF program to the FB program.  Rather than to engage in tenancy 337
arrangements but to take advantage of its professional province, it established an Agricultural 
Production Corporation with its own sponsorship in 2017 to directly help farm management and 
mitigate farmland abandonment.  338
 On the other, City B government built on existing local networks.  Rather than directly 339
approaching the local communities, it continuously took advantage of the JAs’ resources in 
picking up the tenancy arrangements that were applicable for the FB program. Two JAs covered 
the city area: 1) the JA-BX with a broader jurisdictional area across two municipalities; and 2) 
 The JA was established in April 1994 with the merger of 8 JAs, and its jurisdictional area covers City A and another 336
neighboring town. It became the FUAF agency upon the introduction of the FUAF program in 2010 to mediate tenancy 
arrangements by receiving the needs from the interested parties (i.e., owners and farmers who were interested in tenancy) and 
advising as to feasible arrangements through the communications with them (Interview with a JA officer on November 29, 2016).
 The role of the FUAF agency is similar in practice to what the city government has played for the FB program, but the 337
subsidies associated with the FUAF program ceased upon the inception of the FB program. This move was a return of the tasks 
back to the city government in that the JA began to deal with the tasks related to farmland only after the start of the FUAF 
program in 2010, while the city government continuously engaged in the administration of farmland use. Even as a FUAF 
organization, the JA’s role was limited to coordination between the two parties, because the final contracting procedures had to be 
handled by the city government that also organized, updated and stored the data of farmland. After the FB program started, the JA 
continuously served as a FUAF organization but basically to manage the existing tenancy contracts that was made under the 
FUAF program.
 With an aim to stabilize local farming and engage in farmland management in cooperation with farm villages and responsible 338
farmers, one section of the JA established an Agricultural Production Corporation as a stock corporation with the JA’s 
sponsorship in 2017. Given that it was to support the local communities but not to suffer a deficit, it planned for the next several 
years to engage in farming through tenancy arrangements and contract farming with a focus on ‘superior farmland’ (e.g., larger 
improved paddies). 
 In City B government, one division, the Division of Agricultural Policies (DAP), has continued to engage in the tasks of 339
farmland tenancy among a wide variety of tasks related to agricultural infrastructure and human-resource development, involving 
the role of the secretariat for the Agricultural Committee (Interview with city officials on November 22, 2016).
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the JA-BY with a smaller jurisdiction in a part of the city.  Both of them have historically 340
helped their cooperative members, if requested, to make tenancy arrangements, and then served 
as the FUAF agencies to engage in the FUAF program from 2010. In many cases, owners and 
tenants preliminarily agreed on tenancy at their ends, and then sought administrative support 
from the JA to make contracts and, if opportunities given, to apply for governmental subsidies.  341
After the FB program began, they continued to accommodate such requests from cooperative 
members and help them to apply for the FB program.  In particular, the JA-BX has not only 342
liaised with the city government but also handled most of the groundwork for program 
application in each case of tenancy arrangements, while the JA-BY has not actively promoted the 
program. According to city officials, this was presumed to depend on the organizational capacity: 
the former was staffed with an officer responsible for the FB program at the headquarters and 
with officers who could support at four branches, while the latter had neither specialized officer 
nor branch (Interview with city officials on August 29, 2016). 
Program Adoption: 
 The JA-BX was established in 1998 through merger of three JAs including two corresponding two districts in City B and one 340
in a neighboring Town. The JA-BY has remained one JA in a district in City B since 1972. 
 Both of the JAs as local farming agencies have been contacted by the cooperative members to help make tenancy 341
arrangements if needs arose. With a greater organizational capacity, the JA-BX has supported administrative procedures for 
tenancy arrangements in response to the requests from those who had already determined the parties of tenancy contracts, and has 
continued the same practices after the launch of the FB program (Interview with a JA officer on December 12, 2016). Despite less 
capacity to engage in the FB program, the JA-BY has been similarly contacted by the cooperative members for the support of 
administrative procedures (Interview with a JA officer on November 24, 2016). In addition, in the case of the JA-BY, if the 
cooperative members could not find a counterpart of tenancy, they asked the JA to help find counterparts through the JA’s 
networks.
  On a case-by-case basis, if applicable for subsidiary opportunities, they introduced those who contacted to better beneficial 342
means of tenancy arrangements. If a case was applicable to the FB subsidies, the JAs helped them to apply for the FB program, 
but otherwise let them decide any means appropriate for them (e.g., the contracts based on the PIAMF Act, informal agreements) 
(Interview with a JA officer on November 24, 2016).
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Program adoption was also different between the two cities: City A adopted the program largely 
for land improvement, while City B applied it mainly to farm retirement.  On the one hand, 343
City A, located in Naka-Noto region, had greater momentum to promote land improvement 
projects, which were better financially supported if they were combined with the FB program. As 
long as the local communities were motivated to pursue land improvement with the economic 
incentives for collective lenders, this facilitated both farmland aggregation and consolidation. On 
the other, City B basically adopted the FB program for small owner-farmers who retired from 
farming. With the economic incentives for individuals, this slightly aided farmland aggregation 
but not necessarily farmland consolidation.  
 In addition, as in City A, there was a case in City B where local communities adopted the 
FB program upon the incorporation of village-based farming organizations. So long as the 
organizations were motivated and capable to manage their farm in an incorporated manner 
(which normally required additional management capacity), they could take advantage of the 
fund for collective lenders. Yet, this approach was mostly indifferent about de facto farmland 
aggregation and consolidation, as it merely formalized existing local arrangements without much 
 In City A, the farmland that became under tenancy through the FB till the end of 2016, amounted to 90.9ha in 35 local 343
communities, many of which took advantage of the collaboration funds on farmland aggregation to local communities (Interview 
with city officials on November 30, 2016). In City B, the farmland under tenancy through the FB till March 2016, amounted to 
60.9ha of 538 plots where the collaboration fund on management reorganization was provided for retired farmers in most of the 
cases (Interview with city officials on August 29, 2016).
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physical change.  Other than these cases, the two cities continued to engage in conventional 344
tenancy arrangements.   345
 The challenges that these cities faced involved both commonalities and differences. The 
common ground was the administrative complication to handle the FB program. Compared to 
City B that shared the workload with the JAs, City A more severely suffered from the 
cumbersome administrative procedures. While imposing a burden also on owners and users to 
make tenancy contracts, the contractual arrangements took substantial administrative time and 
cost particularly in a setting of fragmented small plots where many cases involved elderly 
landowners, absentee landlords, and heirs who never registered the land.   346
 The differences largely arose from the different density of responsible farmers. In City A 
where responsible farmers were less densely populated, these farmers could relatively easily 
access farmland for better productivity even without the FB program. Albeit a subsidiary 
opportunity for local communities, responsible farmers may or may not take advantage of the 
opportunity contingent on communal decisions, and thus were not necessarily incentivized to 
 For instance in one case, a village-based farming organization with the unincorporated status had pursued farmland 344
aggregation in a community where landowners farmed out to the organization based on contract farming (Interview with city 
officials on August 29, 2016). Although the organization without legal personality could not make an official tenancy contract 
(i.e., user-right setting), it became able to make a tenancy contract upon its incorporation due to the legal personality. In this 
process, the newly incorporated organization increased the farmland aggregation rate from zero to certain percentage depending 
on the factual farmland aggregation even without much physical change.
 In the both cities, the majority of the formal tenancy arrangements other than the FB program were made through the use-345
right setting based on the PIAMF Act, for which the volume of administrative procedures was much less than that of leasehold-
right setting based on the ALA (Interviews with city officials on August 29 and November 30, 2016).
 For instance in City A, to adopt the FB program, as a first step, the city government needs to request farmland owners to 346
register as lenders on each of their plots to be lent out to the FB so that they could make tenancy contracts between owners and 
the FB through farmland aggregation plans (Interview with city officials on November 30, 2016). This process is cumbersome 
particularly in Noto region as in many cases owners had already deceased and their heirs were not yet to register the land. In such 
cases, the city government has to collect the personal seals of all lawful successors who often reside in other parts of the country. 
Compared to the use-right setting with the PIAMF Act, the procedures for the FB program additionally requires the registration 
of each plot to be lent out to the FB. This process is not so easy particularly for the elderly landowners who have even less 
physical strength to write.
 !196
adopt the program.  In City B where responsible farmers were more densely populated, they 347
faced challenges to improve productivity through farmland aggregation (e.g., negotiation 
between responsible farmers, technical difficulties with farmland consolidation). To resolve these 
challenges, village-based collective farming could be a way, for which the FB program offered a 
funding opportunity for collective lenders. Yet, the initiative to develop village-based farming 
organizations and particularly to incorporate them was another challenge in respect of consensus 
building and managerial capacity.  
 In the process of program implementation, both cities revised the CAMPs in a similar 
manner. Prior to the FB program, they had developed the CAMPs for the areas on a larger scale, 
but clipped off certain smaller areas when local communities adopted the FB program. This was 
because the area of a CAMP was used as a denominator of farmland aggregation rate under the 
FB program and provided the funds for collective lenders in accordance with the aggregation 
rate. Thus, a smaller area worked better for funding opportunities (i.e., the funds for collective 
lenders).  
 Other communities, however, remained mostly indifferent about the CAMPs. Therefore, 
although the annual review of all the plans has been encouraged under the CAMP program, the 
city governments have reviewed the plans for amendments only if needed, for instance, when 
local communities collectively adopted the FB program or when new certified farmers needed to 
be listed on the CAMPs to be eligible for subsidies. For instance, City A developed 29 plans 
across the entire city mostly on the basis of the school districts (i.e., 20 districts) until the end of 
 The funds for collective lenders could be used for local agricultural development, including the improvement of farm roads, 347
the purchase of large machines by local responsible farmers, based on the local consensus. As a community is not necessarily 
monolith, the city officials sometimes heard about complaints at local meetings when the funds planned to be used for the benefit 
of local responsible farmers (Interview with city officials on November 30, 2016). 
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fiscal 2013, and then segmentalized the original plans into 41 plans as of November 2016 in 
accordance with the FB program.  City B initially developed 4 plans based on the JAs’ 348
districts, and then came to have 5 plans after clipping off one community that adopted the FB 
program.  349
3.3 Conclusion 
The FB program began as a hopeful new system to drastically expedite farmland aggregation and 
consolidation. With a goal to attain the target of 80% farmland aggregation rate by 2023 as an 
overriding imperative for nation’s revitalization, the national government prepared a huge 
amount of budget for the program. The program facilitated farmland aggregation to some extent, 
but its achievement has been far less than the targeted level. Furthermore, the mechanism 
appeared to subsidize minor physical changes in farmland aggregation, while its economic 
incentives often failed to outweigh the administrative complexity to adopt the program. To avoid 
the risks associated with farmland retention on the government side, the FBs were allowed and 
even encouraged to take advantage of ready-made tenancy arrangements at the local level for 
credit earning. At the same time, despite the economic incentives, the fragmented structure of 
farm plots (particularly in the context of agricultural abandonment) further complicated 
administrative procedures, and disincentivized the tenancy parties to officially make tenancy 
 From the beginning some of the 20 school districts were subdivided, while a few areas with specific responsible farmers (e.g., 348
village-based farming organizations) had plans corresponding to their area boundaries on a smaller scale (Interview with city 
officials on November 30, 2016).
 With the start of the CAMP program, the city developed 4 plans corresponding the 4 JA districts (i.e., 1 district of JA-BY and 349
three branch districts of JA-BX)(Interview with city officials on August 29, 2016). Subsequently, the city government revised the 
plans with updates (e.g., the names of certified farmers, the farmland with tenancy under the FB program) to be endorsed by the 
CAMP committee, which the city government as a secretariat annually held with involvement of key stakeholders at the city 
level.
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arrangements. With this setting, the FB program has promoted farmland aggregation and 
consolidation only a little more than the business-as-usual. 
 The failure to keep up with the annual target has also arisen out of the gap between the 
feasibility and the goal setting. This gap resulted from the policy-making process, which was led 
by the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) along with the business community rather than built on 
the agrarian sector. Both the OPM and agrarian sides stood on common ground that the 
agricultural structure would fall without new farmers due to the aging of agricultural population. 
However, their ends were different: the former aimed to revitalize the nation state, while the 
latter strived to rejuvenate farming communities. Throughout the negotiations, the former has 
gained more power in the political context where the business community fueled the 
administrative leadership along with the increasingly mooted agrarian clientelism. The historic 
regime change somewhat revived the power of the agrarian sector. Yet, the short-lived regime of 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was followed by the vigorous initiative of the OPM-led 
agricultural policy-making under the returned power of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 
Despite the last-minute change at the Diet deliberations, the FB scheme was designed in the 
interest of the business community and hastily bound as new legislation. 
 As a means to restrengthen the nation-state, the national government treated farmland as 
the ‘national’ resource rather than a ‘local’ resource. To be as productive as possible, farmland 
was to be used by most economically and technically capable users and not necessarily by those 
from local communities. To make this happen, the national government had to tackle vested 
interests which farmland owners, local communities and the agricultural sector have held for 
long. Private ownership of farmland was hardly mutable in the capitalist society, but tenancy was 
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more applicable to open a new market of farmland transactions to new targets. Taking advantage 
of jurisdictional ladders, the national government deployed the FBs at the prefectural level rather 
than the municipal one in an attempt to facilitate farmland transactions beyond the grasp of 
owners and local communities.  
 Even if the clientelism of the agrarian sector was almost dismissed through political 
reforms, the bond between farmland and farmers was not to be so easily separable even by 
means of tenancy. The following chapters explore why and how farmers (including owners and 
users) and farming communities have responded to the FB program.  
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Chapter 4: Cooperation or Indifference to the Farmland Bank Program in Ishikawa 
Prefecture 
This chapter addresses how and why communities at large have accepted or resisted the 
Farmland Bank (FB) program. The FB program started nationwide in 2014, and the level of 
acceptance varies according not only to prefectures but also to municipalities and even 
communities within a municipality. The chapter focuses on two farming communities in 
Ishikawa Prefecture where the majority of farmers have practiced land-extensive farming for rice 
production. One, District N in the north, has fully adopted the program with full financial 
support. The other, Village U in the south, has mostly retained conventional tenancy 
arrangements with little government support. The chapter draws on the data collected in the two 
communities to illustrate the processes of negotiations leading to either farmers’ acceptance or 
indifference to the FB program, thereby revealing the dynamic character of the ’farmer-farmland’ 
relationships. 
4.1 Post-War Transformation of Two Communities in Ishikawa Prefecture 
In Ishikawa Prefecture where land-extensive rice farming has been the dominant form of 
agriculture, rice paddies spread across two geographically distinct regions lying north and south 
(Tetsuya Hashimoto 1986).  The north region, Noto, has hilly and mountainous topologies less 350
favored for agricultural production and distribution and has experienced sharp population decline 
 The area of rice paddies accounts for 83.3% of the cultivated acreage and constitutes 8.3% of the prefectural area as of 2016 350
(MAFF 2017c). This share of rice paddies is larger than the national average: the area of rice paddies accounts for 54.4% of the 
cultivated acreage that constitutes 12.0% of the national landmass (MAFF 2017c).
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and aging as well as severe agriculture abandonment.  In this region, small-scale and family-351
run farming is dominant.  The southern region, Kaga, encompasses alluvial plains formed with 352
the rivers, and shows moderate demographic shift and less severe farmland abandonment. In this 
region, the share of the farmers engaging in corporate or large-scale farming is higher especially 
within the extensive flat part of the region, though small family-run farming is still dominant (O. 
Seino 1994; Kasama 1997).  353
 The study focuses on two communities in the prefecture to investigate how and why each 
of them has collectively accepted the FB program in distinctive environmental and demographic 
settings and despite similar administrative culture and structures. The choice was made based on 
contrast: District N in the north extensively adopted the program and Village U in the south 
participated in the program to a very limited extent. District N in City A, is located in the central 
part of Noto, sitting in the intermountain area of the upper river flowing from a mountain. 
Consisting of ten farming villages, the district was populated mostly by part-time farmers 
engaging in rice cultivation on terraced paddy fields and sometimes vegetable farming. It has 
experienced rapid population decrease and aging and has been confronted with the increasing 
 As of 2010, the population increase rate in comparison with 2005 was minus 7.1%, and the population aging rate (i.e., the 351
ratio of population over 65) was 33.7% (Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2013), while the farmland abandonment ratio was 
25.1% (MAFF Hokuriku Regional Office 2015b).
 As of 2010, the family-run farming entities accounted for 98% (cf., 98% on national average), while the management arable 352
land area less than 2ha accounted for 85% of the total (cf., 80% on national average) (Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2011; 
MAFF 2011). Despite the unfavorable farming conditions, the region took advantage of the virtue of agricultural landscape 
management. The rural landscapes of Noto was designated as one of the first two sites in Japan for Globally Important 
Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS) by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in June 2011 to 
showcase the social and ecological significance of the agricultural landscapes and thereby to internationally foster an integrated 
approach to rural development and raise awareness of agricultural practices nurturing biodiversity (Koohafkan and Altieri 2011).
 As of 2010, the population increase rate in comparison with 2005 was 1.3%, and the population aging rate was 21.5% 353
(Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2013), while the farmland abandonment ratio was 9.8% (MAFF Hokuriku Regional Office 
2015b). For the same year, in Kaga Region, the family-run farming entities accounted for 96%, and the management arable land 
area less than 2ha accounted for 73% of the total (Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2011b).
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abandonment of houses and farmland.  Village U, corresponding to one farming village in City 354
B, is situated in the central part of Kaga Plain. Standing on the alluvial fan of a large river, it has 
historically formed part of the major rice-producing region in the prefecture, while providing 
well-drained soil applicable for a variety of agricultural produce owing to a series of irrigation 
development projects (MAFF Hokuriku Regional Office 2015a). The population has slightly 
increased in recent years (3.7% increase between 2005 and 2015), but has been faced with 
shortage of successors in the farming sector (City B 2017).  355
 Both communities have experienced drastic socio-economic, political, administrative and 
environmental changes throughout the post-war period. The following text illustrates the social, 
economic and ecological transformations of each community, with reference to the key variables 
of agricultural sustainability (Kareemulla, Venkattakumar, and Samuel 2017). It lays out the 
context for adopting different tenancy models.  
4.1.1 District N 
District N has been politically and administratively peripheralized through a series of mergers 
and dissolutions in the municipal system in the post-war era. As an official autonomous 
community, ‘Village’ N was first formed under the municipal system of the Meiji Constitution in 
1889, although it had long existed, by custom as a conglomerate of nine ‘early-modern villages’ 
or ‘mura’ (Kano 2000). In the newly enacted post-war municipal system (1947), Village N was 
 The population decreased by 60% over the past 60 years, a decrease of 1,442 (139 households) (i.e.,  from 2,390 (468 354
households) in 1954 to 948 (329 households) in 2014) (NHDA website).
 The population of Village U increased from 454 (129 households) in 2005 to 471 (144 households) in 2015 (Ishikawa 355
Prefectural Government n.d.). 
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re-established in 1948 as a municipality consisting of ten farming villages, including one newly-
settled village. However, in 1954 it was abolished by a merger with five other neighboring 
villages and became a district constituting the northwestern part of Town K. Furthermore, after a 
dissolution of one village in the 1960s and incorporation of another village in the 1970s, the 
district became the northern edge of City A in 2004, into which Town K was merged with one 
city and two other towns.  
 Despite the dissolution of District N as an official body, it has persisted as a batch of ten 
farming villages, each of which has remained autonomously (MAFF Hokuriku Regional Office 
2018). For instance, even today two major traditional festivals are held yearly at the district level, 
while several other smaller festivals are organized at the village level (Shirasaki 2000). Yet, 
along with the administrative mergers by which the district moved from the Village’s center to 
the northern edge of the new City (i.e., 20 km away from the center of City A), key public 
facilities (e.g., nursery and elementary schools, a branch office of Japan Agricultural 
Cooperatives (JA)) were closed and the associated services moved far from residences (City A 
website).  
Social transformation 
In response to this marginalization, local volunteers organized a council called N Community 
Development Promotion Council in 1981 to bring together representatives from each village and 
to discuss and plan their community development activities at the district level (MAFF Hokuriku 
Regional Office 2018). Nurturing local consent, the Council undertook several small-scale 
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development projects (e.g., simple and low-cost land improvement, establishment of a small rice 
processing facility, improvement of a meeting place).  
 Due to some frictions between different villages as well as stagnation of its activities, 
however, the Council reorganized itself into District N Hometown Development Association 
(NHDA) in 1992 by involving other groups (e.g., a commerce and industry association, an 
association of people from the District but residing in metropolitan regions). Setting the key 
phrase as “ten villages as one,” the NHDA extended its activities to include internal and external 
exchange and sales promotion projects (e.g., development of a brand-name spring water park, 
annual drama contests, regularly-held competitive exhibitions of farm products). Further, since 
2008 the NHDA has hosted scholars and students from universities from both inside and outside 
the prefecture. Learning from these visits, it has taken on new initiatives such as branding of 
local produces and tourism activities in order to tackle the remaining problems such as 
agricultural income decline and shortage of successors.  
Economic transformation 
Agriculture and forestry used to support the local economy but became in crisis. As District N is 
said to derive its name from the term of a logger who uses a ‘bush hook,’ forestry prospered for 
hundreds of years but has declined since the early 1960s along with the import liberalization of 
timber (NHDA website). Until the early 1970s, diversified farming was widely practiced, 
including rice as a key product but also timber, cattle, and tobacco. Against a backdrop of 
agricultural mechanization, road network development, and automobile popularization, however, 
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the farming population whose main income source comes from other jobs (i.e., part-time farmers 
in the second-rank classification) rapidly increased from around 1970 (Kano 2000). Besides the 
continuous decrease in the total number of households, the proportions of both farming and 
forestry households have continuously decreased, but the number of full-time farming 
households has increased in some of the villages since around 1980s (Kano 2000). This is 
assumed to be a transformation of part-time farmers to full-time farmers upon their retirement 
from other jobs.  
 In addition, the trends of economic decline and demographic changes have differed 
across the villages. The villages in the upper-stream area, which relied more on forestry, have 
experienced a rapid decrease in population and paddy farmland since the 1970s. Those in the 
lower-stream area underwent much less reduction in population and paddy area.  
Ecological transformation 
In an effort to improve farming efficiency, the district has pursued a series of farmland 
improvement projects to overcome the hilly and mountainous topologies. Within the district, the 
central southern area features largely ‘agrarian’ landscapes encompassing rice paddies and hilly 
hinterland along the wider valley in the middle basin of a river. The surrounding area exhibits 
mostly ‘mountainous’ landscapes with limited space for rice paddies in the narrow valleys along 
the upstream and tributaries of the river. The villages in both agrarian and mountainous areas 
undertook the first round of land improvement projects mostly in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting 
in approximately 200ha of improved paddy farmland (cf., 223ha of the total in the district as of 
1980) (Kano 2000; MAFF Hokuriku Regional Office 2018; NHDA n.d.). Of the improved land 
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134 ha is subject to the Direct Payment System to Hilly and Mountainous Areas (DPSHMA) and 
each village has pursued collective farmland maintenance activities with government subsidies 
(e.g., weeding on slopes of terraced paddies, maintenance and repair of irrigation ditches) 
(MAFF Hokuriku Regional Office 2018).  
 Moreover, following further progress in agricultural mechanization as well as in 
agricultural abandonment, the ‘agrarian’ villages in the central southern area have engaged in a 
second round of land improvement projects since 2013 to further enlarge paddy plots for better 
efficiency (NHDA n.d.). Others in the mountainous area, however, have not participated due to 
the difficulties of resolving agricultural abandonment with land improvement. 
4.1.2 Village U 
Village U has long maintained cohesiveness and autonomy as a community. Originating from an 
‘early-modern village’ presumably established around the middle of Heian Period (794-1192) 
(Kawa 1956), its self-sustaining and governing activities have persisted, and they are organized 
in the neighborhood association (chonai-kai). Similarly to many other villages in rural regions, it 
has also gone through two mergers (1956, 2005) under the post-war municipal system (since 
1947) and has come to form the southwest area of City B, while a conglomerate of several early-
modern villages changed in composition and name even before the first Meiji municipal system 
(1889) and has been defunct (Kawa 1956).  
 Many community activities have been traditionally organized on the scale of the village, 
including same-generation clubs (ranging from the children’s club to the club of the elderly) and 
annual festivals centering on the village’s tutelary shrine (Editorial Committee of U Village 
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History 1995). In particular, the agricultural cooperative, called “Our Cooperative” (dialectally 
Urara no kunme), had been a cornerstone of the agrarian villagers’ livelihoods for over a century 
by offering services for daily essentials and venues for neighborhood communication and 
recreation (Executive Committee for JA-U Centennial Anniversary 2007; Editorial Committee of 
U Village History 1995). In its heyday, this cooperative was a political foothold to collectively 
extend the farmers’ needs and claims and exert influence on national policy. At the rice price 
conference of Ishikawa Prefecture in 1962, approximately 100 farmers from the cooperative ran 
up to the stage and urged a prompt decision on the emergency resolution to double the rice price 
against the national policy aiming to depress it (Executive Committee for JA-U Centennial 
Anniversary 2007). 
Social transformation 
This agrarian community has become gradually urbanized since the rapid economic growth of 
the 1960s (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995), and accordingly its social integrity 
has transformed from an agrarian-based one to the suburban one. Along with the increase in dual 
occupations and tenancy arrangements in farming, the features of food, clothing and shelter have 
drastically changed, particularly losing the elements associated with farming (e.g., rice-husk 
staffed pillows, sweet stuff made of remaining seed rice, an earthen floor available for 
agricultural tasks)(Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995). Although many of the 
village’s year-round events and customs used to be traditionally related to the farming seasons, 
some of the collaborative activities (e.g., collective rice transplanting) has transformed into 
household-level practices (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995).  
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 In particular, the aforementioned agricultural cooperative went through two mergers 
(1975, 1999) following broad socio-economic changes (Executive Committee for JA-U 
Centennial Anniversary 2007). Further, to reinforce the management base of the Japan 
Agricultural Cooperatives (JA) and streamline the operations of the JA’s facilities, the 
cooperative, which originated in 1909 and reorganized lastly as a branch of the JA-BX, closed in 
2006 and an anchorage of the agrarian livelihoods and politics disappeared from the village 
(Executive Committee for JA-U Centennial Anniversary 2007). Contrariwise, as a part of the 
western area of City B where urbanization has largely advanced (Mashima et al. 2011), the 
village has been increasingly populated with younger generations, also owing to the revision of 
the land use planning in 2013 (City B 2016b).  356
Economic transformation 
The economic underpinning of the village has shifted from the local industries in the village to 
other industries outside the village. Besides agriculture, the businesses and industries related to 
Kutani-yaki (i.e., traditional famed porcelain of the Kaga region) had prospered at least until the 
1990s, as the village has been a center of the painting industry for Kutani-yaki since the end of 
WWII (Koda 1975; Bank of Japan Kanazawa Branch 2012).  However, these industries 357
declined after the economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, following the inflow of cheaper 
 The post-war population of U Village first increased and peaked around the mid 1980s (i.e., an increase from 520 (96 356
households) in 1945 to 655 (136 households) in 1985) (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995). Although it had been 
slightly decreasing after the peak, the recent statistics show an increase (i.e., from 558 in 2010 to 577 in 2015) and the estimate of 
the future population increase with the revision of land use planning (i.e. doubling the population in 2010 towards 2060 (1,111) 
(Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995; City B 2016b; City B 2016a).
 The share of households engaging in the businesses and industries related to Kutani-yaki in the village increased from 19% 357
(20 out of 105) in 1955 to 30% (40 out of 133) in 1994 (Kawa 1956; Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995).
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foreign products and decreased interest in traditional crafts particularly among the young 
generations (Bank of Japan Kanazawa Branch 2012).  
 Moreover, the population of full-time farmers radically decreased between the 1960s and 
the 1990s. Instead, part-time farmers increased: they relied on Kutani-yaki industries (until the 
mid 1990s) and corporate employment, and engaged in farming only on weekends. Along with 
the decline of the Kutani-yaki industries, employment procured outside the village has become 
more dominant. The share of the farming households was 13% as of 2015, out of which were 
two full-time farming households.  358
Ecological transformation 
The village has long battled against water damages to secure its farmland. Village U is said to be 
named for the legend that a passing old man exhorted villagers to develop a ‘cow-shaped island’ 
between two rivers by farming with cows so as to take advantage of abundant water supply 
(Kawa 1956; Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995). The village is located between one 
river north and another river south, at the south end of alluvial fan of a racing large river and has 
continuously suffered from floods (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995).  
 Resulting from flooding and submergence, the social turmoils in the village and the 
disputes with other villages on the upper and lower streams used to repeat. These challenges 
 In the mid 1950s, the share of households engaging in farming was approximately 70% (i.e., 69 out of the total of 100 358
households in 1954) (Koda 1975), and more than 80% of those farming households primarily relied on farming (i.e., 58 
households out of the total of 105 in 1955) (Koda 1975; Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995). However, in the 1990s, 
the share of farming households was approximately 30% (i.e., 40 out of the total of 133 in 1994): most of the farmers primarily 
engaged in Kutani-yaki industries and company employment, while those who managed farming primarily ‘in business’ became 
less than five farming households (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995). As of 2015, out of the total of households 
(144) (Ishikawa Prefectural Government n.d.), 19 were farming households — including 2 full-time, and 17 part-time (including 
2 part-time farmers of the first-rank classification whose main income source comes from farming; and 15 part-time farmers of 
the second-rank classification whose main income source comes not from farming, but from other jobs) (MAFF 2016d).
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lasted even after the 16-year effort of land improvement (1918-1934), which involved the 
development of drainage channels and the enlargement of a paddy unit (6.7a as a standard), and 
the installation of a cutting-edge drainage pump in the early 1960s (Editorial Committee of U 
Village History 1995). Finally the land improvement project in the 1990s freed the village from 
flood damages (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995; Executive Committee for JA-U 
Centennial Anniversary 2007).  
 This recent land improvement project offered multiple benefits. Besides overcoming the 
long-standing water problem, the project allowed for better agricultural efficiency as well as 
agricultural policy implementation. The enlargement of a paddy unit with land improvement had 
been long-sought particularly by full-time farmers who expanded mainly through tenancy since 
the late 1960s (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995). Also, the policy for rice-crop 
conversion, which has been strongly promoted since the 1970s, heightened the need to improve 
the wet paddies of heavy clay soil to productively grow field crops such as wheat and soybeans.  
 Taking advantage of the government subsidies, the village completed an extensive land 
improvement project in 1999 to hold much larger paddy units (i.e., 0.3 ha as a standard) with the 
state-of-the-art drainage system as well as an embankment against flooding.  Although the 359
process for local consent on the project took considerable time, the precursors of the neighboring 
villages stimulated the village to achieve 95% agreement among landowners in 1986 (Editorial 
Committee of U Village History 1995). Furthermore, in addition to the government subsidiary 
support, the disposal of a part of farmland in the village to the road development allowed for 
 The scale expansion has been promoted by the series of the national agricultural structure improvement projects (Nogyo kozo 359
kaizen jigyo), which started in the early 1960s to advance agricultural productivity and farm income (Editorial Committee of U 
Village History 1995). The subsidiary support was given by the national, prefectural, and municipal governments (47.4%, 27.5% 
and 17.5% respectively) (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995).
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almost no cost sharing on the part of farmers/landowners, which further facilitated land 
improvement (1990-1999) (Goto 2016; Kawabata and Takemoto 2010). The project’s completion 
brought about efficient farming, policy implementation and water risk management all at once.  
 Despite these improvements, the village has recently faced a declining need for farmland. 
The area of cultivated land decreased over a decade between 2005 and 2015, while that of 
abandoned farmland increased.  In particular, given the increasing need for land uses other than 360
agriculture (e.g., residential development), the city government discussed in its urban planning 
committee whether to relax the control of land-use change and partially loosened the control in 
2013 (see Chapter 6 for further details). 
4.2 Pathways to Tenancy Arrangements 
Having been situated in the distinctive socio-economic and environmental settings, the two 
communities have arrived at the contrasting levels of adoption of the FB program. District N has 
participated extensively in the program and in return received subsidies for collective use in the 
community. Village U barely adopted the program and subsidies were given to a few individual 
retired farmers. These different modes of adoption have evolved around the development of key 
farmers or farm bodies which host tenancy arrangements.  
4.2.1 District N 
 Over the 10 years between 2005 and 2015, although the farmland area registered in the farmland ledger remained the same 360
(73ha), the area of operating cultivated land (‘keiei kochi’, i.e., the land farmers actually cultivate, including owned land and 
rented land) decreased from 58.93 ha in 2005 to 55.17 ha in 2015, while the abandoned farmland area increased from 0.02 ha in 
2005 to 0.27 ha in 2015 (MAFF 2006a; MAFF 2016d). 
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District N’s de facto participation in the FB program since 2015 coincided with the expansion 
and reorganization of community-based farming accompanied by the second round of land 
improvement projects. By taking advantage of the projects, incorporation of the district-wide 
community-based farming allowed for hosting the program in the district. A key host is a legally-
qualified Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative Corporation, called Farm N, that was officially 
established in January of 2015 after two-year long discussions at the District N Hometown 
Development Association (NHDA).  
 Prior to district-level incorporation, community-based farming practices had progressed 
to a greater extent in NI village, one of the ten villages in the district. Six of the largest landed 
farmers in the village, who owned approximately 1 ha each, cooperated with each other and 
organized themselves in 1978 to form a voluntary group of collective farming. This group was 
formalized as a legally qualified Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative Corporation called Village 
NI Agricultural Machine Use Cooperative (NI Cooperative) in January of 1987, the predecessor 
of the Farm N.  
Development of community-based farming 
The six farmers in the absence of immediate successors in Village NI began to cooperate. They 
strategically drew on government support in adopting the Town K’s Communal Farming Group 
Development Program (INATO 2014b). This municipal program followed the national policy for 
regional agriculture to lower the production cost by collectively using agricultural machinery 
(Odagiri 2005; H. Kumagai 2001; T. Kobayashi 1992). As host of the program, the group 
installed several agricultural machines with the subsidy.  
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 Even more than this subsidiary support, however, one of the founders’ sons stressed that 
they were motivated by their strong commitment to farming as a main means to make a living 
(Interview with a farmer on November 7, 2016). According to him, the founders set their minds 
with a competitive spirit towards neighboring villages. The landscape of Village NI consisted of 
a larger proportion of dry fields in addition to rice paddies, and this disallowed many villagers 
from engaging in jobs other than farming, because of their time involved in growing different 
crops consecutively throughout the seasons. While envious of economic affluence in other 
villages where farmers made steady income from other jobs and spared time only for rice 
paddies, they prepared themselves for farming both dry and rice paddy fields to make a living. 
The NI’s village’s commitment to farming is also exemplified by its initiative to carry out their 
first land improvement project without governmental subsidies.  
 Based on the mechanical capacity, this group institutionally grew with scale expansion. It 
started with approximately 6 ha (i.e., about 1 ha from each of the 6 members) in 1978, but 
rapidly extended its farming area by accommodating neighbors’ requests not only from NI but 
also from other villages. With the available agricultural machines, the group was initially 
requested by neighboring farmers through consignment contracts to assist in some of the three 
key farming practices (i.e., plowing, rice planting, and mowing). The neighbors additionally 
asked the group to care for other rice farming practices. Around 1980 its biggest income source 
became contract farming.  
 For management stabilization, in 1983 the group also began processing and sales of its 
agricultural products based on the activities of an internal women’s group. With favorable growth 
of sales, it was reorganized in 1987 as an Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative Corporation (i.e., 
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NI Cooperative). As a formal institution, it expanded its farming area through the ‘use rights 
setting’ for farmland, rather than temporal consignment contracts for farming practices. By 
taking over farming from other farmers incapacitated by aging and/or mechanical troubles, NI 
Cooperative enlarged its farming area to 15 ha by 1998 and 20 ha by 2008, and then to 27ha in 
2015. 
 Building on the NI Cooperative’s achievement, since 2013 the NHDA has developed the 
idea of district-level community-based farming in combination with the second round of land 
improvement projects. This led to the incorporation of Farm N in 2015. Catching the momentum 
that has gathered since 2008, the NHDA secretariat proposed a survival strategy to improve 
farming efficiency through both district-based communal farming and land improvement so as to 
overcome the farm retirement of an aging population. Without strong opposition, most of the 
farmland owners in four villages including NI and neighboring villages (i.e., KI, KH, and KG), 
agreed to undertake land improvement projects and entrust their farmland to a newly 
incorporated organization and a few other large farmers.  
 While changing the prefix from the village name to the district name to strengthen a 
sense of solidarity at the district level, the organization became an Agricultural Producers’ 
Cooperative Corporation, rather than a stock corporation, to secure one voting right for each 
member for a fair hearing in management and at the same time to give a fellowship image for 
sales promotion in marketing their products. Following the prefectural selection of land 
improvement projects in the four hamlets (i.e., NJ and NI selected in 2013, and NH and NG in 
2014), the Farm N was formally launched in 2015. 
 !215
Direct call for the FB program 
District N was directly approached by the prefectural government at the end of 2014 to take 
advantage of the FB program. Prior to this, the four hamlets had planned to pursue the ‘use rights 
setting’ under the Act on Promotion of Improvement of Agricultural Management Foundation 
(PIAMF Act) between the land owners and the Farm N upon the completion of the land 
improvement projects. Despite the start of the FB program in April 2014, nobody in the District 
had been well informed until the NHDA secretariat was encouraged by the prefectural 
government to adopt the program by the end of fiscal 2014 (i.e., March 2015). The secretariat 
speculated that the prefectural authority was pressed with national policy adjustment, by which 
the program budget for each prefecture became allocated in accordance with the prefectural 
performance of program implementation (Interview with a farmer on November 7, 2016).  As 361
another factor leading to the direct approach, one of the NI Cooperative members alluded to the 
prefecture’s familiarity with and trust of the district which has adopted a variety of programs and 
projects and has performed well (Interview with a farmer on November 10, 2016). 
 In combination with the development of collective farming as well as the land 
improvement projects, the FB program has facilitated farmland aggregation and consolidation 
not only in these four villages but also in three others. While looking for a means to have the 
Farm N prepared for the capital investment (estimated worth of nearly JPY 100 million, i.e., 
approximately USD 0.9 million), the NHDA found an interest in the high-price subsidy for 
 The national government announced its prioritization of budget allocation for land improvement projects to the regions that 361
adopt the FB program in order to promote the FB program in combination with land improvement, according to the notice 
provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) in October 2014 (MAFF 2017f). Based on the evaluation 
of the first-year implementation, the national government publicized its policy that the prefectural performance shall be ranked 
based on the program’s ‘contribution ratio’ to farmland aggregation and accordingly supported by the state (Kobari 2015; MAFF 
2015a). The ‘contribution ratio’ means the percentage of the area of farmland that is annually aggregated and contacted out to the 
FB in each prefecture (i.e., the FB’s contribution) to the annual target area for farmland aggregation in each prefecture that is 
predetermined by the national government  (i.e., the goal of farmland aggregation).
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collective use. Given the short period of time remaining in the fiscal year and the condition of 
more generous subsidy if a higher ‘aggregation ratio’ (i.e., the percentage of farmland contracted 
out to the FB in a certain area) was achieved sooner, the villagers from the four villages 
repeatedly met to take advantage of this subsidy.  In addition to coordination efforts by the 362
NHDA secretariat, the preparatory work for the land improvement projects proved effective, 
particularly in terms of the local consent on farmland aggregation and the inheritance procedures, 
to quickly adopt the FB program. The four villages attained high aggregation rates ranging 
between 80% and 92% (see Table 4.1). Receiving the total of JPY 22 million (approximately 
USD 0.2 million) in the four hamlets, the villagers decided to use half of it for the capital 
investment of Farm N and the remaining half for other community purposes (e.g., the 
improvement of communal agricultural facilities). Following this advantageous program 
adoption, the neighboring three villages were planning to apply for land improvement projects 
and participate in the FB program. 

 See Chapter 3 for the detail criteria of the subsidiary rates under the FB program.362
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Table 4.1 The Status of Land Improvement in District N (1950s-2015) 
Source: NHDA (n.d.)  
Notes: 1) Large farm households are those who cultivate farmland with an area over 3ha, irrespective of 
their status of a certified farmer or not. 2) Data of NC, ND, and NF shows the area of tenancy made under 
the PIAMF Act and through informal contracts, while data of NG, NH, NI, and NJ shows the area of 
tenancy made through the FB program. 3) Aggregation ratio is referred to as the percentage of the area of 
farmland contacted out to the FB to the total farmland area. The dates in the round brackets show the 


























NA 18 0 12 ha 
(1976-1978)
No plan NA NA NA




No plan NA NA NA
NC 72 3 households 41ha 
(1969-1971)
50 ha pending 
for selection in 
fiscal 2018
46.7 ha 28 ha NA
ND 20 1 households 11ha 
(1970-1971)
10.8 ha 9 ha NA
NE 5 0 3ha 
(1970-1971)
No plan NA NA NA




32 ha pending 
for selection in 
fiscal 2018
33.4 ha 25 ha NA




28 ha (selected 
in fiscal 2014, 
construction 
started in fiscal 
2015)
19.2 ha 15.5 ha 80.7%  
(Oct 2015)
NH 20 0 13ha 
(1965-1968) 
14.2 ha 12.7 ha 89.0%  
(Oct 2015)






31 ha (selected 
in fiscal 2013, 
construction 
started in fiscal 
2014)
21.4 ha 18.7 ha 87.4%  
(Dec 2015)




20.1 ha 18.5 ha 92.0%  
(Mar 2015)
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4.2.2 Village U 
Village U’s participation in the FB program has been limited, although farmland aggregation has 
been long pursued by a few larger farmers. While the proportion of part-time and non-farmers 
has increased, a handful of farmers since the mid 1960s have expanded farms mostly through 
tenancy. Some of those involved in the expansion have continued to grow, while others have 
shrunk or disappeared due to aging and the absence of successors. In addition, a farming union 
was organized in 2006 and has recently gained momentum, but has not yet been officially 
incorporated (Goto 2016). A few individual farmers have used the FB program by which landed 
farmers received subsidiaries for individual use upon their farm retirement.  
Long-standing independent farming and emerging communal farming 
Farmland aggregation by several individual farmers has not been confined to Village U but has 
involved its neighboring Village S. Following the boosting of Kutani-yaki industry, Village S 
experienced a decrease of farming population earlier than Village U, while holding no farmer 
managing farmland larger than 3 ha even in 1970 (Goto 2016; Ando, Yamaura, and Ohnaka 
2013). With this availability of farmland in the neighboring village, many of the farmers in 
Village U interested in expansion started to seek farmland there mostly through tenancy but 
sometimes by purchase (Goto 2016). For instance, as of 2003, the largest farmer in Village U, 
who pioneered expansion in the mid 1960s, held a higher proportion of both landed and leased 
properties in Village S than in Village U (Goto 2016). Among the three largest farmers, the first 
two (cultivated acreage: 38 ha and 9 ha) procured the tenancy area from Village S for more than 
a half of it (i.e., 74% and 57% respectively), while the third (cultivated acreage: 8ha) did so from 
 !219
Village S for 5% of it (Goto 2016, 335). The third one, as the 'head family,’  had many relatives 363
in Village U, and thus held a much larger share of tenancy based on kinship within the village 
(Goto 2016). The destination of tenancy for scale expansion has been otherwise skewed towards 
Village S. 
 Tenancy has also developed within Village U, dividing the farmers’ community into a 
larger non-farmer cohort and a smaller farmer one. The farming population has decreased since 
1960 and the proportion of non-farmers increased from 15% in 1960 to 87% in 2015 (see Table 
4.2). In particular, the number of full-time farm households has been few since the 1970s, 
although a slight increase occurred due to post-retirement return to full-time farming since the 
mid 1990s (Goto 2016). With this demographic shift, the number of small famers decreased since 
1960 (i.e., first the farmers with farmland less than 0.5 ha since the 1960s and then those 
between 0.5-1.0 ha since the 1970s), the proportion of large farmers has increased since 1970 
(i.e., first those larger than 3ha since the 1970s and then those larger than 5ha since mid 1980s) 
(Goto 2016). By the turn of the 21st century, the five largest farmers with the area larger than 3.5 
ha farmed approximately 40% of the village’s farmland (Goto 2016). 
 The term ‘head family’ is defined and discussed in Chapter 2.363
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Table 4.2 Trends of Farm Households in U Village (1960-2015) 
Source: Goto (2016); Rural Community Cards of Census of Agriculture and Forestry in Japan 
 Along with scale expansion, these large farmers sought to consolidate farmland and 
overcome the inefficiency resulting from dispersed small paddies. This problem was resolved 
partially by the farmers’ exchange of tenures in the mid 1950s, but largely by physical land 
improvement in the 1990s. First, under the prefectural eight-year plan of tenure exchange for 
30,000 ha (i.e., a half of the prefectural farmland areas) (1950-1957), the village undertook the 
tenure exchange project in 1953 by which 46% of the farm households consolidated 7.8% of the 
cultivated area resulting in 14% decrease of paddy units (Goto 2016). 
 With progress in tenancy, the large farmers amplified their needs for more radical 
improvement to reverse the declining efficiency. In particular, the unpremeditated development 




















Ratio of total 
farm HHs to 
non-farm HHs 
(%)
1960 106 90 16 24 50 16 84.9
1965 100 88 NA NA NA 12 88.0
1970 115 72 0 28 44 43 62.6
1975 NA 55 1 10 44 NA NA
1980 133 45 1 14 30 88 33.8
1985 NA 47 2 13 32 NA NA
1990 136 37 (37) 2 8 27 99 27.2
1995 NA 33 (33) 4 10 19 NA NA
2000 137 30 (29) 1 4 25 107 21.9
2005 129 24 (24) 1 6 17 105 18.6
2010 126 21 (21) 4 1 16 105 16.7
2015 144 19 (19) 2 2 15 125 13.2
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Takemoto 2010). At the same time, the small wet paddies (0.067 ha in area) surrounded by 
narrow farm roads (1.8 m in width) not only prevented tenants from taking advantage of 
agricultural mechanization but also forced them into a heavy workload. With increased 
awareness of the roles of the large farmers, the village undertook land improvement towards the 
end of the last century, resulting in larger paddy units (0.3 ha) — which can be further enlarged, 
if needed, by clearing levees on farmland (up to 6.3 ha at a maximum) — with a centralized and 
automated control system of drainage (Goto 2016). This eased farmland consolidation, but 
further facilitated divergence between farmers and non-farmers (Goto 2016). 
 Besides the progress of individual large farmers, communal farming has evolved to crop 
conversion not rice production. The host of the communal farming was the Productive 
Association of the farmers in the village. Since its establishment in 1923, this association has 
pursued collective farmland maintenance activities (e.g., cleaning of drainage channels, weeding 
on farm roads) and also coordinated different interests of the farmers and neighboring villages 
for agricultural development projects (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995). In 
response to the rice acreage reduction policy, which began in earnest in 1970, the Productive 
Association has made an effort to fulfill the crop conversion quota.  After the completion of 364
land improvement in 1999, the association initiated collective crop rotation by consolidating the 
improved paddies to produce barley and soybeans so as to meet the quota requirement and avoid 
replant failure (Nakawatari 2009; Goto 2016). Despite the communal initiative, the collective 
crop rotation, which was entrusted to the association, has been undertaken by a few large farmers 
 The rice acreage reduction policy has designated a specific quota of rice acreage reduction with crop conversion for each 364
agrarian village since the 1970s (Editorial Committee of U Village History 1995; Nakawatari 2009).
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with mechanical and farming capacities (Goto 2016). As such, villagers’ participation in 
communal farming has been limited.  
 The widening gap between farmers and non-farmers has become a threat to tenancy 
arrangements, undermining non-farmers’ understanding and cooperation for farming. In fact, 
many of the non-farmers are farmland owners, but rely on tenants for farming, for which rent is a 
common ground to meet each party’s interests in farmland. In order to cope with agricultural 
downturn, tenants have pursued the lowering of rent to reflect the price of agricultural produce. 
With the decreasing awareness of farming among non-farmers, however, tenants found it difficult 
to adjust rent in accordance with the agricultural market (Goto 2016). They have found 
themselves in tougher negotiations than before with non-farmers holding farmland but often 
lacking an accurate picture of the farming sector. 
 In response, there have been new initiatives since around 2000 to revive a communal 
bond for farming in the village. The Productive Association initiated an annual harvest festival in 
the village in 2000 to boost social integrity (Goto 2016). Furthermore, the Farming Union was 
formed in 2006 to develop a local farming system where different types of farmers can co-
prosper, including part-time farmers, elderly farmers, and large full-time framers (Goto 2016; 
Kanda and Terabayashi 2013). Despite the initial intention to build on land improvement and 
enhance local agriculture, it became a means to take advantage of subsidies that were rendered 
for village-based farming organizations through the political initiative of the rice policy reform. 
The formation of the Union began with the initiative of the Productive Association consisting of 
all the farmers in the village. However, two large farms withdrew to let the Union focus on 
mutual support among small and medium-sized family-owned farms of part-time or elderly 
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farmers. Reorganized to consist of 15 farming households, it has become responsible for 
collective farming of barley cropping as part of a crop conversion effort (Goto 2016). 
 With the emergence of the Farming Union, the farmland in the village has become 
aggregated into a few large full-time farmers, and the members of the Farming Union. As of 
2013, the total area under cultivation by the 15 union members was approximately 30ha, the 
second largest in the village, following the largest farmer (42.5ha) (Goto 2016). The union has 
undertaken collective farming for crop conversion while having been under discussion on more 
complete communal farming including rice cultivation in an attempt to sustain continuous 
farming by small, elderly or part-time farmers. Between 2003 and 2013, among the six largest 
farming households, some receded from scale expansion in the absence of successors while 
others grew in farm size (Goto 2016). Thus, rather than the continuous development by the same 
few large farmers, generational turnover led to participation of a few smaller farmers in farmland 
aggregation.  
Limited Adoption of the FB program 
The adoption of the FB program in the village is limited and only in an individual form. For the 
first two fiscal years in 2014 and 2015, three landed farmers contracted out their farmland to the 
FB that sublet their land to three different farmers in the village. On the one hand, the landlords 
who retired from farming lent out all of their paddies to the FB and in return received farm 
retirement funds. To host the program, on the other, three other farmers were entrusted by the FB 
to manage the paddies that had been previously cultivated and are presently owned by the retired 
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farmers (i.e., the landlords). These hosts (i.e., subtenant farmers) were the one large, incorporated 
farm and two members of the Farming Union.  
 Several qualified farmers hosted the FB program in the village, but the program was 
adopted only on an individual form. As of May 2016, qualified farmers for hosting the FB 
program (i.e., those listed on the CAMP plan) included 11 farmers (i.e., 2 large farmers and 9 
union members). Although the Farming Union has a mission of community-based farming, its 
members can be contracted out through tenancy only on an individual basis rather than 
collectively, since it has not been legally incorporated.  
4.3 Conclusion 
Communal farming has been a key to extensive, collective adoption of the FB program. In 
District N, the historic development of community-based farming allowed for incorporation of a 
legally-qualified Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative Corporation at the district level capable of 
hosting most of the tenancy arrangements under the FB program. Without other available jobs, 
six large farmers joined together to economize their agricultural resources (e.g., machines, labor). 
At the same time, the composition of dry and rice paddy fields in a village forged the competitive 
spirit to form the communal farming in the village and thrive on farming over its neighboring 
villages. The communal farming in this single village has been transformed into an inclusive one, 
as metaphorically expressed in the slogan “ten villages as one,” to collectively overcome the 
challenges facing the district. In addition, years of working relationships between the prefectural 
authority and the organized district led the former to approach the latter for program 
implementation.  
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 In Village U, communal farming has been emerging, but has not been organized as a 
legally-qualified body to host the FB program. Albeit the recent initiatives to revive communal 
bonds, the village has developed independent, individual farming. Under the changing trend of 
local industries as well as the suburbanization, a handful of large farmers opted for scale 
expansion to take advantage of their agricultural resources. Considerable collective efforts have 
been made within the historically agrarian cohesive village to improve the farming resources 
through land improvement, exchange of tenures, and water control. However, farming has been 
managed largely on a household basis, though interests in rejuvenating communal practices have 
been growing to cope with the declining agricultural sector and respond to new policies (e.g., 
crop conversion, rice policy reform) particularly in the face of the divergence between farmers 
and non-farmers. Nevertheless, without a formal body of communal farming, the FB program 
incentivized landed farmers to retire from farming in exchange for retirement funds, but offered 
no economic incentive for independent tenant farmers who housed tenancy arrangements 
regardless of the FB program. 
 In these two different communities, how and why have individual farmers accepted or 
resisted the FB program? District N as a whole has collectively adopted the program, but each 
village has made different progress in adoption. Moreover, the level of participation in the 
program has differed among individual farmers even within a village. Village U has pursued 
individual adoption with only three cases, but many farmers have been involved in tenancy 
arrangements other than the FB program. The next two chapters examine the individuals’ attitude 
to the program so as to tease out the processes of negotiations leading to either their corporation 
or indifference to the FB program.  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Chapter 5: Farmers’ Participation in the Farmland Bank Program in a Hilly Rural 
Community in the North 
This chapter focuses on District N, a hilly rural community in Noto region of Ishikawa 
Prefecture, to delve into the farmers’ participation in the Farmland Bank (FB) program. It first 
delineates the status of farmland owners’ participation across different villages and examines the 
main drivers of collective participation. Second, it explicates different levels and modes of 
participation (including farmers holding farmland but not engaging in farming) across individual 
respondents, and then reveals their motivations for participation. Finally, it scrutinizes immediate 
and future challenges that farmers were concerned about in adopting the FB program. 
5.1 Collective Participation in the FB Program 
The status of participation in the FB program varies across different villages, depending on the 
progress of land improvement projects. This is because program adoption is practically combined 
with village initiatives for land improvement. To meet a subsidiary condition of the size of a 
beneficiary area for land improvement, a couple of villages have been grouped into one project 
zone where the FB program for tenancy has been adopted upon completion of improvement 
work.  
 At the time of my survey that was intensively conducted in November and December 
2016, land improvement projects were underway in four villages that were grouped into two 
zones (i.e., Zone A consisting of Villages NJ and NI with a beneficiary area of 30.1ha, and Zone 
B consisting of Villages NH and NG with the area of 27.9ha), where specific tenancy 
arrangements were already made under the FB program. The initiatives in three other villages, 
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however, had not yet begun, though they were planned to be chosen in fiscal 2018 as prefectural 
land improvement projects in two zones (i.e., Zone C consisting of Villages NC and ND with a 
beneficiary area of 51.8ha, and Zone D of Village NF with that of 27.8ha). Thus, these three 
villages had a broad-blush plan for tenancy arrangements but had not detailed it yet to adopt the 
FB program. 
 Based on the interviews across the seven villages (see Table 5.1), this section examines 
the status and drivers of collective participation in the program in two categorical areas: the 
zones currently involved in the land improvement projects, and those planned to be involved. For 
each area, I first explicate the village-wide status of involvement.  
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Table 5.1 Status of the Land Improvement Projects Combined with the FB Program 
Note: 1) Data on the zones underway are from Ishikawa Prefectural Government (Ishikawa 
Prefectural Government 2016a, 49, 74; 2016b, 56–57). Data on the planned zones are from a 
meeting material (distributed at the village meetings on December 8th and 10th, 2016), and 
NHDA (2016, 6–7). 2) In the neighboring district, District K, the land improvement project for 
the zone including Villages KK and HD with a beneficiary area of 27.5ha was selected on 
February 21st in 2012 as a prefectural project to implement the work for the duration between 
fiscal 2012 and fiscal 2017 based on the 100% agreement among beneficiaries (i.e., 91 out of 
91). The project cost amounts to JPY 486 million (approximately USD 4.28 million). 3) With 
regard to the status of work, the land leveling in Village NJ was completed and available for 
cultivation (albeit remaining incidental work such as underground drains), while about a half of 
that in Village NI was completed and available for cultivation. About a half of land leveling in 
Village NH was being completed and the remaining half planned to be carried out in fiscal 2017 
though depending on the budget. About two thirds of land leveling for Village NG were being 
carried out.  
Initiatives Zone Village Land Improvement Projects 1), 2), 3) 
Work Duration & Status 
(as of December 2016)
Beneficiary 
Area
Project Cost Ratio of 
Agreement
Underway A NJ • Duration: fiscal 2013 -  
2018 (applied on 12/4/2012 
and selected on 1/29/2013)

• Status: Land leveling 
completed in NJ and 
remained for a half in NI




(86 out of 87 
HHs)NI
B NH • Duration: fiscal 2014 - 
2019 (applied on 2/20/2014 
selected on 3/18/2014)

• Status: Land leveling was 
being carried out (a half 
done in NH) 




(50 out of 53 
HHs)NG
Planned C NC • Duration: fiscal 2019 - 
2023 (in a process of 
application to be selected 
in fiscal 2018) 
51.8ha 
(planned)
NA (100% - 
preliminary 
agreement as of 
March 2016)
ND
D NF • Duration: fiscal 2019 - 
2023 (in a process of 




NA (85%- in 
progress as of 
March 2016)
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5.1.1 Initiatives underway: 
In late 2016, many of the farmland owners in the four villages of the Zones A and B were 
participating in the FB program. The construction works for land improvement were still 
underway in the both zones (since 2013 and 2014 respectively), whereas lease agreements 
between the FB and the tenants were concluded for some lands that were already leveled. 
According to the interviews with a secretariat coordinator of the N District Hometown 
Development Association (November 7th 2016 and August 22nd 2018), almost all the landowners 
across the four villages leased out their farmlands to the FB. Those who did not included the 
farmers who decided to cultivate their land on their own in the beneficiary areas and those who 
planned to manage their lands outside of the beneficiary areas for self-sufficiency or 
conservation purposes. The tenants who leased the improved farmland from the FB were called 
‘responsible entities.’  The major tenant was Farm N into which the long-standing communal 365
farming organization was newly incorporated. While Farm N planned to collectively farm most 
of the improved land, a few other farmers planned to continue their farm management under the 
FB program. 
 To initiate the land improvement projects, the villages at large had agreed and planned on 
farmland aggregation and consolidation which were also the goals of the FB program.  As a 366
prefectural project designed to feed into the national policy goals, a land improvement project is 
selected only after overcoming the following three challenges: 1) budget allocation by the 
 The definition of ‘responsible entities’ or ‘responsible farmers’ (Ninaite), both of which are interchangeably used in the text, 365
is detailed in Chapter 3 (see footnote 30 in particular). In many cases, they include ‘certified farmers’ (defined in Chapter 2), 
community-based farming organizations, and corporate farms.
 Farmland aggregation means scale expansion of responsible entities mostly through tenancy, while farmland consolidation 366
means to secure consecutive and uninterrupted farmland managed by a farmer (MAFF 2017h).
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prefectural government, 2) meeting subsidiary conditions; and 3) local consent among 
beneficiaries (i.e., farmland owners). For budget allocation, the District N, as part of the Naka-
Noto region of the prefecture, had better opportunities to have a project funded, given that the 
prefectural government prioritized the region because it lagged behind in land improvement. The 
subsidiary conditions include: 1) the size of a beneficiary area, 2) farmland consolidation, 3) 
farmland aggregation, and 4) development of ‘responsible entities’ (Ishikawa Prefectural 
Government 2016b).  Furthermore, to secure local consent, two thirds of the beneficiaries by 367
law must agree to carry out a project. Local consent on land improvement suggests that the 
majority of beneficiaries conceptually agree on the FB program adoption. 
 Local consent in the two zones was more than sufficient to apply for a project. Although 
project selection legally requires consent from more than two-thirds of beneficiaries, the consent 
percentages reached 98.9% and 94.3% respectively in Zones A and B as of the dates of project 
application (Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2016b, 56).  In general, land improvement is 368
advantageous to local farmers because it generates higher productivity with agricultural 
infrastructural development and better farm management efficiency (Arimoto and Nakajima 
2010). At the same time, it normally requires the project cost to be borne by beneficiaries, while 
it often causes conflicts of interest among beneficiaries to collectively implement a project. In 
particular, land improvement mostly involves ‘designation of replotting,’ by which farmland is 
 For example, some of the corresponding requirements for subsidies include: 1) the size of a beneficiary area should be larger 367
than 20ha; 2)  a farmland plot larger than 30ha should consist of more than two thirds of a beneficiary area; 3) more than 50% of 
a beneficiary area should be managed by responsible entities; 4) existing or new responsible farm management entities should be 
developed by the end of the project (Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2016b, 20). 
 The ratio of agreement among beneficiaries to prefectural land improvement projects was 99% on average across the nation 368
for three years between 2012 and 2014 (MAFF 2015c).
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systematically redistributed among beneficiaries based on collective decision making.  This 369
makes local consent tougher as the process of replotting sometimes results in “cleaving of a 
village,” “distrust of people,” and “the source of future calamity” (Nakajima and Arimoto 2011, 
65). Despite these challenges, why did the four villages achieve high levels of local consent?  
 The literature has identified the following six major factors facilitating local consent on a 
land improvement project:1) cost sharing, 2) coordination, 3) needs and interests, 4) a difference 
in benefits shared among beneficiaries, 5) compromise, and 6) attachment to land. First, a 
minimum amount of project cost to be borne by beneficiaries is a key to local consent (Nohmi 
1995; Y. Sato 1989b). Second, adept coordination among different stakeholders (e.g., steady 
facilitation by a local leader, consultation by a non-partisan local committee) often makes the 
process of negotiations and deliberations smoother (Y. Sato 1989b; Shimokouji et al. 2000; 
Sekino et al. 2000). Third, salient needs for and/or interests in land improvement, particularly if 
ubiquitously shared among beneficiaries (e.g., high expectation of project effect with clear 
information, existence of reliable responsible entities, heightened urgency to improve farm 
environment), are likely to lead to local consent (Nohmi 1995; Y. Sato 1989b; Ishii and Okamoto 
2002a). Fourth, as a precondition of this third factor, if a difference in shared benefits is 
minimized (e.g., more or less equal increase in profitability from a unit area due to homogenous 
land conditions, compensation for disadvantageous farmers), the initiative is more likely to attain 
local agreement (Nohmi 1995; Satomura 1992), but otherwise it is unlikely to reach an optimal 
result (Arimoto and Nakajima 2010; Ishii and Okamoto 2002b). Fifth, if such a difference cannot 
 Ishida and Kiminami (1990) define ‘designation of replotting’ as the work to translocate the rights of ownership, mortgage, 369
superficies, and lease associated with the land prior to a land improvement project on the land after the project in accordance with 
the transformation of land traits through the project, by identifying the previous land with that post-project land in the eyes of the 
law. 
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be minimized, some beneficiaries may compromise, sacrifice or pander their own wills for the 
majority (e.g., a fraction of a community coming to terms with relatively disadvantageous 
replotting) (Satomura 1992; Y. Sato 1989b; Ishii and Okamoto 2002a).  
 Finally, related to the third factor, the beneficiaries’ disengagement from farming or 
detachment from farmland often allows for local consent, whereas their stronger attachment to 
the status quo can be a hinderance. For instance, farmland owners already lending their lands, if 
not highly valuing the property of farmland as it is, are more likely to accord with responsible 
entities for farmland aggregation and consolidation (Ishii and Okamoto 2002a; Ishii and 
Okamoto 2002b). However, if landowners have a high interest in the status quo (e.g., 
continuation of farming as it is, holding of the as-is farmland as an asset), they tend to disagree 
on any change through farmland redistribution (Y. Sato 1989b; Sekino et al. 2000; Arimoto and 
Nakajima 2010; Makiyama and Yamashita 2015; Ishii 2006; Masaru Morita 1992). In this regard, 
absentee landlords are ambivalent ones. Besides technical and procedural challenges to obtain 
consent from absentees who live far from a local community, some show stronger attachment to 
their lands mostly with a high expectation of the property value of the as-is farmland, and thus 
uneasily agree on replotting (Sakamoto and Kubo 2010; Choi, Hwang, and Han 1998). Others 
easily allow for redistribution without much care about farmland based on their disengagement 
from farming (Sakamoto and Kubo 2010; Choi, Hwang, and Han 1998). In either case, owners’ 
attachment to the as-is farmland highly matters for local consent.  
Cost sharing:  
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In the case of the four villages, these six factors intertwined to facilitate local consent on the land 
improvement projects and thereby the FB program. First, the national policy for farmland 
liquidation has minimized the project cost borne by beneficiaries to the extent that subsidiaries 
conditions are met. Although the ratio of the local cost share slightly differs according to 
prefectural and municipal governments, that of District N was 5% (i.e., 55% by the national 
government, 30% by the prefectural government, 10% by the municipal government, and 5% by 
beneficiaries). In addition, if the subsidiary condition on the farmland accumulation rate  is 370
fulfilled ‘in planning,’ the government provides interest-free loans for up to five-sixths of the 
local cost share depending on the budgetary status of a prefectural government (MAFF 2008; 
MAFF 2017d; Ishikawa Prefectural Government 2016b, 13). Moreover, if the farmland 
accumulation rate improves ‘in effect' upon completion of work, an additional subsidy is 
provided for up to 5% of the project cost according to the improved ratio (MAFF 2008; Ishikawa 
Prefectural Government 2016b, 14). This means that if all the subsidiary conditions are met, the 
local beneficiaries only need to pay interest on the interest-bearing loan. In fact, the two zones 
achieved this minimum cost share by fulfilling all these conditions. The beneficiaries in Zone A, 
for instance, bear only JPY 177,975 (approximately USD 1,567) in total for the five-year 
work.  371
 Given past experience in sharing considerable cost among the beneficiaries for the first 
round of land improvement projects, the minimal cost share was a key, rather than the economic 
incentive of the FB program, to local consent for the second round. Although the FB program 
 The farmland accumulation rate is the percentage of farmland accumulated on responsible entities in a beneficiary area.370
 The information on the budget and the cost sharing for the land improvement projects in Zone A was shared at the village 371
meetings on December 8th and 10th, 2016. 
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had a subsidiary option through farm retirement funds, many of the beneficiaries additionally 
owned farmland outside of the beneficiary area, which was mostly for subsistence or 
maintenance, not for rental. Thus, they were ineligible for retirement funds, while the FB 
program offered a collective economic incentive to the community.  Nonetheless, it mattered to 372
the beneficiaries whether the prefectural budget would be allocated with the minimum local cost 
share. Despite the current prefectural focus on the Naka-Noto region, the budget allocation was 
changeable and sensitive to various factors. For instance, the land-leveling work in Village NJ 
progressed ahead of schedule with the budget surplus under the administrative change, while that 
for the other three villages was planned to make slower progress with lesser financing. ,  373 374
 Furthermore, compared to past land improvement projects, a former chair of the 
neighborhood association in Village NH highlighted the importance of the minimum local cost 
share and explained the indifference to the economic incentives of the FB program (Interview 
with a farmer on December 9, 2016): 

I think we’re all not much interested in the FB program and not calculating 
loss and gain specifically from it. … When we did the land improvement 
project about 45 years ago, the repayment money was as large as several 
hundred thousand yen. Initially we were worried about the repayment and 
calculated for it for the current project, but now we know it's little. Even the 
interest of the loan for repayment per 1 tan (i.e., approx. 0.1 ha) is very little, 
 For instance, Village NJ received over JPY 6 million of a subsidy by meeting the farmland aggregation rate in the FB 372
program, and used a half of it for the capital investment of Farm N (i.e., a responsible entity) and the other half for the 
infrastructural improvement within the village (e.g., the paving work of the school roads affected by the project, and the 
maintenance and repair of a meeting place) (Interview with a farmer on December 9, 2016).
 Although the local consent on preliminary designation of replotting normally precedes the inception of land-leveling work, 373
the work began with haste only with the general local consent on the land improvement project, given the sudden availability of 
additional budget which allowed for completion of land-leveling work only for one year, though it had planned to be completed 
in two years (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016).
 According to a chair of the neighborhood association in the neighboring district, he was informed by a city official that his 374
village would be allocated with budget in 10-15 years even if his village would start to prepare for a land improvement project 
shortly (Interview with a farmer on November 10, 2016).
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and that’s ok to pay out of our own pockets. Other subsidiary systems do 
likewise. For the direct payment system for mountainous areas as well as the 
FB program, we’re just all right to listen to the state in silence and then do 
what they say. To many of us, the wishes of not farming on our own come true 
without bearing much cost. In short, in weighing it in a balance, the burden 
we have borne becomes zero without bearing a cost for it at our side. That's 
all there is to it. 
Coordination: 
District N Hometown Development Association (NHDA) took a lead in coordinating different 
stakeholders to attain local consent and to start the land improvement projects in the four 
villages. Since 2010, this association had proposed and prepared for incorporation of Farm N as 
a main ‘responsible entity’ for the projects, while it shared and disseminated the initiative across 
different villages through its systematic networks in the district.  In particular, the secretariat 375
coordinator of the NHDA served a dual role of leadership and implementation in facilitating the 
initiative for land improvement as well as the incorporation of communal farming.  Taking 376
advantage of his forty-year experience as a municipal official engaging in agricultural policies 
and community development projects, the coordinator adeptly facilitated the processes ranging 
from the participatory problem finding, knowledge and information sharing, and budget 
procurement, to the project application and follow-ups, often by coordinating with municipal and 
prefectural governments. For instance, he visited several absentee landlords living in distant 
cities to explain the project and attain their consent and participation, although this role 
 As part of the NHDA, a congress consisting of all the chairs of the ten neighborhood associations (corresponding to the ten 375
villages) in the district, continuously shared and exchanged information across different hamlets in the district (Interview with a 
farmer on November 9, 2016). 
 According to the current president of the NHDA, the secretariat coordinator is a ‘superman’ who has long played both a 376
leading role of a ‘flag ship' and a practical role of a ‘locomotive’ to substantively operationalize the NHDA by devising and 
facilitating a variety of projects (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016).
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customarily assumed to fall under the responsibility of landlords’ families. As a result, most of 
them offered their consent, as one of them said to the coordinator “I don’t cooperate with my 
brother, but if my stake hinders the communal initiative, I’ll cooperate with you.” (Interview 
with a farmer on November 7, 2016). 
 In addition, several board members of Land Improvement Districts played a key role in 
coordinating conflicting interests. A Land Improvement District is an organization of 
beneficiaries which is normally established prior to project selection to prepare for application 
and then implement a project in a beneficiary area (Ishii and Okamoto 2002c). Among eleven 
board members of the Land Improvement District in Village NJ, an area manager handled all the 
complaints from the beneficiaries about replotting and construction work, while he daily 
coordinated with five different contractors on site and liaised with the beneficiaries (Interview 
with a farmer on December 9, 2016). Also, an area manager of Village NG, who had a ten-year 
experience in administrating land improvement projects as a prefectural official, took the 
initiative in developing a replotting plan to meet all the subsidiary conditions effectively and at 
the same time tailor plausible beneficiaries’ needs and expectation (Interview with a farmer on 
December 8, 2016). He then consulted with the beneficiaries to facilitate local consent. 
Salient needs and interests: 
In response to the call for land improvement from the local leaders, the general atmosphere 
involved the emerging sense of crisis in farming as well as the reliability of local ‘responsible 
entities’ for farmland aggregation and consolidation. Foremost, the concern about the lack of 
successors was growing along with the continuously shrinking and aging farm population and 
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looming farm abandonment. Except for Village NI, a few farm households in each village had 
autonomously managed their paddy farms with a complete set of agricultural machines without 
relying on other farmers for any of the rice production tasks. Many others had already entrusted 
partial or full farming practices to their neighbors who were mechanically and physically capable 
of farming others’ farmland.  Even the farmers autonomously managing paddies had faced a 377
lack of successors. This situation was associated with the increasing difficulties of part-time 
farming  and the national policy promoting agricultural mechanization and scale expansion.  378 379
Along with this trend, small farmers were increasingly discouraged from farming on their own, 
as shown in the results from two questionnaire surveys conducted by the NHDA. The first survey 
in 2008 of about 300 households in the district found that one-third of the respondents were 
willing to continue farming after land improvement. Yet, the second survey in 2012 of 90 
households in the four hamlets revealed one single respondent willing to continue farming 
 Prior to the FB program adoption, in Village NJ, among about 30 farm households, two managed their rice farms 377
independently with a full set of agricultural machines (e.g., a tractor, a rice transplanter, a rice dryer), while a community-base 
farming organization consisting of 3-4 farmers were entrusted with the practices of raising seedling and rice reaping — most of 
these and other farmers were the elderly without successors (Interview with a farmer on December 9, 2016). In Village NG, 
among about 30 farm households, four managed rice farming throughout from rice transplanting to reaping, but other active 
farmers entrusted some practices (e.g., rice reaping, drying and adjusting while taking care of rice transplanting, weeding and 
disinfection) to other capable farmers including those from other villages (Interview with a farmer on December 8, 2016). Some 
respondents stated that in Village NG there was no responsible entity capable of farmland aggregation with successors, while four 
large farms entered into farming from outside (Interviews with farmers on December 7 and 8, 2016). In Village NH, three out of 
about 20 farm households independently managed their farmlands, but none of them had a promise in their successors as their 
children went out to cities and set up houses there (Interview with a farmer on December 9, 2016). 
 Farming in one’s spare time became more difficult than before due to the increasingly inflexible work in many workplaces. 378
One respondent stated that people in his generation (in his 70s) who had a corporate job used to take a leave more freely and 
secured time for farming in accordance with farming seasons, but the younger generations could be hardly absent from an office 
for rice reaping for several days given the general working style and the common sense of business (Interview with a farmer on 
November 8, 2016). Referring to the present as ‘the era of long working hours,’ another respondent suggested that it would be 
impossible to have the young generations engaged in farming, who leave home early in the morning and return late at night for 
work, though the earlier generations were able to farm in morning and evening (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016).
 Several respondents mentioned that the era of individual farming was over, given the national policy that has continuously 379
supported farmland aggregation and consolidation and subsidized farm expansion and mechanization (Interviews with farmers on 
November 8, and December 9 and 10, 2016).
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(Interview with a farmer on November 7, 2016). At the same time, abandoned rice paddies had 380
started to appear in less favored areas in some of the villages.  381
 Despite the decrease in the number of active farmers, the existence of locally-based 
responsible entities added to the interest in land improvement. As a major host, Farm N was 
trusted by many beneficiaries given that it built on a long-standing community farming 
organization. Presumably, it would be more reliable than an unknown entity which would enter 
into the district from outside but may leave if it failed. In Village NJ, some of the farmers were 
initially interested in establishing another village-based farming organization. However, the later 
introduction of the FB program, which more explicitly required responsible entities for long-term 
active farming, facilitated the farmland aggregation to Farm N, which was more promising for 
generational change in terms of farm laborers and mechanical renovation (Interview with a 
farmer on November 9, 2016). Furthermore, in response to local concerns raised around 2012 
about the lack of a clear image of future farm management, the NHDA detailed the plan for farm 
management, and then determined the management structure of Farm N in late 2014 to be 
established as a legally-qualified Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative Corporation. As such, 
 This tendency was observed in the examples mentioned by some respondents. In Village NJ, in April 2010 when a former 380
chair of the association proposed the idea of land improvement, which had not been previously decided, none disagreed with him 
with the understanding that they were no longer able to manage their farmlands by themselves (Interview with a farmer on 
December 9, 2016). Moreover, none expressed their willingness to continue farming at the time of consultation with the active 
farmers for temporal designation of replotting (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016). In Village NH, the former chair of 
the neighborhood association, facilitated the land improvement project from around 2010 without much trouble, but when he 
proposed the idea to initiate community-based farming around 1995 by evidencing the negative earnings from the individual 
farming, but it was not agreed given that many farmers managed their farms independently with a full set of machines (Interview 
with a farmer on December 9, 2016).
 There was no abandoned farmland within the ‘Agricultural Developing Area’ in Village NI (Interview with a farmer on 381
December 10, 2016). However, the rice paddies being wild with 2-meter-high reed grasses had become scattered particularly in 
the less favored areas in Village NG (Interview with a farmer on December 8, 2016).
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together with the sense of crisis in farming, the availability of a local responsible entity was 
critical to forge the needs and interests of the beneficiaries.  382
Difference in potential benefits:  
Differences in potential benefits did not matter to many of the beneficiaries. This was largely 
because the majority of beneficiaries planned were already disengaged or planned to disengage 
from farming and thus not to earn directly from farmland. At the same time, the replotting was 
arranged and designated within a village where farmland conditions were more or less similar. 
Yet, there were differences in farmland traits and its surrounding conditions. In fact, concerns of 
gain and loss were raised among the beneficiaries in some of the villages, but were much less 
significant compared to the first round of land improvement projects conducted several decades 
ago. For instance, recalling what he had heard from his farther who was an area manager of the 
first-round project, the former chair of the neighborhood association in Village NH, who 
facilitated the second-round one, offered a comparative observation of beneficiaries’ reactions to 
the plan of replotting (Interview with a farmer on December 9, 2016). The first round involved 
heated conflicts and intense competition among the beneficiaries for farmland with favored 
conditions such as sunshine, drainage, flatness, and accessibility, particularly in the age of better 
farm profitability — when the more farmers worked, the more they earned. For the second 
 These two elements were also critical to project adoption in the neighboring district. In Villages KK and KH where land 382
improvement preceded, on the one hand, the extent of farm abandonment had been more significant, inflating the sense of crisis 
in farming in the communities. For instance, about 27% of the rice paddies in Village KK had become wild with plenty of Canada 
goldenrod, whereas the hilly sections of Village KH had not been farmed for some time — making many of the landowners 
willing to have others take care of their lands (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016). In Village KK, in the absence of a 
major responsible entity, a community-base farming organization was established to initiate the land improvement project 
together with the FB program. On the other, the villages without a land improvement project lacked either of these two elements. 
In Village KYO, rice paddies were well maintained without being surrounded by weeds, owing to the diligent weeding and other 
maintenance activities by the still active postwar baby-boom generation in the community (Interview with a farmer on November 
10, 2016). In Village KYA, despite emerging interests in land improvement, there were neither existing responsible entities nor 
potential ones (Interview with a farmer on November 10, 2016).
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round, although there were numerous likes and dislikes about the potential outcome, those who 
initially raised such issues ended up with letting their land be managed by whoever, wherever 
and however. 
 Differences in farmland did matter to a small number of landed or tenant farmers. If they 
were programatically-defined ‘beneficiaries’ (i.e., farmland owners), they were able to 
participate in the planning processes from the beginning and to negotiate for any arrangements so 
as not to suffer disadvantages. If not (e.g., a tenant who did not own farmland in the area), they 
were unable to participate in the negotiations and designation of replotting until they became a 
formal stakeholder to be contracted out from the FB.   383
 Nevertheless, even without a formal beneficiary status, some tenants who were de facto 
beneficiaries involved in tenancy, drew on their own contacts with other stakeholders even prior 
to the stage of making contracts between the FB and tenants. For instance, one farmer in Village 
NG who was in need of at least 10 ha in total for optimal productivity, negotiated with a local 
leader of kin to temporarily secure farmland in the course of construction work (Interview with a 
farmer on December 9, 2016). Once farmland was contracted to the FB, those farmers were able 
to more boldly negotiate. For instance, having been allocated with improved farmland scattered 
across different villages, another tenant negotiated and coordinated with other ‘responsible 
entities’ as well as local leaders to consolidate farmland in one village, while a final decision was 
 A respondent who was a responsible farmer but not a landowner in Village NH (residing in the neighboring district) 383
mentioned that he only heard about the processes from his friends who participated in the local meetings, but could join neither 
formal nor informal meetings to prepare for the project given the absence of his residency in the village (Interview with a farmer 
on December 7, 2016). Another respondent who was a responsible farmer in village NG but residing in Village NC, also noted his 
status as a non-landowner unable to attend any preparatory meetings, despite his de-facto stake in the project (Interview with a 
farmer on December 9, 2016). 
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made among the landowners as primary beneficiaries (Interview with a farmer on December 7, 
2016).  384
Compromise:  
Compromise was not much needed, since many of the beneficiaries were indifferent to any 
disparity. A few, however, gave way to others to avoid friction in the community. For instance, 
two board members of the Land Improvement District in Village NJ offered part of their own 
allotments to facilitate the communal agreement on the project (Interviews with farmers on 
November 9 and December 9, 2016). The board of the Land Improvement District initially 
prepared a preliminary plan for designation of replotting with the aim of the greatest common 
outcome, and presented it for the four-day public inspection in 2014. Although almost all the 
beneficiaries gave their consent, one landowner disagreed the plan and claimed a different 
allotment with access to a road. In response, two of the board members shifted their allotments 
elsewhere to accommodate the request. Also, one landed farmer in Village NJ inevitably needed 
to accept a disadvantageous allotment. The farmer had planned to continue farming 
independently and thus was designated with a plot outside of the consolidated farmland. 
 The tenant mentioned that the redistribution of the improved land resulted in the most efficient form by consensus, also in 384
accordance with the current agricultural policy (Interview with a farmer on December 7, 2016). Out of the farmland plots for 
which the tenant planned to make contracts with the FB, he planned to sublet a plot to one landed farmer, who decided to 
continue farming after the project for a while but not for several decades, so that the subtenant can return the farmland to the 
original tenant upon his retirement (Interviews with farmers on December 7 and 9, 2016). A landowner in another village also 
mentioned that his village coordinated with other villages to rearrange the farmland allotments among different tenants for 
efficiency, also reflecting on tenants’ needs (Interview with a farmer on December 8, 2016).  
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Although he later became unable to continue farming, it was too late to rearrange the replotting 
and he needed to stick to the original allotment.   385
Attachment to farmland:  
Attachment to farmland was generally insignificant because many of the beneficiaries planned to 
disengage from farming while letting others farm their land. For the first round, many 
beneficiaries competed with each other for advantageous replotting for better profits. However, 
for the second round, many who had already disengaged or planned to retire allowed for 
replotting at the convenience of ‘responsible entities,’ rather than sticking to the status-quo or the 
best individual allotment. Thus, most of the beneficiaries gave silent approval to the preliminary 
replotting which consolidated their farmlands as close as possible to the original locations.  386
Furthermore, one respondent suspected that the landowners’ attachment to farmland would 
further fade away after land improvement (Interview with a farmer on November 10, 2016): 
My own farmland is replotted out there downstream where land leveling is 
going on, but four to five owners are listed for one large plot. There are 
borders between different owners’ lands on a map, but no single nail is 
driven on an actual field. I can only say my land is around there. …So, our 
attachment to land will become much less after the project. In fact, the 
 One responsible farmer in Village NG was not given a subsidiary share despite his participation in the FB program, given that 385
the village community differentiated his farm as an independent one from the communal farming entities. Albeit not necessarily 
in the statutory term, a half of the FB program’ subsidy for collective use was usually shared among responsible entities 
depending on the area of farmland to be contracted out from the FB. This was the case of Village NH where a part of the subsidy 
(approximately JPY 1.2 million; USD 10.7 thousand ) was offered for an independent responsible entity in accordance of the area 
that entity planned to farm in the hamlet (Interview with a farmer on December 8, 2016).
 According to a respondent from Village NH, he shared with other villagers the sentiment that anywhere was fine for 386
replotting, as they would farm no longer on their own, although in the past they had claimed for specific locations for better 
conditions such as sunshine, drainage, and accessibility (Interview with a farmer on November 8, 2016). Another respondent 
from Village NH stressed that the land improvement project was for future responsible entities to farm more easily, recalling the 
quick agreement among the villagers on the plan of replotting developed by the board members given that many of landowners 
still owned their lands but no longer farmed (Interview with a farmer on December 9, 2016).  The respondents from the other 
villages also provided similar comments (Interviews with farmers on November 9 and 10 and December 8 and 9, 2016). 
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attachment is surely being lost, although replotting has been arranged 
based on the area size calculated from the copy of the map also for use 
rights setting. If we have an obsession with our land indeed, we have to go 
out and draw a line in the field by driving a nail by ourselves.  
 In the neighboring district, the owners’ attachment to their farmlands was an obstacle to 
initiating land improvement. In Village KYO without a project, although some landowners called 
for the second round of land improvement given the decaying agricultural infrastructure, others 
who were previously allocated favored farmland clung to it despite already disengaging from 
farming. Even without farming, the latter still received rent and were concerned of not knowing 
where their farmland in sight would be replotted if a project was carried out.  In Village KYA 387
also without a project, many of the active elderly farmers showed their strong attachment to 
farmland despite their aging and the money-losing farming, resulting in failure to foster 
momentum for land improvement.  Even in Village KK with a project, in order to secure a 388
large size plot for more efficient farming, a secretariat coordinator of the Land Improvement 
District needed to fight against others who tried to limit the plot area to more easily 
accommodate owners’s attachment to farmland in the process of replotting.  389
 A respondent from Village KY regrettably pointed to the unsuccessful designation of replotting for the first round, in which 387
even an effectively leveled large plot was halved with a pipe in accordance with many landowners who claimed for their own 
allotments (Interview with a farmer on November 10, 2016).
 A respondent from Village KYA presented his money-losing case of farming and called for a land improvement project 388
several years ago, but many of the still active but elderly farmers were unwilling to join the effort, expressing their preference to 
the status-quo. He suggested that many of the villagers had a great attachment to their farmland, exemplifying their concerns 
about the FB program: their sons might be disallowed to engage in farming once they lend their farmland to the FB; and they 
may need to change their way of obtaining rice from their farmland to purchasing rice for their own consumption or gifts to their 
family and relatives (Interview with a farmer on November 10, 2016).
 According to the respondent from Village KK, the board members for replotting proposed the smaller size of a plot (e.g., 0.2 389
or 0.3 ha) which would be more easily agreed among the beneficiaries given that smaller size of land can be easily replotted in 
accordance with the original size and location of their farmland. As a secretariat coordinator of the Land Improvement District, 
however, reminded them of the initial thrust and stressed the objective of the project to resolve the inefficiency from smaller plots 
and to achieve efficiency through scale expansion of farming, finally resulting in the agreement to plan of replotting with much 
larger size of a plot (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016). 
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5.1.2 Initiatives planned: 
At the end of 2016, the initiatives were in the planning stage in three villages in Zones C and D 
(i.e., Villages NC, ND and NF). Prior to official local consent, most farmland owners had 
informally agreed to apply for land improvement projects in combination with the FB program to 
be selected by the prefectural government in fiscal 2018. Based on the discussions in 2014 held 
on the initiative of the NHDA, the landowners in all these village concluded that re-improvement 
of rice paddy field would solve the problems of irrigation and drainage and address the issues of 
shrinking and aging farm population in the geographically disadvantageous farm environment 
(NHDA 2016). Following this conclusion, they gathered more frequently in 2015 and early 2016 
to discuss the means of land improvement under the leadership of the NHDA, while conducting 
on-site observations in the zones where land improvement was already taking place. As a result, 
even prior to the stage of final local consent, local consent on a land improvement project had 
already achieved 100% and 85% respectively in Zones C and D as of March 2016 (NHDA 2016, 
6–7).  
 As such, based on the lessons learnt from the zones where the initiatives were already 
underway, the three villages recognized their needs and interests in the initiatives under the 
coordination of the NHDA, leading to the high levels of consent. Nevertheless, the villages faced 
the uncertainties and indecisions of: budgetary status and timing, and ‘responsible entities’ and 
replotting. The Land Improvement Districts, organized at each village between January and 
March 2016,  sketched a plan on the beneficiary areas in the two zones for land improvement 390
 A Land Improvement District was organized on January 31st, February 7th and March 19th in 2016 respectively in Villages 390
ND, NF, and NC  (NHDA 2016, 6–7).
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as well as main ‘responsible entities’ including Farm N. They submitted their preliminary 
application to City A in November 2016 aiming at prefectural selection in fiscal 2018 and then 
within a few days, gained approval by the prefectural government. As of late 2016, they were 
planning to obtain formal local consent in fiscal 2017 to prepare for formal application and 
approval in fiscal 2018 so that the projects could be selected by the end of fiscal 2018. With this 
schedule, they were aiming to start the construction work in 2019, although it would depend on 
the national budgetary status. 
Budgetary status and timing: 
Following the experiences in the zones where the initiatives were aleady underway, the idea of 
minimal local cost share as well as additional financial advantage from the FB program was 
generally shared among the landowners in the three villages. In fact, the initiatives started with a 
call from the NHDA secretariat to join forces to pursue land improvement while the time was 
ripe. The secretariat explained that the current policy allowed beneficiaries to bear almost no 
cost. Despite the salient needs for renovation of the decaying water facilities, several respondents 
presumed that the majority would have not agreed if they needed to bear the cost particularly 
when rice production was not economically viable. Likewise, it was generally understood that 
farmland aggregation through the FB program would be more financially advantageous for the 
communities at large while incorporation of farm entities would be also subsidiarily encouraged. 
To take advantage of the FB program, the three villages laid out a goal to aggregate farmland as 
much as possible (e.g., more than 50% for the farmland aggregation rate in Village NC). In 
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addition, farmland aggregation into incorporated farm entities was generally agreed so that farm 
management would be better subsidized under the current policies.  
 However, the three villages were late comers. They were expecting to complete 
construction work in fiscal 2023 at the earliest, while the first tenancy contract with the FB 
would end in another next 10 years (i.e., 2033). Furthermore, the subsidiary rates were 
fluctuating. Under this financial and political climate, a leader of Land Improvement District in 
ND village expressed anxiety about uncertainties of local benefits and possible risks in the 
timing of project implementation (Interview with a farmer on December 10, 2016):  

In the vein of the talks so far, the landowners in our village easily agreed and 
lightly signed the preliminary consent only by looking at the opening of the story. 
But I guess they gave consent without fully understanding each scenario of the 
story including any possible outcome, and if so, they may say “I never heard 
anything like that” in the course of obtaining formal consent from now. … 
Although I was briefed on the FB program, its pros and cons didn’t go strait over 
my head, but after a while eventually now I understand it will take almost a decade 
to complete the construction work for land improvement, and after that, we should 
lease out our land to the FB for a decade for the initial contract. So, this initiative 
will last for almost two decades. In such a long run, I started wondering, what will 
happen if there is no heir in each household upon the end of the contract as even 
now we are all aging already and may not live then. … Though city officials tell us 
about the figures of subsidies for the program, the figure a few years ago, that for 
the present, and that for the future are changing from time to time. When we first 
heard from the NHDA secretariat a couple of years ago, there was certainly 
substantial advantage in initiating land improvement, but now I sometimes think 
there is not much. Besides such an annual fluctuation, the officials also are gaining 
more knowledge about the program and policies and are becoming more specific 
about conditions and limitations. … If the work starts out late, our repayment for 
local cost share may even linger for many years in the future in the worst scenario.  
Responsible entities and replotting: 
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In late 2016, replotting as well as allotment for responsible entities was yet to be discussed. 
Based on the preceding discussions, the villages had shared the scheme by which most of the 
landowners would lend their land to the FB and would engage as a cooperative member in 
communal farming under the management of ‘responsible entities’ who would lease land from 
the FB. Also, they had shared the idea that the major ‘responsible entity’ would be Farm N. In 
addition, the NHDA secretariat shared the schedule at the meetings of Land Improvement 
Districts in December 2016 to prepare a plan of farmland aggregation and consolidation with 
identification of ‘responsible entities’ in October 2017 to be submitted for formal application and 
then develop a plan of replotting within fiscal 2018. As such, the plan of both replotting and 
allotment was supposed to be detailed in the next few years.  
 The general impulse to configure the arrangement for replotting and house ‘responsible 
entities' in each village differed according to the status of the existing ‘responsible entities’ and 
the environmental conditions. In Village NC, it took a little more time than the other villages to 
attain preliminary consent on the initiative, largely because the existing local ‘responsible 
entities’ had managed to cultivate the land without outside help. There were certainly strong 
needs for solving the problems with irrigation and drainage, whereas the demographic problem 
was obviously serious. However, some voiced doubts about a need for increasing a paddy plot in 
size, as the possible extent of enlargement would be limited (e.g., 0.3ha) compared to that in the 
zones with the initiatives underway (e.g., 1ha) due to the sharper geographical features of the 
village. Furthermore, three active family-run farms who had engaged in farming others’ farmland 
in the village while being qualified as certified farmers faced a decision of whether to be a 
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‘responsible entity.’  Among these three, the largest and incorporated one (with the area of 391
10ha) already planned to do so after land improvement together with Farm N, but was yet to 
determine the volume and locations of his allotment. Two other individual farm entities (with the 
area of 4-5ha) were undecided but would be forced to make a decision. 
 Both Villages ND and NF have achieved preliminary consent without significant 
opposition, given that these villages had no longer been able to manage without outside help. In 
Village ND, one outside ‘responsible entity’ joined tenancy for the past two decades and had 
been in charge of farming one-third of the village’s farmland.  With experience of having some 392
of the paddies abandoned in the past, none of the landlords residing in the village disagreed on 
the initiative, despite a few doubts from absentee landlords.  Rather, a local leader was 393
concerned about plausible challenges to gain participation by beneficiaries in future discussions 
on replotting and responsible entities given little interest among the landowners (Interview with a 
farmer on December 10 , 2016). In Village NF, the NI Cooperative, the predecessor of Farm N, 
had been already one of the responsible entities.  Also, in the presence of sporadically 394
abandoned farmland, a sense of crisis was generally shared. With the common understanding that 
 In Village NC, there were three major responsible entities who were also certified farmers and involved in tenancy to engage 391
in cultivating farmland owned by their neighbors and relatives, in addition to owner-farmers (including both parti-time and full-
time farmers). In the past, there were two initiatives of community-based farming where one of these family-run farms took a 
lead: 1) the first initiative of Agricultural Machine Use Cooperative ended with the challenges of joint financial management 
(1981-1994); and 2) the second similar initiative nominally continued for the subsidized agricultural machines but was not in 
operation (2004-) (Interviews with farmers on December 7 and 8, 2016).
 In addition, two local responsible entities had been engaged in a half of the village’s farmland and two owner-farmers had 392
been for the rest (Interview with a farmer on December 10, 2016).
 According to the president of Land Improvement District in ND village, there were some absentee landlords who puzzled 393
over the initiative (Interview with a farmer on December 10, 2016). He stated “Some of them let us do what we want as they saw 
themselves having troubled us due to their absence. Others raised doubts as to why land improvement should be conducted again 
although it had been done decades ago, and how they as recipients of pensions can come up with the repayment money to share 
the project cost.”
 In addition, there were one local responsible entity besides 7-8 active owner-farmers including part-time ones.394
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no one will take care of their farmland unless it is improved, most of the landowners in the 
village gave swift consent.  395
5.2 Individual or Household Participation in the FB Program 
The respondents associated with Zones A and B (n=16) had already determined how to 
participation in the FB program. Those from Zones C and D (n=10) were in an unsettled status 
given that the initiatives were only preliminarily planned. The former included those who 
planned to be involved in communal farming by lending their farmland to the FB, and those who 
planned to continue independent farming by leasing farmland from the FB. With the tenancy 
arrangements through the FB, the roles and responsibilities of the individuals in farm 
management were in transition along with the land improvement projects. The latter included 
those who made a preliminary decision and those who were indecisive. The decision-making 
status of respondents’ participation in the program is shown in Table 5.2. This section illustrates 
to what extent the respondents had made a decision as well as how they planned to participate in 
accordance with the progress of the initiatives. 
 The land improvement project planned to cover most area of the relatively large village, but to exclude the hilly part because 395
farmland management activities would become more burdensome due to the increased sharpness of slopes if a paddy plot is 
enlarged (Interview with a farmer on December 10, 2016).
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Table 5.2 Status of Respondents’ Decision Making on Participation in the FB program 




Affiliation Roles & Responsibilities Reward
Underway
: Zones A 
& B 
(n=16)
Communal (n=13) Yes 
(n=13)
Yes - as a 
cooperative 
(n=12)
Farm N Board of directors (n=7): 
Capital subscription, right to 
vote, execution of operation 
for farm management 
(planning& management, 
cultivation — including 






Other cooperative members 
(n=5): Capital subscription, 
right to vote, farming 
support, collective farmland 
management
Rent, (wage)
No (n=1) NA Non cooperative member 
(n=1): Collective farmland 
management
Rent, (wage)
Independent (n=3) Yes 
(n=1)







management, payment for 
















Yes - as a 
cooperative 
(n=2)
Farm N (Either board of directors or 





Undecided (Either cooperative members 













management, payment for 









Undecided (n=5) NA NA NA NA NA
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5.2.1 Initiatives underway 
All the respondents associated with the four villages where the initiatives were underway had 
planned to participate in the FB program either through communal or independent farming. To 
adopt the land improvement projects in combination with the FB program, the beneficiaries 
needed to decide as individuals or households whether to lend their land to the FB. If they 
decided to lend their land, they also needed to decide whether and how they would engage in 
farm management. If they decided not to lend, they would presumably continue independent 
farming.  
 On the part of tenants, even without owning farmland within the beneficiary areas, 
farmers (e.g., outside farmer) were able to lease farmland from the FB as long as they were listed 
as ‘responsible entities’ for the areas in the Community Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP). The 
major tenant was Farm N, but a few others joined the program as independent farm management 
entities. In fact, some of the beneficiaries planned to lend out their land to farm management 
entities other than Farm N, but through the FB. Regardless of their affiliations and actual 
counterparts of tenancy, all the respondents who were landowners, if they had decided not to 
pursue independent farming, planned to engage more or less in communal farming.  
Communal Farming: 
The activities of communal farming were centered around the management by Farm N, an 
Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative Corporation.  With a right to vote in plenary assemblies, 396
cooperative members could participate in decision making on farm management. Among the 
 As of December 2016, Farm N consisted of 31 landowners from the four villages, who as cooperative members subscribed a 396
share of capital (i.e., JPY10,000 (approximately USD89) per 0.1ha) (District N n.d., 11).
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cooperative members, 9 members were serving as a board of directors to represent the 
cooperative in executing operations and were responsible to the institutional contracts as well as 
the decisions made by the plenary assemblies. The roles and responsibilities of the board were 
broadly divided into two areas: corporative planning and management, and cultivation and 
farmland management.  The former included the tasks related to financing and human resource 397
management. The latter included the tasks related to growing crops and maintaining farmland 
mainly on the improved land.  
 Despite the central roles of Farm N, farming practices, including both crop cultivation 
and farmland maintenance, drew on the contributions not only from cooperative members but 
also from other members of the villages. Crop cultivation was managed at each village under the 
leadership of one member from the board assigned to each village. Although the assigned board 
members themselves engaged in actual cultivation on the improved land, Farm N recruited 
cooperative and non-cooperative members on an as-needed basis to engage in cultivation 
particularly during peak periods in return for an hourly wage (NHDA 2016). Besides the annual 
compensation, into which the limited amount was equally divided among them given the initial 
stage of corporate business, the board members were paid an hourly wage if they engage in rice 
cultivation. 
 The practices of farmland maintenance involve two kinds: maintenance of cultivated land 
(e.g., weeding on levees, and water management directly associated with the land), and 
maintenance of farm roads and water channels normally perceived as common properties of a 
 In addition, another group responsible for processing of farming products planned to be incorporated into Farm N, although 397
the group was still part of NI Cooperative in late 2016. NI Cooperative still continued as an incorporated farm entity and leased 
out its agricultural machines and facilities to Farm N, while selling processed products to Farm N. However, once these machines 
and facilities would become out of order, Farm N planned to purchase and build new ones. As such the farm management was in 
transition from NI Cooperative to Farm N (Interview with a farmer on November 7, 2016).
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village (e.g., cleaning of water channels, and weeding on farm roads). While the former 
customarily falls under the responsibilities of cultivators, while the latter falls under the 
collective responsibilities of villagers. Following the customs, the former was under the 
management of Farm N. Along with the progress of the combined initiatives, however, the 
cultivated land was being aggregated, broaden out overall, and thus beyond the practical capacity 
solely of Farm N. Therefore, in the same manner as the management for cultivation practices, a 
group was organized at each village to engage in maintenance practices on the improved land 
(NHDA 2016). The latter was continuously practiced as traditional regular events at each village 
(two to four times in a year) with involvement of both farmers and non-farmers. Under the 
coordination between Farm N and four neighborhood associations of the villages, economic 
incentives were provided for the both kinds of farmland maintenance practices in the form of 
wages by drawing on the government subsidies.  In addition, as long as landowners lent out 398
their farmland to the FB, they were given a standardized rent (e.g., JPY 6,000 per 0.1ha annually 
= approximately USD 53) by the FB even without engaging in any farming practices. 
 The respondents who decided not to pursue independent farming in these zones all 
contributed to farmland aggregation and consolidation by lending their farmland to the FB that 
would then lend them to responsible entities. However, the level of contribution to communal 
farming varied according to their roles and responsibilities in Farm N. Among the respondents 
 The neighborhood associations in the four villages had adopted the national subsidiary systems such as the Direct Payment 398
System for Mountains Areas and the Multiple Functions Payment Grant System mostly since 2000 to support local collective 
activities for farmland maintenance. The subsidies were used for wages, and purchase, repair and maintenance of equipments and 
facilities. In addition, the four villages collectively adopted the regional cooperation project of the Direct Payment System for 
Mountains Areas as a first kind in City A in 2015 and received an additional amount of subsidies (JPY 2 million = approximately 
USD 17.8 thousand) (Interview with a farmer on December 8, 2016). While even prior to the land improvement projects, NI 
Cooperative had already drawn on these subsidies for farmland maintenance practices also on the cultivated land as a village-
based farming organization in NI village, Farm N extended this manner of drawing on the subsidies to all the four villages 
(Interviews with farmers on November 9 and 10 , 2016). However, in Village KK of the neighboring district, the newly 
established cooperative was unable to draw on these subsidiary systems for its farmland maintenance practices due to a lack of 
coordination between the cooperative and the neighborhood association (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016).
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from the board directly engaging in farm management, four were in charge of corporate planning 
and management and three were responsible for cultivation and farmland maintenance. The 
cooperative members generally relied on the board in execution. The cooperative members from 
the area where land was yet to be leveled were not practically involved in the new farm 
management system, but those from where land was already leveled, started to be involved. In 
particular, there were two respondents who had been already non-farmers but holding farmland 
and lent their land to an independent farm entity through the FB due to the replotting 
arrangements for consolidation: one was affiliated with Farm N as a cooperative member, while 
another was not but was engaging in collective farmland maintenance practices as a hamlet 
member. 
Independent Farming: 
The respondents who decided to continue individual farm management after land improvement 
planned to grow crops, maintain farmland and sell their products (and also sometimes process 
the products) independently from communal farming. Although all were individual farm 
management entities, rather than incorporated ones, one had been actively expanding the scale of 
farm management across several villages and districts and two others were not planning to do so. 
The former (hereafter called Large Rice Farm A), without his own land in District N, had been 
farming the land across three villages  as a certified farmer by aggregating the land through 399
conventional tenancy arrangements. After land improvement, he planned to continue rice 
 These included Villages NI, NH and NG.399
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production and other crop cultivation by consolidating the land into one of these villages as a 
‘responsible entity' for that village.  
 One of the latter (hereafter called Small Vegetable Farmer A), without his own land in the 
zones but in the district, had moved back from a city and started vegetable farm management in 
one village (i.e., Village NI) independently in 2012 after one-year training at NI Cooperative by 
taking over the portion of the use-rights from the NI Cooperative. After land improvement, he 
planned to continue the same manner of farming on the same scale while changing the 
counterpart of the tenancy contracts from landowners to the FB. Another of the latter (hereafter 
called Small Landed Rice Farmer A), who had become a full-time farmer upon his retirement 
from another job, had been farming neighbors’ land besides his own land. In accordance with the 
initiatives, he planned to halved the area for farming by limiting it to his own land to be 
subcontracted with Large Rice Farm A for his retirement in the near future.  
5.2.2 Initiatives planned: 
Despite the unsettled status, some of the respondents had tentatively decided their participation, 
but others were yet to make a decision. With reference to the experiences in the zones where the 
initiatives were already underway, those decided were preliminarily planning either to lend their 
land to the FB, or to continue independent farming. In particular, the respondents planning to 
lend the land took advantage of their accessibility to information and knowledge about the 
initiatives: two of them (who were playing a coordinating role in the initiatives) were planning to 
participate in communal farming at Farm N, while one (whose cousin had experienced in the 
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preceding zone) was planning to follow his cousin to lend out land to the FB but yet to decide to 
what extent he would participate in communal farming.  
 Two respondents who planned not to lend their land, had been full-time farmers 
interested in continuing their independent farming. One of them was an incorporated farm entity 
as well as qualified as a certified farmer and had been actively expanding the scale of rice 
farming over more 20 years by aggregating the land across four villages  including his own 400
residential village in the district (hereafter called Large Rice Farm B). To coordinate with other 
‘responsible entities’ for the allotments in both of the preceding and planned zones, the farmland 
for his cultivation was to be consolidated into his residential village, while he was aiming to 
further expand his farming scale with an expectation of improved efficiency after land 
improvement. The other had been organically growing vegetables for sales purposes as well as 
rice and other crops mostly for self-sufficient and conservation purposes on his own land 
(hereafter called Landed Organic Farmer A). To secure organic soil, he was planning to ask for 
exclusion of his vegetable farmland (existed cohesively, not scattered across different locations) 
from land improvement, while intending to continue rice farming on his own land possibly by 
consolidating it through land improvement.  
 The rest of the respondents, who were indecisive, had been farming their neighbors’ 
farmland in addition to their own farmland. For the time being, they were capable of either of 
lending their land to the FB or continuing independent farming. In the face of the above 
mentioned uncertainties, however, they were wondering whether they would continue 
independent farming.  
 These included Villages NH, NC and ND.400
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5.3 Motivations for Participation 
Individuals’ motivations for participation in the initiatives reflect the following six components: 
1) intergenerational responsibility; 2) social relations; 3) economic dependency; 4) technologies 
and physical strength; 5) spiritual fulfillment; and 6) attachment to rice. All the respondents had 
faced a decision about farmland use, particularly by identifying their position somewhere 
between individual engagement and communal engagement. Although two respondents were 
from outside the zones, all of them were part of the farming community in District N as all had 
been involved in farmland use and maintenance. Furthermore, each was a member of a family 
that had inherited farmland over generations. The majority of farm households had also engaged 
in family-based farming previously, although some of them had engaged in community-based 
farming such as that of NI Cooperative. At the same time, each could decide whether and how to 
participate. As either an individual, a household member, or a community member, they had 
weighted or were weighing these six components to make a decision.   
Intergenerational responsibility:  
Intergenerational responsibility for handing down farmland was a priority for most of the 
respondents. Farmland is institutionally associated with owners’ de-facto responsibility for 
farming. Furthermore, the sense of responsibility for handing down farmland as a ‘living 
property’ was shared among the respondents. This responsibility customarily falls to the eldest 
son in each family. In fact, many of the respondents indicated that their prime reason for initially 
engaging in farming was to succeed to the family estate as the eldest son. In the absence of an 
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eldest son as a successor, some respondents had engaged in farming as a husband adopted into 
his wife’s family from a neighboring district, a sibling or a relative available to take over the 
family farm. Engagement in farming was generally a result of inheriting the family estate (ie), 
including “the house and lot (ie-yashiki),” “hill (yama)” and certainly “farmland (tanbo)” as a set 
(Interviews with farmers on December 8, 9 and 10, 2016). In particular, for those over 50, such 
customary practices were thought to “be in the natural order of things” and were done “without 
any resistance” (Interviews with farmers on December 7 and 9, 2016). At the same time, many of 
them presumed that such responsibility prevented them from freely choosing their residence and 
job. 
 However, succession of farmland and farming at the household level has become a crisis. 
Small family-run farms that had been ubiquitous were economically and politically discouraged. 
Particularly during the agricultural downturn, younger generations had come to view farmland as 
a “negative legacy” rather than a fortune to be handed down for the prosperity of descendants 
(Interviews with farmers on November 8 and December 8, 2016). The arduousness and hardship 
of farming practices were perceived across different generations. However, the intergenerational 
responsibility for succession was felt differently over generations, as a wife of the eldest son of a 
family in one of the hamlets mentioned (Interview with a farmer on November 10, 2016): 
We cultivate leeks, and our sons say “Mom and dad, why do you do what brings 
nothing but trouble?” My husband says “That’s not for money, but we do it for 
our health,” not the matter of whether he succeeded to our family estate as the 
eldest son. But sometimes I wonder if it is truly meaningful to maintain our health, 
as we often need to wake up early to work even when I am in bad shape. … Young 
people have the flat-out idea that they are better not to do whatever has no merit, 
but we can’t continue with farming, if we say “we quit as there is no merit in it.” 
We cant’ continue without perseverance and belief that we can’t quit in one or two 
years once we come in. So it’s our responsibility. I may have the naturally 
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implanted idea that I should continue with what this family has once I come in, 
and then endow it to the next generations. I have my responsibility of having 
married into this family, and so may have a sense of responsibility that I’m very 
sorry if our generation that I come in discontinues this family and what it has. 
 With this transformation, some with successors tended to continue independent farming, 
while others without successors appeared to rely on communal farming. Two respondents had 
secured their successors, and both of them decided to continue independent farming. One 
respondent stated that the bottom line to decide on his continuation was whether he could secure 
his successor on his own. Most of the respondents who opted for communal farming included 
those with no children, and those with more than one child who were unwilling to engage in 
farming or unable to do so due to their residence, jobs or other technical capacities of farming. 
One of the objectives for Farm N was to place intergenerational responsibility at the community 
level given that it no longer was feasible at the household level. All the respondents who opted 
for communal farming expressed their expectations for “securing successors,” “succeeding 
farmland,” “ensuring to have responsible entities” and “responding to aging in the community.” 
Social relations: 
Maintenance or improvement of social relations was another factor for many respondents. By 
design, communal farming could secure good social relations for its members. As a major tenant, 
Farm N took a form of a Cooperative Corporation where good social relations could be mutually 
shared by the both ends of tenancy through the FB. This would allow cooperative members to be 
socially integrated in the farming community by participating in plenary assemblies for 
collective decision-making with an equal right to vote regardless of the amount of capital 
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subscription. Participation in plenaries would allow them to coherently understand the status and 
development of the farming community and evaluate the potential for its future actualization. 
Participation in the farming practices would also allow them to contribute to the farming 
community.  
 Aspiration for favorable social relations differed among the respondents according to 
their status of tenancy and reflected the mode of their participation. As a landowner, many 
respondents expected tenants be socially engaged. For instance, two respondents who decided to 
lend their land stated “visibility of” or “a face-to-face communication with” tenants as a key to 
relying on them (Interviews with farmers on December 9 and 10, 2016). One respondent also 
indicated his disinclination to tenants who would manage farmland "arrogantly without respect 
to landowners” (Interview with a farmer on December 9 and 10, 2016). These respondents 
expressed their preference for local tenants over outsiders, but also suggested that either can 
work as long as a favorable relationship could be built between landowners and tenants. 
 Among the landowners, the interviews also found divergent motivations for maintaining 
social relations. All the respondents who decided to belong to Farm N expressed their 
willingness to engage in the farming community, for instance, by “participating in decision 
making on the farm management” or “contributing to local development or environmental 
improvement” (Interviews with farmers on November 8 and December 8, 9 and 10, 2016). In 
particular, most respondents from the board stated that their motivation was to overcome 
community problems (e.g., aging, lack of successors, farmland abandonment) and draw on 
government subsidies for future farming. Those who were indecisive were uncertain about how 
their social relations could or should be maintained through their membership. Some expressed 
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fear of losing their social relations particularly within their own village even if they joined the 
corporation, while others were reluctant to share a burden by getting involved in the corporation. 
This difference in perspectives alludes to another generational gap. For instance, a respondent 
from Village NC in his early 80s stated his concern about possible transformation of the 
community through the program and his preference to the village-level communal farming 
(Interview with a farmer on December 7, 2016): 

If only about ten people farm around 100 hectares of land under the corporation, 
the rest of the people will only see their farming in silence and can’t do it even 
though we want. … If our village takes initiative, I think, a few of us could 
sufficiently manage 20 hectares of farmland once land is improved. Farmland is 
improved finally, but if it will be managed by Village NI, that’s not so great. I think 
we should have responsible entities on our own, and am asking young people in 
our village a riddle, but they and their parents don’t provide favorable responses. 
If I ask them much, they say “You’re a communist!” and shrink away from me.  
 One respondent from Village NF in his late 40s offered a contrasting view on his possible 
involvement in the farming community (Interview with a farmer on December 10, 2016): 
There lies the difficulty in deciding my own involvement. I feel like leaving all my 
roles and responsibilities to a responsible entity. I don’t know if a cooperative 
member needs to contribute to farm maintenance practices… If I have some 
energy left, I may engage in such practices, but I’m not eager to do so. If I’m 
held responsible for some farming practices by becoming a cooperative member, 
I may rather choose a different responsible entity, if there is, that won’t require 
such responsibilities. 
 Among the tenants, a good social relation was desired.  For instance, Small Vegetable 
Farmer A stated that he made efforts to maintain farmland as beautiful as possible so that the 
villagers would be comfortable with seeing them. In particular, the farmer of Large Rice Farm A 
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devised strategies for him to be accepted as a responsible entity from outside and to nurture a 
social relation whereby the both ends of tenancy can feel mutually industrious (Interview with a 
farmer on December 7, 2016):

I give rice as a rent back to an individual landowner, but also return a favor to a 
whole village. Every spring and fall, I devote sacred sake (rice wine) for festivals 
to all the villages where I engage in tenancy. I have to pay a considerable cost 
for it, but it transcends money to reduce friction. … In Village NH, I have the 
active female elderly help with vegetable farming on their own land, and in 
return provide them with wages or buy out their harvest. After I started this, all 
turns out right based on the interdependent relationship. At the beginning, I used 
to work with other laborers by bringing them and machines on the paddies. It 
was a source of the problem that villagers were only looking at our farming. …
Previously there were some conflicts with villagers such as a trouble with 
irrigation, but finally even one villager volunteered to assist in taking care of 
water. I think there was a kind of adverse reaction as if they got a flu virus and 
felt need to take it out when they saw someone not belonging to their village 
working in their garden. But after I deployed a system by which I get them 
involved and give them a rebate, the things have come off well.  
Economic dependency: 
Economic dependency was a priority for some of the respondents. Most of the respondents who 
had relied on farming as a primary source of income opted for independent farming. In fact, four 
respondents out of five who decided to continue independent farming, primarily relied on 
farming for living, whereas one, Small Landed Rice Farmer A, who was able to live on a 
pension, allowed for halving his farm size. While taking risks from their own farm management, 
all these respondents developed their own means to reap a profit. Two respondents from rice 
farms had been expanding to secure profitability (Large Rice Farmers A and B), while others 
developed sales of their products for profits rather than expanding scale (Small Vegetable Farmer 
A, Small Landed Rice Farmer A, and Landed Organic Farmer A).  
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 Most of the respondents who decided on communal farming had been living on pensions 
or earnings from work other than farming. Except for those who engaged directly in cultivation 
at Farm N, none of these respondents expressed their expectations for their economic reliance on 
communal farming. In particular, one respondent estimated that independent farming could bring 
better income than wages from communal farming at the current market price of rice. Rather 
than an economic incentive for communal farming, many respondents mentioned the economic 
disincentive as a reason for their shift from independent to communal farming. For instance, one 
respondent raised the price depreciation of rice as the greatest reason behind his move. Several 
respondents who were indecisive also stated that further price depreciation would leave no 
alternative but to retire from independent farming and join communal farming, as it would 
disallow them to renew farming machines. Furthermore, one respondent who was decisive about 
retirement, expressed his relief from care for the farmland that has imposed a responsibility for 
inheritance but brought no benefit and even sometimes incurred a loss.  
Technologies and physical strength: 
The initiatives of program adoption combined with land improvement encouraged some 
respondents and discouraged others to continue independent farming, depending on the 
technologies they had employed as well as their physical strength. In terms of technologies, the 
mechanical capacities of the respondents either enlarged or narrowed their participation. 
Enlargement of a plot demotivated those whose farming machines were aging or only suitable 
for smaller plots to continue farming, whereas it motivated those mechanically capable to further 
expand farming scale by taking advantage of land improvement. The former respondents noted 
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the deadlock of upgrading their mechanical capacities in the situation where the price of farming 
machines was rising with technological advancement while profitability of rice production was 
decreasing. The latter, including Farm N, not only took advantage of their existing mechanical 
capacities, but also drew on governmental support to upgrade their capacities for further 
expansion particularly if they were incorporated. For instance, Large Rice Farm B, which was 
incorporated, was planning to expand the scale from 10 ha to 40 ha with a change in cultivation 
methods for which subsidies would enable him to invest in machines. 
 The farming methods which the respondents had used also affected their choice of 
participation. In particular, land improvement hampered continuation of some farming methods 
unless it could exclude certain farmland for the use of such methods. Landed Organic Farmer A 
was planning to continue organic farming on his land by asking for exclusion of a block of 
farmland from land improvement. However, a respondent, who was employing traditional, 
manual drying techniques for the harvested paddy rice (hazaboshi) was indecisive about whether 
to continue independent farming, because the initiatives were presumed to consolidate his small 
and scattered plots into a fewer larger plots that inevitably require mechanization for efficiency. 
He expressed his willingness to continue his farming if any small plots would remain, but, if not, 
mentioned that he would give up his independent farming and rely on responsible entities. 
 Physical strength was a critical factor for many of the respondents around age 65. Two 
respondents who had retired from farming noted their physical limit (i.e., their own sickness or 
their family’s decease) as a final determinant for farm retirement. Two respondents around age 
50, who had a full-time occupation and decided to retire from independent farming, expressed 
‘fatigue’ or ‘tiredness,’ resulting from their limited time along with decease or aging of their 
 !265
family members who had engaged in farming. Also, two respondents around age 70 who decided 
to retire from rice farming despite their willingness to continue, pointed to their ages as a 
determinant in consideration of their physical strength for the next 10 years. In relation to their 
technological capacities, two respondents over 60, who were indecisive, expressed concern about 
their adaptability to a new farming environment (e.g., speedy large-sized machines, a new farm 
management system). 
Spiritual fulfillment through farming: 
Gaining spiritual fulfillment motivated some of the respondents to keep farming. Most of the 
respondents who decided to continue independent farming expressed their feelings of 
accomplishment enjoyed after harvesting and a sense of self-actualization gained through the 
reputations of their products. For instance, Small Vegetable Farmer A stated that farming as an 
entrepreneur in the middle of nature was totally different from his experience in working as a 
corporate employee in a city and gave him a pleasant feeling despite the instability of farm 
management. Small Landed Rice Farmer A shared a grateful feeling of receiving acclamations 
from urban consumers about his packaged products including rice and local vegetables. Also, 
Landed Organic Farmer A elaborated on the continuing process of trial and error in organic 
farming, but also highlighted the zest he had been finding through learning and experiencing. 
 Involvement in communal farming allowed for attaining spiritual fulfillment for some 
respondents but not all. This possibility largely relies on the room left for them to discretionally 
cultivate farmland. For example, a respondent who was a board member responsible for growing 
vegetables for crop conversion explained the constitutional benefits from his involvement, saying 
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“By farming, I can see and enjoy nature, use my energy, and use my inventiveness to incorporate 
my ideas into practices” (Interview with a farmer on November 9, 2016). However, another 
respondent who was undecided, anticipated a possible depravation of his discretional farming 
together with loss of spiritual fulfillment by getting involved in communal farming (Interview 
with a farmer on December 8, 2016): 
It’s as if my job will be taken away. I can work at the corporation, … but it’ll 
be impossible to have my way with farming. … Once land is improved, 
farming will get nothing without mechanization, and I have to make an about-
face on farming and can no longer practice hazaboshi (manual drying 
techniques). … I have no time in busy farming seasons. In my case it takes a 
few months to get it done compared to one week for others. My way produces 
little, while taking time and space. … My rice is sweeter and people say it’s 
tasty…. People who visit here say “spectacular,” looking at the terraced 
paddies with the drying harvested paddy rice. … It’s indeed laboring, as I’m 
doing what can’t be done particularly with no family member who can work 
with me. But it’s very indescribable to have a sense of accomplishment after 
getting my job done.  
 Among the respondents who retired from rice farming upon the program adoption, those 
who still had their land outside the zones stated that they continuously engaged in farming or 
forestry mostly for self-consumption or land conservation, which sometimes gave them 
enjoyable feelings. However, a respondent who lent out all his farmland had mixed feelings 
involving a sense of release and a sense of loss. Puzzling over the great change in his lifestyle, he 
noted the reduced burden in both physical and spiritual terms (e.g., worries about irrigation and 
weeding, daily visits to farmland), but also indicated forlornness resulting from the loss of the 
field to call ‘his own’ whereby he needed to bear a burden but looked forward to the next. 
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Attachement to rice: 
Farmers’ attachment to rice that they produced on their own land made some of the respondents 
indecisive about their participation. As practiced widely in Japan (Matsumoto 2010), most 
respondents used to set aside rice they had produced for self-consumption (hanmai) and often for 
gifts to children and kin (i.e., gratuitous rice called enko-mai). Under the conventional tenancy 
arrangements, the rent was paid in rice basically produced on the owner’s farmland, except for 
when landowners preferred monetary rent. Under the new tenancy arrangements, however, the 
standardized amount of rent was paid in a monetary form.  This means that if farmers decided 401
to lend their land to the FB, they had to purchase rice while being paid monetary rent. This 
change perplexed some of the respondents. Some who decided to participate in communal 
farming expressed an “uncomfortable feeling” with purchasing rice (Interviews with farmers on 
December 8 and 10, 2016). Others who were indecisive shared their regrettable feelings, for 
instance, mentioning “Our rice will be taken away from me.” or “It’s bitter for me as a farmer to 
be forced to buy rice.” (Interviews with farmers on December 8, 2016).  
 The interviews suggest that the farmers’ attachment to rice was associated with the 
specific ‘eating quality’ and the sense of ownership over farmland, besides the purpose to secure 
the staple for family and kin. One respondent explained that the taste of rice differs according to 
its constituents which vary across different paddies and areas and cannot be expressed in a 
‘grade,’  and that the taste would change if different rice crops from different areas were mixed 402
(Interviews with farmers on December 10, 2016). Another respondent expressed his expectation 
 Although the FB program allowed for FB’s payment of in-kind rent, the monetary rent was adopted in many cases to ease 401
payment procures (Interviews with prefectural officials on August 23, 2016).
 A grade of rice is used in referring to certain standards such as water content and shape in the examination of brown rice.402
 !268
for reserving ‘a right to rice’ that belongs to the farmland of his family or his village, proudly 
saying “Though it’s a self-praise, the rice of our family was really tasty, and the rice of our 
village has a quite high reputation.” (Interviews with farmers on December 9, 2016). To accord 
“the farmers’ primitive wishes to eat rice from their own paddies,” a respondent who had been 
engaging in the NI Cooperative, expounded the customary practice adopted by the Cooperative 
to provide landowners with rice from their farmland as in-kind rent by labeling the sacks of rice 
with specific locations (Interviews with farmers on November 11, 2016).  
 Following this customary practice, Farm N labeled the sacks of rice with identification of 
each block of farmland so that landowners could purchase rice from their proximate areas. Thus, 
the new tenancy arrangements still allowed for accommodating owners’ attachment to rice 
despite the change to monetary payment, although the new system diluted the specificity of rice 
to a paddy due to land improvement. Some respondents who decided to discontinue independent 
farming, compromised in the new arrangements, though they wished to maintain the same means 
of self-consumption and kinship care. 
5.4 Immediate and Future Challenges  
Farm management in the district was in transition. The interviews highlighted sooner 
stabilization of farm management as a priority to be addressed. In this regard, as many 
respondents mentioned, an immediate challenge was to deal with change in farming 
infrastructure and tenancy and put new farm management in place in the both preceding and 
planned zones. Furthermore, the interviews pointed to the long-term securement of successors as 
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a key to the sustainable future of the district. The respondents expressed hopes and fears about 
the long-term continuation of the newly established farm management. 
5.4.1 Farm management 
New farm management was groundbreaking along with physical and systematic transformation 
of farming in both zones. The first step was a successful completion of the land improvement 
projects. Since the projects were collective initiatives, a few respondents coordinating the 
projects still faced the challenges of smooth implementation (e.g., attaining formal local consent, 
financing the projects, and handling the subsidies). Based on the observation of some areas 
where the initiatives were already underway, however, the immediate challenges mentioned in 
the interviews focused on how to deal with: farmland maintenance, and economic feasibility.  
 First, the emerging challenge was how to maintain farmland in accordance with scale 
expansion. To address this, several potential strategies were assumed. Building on the system in 
the  zones with the initiative underway where villagers were called for farming practices at each 
village on an as-needed basis, the board in Farm N was under discussion to determine whether to 
renew the corporation to have two management systems under one corporation to farm the 
estimated 100 ha. This was intended to encourage villagers to engage more responsibly for 
farming practices in their nearby areas. Also, Large Rice Farmer B, who was planning a scale 
expansion, indicated a possibility to employ people to cover the increased farming practices, 
including farmland maintenance. Similarly, some respondents from the planned zones expected 
to communally maintain farmland by “taking advantage of the machines and equipments of 
retiring farmers” or by “having villagers, including those having other jobs, engaged in 
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maintenance practices weekends or on holidays” (Interviews with farmers on November 8 and 9, 
2016). 
 However, the responses from the zones with the initiatives underway suggested that 
overcoming this challenge would not be straightforward. Some respondents feared that labor 
shortage would become far more serious along with scale expansion, given that the number of 
villagers participating in farming practices at each village was already decreasing. Some of the 
cultivation practices were not necessarily something that anyone can do. Yet, the villagers were 
reluctant to engage even in maintenance practices on cultivated land that most villagers can do, 
despite the wages in compensation for their work. The respondents commented on several 
reasons they heard or observed: “Villagers say I have a job to do or just don’t like to work in the 
hot weather in summer;” “Many are thorough about not getting involved in any farming 
practices, leaving them up to others;” and “Many have become not to strain to go out for 
miscellaneous tasks once they lost their attachment to farmland.” (Interviews with farmers on 
November 9 and 10, 2016). One respondent, who was a board member, elaborated on the 
dilution of landowners’ commitment in accordance with the transfer of land-use rights (Interview 
with a farmer on November 9, 2016): 

People used to care about paddies, taking care of a grass and a stone on the 
land. But now they have only ownership rights, but their use rights were 
handed over to the cooperative. It comes easy for them, but I feel something 
tenuous and that’s sad for us taking care of farm. As they still have ownership 
rights, I wish they could go in more for a look-around or they could be a little 
more involved. They used to farm then on their own. It’s indeed changing over 
about two years. 
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 Compared to maintenance of cultivated land, the challenge for traditional collective 
practices on farm roads and water channels was not obvious but might be in the near future. In 
the zones where the initiatives were underway, most households including non-farmer ones, were 
participating in the collective practices, except for the elderly living alone or sick. However, 
these exceptional cases were increasing with the aging and shrinking population, resulting in 
longer hours for fewer villagers, for instance, in Village NI. Furthermore, in Village NH where 
the way of collective maintenance after land improvement was yet to be determined, some 
villagers were claiming that responsible entities should maintain water channels previously 
perceived as a common property. In the planned zones, declining participation in collective 
maintenance was more saliently felt by the respondents. This may be because farmland had been 
aggregated into fewer farms, reflecting the aging and shrinking population. Land improvement 
would technically ease the maintenance practices. In addition, all the villages were drawing on 
subsidies to pay wages for participants in compensation for practices that used to be done 
without compensation. Nevertheless, the demographic trend as well as the owners’ claims to 
disengage from farmland maintenance allude to plausible challenges of eliciting cooperation 
from villagers.  
 Second, economic feasibility was a challenge not only for communal farming but also for 
independent farming. As the largest responsible entity, Farm N assumed the heaviest 
responsibility for farm management in the sense of taking care of the properties of the majority 
in the villages. To fulfill this responsibility, some board members stressed the absolute necessity 
to make farm management take off at any cost. A key objective was to streamline farming by 
collectively investing in and using machines and facilities for improved profits. However, as the 
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literature shows (Hiratsuka 1992a, 1992b; Miyatake 2007), financing community-based farming 
is a challenge. In fact, the past initiatives of village-based farming in Village NC were 
unsuccessful due to the difficulties in managing cash flow and sharing profits among the 
cooperative members. In the case of Farm N, one female respondent appreciated the wage 
payment to individuals rather than households, compared to the previous independent farming 
where revenues and expenses were shared in the household. At the same time, one board member 
pointed to substantial inequity among people, given that same hourly wages were paid regardless 
of skills and physical strength. 
 In the initial stage of development, Farm N was drawing on various government subsidies 
including that from the FB program, while taking advantage of the machines and facilities owned 
by NI Cooperative. Yet, several respondents presumed the predicament for securing profitability 
on a downward trend of rice prices particularly in a corporation whose accounting would be 
more rigid and inflexible than in family-run farms. To rise above adversity, some respondents 
hinted at diversified farm management in combination with forestry, development of new rice 
varieties, better governmental support (e.g., for initial investment, project implementation, and 
dry-field farming), and consultation on farm management by outsiders.  
 Likewise, economic feasibility of farm management was a priority for independent 
farmers, given the vulnerability to climate and market conditions. For rice production, even small 
farmers admitted that small farming would no longer survive and farmland aggregation would be 
inevitable. The present agricultural policies were promoting large farming by subsidizing the 
initiatives of farmland aggregation and consolidation as well as the incorporation of farming 
entities. In fact, the incorporated Large Rice Farm B was planning to take advantage of 
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government subsidies for investing in further expansion, although he expressed concern over the 
frequent changes in policy. On the other, the president of Large Rice Farm A which was not 
incorporated but was expanding criticized the policies that gave disproportionate weight to 
incorporated entities with a focus on lowland farming. He urged narrowing the gap between 
incorporated and individual entities and according regional characteristics in policy support, 
exemplifying his experience of missing out on a subsidiary opportunity for his efforts in 
diversified farm management in combination with fisheries. Furthermore, he presented a 
dilemma between pros and cons of the FB program: 
Previously the tenancy contracts were on an individual basis. So, I used to 
deliver sacks of rice as in-kind rent to the landowners from door to door. It was 
a bit cumbersome, but something good also happened. While chatting, they may 
say “Will you sell me more rice?” or “Could you farm the land there, too?” 
Face-to-face communications often bring about business talks leading to the 
next year. Now once landowners lend out their land to the Farm Bank, rent 
payments are made from a bank account. I can’t see their faces and it’s a bit sad 
or easy. … I used to tell our employees to attend to any chitchats with the 
villagers. In fact, many elderly people feel lonely and are yearning to talk to 
anyone.  
5.4.2 Successors 
For longer-term farm management, the interviews underscore the securing of a successor as a 
key. As a major responsible entity, Farm N was securing younger employees, but was managed 
by the generation over 60. To secure successors to head the corporation, many respondents hoped 
that younger generations in the district, including the middle-aged villagers in their 40s and 50s, 
would interestedly and continuously engage in farming. Some respondents mentioned their 
readiness to welcome anyone interested in farming or settling in the district, including those from 
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outside, not necessarily the young fellows from the district. In particular, one respondent 
anticipated the opportunity that outsiders or anyone without experience in conventional farming 
might bring new insights to innovative farm management. 
 Besides successful farm management that could attract people, the interviews hinted at 
two additional challenges to secure and nurture successors: technical knowledge and skills, and 
motivations. First, people technically capable to impart knowledge and skills on farming were 
becoming fewer. One respondent stressed that farming requires practical knowledge and 
techniques appropriate to specific local environments, not those universal to any contexts. He 
inferred, however, that far fewer local masterful farmers would be available to the next 
generations due to aging and retirement. In addition, another respondent from the neighboring 
district where land improvement had taken place mentioned that almost no one could give 
adequate guidance to large-scale farm management on enlarged paddy plots with an area over 1 
ha. Furthermore, many respondents pointed to the systematic flaw of Japan Agricultural 
Cooperatives (JA). Although the JA had frequently dispatched veteran staff to attend to inquiries 
and offer expert and practical knowledge, such practices were no longer available due to a lack 
of system in the JA where knowledge and practices were institutionally updated and taken over. 
 Second, landowners’ motivation was being lost not only for farming but also for 
contributing to farmland maintenance. To reverse the trend of diluting attachment to and 
responsibility for farmland, some respondents expressed their expectations for sharing common 
awareness of the issues of future farm management. However, several respondents suggested that 
younger generations (e.g., those in their 40s and 50s) were not motivated to actively participate 
in local cultural activities (e.g., seasonal festivals) and community gatherings, but rather were 
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forced to play a role on such occasions. One respondent stressed the importance of incidental 
communications across different generations rather than pre-organized regular events, regretting 
the disappearance of a ‘bar’ (aka-chochin) in the district. Another respondent in his mid-60s 
expressed his wish for the mindset shift from the individually-based to the community-based 
upon job retirement, but also commented on the difficulties in closing the intergenerational gaps 
(Interview with a farmer on December 9, 2016): 
Foremost, young people are not interested in the issues of the village. That’s my 
greatest fear. I anticipate they may change their mind along with aging, because 
when young, they live as a compony employee. … After all, knowing the charm of 
farming is a key. Without a fun of getting covered in mud in farming, without 
attachment and joy, anything doesn’t move forward. It shouldn’t be a role. If 
people just leave weeds growing in sight, they can’t savor the joy of farming. I 
think it’s our responsibility to tell them, but it’s quite difficult. … By being in a 
festival, drinking session, gossip session, and anything like that, fellows were 
motivated to get together and work together. …  But now, there’s no young people 
in such an occasion. … When I was young, we used to be introduced by the 
elderly to the theories. But people now just go home after gatherings, only 
getting their lunch boxes. They are not willing to have something taught, but 
rather feel annoyed at the elderly. The elderly also know about it, and they don’t 
say much now.  
 Motivation for residing in the community is a minimal necessity to keep the farming 
community viable and livable. With the initiatives that allow fewer people to manage farmland, 
some respondents cautioned against a lack of places for jobs and education which had been 
receded along with a series of administrative mergers and dissolutions. In particular, one 
respondent urged additional policy support to create job and educational opportunities in 
underpopulated areas. Without any drastic change, however, several respondents suspected that 
the initiatives of farmland aggregation would worsen the trend of aging and shrinking population 
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along with disengagement and detachment from farmland. For instance, one respondent in his 
late 60s described a plausible scenario in the next few decades (Interview with a farmer on 
December 9, 2016): 

I have thought many times, but have no idea about what we could change for 
the better. There is no way to stem the declining population. I get scared when I 
start counting the households that would remain. … I have a sense of crisis 
that our village will disappear. …We are now working on land improvement, 
but there will be some households leaving their farmland to responsible entities 
and moving away from here. Even if land is improved, but if people move out, 
it’s sad. … People now say “U-turn” (i.e, moving back from cities), but 
there’re only a handful of people trying to move back. In fact, there are a few 
but they again move back to cities. That’s indeed bitter. … Farming can’t be 
enough to feed themselves unless they really fully professionally engage in it, 
and there’s no other job here. … We’ve cherished our hamlet, treasured the 
land of our ancestors, and taken care of paddies and forests while living. But, if 
we leave them up to responsible entities, some of us may move to even a bit 
easier places to live. … There’s no need to be here. … Even now young people 
do so. They seek jobs that they like to do. There’s no such a job here, and they 
move out to cities.  
5.5. Conclusion 
The seven villages in District N were taking initiatives to improve farmland in combination with 
the FB program as a survival strategy to cope with aging and shrinking population in the face of 
agricultural adversity. The initiatives primarily aimed at facilitating productive and efficient farm 
management for a sustainable future of the community. Despite some uncertainties about the 
planned zones as late comers, both of the preceding and planned zones reached general 
agreement on the program adoption under adept coordination among different stakeholders led 
by NHDA, taking advantage of minimal local cost share supported by the current agricultural 
policies. Given the scheme where the majority of landowners would disengage from farming and 
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leave it to ‘responsible entities,’ few conflicts of interests arose in benefits shared among 
landowners from the initiatives. Thus, little compromise was needed to secure landowners’ 
interests and attachment to farmland.  
 The combined initiatives of the FB program adoption with land improvement placed 
Farm N as a major responsible entity to engage in communal farming, while accommodating 
several independent farms in tenancy. Farm N as a cooperative corporation took community-
wide responsibility for handing down farmland as a ‘living property’ to the next generations. 
While taking advantage of scale economy with technological capacities, it allowed landowners to 
secure their attachment to rice and farming practices albeit with the change from hands-on 
experiences to monetary transactions (e.g., land rent, wages) and to maintain social relations and 
sustain spiritual fulfillment. Although communal farming could not fulfill all the individual 
needs and interests, economic dependency and technical and physical capacities were the 
principal determents to opt for either independent or communal farming, whereas either of the 
options were assumed to allow landowners to carry their responsibility for succession. As such, 
the current trend of agricultural downturn and aging demography expedited the majority’s shift 
from independent to communal farming.  
 For the sustainability of communal farming, drivers for program adoption could be 
contradictory. Landowners’ disengagement from farming was a key to farmland aggregation and 
consolidation into fewer responsible entities. However, this further facilitated their detachment 
from farmland and in fact was discouraging many of them from engaging in communal farming. 
It might even discourage them from staying in the farming community in the absence of 
alternative job and educational opportunities. Farm N was facing the challenges to stabilize its 
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farm management by securing sufficient labor for farming practices and ensuring economic 
feasibility. Furthermore, it would need to assure that next generations succeed to farm 
management. However, intergenerational gaps in the farming community were already widening 
and social relations were being fragmented. Attachment to farmland kept landowners in the 
community, but their perspectives on farmland, including intergenerational responsibility for 
farm succession, were drastically changing.  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Chapter 6: Farmers’ Participation in Alternative Tenancy Arrangements in a Flatland 
Suburban Community in the South 
This chapter focuses on Village U, a suburban community located in flatland areas of Kaga 
region, Ishikawa Prefecture. It first overviews the status of participation of farmers (including 
those holding farmland but not engaging in farming) in the program as well as alternative 
tenancy arrangements in which many of the villagers have been involved. Second, it reveals their 
motivations for participation (or not) in tenancy arrangements. Finally, it explores emerging 
challenges and opportunities that the community might face in the next few decades.  
6.1 Status of Participation in Tenancy Arrangements 
In the beginning of 2017, the village had three cases in which landowners participated in the FB 
program to have their land cultivated by other local farmers. The cases present the FB’s role in 
aggregating farmland by leasing land from retired farmers and lending it to either an independent 
farmer or the members of the Farming Union (Eino Kumiai). In terms of lenders, three owners 
out of approximately 80 landowners (i.e., farm households) constituting the Production 
Association (Seisan Kumiai) in the village were lending their farmland to the FB. These owners 
used to farm their land on their own but retired upon their participation in the FB program. In 
return they received retirement funds amounting from JPY 500,000 to JPY 700,000 
(approximately USD 4,440 - USD 6,220) depending on the area of leased farmland (see Table 
6.1). Their land was first leased by the FB and then contracted out to three different farmers, 
including one incorporated farm and two individual farms affiliated with the Farming Union. The 
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rent was settled depending on the conditions of farmland such as the status of land improvement, 
original yield, sizes, figures and access to roads. 

Table 6.1 Status of the FB program Adoption in Village U 
Note: 1) The farmland owned by Owners T and I extended across U and S villages. The farmland owned 
by all the three owners included both improved land and non-improved farmland. 2) The amount of 
retirement funds was determined based on the following initial standard for the fiscal years 2014 and 
2015: i) JPY 700,000 per a household for leased farmland with the area more than 2.0ha; ii) JPY 500,000 
per a household for leased farmland with the area more than 0.5ha and less than 2.0ha; and iii) JPY 
300,000 per a household for leased farmland with the area less than 0.5ha. 
 The rest of farmland in the village was managed by either the landowners themselves or 
others through direct contracts between owners and local farmers. Besides consignment contracts 
for key rice farming practices, the direct contracts for tenancy were made in three forms: 1) the 
use-right setting with the Act on Promotion of Improvement of Agricultural Management 
Foundation (PIAMF Act); 2) the leasehold-right setting with the Agricultural Land Act (ALA); 
and 3) informal contracts. The study could not reveal the actual share of different types of 
contracts at the village due to the privacy policy in addition to the informality of the third form. 
Nonetheless, as discussed below, the interviews suggested that many farmers made tenancy 
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arrangements mostly through the use-right setting or informal contracts prior to the introduction 
to the FB program in 2014, while the leasehold-right setting was minimal.  
 The semi-structured interviews with 20 households (involving 24 respondents) detailed 
the actual status of their involvement in tenancy arrangements. As shown in Table 6.2, the 
households consisted of three types: 1) 2 farm households independent from the Farming Union 
(hereafter called ‘independent farms,’ including 3 respondents); 2) 9 farm households affiliated 
with the Farming Union (hereafter called ‘Union-member farms,’ including 11 respondents); and 
3) 9 households holding farmland but not engaging in farming (hereafter called ‘non-farming 
landowner households,’ including 10 respondents).  The following section describes how they 403
were or were not engaged in farming (Section 6.1.1), tenancy arrangements (Section 6.1.2), and 
farmland maintenance (Section 6.1.3). 
 After it was first defined in the 1990 Census of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 403
(MAFF) continues to define a ‘farm household’ as “the household who manages the area under cultivation not less than 0.1ha or 
who sells agricultural produce amounting to JPY 150,000 or more annually,” and a ‘non-farm household holding farmland’ as 
“the household who is not a farm household but holds farmland under cultivation and/or abandoned farmland not less than 0.05ha 
in total (MAFF 2011a). One respondent identified his family as a farm household in census terms because he declared the 
revenue from sales of agricultural products made through informal tenancy contracts with another farmer, although he was not 
directly engaged in rice farming. Thus, I use the term ‘non-farming households’ rather than ‘non-farm households’ to inclusively 
mean those not engaging in farming but holding farmland. 
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Table 6.2 Status of Respondents Participation in Tenancy Arrangements 
Note: 1) Per-diem allowances are paid for collective farmland maintenance activities associated with agricultural 
facilities (e.g., weeding on farm roads, cleaning of irrigation channels) in which villagers participated on a voluntary 
basis. 2) This includes 1 formal tenant (1 HH) who made a direct tenancy contracted with the FB, and 1 informal 
tenant (1 HH) who were subcontracted by the formal tenant. 3) This means farming exclusively for paddy 
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The households of respondents who directly engaged in farm management, were either Union-
member farms or independent farms. The rest were non-farming landowners who lent their land 
to tenants. The Union-member farm households were taking part in the Union to share the use of 
agricultural machines for barley cropping so as to collaborate on crop conversion. Yet, these 
households were individually pursuing rice farming.  
 The Union was established in 2006 not only to reduce cost and improve profitability 
through shared use of agricultural machines but also to fully meet the subsidiary conditions for 
land-extensive farming (i.e., rice farming and crop conversion).  In response to the rice policy 404
reform that limited income subsidiary recipients to large farmers, the Production Association 
opted to organize a group for communal farming to overcome the limited scale of individual 
farms and collectively meet the required size for the subsidiary support.  Despite the political 405
intention to facilitate farm incorporation, however, the policy allowed for the practice of 
incomplete, partial communal farming called “Edaban” (branching) management method, by 
which an unincorporated group nominally shares the accounting for (often partial) farm 
 Small and/or elderly farmers (i.e. those other than certified farmers meeting the condition of a minimum size of farm 404
management) were eligible for the subsidies for crop conversion as long as they engaged in production adjustment (MAFF 
2007a). However, the measures for subsidizing paddy cultivation involving rice, wheat and soybean cropping (i.e., the Cross-
Item Management Stabilization Measures) were applicable only to those meeting a minimum size of farm management. Thus, 
small and/or elderly farmers were ineligible for the subsidies for rice farming unless they belonged to communal farming to meet 
a minimum size (MAFF 2007a). Note that since 2015, the legal revision has rendered the measures applicable for those who do 
not necessarily meet ‘a minimum size’ but applicable to certified or communally-organized farmers who have ‘an appropriately 
developed farm management plan’ (MAFF 2014a).
 As part of the rice policy reform that followed the Outline Plan of Rice Policy of 2002, the non-product-specific management 405
stabilization measure was decided in the Policy Principles for Management Stabilization in 2005 to be introduced from fiscal 
2007 so as to economically incentivize large farms through income subsidies and improve the structure of land-extensive farming 
(Ando 2011; Niitsuma 2006; MAFF 2009) (also see Chapter 3). In particular, it specified the income subsidiary recipients to large 
individual farms (i.e., those with the farm management scale — which is measured by the area under cultivation and the area 
under consignment for farming practices — of 4ha or more in the prefectures other than Hokkaido where the size should be 10ha 
or more exceptionally) or communal farms with the management scale not less than 20ha in total, which also share the 
accounting and plan to be incorporated in five years, although these standard management scales could be adjusted depending on 
specific geographical conditions (Ando 2011; Ono 2010).
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management, but allows its members to individually manage their small family farms (Ando 
2011; Ono 2010; Hirabayashi and Ono 2014). As observed in many parts of Japan, the Union 
collectively managed barley farming solely under the shared accounting so as to qualify for the 
income subsidies, whereas individual farms managed rice farming under an independent 
accounting on a household basis.  Given no obligation to return the subsidies even if these 406
groups fail to be incorporated as initially planned, the Union kept extending the target year of 
incorporation since its establishment in 2006 (MAFF 2009, 5). 
 The Union started with the involvement of all the farmers who were active in farming 
(Goto 2016). Some of them, mostly those who possessed agricultural machines for shared use, 
engaged in operation of their own or commonly owned machines for key practices of barley 
cropping (i.e., plowing, sowing, and mowing) for compensation, while others joined 
maintenance activities such as weeding. In return for collective sales to the Japan Agricultural 
Cooperative (JA), the revenues were pooled and redistributed to the members in accordance with 
the farmland area entitled to their farming (i.e., owned and tenanted land areas).  
 However, two largest, independent farms, including the incorporated farm and the 
individual family farm, opted out of the Union after a few years, although the rest were still 
involved as long as they were active in farming.  As reasons for their withdrawal, the 407
respondents from the largest family farm highlighted better flexibility of farming practices, 
 Ando (2011, 39) called the surge of numerous communal faming groups “Rhapsody of Communal Farming” as a result from 406
the introduction to the non-product-specific management stabilization measure that started in 2007 to condition the farm 
management scale for income subsidies. The emergence of communal farming that adopted the Edaban management method was 
observed nationwide but particularly in Tohoku, Kanto and Kyushu regions where individual farms had been dominant (Ono 
2010; Hirabayashi and Ono 2014). Although this method was adopted in various manners in sharing the accounting and farming 
practices, the most typical type was to collectively manage crop conversion such as barley cropping and soybean farming but 
individually farm rice (Ando 2011; Ono 2010; Hirabayashi and Ono 2014).
 As of 2016, the Union involved 12 households after the farm retirement of 3 households in addition to the withdrawal of the 2 407
largest farms (Goto 2016) (Interviews with farmers on November 23 and 27, 2016).
 !285
including the time management and the ways of cropping. On the other, the respondent from the 
incorporated farm pointed to the systematic exclusion of tax exemption, to which the corporation 
used to be entitled but was no longer applicable under the involvement in the Union.  These 408
two farms, both of which were run by full-time farmers, had machines and facilities to 
independently manage crop conversion. Many of the rest, if not all, including part-time farmers 
and full-time but post-retirement farmers, relied on communal farming for crop conversion. 
 Both the Union-member and independent farms were managing rice farming on their 
own. Each farm was independently responsible for both farming exercises and accounting, and in 
return profited from their own farm management. Different cultivation methods as well as 
planting different rice varieties resulted in different rates of profit. In particular, the strategy to 
profit from rice farming was different largely between the Union-member and independent ones. 
The former, dominated by part-time and post-retirement family farms, were selling their rice 
mainly to the JA that offered a stable sales channel but relatively cheap prices, though a few were 
additionally selling rice to individual customers. The latter, run by full-time farmers, were 
differentiating their rice farming to better profit in several ways, including farm-scale expansion, 
development of sales channels other than the JA, and product development. The incorporated 
farm put great effort in developing value-added products (e.g., organic varieties) as well as new 
sales channels (e.g., internet retailing). 
 Farmers who had been entitled to the grace period for inheritance tax payment lose their entitlement under their membership 408
to communal farming, when they establish the usufructuary rights with a communal farming group (MAFF 2006b; N. Taniguchi 
2004). Also, unincorporated groups of communal farming pay corporate tax when they engage in profit-making businesses 
(except for selling agricultural produce to certain consolidating stations such as JAs), although either individual or incorporated 
farms, who engage in profit-making businesses, could take advantage of income or corporate tax reduction by incorporating the 
depreciation cost in tax calculation (MAFF 2006b; NARO 2007).
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 Likewise, the potentials of securing successors were different between these two groups. 
The incorporated farm took on a few non-family members as full-time workers in addition to the 
family members of the corporate president as a family head.  The largest family farm was yet 409
to secure a successor, but the son of the family head assisted in farming between other jobs. All 
the respondents from the Union-member farm households indicated absence of successors, given 
their children were absent either in farming or even in the village. Thus the Union members 
occasionally talked about whether to develop communal farming by incorporating rice farming 
as discussed below. At any rate, these two groups were not necessarily competing against each 
other, and often mutually supportive or dependent as in the case in which several Union 
members relied on the rice processing facilities owned and managed by the incorporated farm.  
 Within each farm across both groups, a family head was seizing rights and responsibility 
for entire farm management. He was usually entitled to ownership and use rights to farmland and 
assumed control of farming, accounting and sales. In particular, a family head was more firmly 
in control of rice farming. In some cases other family members assisted in a complementary 
manner, whereas in other cases, family heads (e.g., post-retirement farmers) engaged in rice 
farming solely with the help of agricultural machines. However, in dry-field farming, mostly as 
sidelines or for self consumption, other family members sometimes took a lead. For instance, the 
wife of the family head in the largest family farm stated her initiative of dry-field farming 
differing from rice farming (Interview with a farmer on December 12, 2016): 
 The presidency of the incorporated farm was transferred from the father to his son in January 2017, while the farther 409
remained serving as a chairman (Interview with a farmer on August 19, 2018). As most of the interviews were conducted in late 
2016, I basically present the interview results as of late 2016.
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When someone asks us for tenant farming, my husband basically decides 
although he checks with me just in case. He likes rice farming at all, and wants 
to say ‘Yes’ whenever asked. Honestly I don’t like rice farming, and I say ‘No’ to 
him once at least, but inevitably accept it, thinking about economical use of the 
machines. … Preparatory work remains same or primitive even since after 
farming was mechanized. It was worse when I got married. In those days when 
the paths for machines were narrow, I had to repeatedly carry and place a 
portable bridge for a machine to path through to a paddy field before my 
husband on a machine arrived at the edge of a field, and then cleaned up the 
field after the machine traveled. … There is an atmosphere that rice farming is 
being kept from women. As I work only with my husband, I don’t go to the 
places like the Union, and there’s no need to speak to them. The farming sector 
in general is made up of 90% male. Women after all have a backup position, 
and serve to support farming within a family without actively taking a 
responsibility. … But I take 95% responsibility for dry-field farming. My 
husband only tills the field with a small tiller. .. I prefer crop conversion like 
growing barley and beans. Though he doesn’t like weeding, I also do weeding 
and don’t dislike it. … When my husband says to me ‘Here we go to rice paddy,’ 
I unwilling say ‘Year’. But when it comes to sowing for beans or weeding, I first 
say ‘Here we go!’ 
 The non-farming landowner households who were lending their land to either of these 
two groups, relied on other farmers for farming, although they belonged to the Production 
Association. Being economically reliant on other sources of income, these households mostly let 
tenants decide the way of farming including the kinds of crop. In return they received the land 
rent in the form of money and/or rice. In addition, some of them engaged in farming dry fields to 
grow vegetables and flowers basically for self consumption or pleasure.  
6.1.2. Tenancy arrangements 
The three cases of the FB program adoption manifest the trend to aggregate farmland in the 
hands of two groups including the independent and Union-member farms. This trend began 
before the FB program was introduced in 2014. The change brought about by the FB program 
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included the economic incentives for lenders in the form of retirement funds and the conditions 
and administrative procedures to be followed (e.g., 10-year contract life, contracts between the 
FB and the two parties (i.e., owners and tenants), and owners’ farm retirement from rice 
farming).  Farmland aggregation into the two groups had progressed through the direct 410
contracts between owners and tenants. The two largest, independent farms had been actively 
expanding their farm scale for commercial farming in the postwar years through tenancy 
arrangements. Among the Union-member farms, some with available capacity had been engaged 
in tenant farming on a kinship or community basis in response to the requests from incapacitated 
landowners.  
 The two independent farms had expanded their farm management areas through tenancy 
since the 1960s.  To attain economy of scale for commercial farming, these farms increased 411
their tenanted land across Villages U and S by attending to emerging interests and needs for 
tenant farming in their neighborhood.  Initially they began with consignment for farming 412
practices, but soon engaged in tenancy by leasing farmland from small part-time farmers who 
became unable to bear the production cost and time. The needs for tenancy from these small 
farmers amplified along with the price increase of machines and other agricultural inputs as well 
as the development of other industries such as Kutani-yaki industries that absorbed local labor. 
 The conditions and procedures for the tenancy contracts under the FB program are detailed in Chapter 3.410
 The incorporated farm embarked on scale expansion through tenancy in 1965 (more actively from 1969), while the largest 411
independent family farm did so in 1967 (Goto 2016).
 Although the share of the tenanted land between the two villages was not identified through my interviews dated in 2016, 412
Goto (2016) found that the area of tenanted land in S village accounted for 74% and 57% respectively for the incorporated farm 
(38 ha of cultivated acreage) and the family farm (9 ha of cultivated acreage) as of 2003.
 !289
Finally the cultivated acreages of these two farms reached nearly 50ha and 12ha respectively for 
the incorporated and family-run ones at the end of 2016.  
 Yet, in recent years both farms became passive about scale expansion. Although the 
incorporated farm used to put the biggest energy into scale expansion particularly after the 
completion of the land improvement project in 1999, it has shifted its priority to the development 
of sales channels and product varieties. Taking into account the recent economic trends involving 
rice price depreciation, the farm kept limiting the travel distance for farming (i.e., the work trip 
from the farm office to tenanted land) to a few hundred meters within the two villages so as to 
save cost and time for farm management. Thus the farm has limitedly increased cultivated 
acreage by passively accepting requests from neighbors and kin, though it used to constantly 
increase to 44.5ha around until 2010. Likewise the largest family farm was reluctant to expand 
due to aging, though not resisting requests from neighbors.  413
 Granting that these farms had been municipally designated as certified farmers since 
2001, the official recognition of the factual cultivated acreages involving tenanted land under the 
formal contracts may matter for them to receive subsidiary support from the government.  414
However, their tenancy involved substantial informal arrangements. The informal arrangements 
for the incorporated farm accounted for about 20% of the total tenanted land. In consideration of 
 The family head of the farm presupposed the status quo of farm scale in the near future, given his aging as well as his 413
uncontrollability of succession by his son who was assisting in farming between other jobs (Interview with a farmer on 
November 25, 2016).
 The official recognition of farm scale was one of the prerequisites for the eligibility of certified farmers who assumed to 414
improve farm management through scale expansion and other means. In the system of certified farmers, farmers who develop a 
plan for the next five years to improve farm management through expanding farm scale, streamlining production and 
management control methods and other means are certified by municipalities in accordance with municipal schematic plans so 
that the certified farmers are eligible for various subsidiary programs such as the low-interest loan program, the farmland 
liquidation measures, the land improvement projects. (Honma 2010; Fujino 2011; Fujie 2016) (also see Chapter 2 for details). 
Though the criteria for certification had not been limited to scale expansion but also included intensification and streamlining 
(Honma 2010), the revision of the system’s guidelines has allowed farmers to be certified if they meet the income level criteria 
regardless of their scale since fiscal 2017. 
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time and effort for formal procedures to be taken by both the tenant and owners, the farm 
pursued informal arrangements in principle for the land smaller than 0.1ha. As such, the number 
of cases of informal contracts, which were mostly made through verbal promises, exceeded the 
formal ones.  The largest family farm primarily relied on informal arrangements in recent 415
years, though it had taken formal procedures in response to the municipal government 
approaches. Besides the trust between owners and tenants based on the neighborhood or kinship, 
the customary agreement on standardized rents at each Production Association of the villages 
often avoided or eased conflicts between the two parties, as it allowed for transparent terms and 
conditions of tenancy even without formality.  
 As one of the three cases of the FB program adoption, the incorporated farm leased the 
land from the FB. The landowner, who had heard about an opportunity of retirement funds 
available through the FB program, approached the incorporated farm to ask about tenant 
farming. In response, the farm consulted with the municipal government, where their tenancy 
arrangement was handled in the form of the FB program. In the interest of applying the existing 
tenancy contracts for the FB program, he, as both a tenant and an Agricultural Committee 
member, checked with the municipal authority but found that the existing ones would not be 
applicable to the program. Given that his farm was involved in tenancy arrangements with 
approximately 100 landowners, he stated the limited effect of the program on his circumstances: 
I only see the FB program as one of several past or ongoing programs… Only few 
of many have been applied to the FB program here. Sooner or later many cases 
 The president of the farm indicated the recent increase in informal arrangements with small landowners, though most of the 415
tenancy arrangements were officially made in his farther’s generation for the one-year contract life (Interview with a farmer on 
November 22, 2016).
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may be incorporated in the program, though it may depend on ‘candy.’  … The 
government set the target of at least 80 per cent of farmland in the country being 
farmed by responsible entities (Ninaite), for which the FB program is to expedite 
farmland aggregation. But in reality we have already attained the 80 per cent of 
the accumulation rate even without the FB. It’s for sure that the accumulation rate 
is very substantial if we take into account all the tenancy arrangements including 
the informal ones. … I asked a question at the Agricultural Committee last 
December, and was clearly told by the municipality that the existing contracts 
won’t be applicable to the program. … It's indeed the historic fact that the reality 
has preceded before the policy. I don’t much care about the very late comer, the FB 
program. 
 The Union-member farms were farming their own land at least. In addition, some of them 
engaged in tenancy on a kinship or community basis if they had available capacity (e.g., time and 
machines). Two respondents from this group had been officially recognized as certified farmers 
since 2012 and 2015 respectively. Thus they were willing to expand their farm sizes to 8-10 ha 
but not beyond, based on the existing mechanical capacity. In general, the Union members were 
less aggressive about tenancy than the independent, full-time farmers given their lower economic 
dependency on farming. Some of them became full-time farmers after retirement from other 
jobs, but were reliant on pensions. To render their available but limited capacity for tenancy, they 
often shared responsibility for tenant farming among the active farmers, sometimes including the 
two independent farms. Compared to the tenancy arrangements held by the independent farms, 
most of those by the Union members built on more intimate relationships between owners and 
tenants, often between kin or neighbors living next to each other. Given this intimacy, they 
served owners’ requests to the extent which they were capable, but if not, partially shared 
responsibility with other available farmers. Mostly they made informal arrangements between 
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kin. Even between neighbors, they often made informal arrangements, but in some instances they 
did paperwork so as not to cause trouble with neighbors.  
 The strategy of sharing responsibility for tenant farming applied to the FB program 
adoption. Two of the three cases of adoption officially involved two certified farmers as tenants 
(see Table 6.1). However, the actual status of tenancy arrangements involved informal 
subcontracts to share responsibility among three Union members (see Tables 6.3 and 6.4). In 
each of these two cases, the process began with a farm retirement of each of the two landowners: 
one at the age around 60 who decided to retire from farming after sickness (Case A); and the 
other who passed away and whose son was unable to succeed to farming because of his job in 
another prefecture (Case C). As a rule of practice, it had to be determined who would become 
tenants so as to have their farmland lent to the FB. Largely based on the command by the Union 
president who doubled as the president of the Production Association, the arrangement was 
decided through consultation in the way which a few available Union members shared 
responsibility for tenant farming. Consequently, in the first case (Case A), two certified farmers 
officially leased farmland from the FB, whereas a part of the land was informally subcontracted 
to an uncertified farmer. In the second case (Case C), one certified farmer formally leased 
farmland from the FB, while he subcontracted a part of it to another certified farmer. To pay land 
rent to the owners, the subcontractors directly paid their shares of rent to the official tenants who 




Table 6.3 Tenancy Arrangements under the FB Program (December 2016) 
Table 6.4 Tenants’ Profiles and Their Shares under the FB Program (December 2016) 
 The informal arrangements under the FB program developed to fill the gap between 
official qualifications of tenants and their actual availability. To serve as a tenant under the FB 
program, a farmer is supposed to be fully qualified for a long-term tenancy contract (usually for 
10 years), and procedurally has to be listed on the Community Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP) 
(see Chapter 3). In Case A, albeit being listed on the CAMP, the uncertified subcontractor at the 
age of 73, failed to be well qualified as an official tenant while he presumed his availability to 
Cases Owners Farmland  (ha)
Tenants
Official (Shares of land: ha) Actual (Shares of land: ha)
A TS 3.2
Union Farmer IY  (1.1) Union Farmer IY 
Union Farmer KI
Union Farmer KI (2.1) Union Farmer MA (1.0) - informal
B KA 1.2 Incorporated Farm TA (1.2) Incorporated Farm TA (1.2)
C IS 3.0 Union Farmer IY (3.0)
Union Farmers IY
Union Farmers KI - informal
Tenants Farm management status Land leased from 
the FB







TA 64 50 Independent Incorporated Full-time Certified 1.2 1.2
IY 59 N.A. (>8) Union Family-run Part-time Certified 4.1 1.2
KI 65 6 Union Family-run Full-time  (Post-retirement) Certified 2.1 3.0
MA 73 2 Union Family-run Full-time  (Post-retirement) Uncertified - 1.0
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farm the land at least for the next 4-5 years. At the same time, the two certified farmers were 
officially qualified, but were not practically available for all the tenanted land given their 
capacities (e.g., time and machines).  
 Moreover, the FB program did not provide incentives for tenants to formalize tenancy 
arrangements in any case. The subcontractor of Case C (identical to one contractor in Case A) in 
his mid 60s, was a certified farmer but noted little advantage from becoming a formal tenant, 
while he hardly found benefit from being a certified farmer to take advantage of his status to 
receive subsidiary support.  Although data were not available due to my inaccessibility to the 416
official tenant of Case C (identical to one contractor in Case A), the tenant might have prioritized 
his kinship with the owner as a common practice in the village and thus has taken responsibility 
for the official contract despite his limited availability for farming. 
6.1.3. Farmland maintenance 
The activities for farmland maintenance associated with each paddy were under the customary 
jurisdiction of farmers engaging in cultivation of each paddy field. Those related to agricultural 
infrastructure (e.g., farm roads and large irrigation channels) fell under the responsibility of all 
the villagers entitled to farmland, including non-farming landowners. Most of the former 
activities, which were conducted in and around each paddy field, continued to be practiced 
individually by each farm. Yet, some of the activities had become collectively exercised by 
 The subcontractor stated that he became a certified farmer four years ago at the suggestion by the Union president as he learnt 416
that he would be able to receive subsidiary support to purchase agricultural machines. However, he found few opportunities for 
smaller certified farmers like himself to receive subsidies given the limited budgetary framework at the government (Interview 
with a farmer on November 23, 2016).
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several active farmers of the Production Association through the technical development (e.g., 
disinfection by unmanned aerial vehicles) particularly after the land improvement project.  
 Despite the continued practices by those engaging in cultivation, the way of sharing cost 
of maintenance for tenanted land was in transition along with the change in land rent. In 2015, 
the Agricultural Committee at the municipal level re-examined the reference prices of land rent 
across the city, which the Committee annually presented as reference for individual tenancy 
contracts. This review was done to address the farmers’ concern that the market prices of land 
rent used as reference were not reflecting farm profits affected by the recent economic trends. In 
response, the Committee conducted a questionnaire survey to investigate factual rents including 
the share of maintenance cost, and accordingly proposed to re-adjust reference rents as well as 
shares of maintenance cost between landowners and tenants. 
 These revisions caused a clash between owners and tenants. As the survey results 
showed, the ways of sharing maintenance cost and the land rents varied across different villages. 
For instance, the irrigation dues were 100% borne by landowners in Village U, whereas they 
were 100% for tenants in Village S. Based on the survey results, the Agricultural Committee 
recommended that the dues should be optimally halved between owners and tenants. The amount 
of dues was not necessarily inexpensive (JPY 4,200 per 0.1ha: i.e., approximately USD 37 per 
0.1ha), and thus the change drew attention from owners particularly in S village. In an attempt to 
change the rents as well as the share of irrigation dues based on an agreement at the Production 
Association by following the recommendations from the Committee, some tenants faced hard 
negotiations with owners in Village S where the share of dues borne by owners was about to 
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increase from 0% to 50%. The respondent from the incorporated farm explicated the confusion 
arising from the change (Interview with a farmer on November 22, 2016): 
As did yesterday, today I have to go and explain to each landowner about the 
reduction in land rent. I should address their questions and concerns about why 
it will decrease that much and whether their cost burden may go beyond their 
benefit. … In addition to the rollback of rent, there is a change in the share of 
irrigation dues. They are caught in that issue pretty much. … In Village U 
landowners have been paying 100% of dues, and in Village S the cultivators 
paying 100%. Of course, the rent itself has been different between the two 
villages. The standard rent was set by Shaku-kan system (Japanese measuring 
system) in these two villages. In Village U, the rent for improved land per 1 tsubo 
(3.306 m2) was 1 go (0.3306 m²) 4 shaku (330.6 cm²) and in S village it was 1 go 
2 shaku. The things were coming from the era of Goko-gomin (five for the lord, 
five for the commoner in Edo Period). … When the presidents of Production 
Associations from different villages discussed this issue in 2014, which was prior 
to the revision by the Agricultural Committee, I heard those from Villages U and 
S talked about the rent in Shaku-kan system. Others were perplexed, but it was 
like ...“We are still talking, wearing Chonmage (Japanese traditional topknot 
haircut). What we do is Shaku-kan system!” … Since 2016, the measuring system 
for rent has changed from the Shaku-kan system to the metric one, and the in-
kind payment principle has changed to the monetary one. This and that has 
changed, and people have been puzzling over.  
 Then, he continued to detail the conflicting perspectives to the benefits from tenanted 
land between owners and tenants: 
… Though it was presumed, some owners (in village S) say “Why do we have to 
pay irrigation dues? As you use water, you cultivators should bear 100% of the 
dues as before.” It’s indeed complicated, as agricultural economists has been 
arguing the issue of ‘useful expenses.’ … The market price of land rent for rice 
paddies is said to be twice as much as that for dry fields. If we pay irrigation 
dues on top of the rent, I want to say, we pay a double of the double, though I 
don’t say to them as the things would become too complex. In any case, as there 
is the term ‘Ko-so Ko-ka’ (taxes and public dues), I understand that both the 
fixed property tax and the dues are attributed to owners. … The owners of large 
plots on improved land in our region would surely benefit from owning the land 
even if they pay tax and dues, but those having tiny plots may lose. In some 
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region (where profitability of farming is very low), owners pay management 
charge to tenants rather than receiving rent. Some owners may think it’s 
preferable to abandon their land if they have a deficit after paying the fixed 
property tax, irrigation dues, and management charges instead of receiving rent. 
If that kind of sleazy way of thinking becomes common, it would be a problem. 
 The large agricultural facilities in common use were collectively managed by those 
entitled to farmland including non-farming landowners. The collective maintenance activities 
were administered by the steering committee as a part of the Production Association. This 
steering committee, called the Environmental Conservation Group for Farmland and Water, 
consisted of about 10 members from the Association, who were appointed to serve paperwork, 
accounting and communications. With the aid of financial support from the government, the 
committee facilitated three activities: seasonal events; routine water management; and 
engineering works. First, the seasonal events were annually held in every spring and fall to 
jointly clean water channels and weeds on farm roads. One representative from each household 
as a member of the Association was to participate on a voluntary basis (i.e., normally about 30 
villagers in total). In return each participant received a per-diem allowance with the amount of 
about JPY 4,500 (approximately USD 40.00). Second, water management was contracted to one 
member who operated the electric-powered pipelines for pumping water and received 
compensation for the services. Third, the engineering works such as plastering of levees across 
paddies and supplementing gravel on farm roads were outsourced to vendors as necessary and 
financed with the budget from the government subsidies.  
 Technical improvements, particularly those enabled by the land improvement project, 
allowed for labor saving of these maintenance activities, for instance, through electrification of 
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water management and mechanization of weeding practices. In addition, a series of government 
programs, which began in 2007 to support community-based farmland maintenance, financed the 
collective maintenance activities at the village (Nakatani 2016; Komiyama and Ito 2017). The 
Production Association adopted these programs in 2007 and was receiving the budget of 
approximately JPY 3 million (approximately USD 26.4 thousand) annually for the past several 
years with no financial cost borne by the landowners.  Several retired municipal officials as 417
landowners were serving as committee members to handle administrative procedures. The 
participation level of villagers in the seasonal events used to be declining along with the falling 
of farming population in the village. Since the village adopted these programs, however, the 
participation had been relatively stable due to the per diems despite the aging of the participants. 
6.2 Motivations for Participation in Tenancy Arrangements 
Adoption of the FB program was limited on the grounds that the tenancy arrangements 
conventionally preceded on the basis of kinship or community. Given that the existing tenancy 
contracts were not directly transferable to the FB program, the three new cases, which were 
qualified for retirement funds, entered into contracts under the FB program. The interviews 
suggest that the farmers’ involvement in (or absence from) a certain tenancy arrangement, 
whether it is under the FB program or conventional arrangements, rest on three key factors: 
economic feasibility; kin-based life security; and tensions between community and individual 
wellbeing. These factors were neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily complementary. They 
 According to a respondent who served to the Environmental Conservation Group for Farmland and Water at the Association, 417
the program budge was shared by the national government (50%), the prefectural government (25%) and the municipal 
government (25%), while no financial cost was borne by the local community (Interview with a farmer on November 23, 2016).
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were often conflicting, but influenced the respondents’ decisions reflecting their circumstances. 
In regard to each of the factors, the following section describes how both owners and tenants 
were motivated to participate in a certain tenancy arrangement. It also adds to the explanation of 
why owner-farmers were not involved in any tenancy arrangements, while farming their land on 
their own. 
6.2.1 Economic feasibility  
The FB program provided funds for the owners who decided to retire from rice farming and 
economically incentivized them to participate. Yet, the level of their economic reliance on 
farming affected their decision on wether to retire and render their land available for other 
farmers. Certainly, one owner (in Case B) suggested the idea to the tenant to make a contract 
with the FB so as to receive the funds, while another (in Case A) showed his appreciation for the 
funds upon his retirement. However, the alternative means of living allowed for their retirement, 
which followed the decrease in their capacity for farming on their own. For instance, Case A 
illustrates that the owner decided to economically rely on a pension and savings at the age of 
around 60 even after recovering from sickness.  Case C also suggests that the farm family of 418
the owner might no longer need to rely on farming due to the decease of the previously active 
farmer as well as the secured job for his son other than farming. These cases suggest economic 
feasibility as a key to farm retirement and then participation in the program.  
 The cases of conventional tenancy arrangements affirm economic feasibility as a key 
determinant for landowners. Among eight households who were non-farming landowners 
 The respondent suggested that his sickness was also related to farming that sometimes involved frictions among the villagers 418
and emotionally and spiritually affected his wellbeing (Interview with a farmer on August 20, 2018).
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engaging in conventional tenancy arrangements, six pointed to the lack of farming labor within a 
family (i.e., decease or health impairment of previously active farmers, time available farming 
reduced by other jobs) to discontinue farming. Two others noted the increased cost for machines 
and other materials that exceeded available capacity of part-time, small family farms (e.g., 
0.5-1.0 ha) who were economically dependent on other jobs. As such, economic infeasibility 
facilitated their farm retirement to engage in tenancy and, at the same time, economic reliance on 
other jobs allowed them to do so.  
 Likewise, economic feasibility was a critical factor for tenants to determine whether and 
how to engage in tenant farming. All the respondents participating in the FB program as a tenant 
in practice admitted the importance of profitability.  Nonetheless, two of them involved in the 419
Union highlighted their laboring capacity as a fundamental criterion to determine to what extent 
they engaged in tenant farming, differently from one respondent from the incorporated farm who 
showed a stronger interest to improve farm profitability. In other words, they were not motivated 
to go beyond the current level of farm investment since their families primarily relied on 
pensions as a source of income and lacked successors in their families. They agreed to engage in 
tenancy to the extent which the additional labor for tenant farming would not undermine 
economic feasibility. Thus, they shared responsibility for tenant farming even informally among 
the members depending on their available capacity. 
 For instance, the respondent from the incorporated farm specified the following five criteria to evaluate farmland, which 419
affected economic feasibility and thus his interest in farmland use: 1) soil fertility; 2) water use conditions; 3) accessibility to 
roads; 4) sizes; and 5) figures subject to mechanical use(Interview with a farmer on November 22, 2016). The respondent who 
was an informal subcontractor under the FB program, mentioned land profitability as one of the criteria to determine the benefit 
from farmland, which also motivated him to engage in farming (Interview with a farmer on November 23, 2016). In addition, the 
respondent, another contractor affiliated with the Union, shared his interest in recovering his investment in agricultural machines 
by expanding farm management scale through tenancy (Interview with a farmer on November 23, 2016). 
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 This approach to tenant farming was based on the existing investment level and applied 
indiscriminately to most tenancy arrangements, given the indifference of economic incentives for 
tenants between the FB program and conventional arrangements. In general, the Union members 
took responsibility for tenant farming as much as they were available based on their existing 
farming capacities, and if it went beyond such capacities, they transferred responsibility fully or 
partially to other available tenants. For instance, one owner first lent his land to a neighboring 
family farm but moved the entire tenancy to the incorporated farm upon the decease of the 
original tenant in the absence of successors. Another owner lent a part of his land to a 
neighboring family farm based on its farming capacity, but asked the largest family farm to take 
care of the rest. Likewise, one tenant affiliated with the Union shared responsibility for tenanting 
the land owned by his brother with the two independent farmers. Two respondents from two 
different farm families branched from a same head family shared the tenanted land at a ratio of 
6:4 based on their availabilities. In addition, two owner-farmers suggested that they stretched 
their capacities to take care of their own land. 
 The independent farms had actively engaged in tenant farming so as to expand farm scale 
and bolster economic viability of farm management, but appeared to be less active in recent 
years. A respondent from the largest family farm in his mid-70s suggested labor as a factor not to 
further expand, while another from the incorporated farm in his early 60s with a secured 
successor suggested the limited role of scale expansion in improving farm profitability. The latter 
used to purchase farmland even in debt but for investment, if given opportunities. Despite more 
availability of farmland for tenancy than sale in the land market, he has seen that land purchase 
allows his farm to expand farm size more stably than tenancy, as is often the case that tenancy 
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accompanied with temporality and inflexibility sometimes hinders farmers from long-term 
investments and land conservation (Rotz, Fraser, and Martin 2019; Varble, Secchi, and Druschke 
2016). Lately, however, his perspective on farmland as a resource of farm management has 
changed based on his assessment of economic feasibility as he mentioned: 
Quite some time ago, I attended a lecture and learnt that the reduction of gross 
revenue by 13% would be compensated only for scale expansion by 54%. I was 
thinking that 13% reduction in revenue could be offset by 13% expansion in farm 
size, but I was wrong. This had a strong impact on me, and I realized that I should 
be more mindful of price rate of rice. … Still I see naturally scale expansion 
through tenancy as the way forward. … But I might have lost my motivation to 
buy farmland. My value judgement is changing. … In my farther’s generation, he 
surely purchased farmland in debt, taking advantage of the public-financing 
systems. Though not exactly the same, in my generation I have continued to buy 
farmland if given the chance. … Tenancy has been more socially common today, 
and if other farmers had been motivated for land purchase, I might have been 
more motivated to competitively buy land. … In the next generation, to those who 
has never experienced the real estate myth, purchasing farmland in debt would be 
completely unthinkable. … In April this year, when I contacted them to talk about 
lowering rent, three absentee owners, who were siblings of each other, proposed 
deals to sell farmland that I used to tenant. I acceded to the deals, but wondered if 
I might be still singing an out-of-date song even when the societal environment 
around land has changed. … As might be expected, they had approached other 
farmers to propose a deal. When I was approached, I checked with another active 
farmer whether he was comfortable for me to make a deal. He said “I’m quite 
enough of land purchase.” … I did consult with him, who is a local in Village S, 
as I’m somewhat an outside there. In my generation, I’ve come to make a 
ceremonial greeting (jingi) to consult local farmers prior to making a deal. … In 
my farther’s generation, he made a blunt and direct deal without any greetings 
with others. Otherwise he would have been killed! 
6.2.2 Kin-based life security 
By design, the FB pursues anonymous matchmaking and intervenes in tenancy to officinally 
make a contract directly with owners and then tenants. This is different from the kin- or 
community-based arrangements that were conventionally made in the village. Despite the FB’s 
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contractual involvement, however, the actual matchmaking was indifferent between the FB 
program and the conventional arrangements. This was because program adoption practically 
conditioned the pre-agreement between the two parties prior to the official contracts. Thus, the 
tenancy arrangements even under the FB program were based on either kinship or the local 
community. In general, the matchmaking prioritized the connections based on kinship over those 
based on the village community, as one respondent affiliated with the Union summarized 
(Interview with a farmer on November 23, 2016):  
For tenancy arrangements, the landowners who have decided to retire from 
farming would go either to one of the two largest farms or to a fellow of 
our Union. The latter is mostly based on kinship, or relatives. If not, it’s 
based on immediate neighborhood. It’s often the case that they ask kin or 
close neighbors if they are still active in farming, rather than asking less 
intimate large farmers. Usually it’s like “If that was the case I asked a 
corporate farm, I would prefer asking my relative to have our land 
farmed.” 
 Out of 20 households, the study found that at least 7 households were involved in kin-
based tenancy arrangements. The interviews suggest that non-farming landowners rely on their 
kins, if available, to secure the land as a family asset and at the same time fill a farm-family role 
in the community in the unit of the large family system. This mechanism appeared to build on 
the histories of the prewar landlordism and the postwar land reform. For instance, one non-
farming landowner had married into a farm family, which had branched from a head family, and 
in due course lent his farmland to the head family for tenant farming. His cousin from the head 
family provided the context for sharing farmland among the members of the large family system, 
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recalling what he had heard from his father and grandfather (Interview with farmers on 
November 25, 2016):

In the prewar days, our family, the family head, was a landlord with about 6ha 
of farmland. In the land reform, 3ha remained with us as regulated, and the rest 
moved to tenants and brothers. My farther was the eldest son among eight 
siblings including four males. Along with the reform, it was the way that the 
head family shared its land, including its title deed, with the branched families 
as much as they can have enough rice yield to feed the members of each family. 
… In the order of seniority, while remaining with 3 ha for my farther as the 
eldest, 0.4ha was given to the second brother, about 0.2ha to the third one, none 
to the forth who married into another family, and the rest to the tenants. … 
Nobu-san (another respondent as a non-farming landowner) is married with the 
eldest daughter from the family of my father’s second eldest brother. So, he is my 
cousin. … Rent payment as rice for home consumption has been the customary 
practice of the village, and as he’s from our branch family, I think we pay rent 
with a little higher rate than the village’s standard.  
 With this context, the non-farming landowner, Nobu-san (pseudo.), explicated how and 
why he was involved in tenancy, calling his cousin from the head family ‘Aniki’ (Brother)  
(Interview with farmers on November 25, 2016):

After I married into our family, my father in law was farming as much as he 
could do, while working for painting of Kutani-wares. But, we had to rely on 
tenancy due to his aging and health impairment. …There’s no inconvenience in 
a verbal promise for tenancy, though I think I have been causing much trouble 
to Aniki. … As it was preciously given, I think we want to somewhat take 
advantage of the land rather than eating the family out of it, though we are not 
farming now. … It depends on Aniki, depending on to what extent he would be 
physically available. … As there’s the issue of tax, if we really don’t need the 
farmland, we may want to sell it to the corporate farm even at a desperate price. 
Otherwise, it would be a problem. … For now, we’re leaving everything up to 
Aniki, including irrigation dues. … In farmland maintenance, I’m willing to 
contribute to assisting as long as I’m capable. I say to Aniki I’ll do whatever I 
can do, but he hasn’t yet asked me for help. I quite heavily depend on him. … As 
a member of the Production Association, I don’t have much to say in particular, 
as I basically leave the things up to Aniki.
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 The interviews with others affiliated with the Union reinforced the motivations of tenants 
to be responsible for securing and maintaining farmland within the large family system. In 
response to a request from another member of a large family system, a cousin of the landowner 
developed a strategy to control tenancy under his own responsibility despite his limited 
availability (Interview with a farmer on December 11, 2016):  
My best cousin, like a brother to me, who was the eldest son of our head family 
owning about 3ha, passed away three years ago. When he was sick in bed for 
the last year, he said to me to take care of his farmland as he didn’t want to lose 
it. As it was too much to me, I shared the task with another 6-year younger 
cousin, the eldest son of the family of my farther’s second brother, asking him to 
take care of 60% as I would do for 40%. … Initially there was no official 
contract, but we followed the rent payment standardized at the Production 
Association. … My best cousin had four daughters, among whom three had 
married into other families, but after my cousin’s passing away, a remaining one 
took a husband, who is a banker and obviously unavailable for farming. There, 
upon her marriage, I pursued an official contract through the Agricultural 
Committee, for which I’m officially responsible entirely. … In practice, for the 
first year, I was farming more than 2ha in total, including 1ha of my own and 
40% of 3ha of my cousin’s (i.e.,1.2ha), but it was too much. Then, I 
subcontracted a part of my cousin’s land (0.5ha) to my close, trustable friend 
additionally. There’s no official paper work for these subcontracts, and I 
transfer the rent payments from the subcontractors to the head family while all 
we know about these arrangements. ... Officially I seem like a big farmer 
managing 4ha, though I cultivate 1.7ha actually. 
 In his mid 70s, he continued to elaborate how these informal arrangements work to 
extend the life security function of the family: 
Ankiki (Brother) of the head family, my best cousin, graduated from an 
agricultural high school, had a strong attachment to farmland. … When his 
daughter and son-in-law came and visited me, they said he used to say to his 
daughter “Absolutely, don’t let our farmland go.” … Aniki was the only, eldest 
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son in a family and so I am, and we were very close, also in age. … The truth is 
I feel like letting it go, but as he was really worried about it… To me, if I 
become unable to do any longer, we should let it go, for example, to the 
corporate farm. I’ve already expressly said to the head family about that. … For 
now, we should keep it in our kin. … The current arrangements work OK to 
secure the trust relationship or kinship. Though I have asked a friend of mine, I 
can easily say to him to farm the paddies like this or that. He is a diligent man, 
and helped me a lot. Actually if he is not a like-minded friend, that’d rather a 
tall order to fill.  
 This extended kin-based tenancy did not necessarily apply to all the cases. To follow the 
owner’s will, farmland can be more securely and even flexibly managed within a stem family, 
rather than relying on tenancy based on an extended kinship. As such, two owner-farmers absent 
from tenancy confirmed that both secured their livelihoods through earning from other 
occupations but at the same time followed their late fathers’ wills to keep farmland as a family 
asset. In particular, farmland often served as a ‘reserve’ to ensure life security of family 
members, not only to feed them daily but also to cover expenses in a pinch. Given the role of 
farmland in securing family’s livelihoods, some of the owners chose to lend their farmland to 
others based on their assessment of economic feasibly rather than kinship. For instance, one 
respondent in his early 60s, who was a non-farming landowner, noted his preference for the 
corporate farm over his relatives, though assuming that the land property should be kept under 
kinship (Interview with a farmer on December 11, 2016):  
The tenant is my buddy. I could have let it out to my relative, but rather easily have 
the land farmed by the corporate farm, and when needed, I’d easily ask him to return 
it as he manages a large farm. … To allow me to come back to farming, I keep our 
tenancy as a verbal promise, though I don’t know if I can return to farming. … 
Nothing else is as easy as rice for selling off. The rice price has been depreciated, but 
it makes sense economically if we incorporate subsidies, salaries or pensions in 
farming. Yet I don’t know to what extent this would continue, as my physical capacity 
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will decline and none of my children can take over. In the end, I should hand it over to 
someone, but as I can’t let it go to anyone else, I’ll pass it to Ni-chan (like brother, but 
a cousin), but he is inexperienced. … So I like to develop a way forward. … Farmland 
is a household asset. Though it’s a classic way of saying, it is what we keep and 
manage, and then hand over to the next generation on the best possible conditions, as 
it is nourishment to generate our resources. It’s a bit different from ‘real estate’ we 
transact from right to left. … When needed, we sell it to someone else in the village, 
but again when needed, we buy it from the one. So it’s like an ‘insurance’ in the 
village. This may not work today, … but we sold three paddies when I went to college. 
 To manage farmland on a stem-family or even extended-family basis, the roles and 
responsibilities of the constituent members are not always equal. They are streamlined 
economically under the family headship. The interviews with four wives of the farm family 
heads pointed to diversified roles of females in accordance with the life stages of the family 
members, including childcare, seasonal assistance in rice farming, vegetable farming for home 
consumption, housekeeping, and elderly care. At the same time, farm management, including 
accounting and decision-making of tenancy arrangements, were mostly led by a family head. The 
respondent in her mid 70s who married into a head family of a multigenerational household, 
described how the constituent members mutually maintained kinship (Interview with a farmer on 
December 13, 2016): 
I handle the household accounts, pooling money from my husband, my son’s family 
and my daughter, in addition to my own pension. And, my husband manages all the 
farm accounting, including rent, irrigation dues, expenses for chemical herbicides, 
fertilizers. … We also engage in tenant farming for two branch families…. They 
may have asked my husband, and I have nothing to do with such communications. 
There’s no consultation with me. I say to him “It’s ok to take care of our family’s, 
but let others’ go,” but he doesn’t listen to me, and I just work. I’m now 74 years 
old, and so my husband is. Farming is physically tough. I guess as they’re 
relatives, we have to do fatally. They are branch families…, and I guess they can’t 
allow themselves to ask others. If they asked us first and then were turned down, 
they may ask others. After all, there’s an order they think they ought to follow, I 
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guess. … My husband was raised with much care as the eldest son of the head 
family. … As he was working in the employment, the uncles took care of most 
preparatory work for wakes and weddings, while he sat at the head table and gave 
speeches. They often jokingly say “He doesn’t do anything and comes late, but sits 
and greets at the head.” Even uncles stand around and take care of him, and I 
can’t step ahead of him. … That kind of idea has been completely imbued with 
them since their childhoods. Even when my son attended a wedding on behalf of 
my husband, he, the eldest son of the head family, sat at the head above our uncles, 
though he’s a younger brother of my daughter.  
6.2.3 Tensions between community and individual wellbeing 
In practice, the village community facilitated tenancy arrangements either under the FB program 
or in a conventional form. To participate in tenancy, the villagers appeared to leverage the self-
governance capacity of the village through: information sharing, rule-making, and collective 
work of farmland maintenance. First, policy information related to farmland was basically shared 
through the Production Association across all the landowners in the village. For instance, the 
information on the subsidiary advantage for farm retirement under the FB program was 
conveyed by the president of the Association to the one who planned to retire. Besides, the 
visibility of farming practices or verbal communications in the neighborhood allowed owners to 
make a judgement about who could be a capable and appropriate tenant in terms of age, 
availability of successors, and mechanical capacities.  
 Second, the Association rendered the rule-making of tenancy arrangements transparent 
and legitimate. It held a plenary session annually involving all the landowners to share the 
planning and accountings of its activities, whereas its board members (about 10 members) 
gathered once two or three months to develop the plans. In particular, the Association evaluated 
the standard rents for revision every three years to accord with the socio-economic status of 
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farmland. The standard rents did not necessarily have to be followed, but were used extensively 
to legitimize the terms and conditions of tenancy arrangements.  
 Finally, the group organized under the Association (i.e., Environmental Conservation 
Group for Farmland and Water) facilitated and coordinated collective farmland maintenance 
activities, taking advantage of government subsidies. This collective effort involved non-farming 
landowners, and thus complemented farm management by a limited number of active farmers 
under tenancy.  
 This collective capacity appeared to build on individual wellbeing. This is inferred by the 
strategy by which tenants shared responsibility for farming among other available farmers. Many 
respondents who were post-retirement farmers affiliated with the Union mentioned their own 
health promotion as a key motivation to engage in farming, while some added their personal 
hobby to it. This suggests that many tenants were involved in tenancy as much as they could 
satisfy or at least would not sacrifice their individual wellbeing.  
 Though the concept and measurement of wellbeing are arguable, wellbeing involves 
tangible and intangible components (e.g., income, pleasures/pains, participation in society) as 
well as subjective and objective aspects (e.g., satisfaction/dissatisfaction, optimism/pessimism, 
health) (Gasper 2007; National Research Council 2001). Moreover, these multiple components 
and aspects are often contradictory, conflicting and dynamic (Dodge et al. 2012; D’Ambrosio 
and Frick 2012). As societal participation is one component of wellbeing, the perspective toward 
communal activities varied across individuals depending on their experiences, histories and 
current states. For instance, two female farmers differently viewed the farming practices in 
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relation to their community participation. One referred to the current state of farming (Interview 
with a farmer on December 12, 2016):  
As paddies have been enlarged with better accessible roads, rice farming, 
including the preparatory and aftertreatment work for which I’m responsible, 
became pretty much easier. … In the past, many of the wives were present at the 
fields, and I could easily find my friends to have a chat and a bit of relaxation. I 
often had small talk and snacks with them, without my husband’s seeing, and that 
was a bit of recreation. Now I can see few female friends on the fields, and I can’t 
take such a pleasure. … Since the launch of the Union, I have seen much fewer 
females there. Though all the farm families, except our family and the corporate 
farm, are involved, there’s no need for females to get involved as males operate the 
machines. … I can only take care of our family’s at ease, but there’s no need for 
collaboration and communications for us somewhat unfortunately. 
 Another described the similar state but from a different perspective (Interview with a 
farmer on December 13, 2016): 
When the village published a brief on the land improvement project, I found no 
mention of females’ contribution. Rice farming is certainly masculine, but there’s 
no recognition of females’ power behind the scenes. It has many pictures of males 
but only a few of females spending time with the sun. … I know little about 
collective maintenance, as I only engage in farmland for which our family is 
responsible. … One person from each household is supposed to contribute to 
collective maintenance such as cleaning of channels. Though I don’t know about 
the current state, quite some time ago my husband had a schedule conflict, and I 
joined the cleaning, but the allowance was halved! I was a bit upset, as I was 
working hard, though some men were doing inefficiently, taking over a cigarette. 
… After the land improvement, I can see only a few females on the paddies, and 
just say hi to them. When the paddies were smaller, we had to greet and talk. Those 
who were talked might have also felt bothersome, we had to behave as a good 
neighbor. Otherwise, I’d have got a trouble. Now, thanks to the large paddy with 
100-meter width, where I travel by a tractor, it doesn’t matter whether I loudly sing 
a song or fight with my husband. No one can hear me well. .. That’s easy to me. I 
have some other jobs to do … I appreciate getting away from sometimes hassle 
interactions. 
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 Furthermore, the same individual faced a dilemma between different components of 
wellbeing, leading to a strategic choice of a tenancy arrangement. In relation to his involvement 
in communal activities, for instance, one non-farming landowner described his perspectives on 
farmland and the strategy to accommodate his values in the tenancy arrangement (Interview with 
a farmer on December 11, 2016): 
In terms of the benefits from farmland, I see the monetary one, and the peace of mind, 
which is a sense of belonging to our village. It’s the same as a fellow-feeling that we 
control our stuff on our own. It’s said that animals feel comfortable in ‘Mure’ (a 
flock). It’s similar to that, as ‘Mura’ is called ‘Mure-shakai’ (flock society). … As 
there used to be an Agricultural Cooperative in our village, … that’s the way in U 
village, that when a family couldn’t farm, we asked another family in the village so as 
to secure and manage farmland in the village. The prime example of that is the 
corporate farm. We, villagers, have collectively managed our farmland and expanded 
it also by leasing it from neighboring villages. … Since our childhood, we’ve been 
told “U village, it’s such a ‘Erai’ (terrific) place.” ‘Erai’ has two meanings: one is 
‘rich’ as it has plenty of farmland, and the other is ‘hardworking’ as it involves lots of 
tiring work. Here, some can’t handle farmland, others can take it over. … I’m not 
much worried about my farmland, though I’m sort of concerned about the financial 
term. I feel secure as I leave it to someone whom I've known as a local, and begging 
would be good enough to get by. But I feel guilty if I’m slacking off without farming. 
Suppose, having 2.7ha of rice paddy, one is idling over weekends without farming, 
and goes to a hot spring or drives on holiday. The one feels ashamed, don’t we? 
Unless I take at least three positions to serve to the village, I’ll be talked about behind 
my back. That’s true! Others are thinking when I’ll retire, why not I farm, …that’s the 
‘unseen force.’ No one won’t help me. I can’t make an excuse.  
6.3 Emerging Challenges 
Regardless of the limited involvement in the FB program, farmland use and management in the 
village were in a gradual shift. Largely due to the demographic trends, the following two major 
challenges were emerging: incorporation of the Farming Union and land-use change. First, along 
with the aging and shrinking of farming population, farmland was being aggregated: farmland 
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beyond the capacity of an owner-household for farming was put under the management of either 
independent or Union-member farms. The former group, particularly the corporate farm, had a 
larger potential of securing successors to farming for the coming decades. The latter, however, 
had few active farmers available for the next few decades. Thus, they were under the discussion 
to collectively secure successors by incorporating the Union, though it was yet to be 
materialized.  
 Second, the village faced the mismatch between the villagers’ interests and the zoning 
designations in land-use. The farmland other than the improved large paddies (i.e., unimproved 
rice paddies, dry fields) was increasingly abandoned. Under this status, some respondents 
mentioned the inconvenience of the area delineations under the current zoning to accommodate 
the increasing non-farming population. Others expressed their future interests to divert their 
farmland to other uses. Consequently, the issue of land-use planning was often discussed, and it 
was communicated to the municipal hall. 
6.3.1 Incorporation of the Farming Union 
Farmland in the village (approximately 90ha) was managed largely fifty-fifty in areal terms by 
two groups: the independent farms (i.e., about 45ha); and the Union-member farms (i.e., about 
45ha). Many of the respondents felt that this would not continue due to the aging of farm 
population, particularly after baby boomers would have to completely retire from farming. Some 
of the currently active farmers expressed their physical limit to farm as remaining 5-6 years. 
Only the corporate farm placed reliance on their children to take over responsibility for farming, 
while most of them were concerned even about managing their own land. Accordingly they 
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presumed that new arrangements would have to be made. Not knowing motivation or willingness 
of the corporate farm to further extend its farm scale, some respondents hoped that the 
corporation would expand its farm, given the farming capacities and trust relationships in the 
village community. Others were interested to develop the Union into another corporate farm to 
farm the land in the village.  
 In addition to the already incorporated farm, interest in developing the Union as another 
responsible farm (Ninaite) largely rested on concerns about to what extent owners would be 
involved in farm management in the future. Some respondents hinted that an Union-based farm 
corporate would allow landowners to engage in farming and farmland maintenance more 
flexibly, compared to the contractual arrangements with the independent corporate farm. Others 
expected that the owners’ entitlement to farmland would be more saliently pronounced in the 
Union-based farm, rather than the independent corporate farm to which capital is centralized. For 
instance, a respondent, who was a Union-member farmer, explored the potential of such a Union-
based farm (Interview with a farmer on December 13, 2016): 

The next step after the kin-based tenancy would be tenancy contracts with the one 
or two large farm(s). Finally all the owners in our village may ask them to farm 
the land…. Though I didn’t want to talk about this, if we leave it up to them, as 
they are commercial farms, we have to mindlessly follow them. Land rent will 
depend on the market, and it may be none, following the rice price depreciation. 
We can’t engage in farming even if we want. … Then it’ll be the monopoly 
dominated by them. To my mind, we want to have another farm of the Union 
where we all gather in our village so that we develop through friendly competition 
with each other. … If not, as irrigation is automated, we won’t know how it’ll be 
actually managed, including the dues. … On another matter, if we small farmers 
gather into a Union farm, my son, when he reaches retirement, may feel like 
assisting in farming there, but if not, he can’t do so. … Since the government sets 
the criteria for farmland aggregation, small farmers are ineligible for subsidies 
and can’t afford machines. We have to be large, but we have neither capital nor 
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subsidies to do so. …We are in an extremely precarious position… To be eligible, 
we have to organize ourselves to manage a large area of farmland. … The 
government supports large farms to promote farmland aggregation… Possibly all 
the farmland will be aggregated into the largest farm, or halved into the two 
largest.… I don’t know how long I can continue farming, but if there’s our group, 
when I become incapable, my son may want to take over. … Moreover, if there will 
be a single company in our village, we have to obey whatever it says, including 
rent, but if there will be two or three farms, we may talk and accommodate each 
other not to be disadvantaged. …Otherwise, we small owners, can’t continue on 
our own, and may eventually disappear.  
 As he explored, if the Union is incorporated as a better-qualified farm entity, it will 
become eligible for several other subsidiary programs, for instance, to be subsidized for 
machinery purchases. Thus, since its establishment, the Union members occasionally discussed a 
plan to incorporate.  Around 2013 they even reached an agreement on the roles and 
responsibilities among the members.  
 However, they were yet to reach a conclusion to finally establish an incorporated Union 
farm. The members felt a larger risk of losing their individual wellbeing than benefiting from 
collective farm management given the uncertainties about securing profitability. First, securing 
profitability would not only require considerable facility investment to take advantage of 
economy of scale. It would also require commercial farming strategies including products and 
sales channels and at the same time successors to farm management. Even more than the issue of 
the fixed amount of subsidies insufficient for facility investment, long-term strategies for farm 
management were hardly developed. Second, most Union members were not urged to change 
their farming styles. Many of them were post-retirement farmers engaging in farming not for 
necessity of living but for health promotion or other purposes. Moreover, if push comes to shove, 
they could rely on the existing large farms, and not need to take a risk by turning out their own 
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resources just for economy of scale. In this regard, a respondent, who was an owner-farmer 
affiliated with the Union, explicated (Interview with a farmer on November 26, 2016): 

I’m already 80 years old, and may retire in the coming year or so… Then, I 
would naturally ask others to farm the land, as my son says he can’t do. … For 
crop conversion, I used to be working with a friend of mine for a couple of years, 
but in response to the call, I’ve come to join the Union. I thought we could take 
advantage of cost-saving through collective work, but.. even the work by two of 
us seems to be more advantageous than the Union in terms of cost reduction. … 
After all, only barley cropping doesn’t work, we have to grow something added-
value. … Now we only rely on the government subsidies. I heard barley cropping 
won’t be subsidized any longer in a few years, and so there’ll be no benefit in it. 
… I think we can’t do better without the support by the JA, as we have to have 
facilities for processing and develop sales channels so that the products will be 
consumed without surplus. … There’s no such support from our JA… When the 
subsidies become unavailable, it can’t help but tumble down. … On top of the 
sales, the cost-saving is foremost so that the shared profit would improve. 
Though it’s a tiny detail, going for lunch together would cost more than having it 
at home. … small expenses could be accumulated.. My wife says ‘How can those 
of the Union make a profit from barley cropping?’… In the end, people seek for 
profits that affect our livelihoods. … I guess the thing will be as it is. Timewise it 
may not easily change, and we are not motivated to make a change… Even if we 
try and invest money, it would be the most possible case that what remains is 
only the shared debt. 
6.3.2 Land-use change 
While the improved large paddies were managed by the two groups, smaller fields such as 
unimproved rice paddies and dry fields became sporadically abandoned over the past several 
years. Few farmers were willing to take responsibility to manage small rice paddies located at the 
fringes of the residential districts, given the inefficiency of farming them due to the sizes, figures 
and accessibility. Some post-retirement farmers or elderly females of farm households were 
farming dry fields lying along the river for their household consumption, but had found few to 
take over their roles. Despite the aging and decrease in farm population, the village experienced 
 !316
a slight increase in the total population. In fact, many respondents observed grown children 
returning to the village after marriage and building their houses near their parents’ home. This 
gives the opportunities to economize their family resources (e.g., childcare, elderly care, 
housing). As such, some tenancy arrangements were cancelled to allow landowners to build their 
children’s houses on farmland nearby. 
 Land-use in the village is controlled mainly by three laws: 1) City Planning Act (CPA); 2) 
Agricultural Land Act (ALA); and 3) Act on Establishment of Agricultural Promotion Regions 
(EAPR Act). First, the entire area of the village used to be designated as the Controlled 
Urbanization Area within the City-Planning Area (Toshi-keikaku kuiki) based on the CPA until 
the municipal city planning was revised in August 2013. This designation disallows development 
actions in principle, and those who intend to build need to secure a building permit, but if they 
plan to build farm houses and public facilities, they do not need such a permit. Following the 
revision in 2013 that demolished the CPA area divisions the and designated new divisions based 
on the municipal ordinance and planning, a part of the village, including the residential districts 
and their surrounding areas, came to be designated as the Developable Area (Kaihatsu-kano 
kuiki) that allows for development actions, though the rest remained in the controlled area newly 
called Controlled Development Area (Kaihatsu-kisei kuiki).  
 Second, if the land is farmland, those intended to build on it additionally have to gain a 
permission for farmland diversion under the ALA. This permission is conditional on the area 
designations under the EAPR Act. In the region designated by a municipal Agricultural 
Promotion Regional Plan, farmland diversion within the Agricultural Developing Area 
(commonly called ‘Ao-ji’: Blue Land) cannot be permitted, while that within the rest of the area 
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(commonly called ‘Shiro-ji’: White Land) is permissible if certain conditions are met. In 
accordance with productivity and surrounding environment of farmland, the land within White 
Land is classified into the four categories including the Class A, the First Rank, the Second 
Rank, and the Third Rank: the former two are mostly disapproval except for the development 
actions to build for agriculture related activities and the latter two are more easily permissible. 
Thus, farmland on small paddies nearby the residential districts ‘outside’ the Blue Land can be 
diverted for other land-uses like housing as long as the diversion maintains or improves the 
social functioning of the village. 
 Yet, not only the improved paddies but also the dry fields and some of the small 
unimproved paddies remained within the Blue Land. Given the potentials of housing and 
commercial development backed by the favorable access to the transportation, residential and 
commercial facilities (e.g., an airport, industrial roads, schools, hospitals, shopping facilities), 
many villagers were seeking a change in the area designation. For instance, the Neighborhood 
Association consisting of all the villagers including non-farmers, occasionally discussed this 
issue and conveyed their request for change to the municipal hall. However, the current land-use 
system under the EAPR Act and the ALA hardly allows for deselection of the Blue Land, 
resulting in the unchanged status of the designations (Interview with municipal officials on 
August 20, 2018). On the agricultural decline, the respondent from the corporate farm, who 
served on both the Agricultural Committee and the City Planning Council at the municipal level, 
suggested the mismatches between the affordability of productive farming and the institutional 
demarcation (Interview with a farmer on November 22, 2016): 
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As discussed at the City Planning Council and the Agricultural Committee, I 
acknowledge the importance of both city planning and farmland liquidation. … The 
common thread is what is supposed to be about land-use. So, I neither agree that we 
should blindly increase the housing nor that we should preserve all the farmland at 
any rate. … Though it’s ridiculous to say city planning in the countryside, … it’s still 
relevant to demographic policy. .. Although our village is neither under the pressures 
of urbanization nor depopulation, with no strategy, the population will decrease on the 
general trend. … I don’t think we should force ourselves to continuously grow crops on 
the land adjacent to houses. We should rather create opportunities for population 
increase if any. … The city abolished the zoning of city planning districts. It was 
criticized as the reciprocal policy against the trend, but I think the state frozen by the 
zoning might be against the times. Under the zoning, no one except for farm families 
or their branch families was allowed to build a house in our village. So, it gave a 
complete loyalty to the principle of eliminating outsiders. … As I pay land rent to 
owners, I often confront this issue. The rent for small paddies nearby the residential 
districts has remarkably decreased. In response, owners surprisingly ask “Is the 
difference between the improved paddies and the small plots that much?” While 
honestly I feel like giving me a break to take care of those paddies, I talk to them about 
the cases in some regions where owners rather pay management fees to tenants. .. but 
they are uneasy and it takes a while to make me understood. … On top of the rent, 
there’s the issue of the share of irrigation dues. … I heard from one official of the Land 
Improvement District that one owner with the largest farmland in S village has come 
to bear more than JPY100,000 (approximately USD883) annually. Before the change 
in the share, I used to bear the annual dues amounting to more than JPY one million 
(approximately USD8,830). 
 With little possibility of drastic change in land-use, all the respondents noted benefits 
from farmland for their living. Those who were practically engaging in farming, expressed their 
sense of responsibility for managing farmland to secure the inherited family estate and not to 
make any negative impact on the surroundings as long as they were physically capable. 
However, some of the respondents who were owners but not engaged in farming showed their 
interest in converting their farmland into some other land for cost-benefit considerations. Besides 
the irrigation dues and tax payments, landowners may need to bear the cost and/or make an 
investment in maintaining the agricultural infrastructure in the course of infrastructural decay. 
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Having experienced or observed the governmental land acquisition for road construction, which 
was conducted prior to the land improvement project, they expected to be relieved from 
responsibility of managing farmland. At the same time, some respondents highlighted the 
importance of landscape integrity for its athletic benefits as well as land-use efficiency. In this 
regard, one respondent shared the view that a collective decision may need to be made in the 
near future to what extent they keep and manage farmland (Interview with a farmer on December 
11, 2016): 

Landowners in the neighboring villages, where apartment houses are built, not 
seem to care about farmland as the land prices are increasing. … But as farmland 
outside the Blue Land is subject to taxation based on the tax rate evaluation 
similar to the municipal property, I guess the present expenses might be larger 
there. So, our village would be better off with remaining in the Blue Land for the 
time being, but when someone comes to buy it, we may like to have it deselected 
from the current demarcations and sell a bunch of fields to a developer. … It’s like 
the time when we had the land improvement project. … Today, the balance of 
payments for farmland maintenance is relatively easy, thanks to the subsidies 
which now go to a group of farmers rather than individual farmers. .. Yet, as the 
paddy fields have been enlarged, repair expenses for unexpected technical 
troubles became considerable, sometimes amounting to JPY 500,000 or 100,000. 
Currently, such costs are more or less covered by the subsidies, but I’m worried 
about how long this kind of programs would continue. In addition, as a few 
decades have passed since the land improvement, the infrastructure is degrading 
with age. … Some of us are thinking that it’s a way to do another round of land 
improvement to further enlarge the paddies. … But if we do so, the land will 
remain in the Blue Land for the next few decades. … In such a case, we have to 
delineate the area to demarcate sellable land from unsellable land. It sounds 
greedy, like a real estate agent, but it would be a problem if farmland is bought 
sporadically. … We want to decide land-use on our own based on our local 
consent. … Otherwise, we let it be sprawled, … and our local environment will 
deteriorate. … There’re numerous cases in which some owners get temporarily 
paid for the land but the local community become teared apart.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
The adoption of the FB program in the village was limited to three individual tenancy 
arrangements by which farmland of three retired farmers was lent out to different farms through 
the FB. Yet, tenancy had preceded before the program introduction, leading to farmland 
aggregation into independent farms and Union-member ones. This trend resulted from the 
spontaneous arrangements among the villagers. They negotiated their value perspectives to 
farmland to ensure security of life and property fundamentally on a kinship basis but also based 
on their assessment of economic feasibility. To facilitate this negotiation, the Production 
Association shared relevant information, legitimated the local standards, and coordinated 
collective actions for complementing farmland management under tenancy. Tenant farming was 
managed on a household basis, although some of the farms collectively engaged in barley 
cropping but not in farming rice. As such, there was no local institution to allow for collective 
tenancy arrangements through the FB, unlike the case in N District. Furthermore, given that 
existing tenancy arrangements were not directly applicable to the FB program, program adoption 
was confined to new farm retirements.  
 Even without program adoption, farmland aggregation had progressed, whereas farmland 
was managed and maintained without much problem, taking advantage of subsidiary programs. 
On the one hand, however, the independent farms with a better potential of securing successors 
became less motivated to enlarge further. On the other, the Union-member farms appeared to fall 
into a crisis due to a lack of future farm labor. Thus, the villagers were exploring two best 
possible scenarios: the incorporation of the Farming Union, by which its members will manage 
both rice farming and crop conversion with flexible involvement of landowners to collectively 
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manage farmland; and land-use change whereby the village community can take advantage of 
possible population increase enabled by farmland diversion to make the community 
economically viable. These two scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The most 
expected way might be to develop farm management in the form of communal farming at the 
Union and at the same time to reduce the burden on the farmers by diverting less cost-effective 
farmland for other land-uses and limiting farming to superior farmland. To follow either of these 
scenarios, the community has to overcome multiple barriers, including the land-use controls 
under the currently institutionalized systems, the agricultural downturn involving the rice price 
depreciation, the infrastructural decay of agricultural facilities, and different interests and needs 
for land among villagers. 
 The FB program might be used for either of these scenarios. In theory, the Union, if 
incorporated, can take advantage of the FB program to collectively aggregate farmland and thus 
receive a subsidy for the use of community-based agricultural development. Also, the 
independent farms can renew the tenancy contracts operationally through the FB program, 
though they may not be subject to retirement funds that are conditional on a landowner’s 
complete retirement from rice farming upon the adoption. In particular, land improvement in 
combination with the FB program has been increasingly supported and financed by the 
government. Thus, the FB program might help an agricultural investment in the village by 
officially aggregating farmland and renewing and upgrading the agricultural infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, even more than the governmental capacities for program implementation, it would 
be the first step to clarify who could be responsible for farmland as an individual property, as a 
family asset, and as a communal resources, and to what extent.   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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The national government introduced the Farmland Bank (FB) program in 2014 as a hopeful fix 
of a fragmented agricultural structure to generate better economies of scale. To build on but 
surmount the post-WWII legacy of farmland ownership, it deployed the multi-level governance 
(MLG) model where the FBs at the prefectural level were designated to intervene in farmland 
transactions and bring new farmers in tenancy even without the owners’ consent. This approach 
to farmland governance challenged the vested interests, which have been nurtured in the farming 
families and villages and the farming sector since the post-WWII land reform. The FB program 
legally and politically repositioned farmland owners in the farmland market. This was a radical 
turning point in the years since the postwar agrarian reform that has given owners a central role 
in decision-making on private farmland use. 
 This dissertation has offered new insights into the process of governing farmland as a 
way of negotiating different value perspectives. From the angle of farmers (including owners) in 
a region facing farmland abandonment, it discussed how different actors have interacted, 
negotiated and contested across formal and informal jurisdictional levels to act on their 
motivations to use (or not use) and manage (or not manage) farmland. With a focus on rice 
paddies, a symbolic Japanese agricultural landscape, it illuminated farmland as a ‘social field of 
power’ and farmers as active social agents in the process of governing farmland. Taking the FB 
program as a new MLG model, the study examined how and why the program has emerged, and 
how and why farmers have responded to it. The following sections present the key findings and 
draw out theoretical implications and directions for future research. Finally the chapter ends with 
policy implications for policy-makers and planners. 
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7.1 Key Findings from the Study 
7.1.1 Institutional transformation in the postwar era 
The introduction of the FB program followed a decade-long political struggle to revitalize the 
nation-state. At the state level, the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) along with the business 
community led the policy-making process to take advantage of farmland as ‘productive 
resources’ for national economic recovery. At the same time, the farming sector (i.e., agricultural 
ministry, farm-tribe lawmakers, and interest groups) resisted radical change so as to preserve 
farmland as the ‘sectoral resources’ of the agrarian community. On the one hand, the business-
oriented agencies advocated for the exclusion of local actors, particularly farmland owners, from 
the decision-making process on farmland use for tenancy in an attempt to open an avenue for 
new entries including business corporations to a competitive tenancy market. On the other, the 
agrarian agencies upheld local integration and the inclusion of locals to ensure that they not 
suffer a loss or disadvantage from the new policy, while being urged to revitalize the farming 
sector. Yet, the political power of these agrarian agencies has been increasingly debilitated 
through the electoral and administrative reforms since the 1990s, allowing for a program design 
largely reflecting the wishes of business. 
 These opposite ends of the state-level agencies, however, shared similar concerns over 
agricultural land and population. Despite a series of political efforts, farmland abandonment has 
grown, and the agricultural workforce has increasingly shrunk. Due to the ongoing retirement of 
the massive cohort of farm population, the agrarian community can no longer maintain its social 
and economic viability against the intensifying agricultural internationalization. Even prior to the 
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FB program, the preceding governance models have opened room for interested parties to engage 
in farming through tenancy. Originating from the first postwar land reform model, the model has 
shifted from ‘owner-oriented’ to ‘user-driven’ not only to improve agricultural productivity but 
also to ensure that the broader society can continuously benefit from the productive use of 
farmland. In line with this move, the notion of farmland has changed from private property of a 
farm family to the commons of the society and, accordingly, the governance approach has altered 
from the centralized control of individual property to the decentralized, multi-level coordination 
for collective decisions on farmland use. While these changes reflect external pressures (e.g., 
trade negotiations, international relations), they have been at the same time driven by internal 
forces. 
 The internal forces driving these governance model changes have been forged through 
the institutional transformation in the agrarian community. Over the postwar years, the agrarian 
community has drastically changed its constituents and functions around two key institutions: 
farm families (ie) and villages (mura). Transforming from the trinity of inheritance (i.e., family 
property, family business and family name), farm families have been subdivided in terms of 
work and life across and within generations, and multi-generational families have decreased. In 
accordance with the increase of non-farming households even with farmland ownership, farm 
villages have been stratified into farming versus non-farming constituents between which 
tenancy arrangements have developed.  
 Both farm families and villages have secured minimum functions to act collectively as a 
unit, whereas the farming component, either as a family business or a common ground of a 
village, has been largely marginalized. Farm families have persisted as a life-security unit to 
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strive for livelihoods of the constituents by adapting to the socio-economic changes. Farm 
villages have maintained a neighborhood function to collectively deal with externalities of 
individual households (e.g., infrastructural investment, cultural activities). However, active 
engagement in farmland use and management has declined in both farm families and villages, 
where farmland has become no longer the ground of livelihood for the majority. In this context, 
many of the constituents have lost their connection with farmland and have become increasingly 
indifferent about whoever might use and manage it.  
 To accord with these institutional changes, the government has continuously reconfigured 
the postwar tenancy model. Departing from the land reform model (i.e., the centralized state 
control of one-parcel-based farmland transactions), it first invented the decentralized planning 
scheme of ‘use-rights’ setting in an attempt to leverage the self-governance capacity of farm 
villages to improve the farming industry (the second model). This model failed to promote 
farmland aggregation for competitive, large-scale farming. Without specific targets of 
aggregation, it allowed nominal binding of existing informal tenancy contracts through 
administrative planning at the municipal level. To more specifically guide collective 
arrangements for better economy of scale, the government bolstered multi-level features of the 
model by designating prefectural authorities to coordinate the village-municipal agencies with 
national policy goals (the third model). With the aim at aggregation by qualified farmers (e.g., 
certified farmers, village-based farms), this model expanded the governance scope to render 
agricultural multifunctionality beneficial to a broader society. Yet, the very farmers who can 
generate multifuntionality have been decreasing in the agrarian community. 
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 Taking the agricultural abandonment as an opportunity, the government initiated the FB 
program as the latest model to bring new actors in farm management. In the interest of rendering 
free and open competition in the tenancy market, it gives more power to prefectural authorities to 
publicly recruit users and redistribute farmland to those who the government considers are 
economically and technically capable (e.g., business corporations and outside farmers) regardless 
of owners’ wills. By setting the numerical target as an overriding imperative (i.e., 80% 
aggregation rate by 2023) with a huge amount of budget (for the use of subsidies to owners and 
local communities, administration, and farmland data management), the state deployed the FBs 
at the prefectural level rather than the municipal one in an attempt to facilitate tenancy 
arrangements beyond the grasp of owners and local communities. It also gives prefectural 
authorities discretionary power to design implementation policy in consideration of regional 
characters, while allowing them to delegate some of the administrative tasks to municipal 
agencies so as to mobilize local administrative resources for implementation. With the 
understanding that private ownership is hardly mutable in the capitalist society, the idea is to 
separate between ownership and usership so as to tackle the vested interests held by the agrarian 
community and open the farmland market to outsiders. This model enables the nation-state to 
exploit farmland as the ‘national’ resource rather than a ‘local’ one. 
  
7.1.2 Nexus of farmers’ perspectives in governing farmland 
Farmers’ sense of farmland as ‘family property’ was a key determinant of the mode and level of 
the FB program adoption. One community (District N) adopted the FB program in combination 
with land improvement, by which a majority of landowners entrusted their farmland via the FB 
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to a reliable local farm, which was simultaneously incorporated as a community-based 
Agricultural Producers’ Cooperative Corporation. This allowed owners to keep their family 
property alive for a longer period of time by means of infrastructural investment together with 
stewardship by the local corporation. 
 The other (Village U) largely remained within the conventional tenancy arrangements 
where landowners entrusted their farmland directly to several large local farms, either 
incorporated or family-run. These tenancy arrangements allowed owners to secure their family 
property under kinship or its extension to the neighborhood. Among the active farmers, owner-
farmers insulated their family property through their direct engagement in farming on their land, 
whereas tenants extended their sense of values in family property to that in the commons of the 
extended family or the neighborhood to steward the farmland of others.  
 The study also shows the farmers’ perspectives were negotiated and continuously 
changing. The following part discusses the negotiating value perspectives in each of the two 
cases. Then, the findings from the two cases are comparatively analyzed in terms of the 
following key factors affecting farmers’ value perspectives to farmland: threats and opportunities 
to farmland use; generational gaps and connections; and institutional changes. 
District N: 
In District N, the adoption of the FB program was a collective action. The majority of farmland 
owners agreed on the initiatives of the FB program combined with land improvement and lent 
their land to the FB that sublet it mainly to the local cooperative farm. Certainly critical 
reflections were given to the initiatives: some owners were concerned about whether the cost for 
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land improvement might be left as ‘debts’ associated with family property to their descendants 
and others doubted whether the cooperative farm could be competitive enough to avoid 
generating ‘debts.’ These doubts and suspicions were mostly cleared up through the local 
dialogues that leveraged the social relations within and beyond the community. The economic 
incentives for the initiatives eased the anxiety about financial burdens on the owners. The 
historical development of communal farming demonstrated the managerial capacity of the 
cooperative farm and boosted it as a trustable subtenant.  
 More significantly, many owners, particularly those who had lent their farmland to 
others, were largely indifferent about the initiatives. These attitudes were starkly different from 
those in the 1960s-1970s when the owners contested, competed and disputed with each other for 
a better share of farmland from land improvement. In those days, farmland was more socially 
and economically viable, and the owners were eager to ensure their family property, secure their 
livelihoods, and maintain the wellbeing of their family members. However, with the loss of 
social and economic viability, farmland mostly lost its life-security function as family property. 
Although owners were still aware of farmland as family property, their present concerns were 
over whether it would bring ‘debts’ or not.  
 In place of farming, owners increasingly relied on other jobs as sources of income and, 
through receding from farming and farmland, have changed their connection with and their sense 
of values in farmland. Some who disengaged from farming but received ‘rice’ as land rent, found 
a connection with their farmland through ‘rice’ and sticked to its specificity. Those who still 
engaged in farming but with the increased responsibility for other work identified ‘unnecessary’ 
fatigue and toil with farmland through their weekend labor, but sometimes were cheered up with 
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non-monetary rewards (e.g., enjoying a few beers after farm working!). Among the full-time 
farmers, some who relied economically on farming, saw their future in farmland, while 
occasionally projecting their uncertainty and the instability of agriculture onto farmland. Those 
who received pensions found their creativity and ingenuity on farmland but often with a mixture 
of anxiety over the absence of heirs and their own aging. Together with changes in their 
economic, technical and physical capacity, their perspectives were changing simultaneously with 
a mixture of different feelings through their experiences and contacts with farmland.  
 Despite the progress in farm retirement that had been already underway, the adoption of 
the FB program in combination with land improvement made a radical change in the 
relationships between farmers and farmland. The initiatives urged many of the remaining active 
farmers to change their lifestyles, belongings and/or social relations, and thereby to alter their 
own subjectivities. Some farmers of family-run farms confronted a decision about whether to 
continue their independent farm management in the very different environment or to be part of 
the cooperative farm by giving up their farming styles. Many of them opted for inclusion in the 
cooperative farm but felt a loss of hands-on feeling about farmland or puzzled over the lifestyle 
changes, while having a sense of justice for the sake of the community. It was not an easy 
decision for those who had a sense of worthiness in their own farming, as it was not only to gain 
monetary returns but also to stretch their originality and ingenuity, support their family members 
and kin, and demonstrate ‘a way of life’ in their own manner. Furthermore, the enlargement and 
leveling of paddies erased previous boundaries and deaden the specific identification of original 
paddies. This physical transformation inhibited owners from maintaining the same connection 
with their farmland, either through having a particular ‘rice’ or farming on specific land. 
 !330
 The changes in material and physical connections between farmers and farmland not only 
affected the present but rippled over time. Many farmland owners, most over the age of 60, 
subjectivized themselves as a family head of a farm household through their experiences in being 
raised by their parents who engaged in farming, helping their parents with miscellaneous farming 
practices, and playing with their friends on the farm roads. Through being part of active 
gatherings, cultural activities, and community lives rooted in farming, they developed their 
collective subjectivities as a member of a farming community. Even if they no longer engaged in 
farming, these experiences and memories nurtured their perspectives to farmland as family 
property to be handed down to the next generation and bolstered the sense of commitment to 
their farm villages. As such, despite adversity in agriculture, some active farmers remained in 
charge of farming either through being part of the cooperative farm or by continuing independent 
farming. 
 Younger generations whose parents had already disengaged from farming or engaged in 
mechanized farming on a part-time basis had much less physical, material, and cognitive 
connections with farmland. Without such connections, their attention to farming and farmland 
was marginalized, and their individual and collective subjectivities were very different from 
those of their parents’ generation. They had other ways of pursuing their private and professional 
lives. Less of a constituent of a farm family and a farm village, they were far less preoccupied 
with a sense of responsibility for handing down farmland to the next generation, and were less 
motivated to sustain a farming community. This is the concern inferred by some informants that 
the ‘complete’ entrustment of farming to others would discourage owners to keep their farming 
community alive. In fact, from my follow-up fieldwork in August 2018 I found that the villagers’ 
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participation in farmland management activities declined while one of the villages ceased to hold 
a long-standing traditional festival.  
Village U: 
In Village U, tenancy arrangements had already progressed on a household basis prior to the FB 
program, leading to farmland aggregation to a handful of local large farms. Given the potential of 
only marginal increase in farmland aggregation, the FB program was not actively introduced by 
the government authorities in consideration of minimal subsidiary opportunities. Even in a few 
cases of program adoption, the conventional arrangements persisted except for the paper-based 
arrangements via the FB. Hence, tenancy primarily went through direct negotiations between 
owners and tenants and, if not successful, leveraged neighborhood communications or the 
network of the village-based organizations (e.g., Farming Union) for agreeable arrangements.  
With the assumption that families were responsible for care of their property, the kernel of 
negotiations was the capacity of tenants to ‘decently’ steward farmland. Given the understanding 
that farmland could not be very profitable, owners were not demanding ‘profitable’ returns, but 
to supplement their household income. With the reference prices of land rent standardized in a 
village, there was generally no competition among tenants in terms of rent. Owners thus relied 
on kinship, friendship or acquaintance as long as they could have ‘decent’ rent to cover the cost 
of holding the farmland.  
 However, the perspectives on farmland were diverging between owners and tenants, and 
this gap occasionally elicited conflicts between them. Many of the owners who had disengaged 
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from farming and submerged themselves in suburban lives often failed to comprehend how the 
‘decent’ level of stewardship came about with ‘decent’ rent. Consequently some of them saw the 
land rent reduction as well as the increase in the share of irrigation dues even unfair. Having 
subjectivized themselves as ‘right holders’ of ownership, they were skeptical about whether their 
rights to farmland might be unduly exercised. In such situations, the village-based organization 
(i.e., Production Association) mediated (potential) conflicts by rendering the standardized rents 
as a reference to show that landowners were at least ‘equally’ treated for the rent payment and 
the cost sharing. 
 Furthermore, their ownership rights could be exercised only within the legal frameworks, 
and they could not freely alter land-use or sell it. Yet, having experienced the exceptional case in 
which a portion of farmland was sold for highway construction on the occasion of land 
improvement in the 1990s, farmland conversion was not an unthinkable future option for many 
owners. In the suburban context where land demand was noticeable, most of the owners 
subjectivized themselves as ‘land’ owners but not necessarily ‘farmland’ owners. 
 As constituents of the farming village, tenant farmers had no authority over owners to 
enlarge and/or level their paddies autonomously to be more efficient. Rather they accommodated 
owners’ requests for tenancy to accord with their capacity and interest. For several large farmers, 
paddies were still contested ground, though their eagerness was much less than several decades 
ago and also varied across different farmers particularly depending on their economic reliance on 
farming. Albeit passively, they negotiated in consideration of to what extent they could extend 
their capacity to tenancy while securing their livelihoods: some took into account the physical 
potentials of how far they could travel to manage the entire farmland and others accepted any 
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requests to expand future opportunities of tenancy. They had their own criteria of tenancy 
arrangements to maintain their wellbeing and adapt their lifestyles to change in tenancy.  
 The point of contestation was not the land rent but the social relations in the village. The 
social relations were sometimes delicate, not necessarily dependent on technical or economical 
capacity of farming, but involved all the drama of village life. One case of program adoption 
suggests that a large farmer retired not merely from rice farming but from the stressful, tiring 
contestation while he still had his physical and technical strength.  
 On this competing ground, the incorporation of the Farming Union was not an easy task, 
though it was one way to take advantage of the FB funding opportunities. Despite the existence 
of the Union, it was fragmented across family-owned farms, each of which developed their own 
ways of farming and living that still essentially built on rice farming. Having extended the 
heritage to their own invention and innovation, large farmers as tenants as well as owners saw 
farmland as ‘a part of their lives,’ through subjectivizing themselves as heads of farm families. 
Thus, their perspectives on rice paddies were more on a family basis than community-based and 
such perspectives hindered their initiative to incorporate the Union for collective rice farming. 
 Their subjections built on their experiences and observations of the daily struggles of 
previous generations in their childhoods and younger adulthoods. It was certainly impossible to 
completely share the same experiences across generations, and so was it to see themselves and 
farmland in the same way. This gap was the critical challenge that many elderly farmers were 
confronting. To fill the gap, only a few were able to hand over farming to their heirs and thereby 
to directly communicate and share a vision of farm management within a family. Many others in 
the absence of successors were already hopeless to close a gap within a family, but hoped that 
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farmland stewardship could be collectively passed down within the village. Thus, many were 
aware of the potential of the Union to fill the inter-generational gap. Yet, besides technical 
barriers (e.g., managerial expertise, accounting skills), they also recognized the intra-
generational gap in perspectives.  
Threats and opportunities to farmland use: 
Both communities experienced decreased ‘profitability’ but faced different threats to the 
productive use of farmland: farmland abandonment in District N, and farmland conversion and 
partial abandonment in Village U. Now that the life-security function of farmland has lessened, 
the main concern of land owners was over whether their holdings could suffer ‘deficits.’ Owners 
agreed on tenancy arrangements as long as their concerns over any deficits arising from the 
arrangements were dispelled. If they found the costs of keeping it under tenancy exceeded the 
benefits, farmland often ceased its agricultural production function.  
 In District N, farmland abandonment was encroaching on several villages, and the 
villagers assumed that more farmland would be abandoned without land improvement. 
Particularly in the three villages that were excluded from program adoption, some owners 
appeared to abandon their farmland with inferior conditions (e.g., terraced paddies on steep 
slopes) given few tenants willing to steward such farmland. In Village U where more potential 
existed, some owners expressed their interests in diverting farmland for non-agricultural 
purposes. In fact, farmland conversion for residential use progressed in certain area where land-
use changes were allowed. At the same time, inferior farmland where land-use changes were 
disallowed was increasingly abandoned. If land-use changes are appropriately managed, either 
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farmland abandonment or conversion could turn into opportunities (e.g., revegetation, 
urbanization).  
Generational gaps and connections: 
Farmland owners performed their assessments not merely in economic terms. Their analyses 
extended to their individual and collective relations to farmland and other people within and 
across generations. Due to the increased disengagement from farming, many in younger 
generations subjectivized themselves as a constituent of a non-farming family and a professional 
community rather than a farming village and, as such, marginalized their relations to farmland.  
 Within the same generation, the gap in perspectives was widening between farming and 
non-farming households: farming ones saw farmland still as part of their lives to supplement 
their household incomes and diets and spend time, energies and other resources for farming, 
whereas non-farming ones found themselves apart from farmland as it was mostly absent in their 
daily lives. The former’s sense of farmland appeared to extend to non-monetary values (e.g., 
feeling of accomplishment, creativity and originality), but the latter’s sense was often reduced to 
monetary ones.  
 Between the active farmers, the two communities show different modes of intra-
generational connections. In District N, collective subjectivities had evolved in rice farming 
across different farm households through developing the community-based farming organization 
to steward paddies across several villages. Those affiliated with the organization nurtured their 
sense of farmland as the commons of the community. This sense of belonging and valuing 
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farmland helped to adopt the FB program, as it fueled the local key figures’ commitment to the 
community to take a lead in the initiatives.  
 In Village U, collective subjectivities in rice farming remained largely with individual 
farm households, while occasionally extending to kinship and neighborhood. Despite their 
affiliation with the Farming Union, the substantial fragmentation disallowed the nurturing of the 
sense of farmland as the communal commons. The stronger sense of values in farmland as family 
property induced either contestation or insulation of tenancy arrangements, rather than 
cooperation or dialogue, hindering the incorporation of the Union and the collective adoption of 
the FB program.  
Institutional changes:  
Both communities were undergoing institutional transformations in governing farmland. As one 
of the key social institutions, the farming community has changed in its territorial scope, but 
differently between the two communities. In District N, the scope of a farming community 
expanded from each village to the agglomeration of multiple villages to extensively manage 
paddies under tenancy arrangements. Through communal farming across these villages, farmers’ 
belongings and social relations were drastically changing. In addition, land improvement fueled 
the change in the farmers’ material and cognitive relations to farmland by reshaping the 
boundaries and surfaces of paddies. Village U remained mostly unchanged within one village, 
although rice farming on an individual farm basis had transcended the village boundary to 
include a neighboring village. As such, farmers’ communal perspectives as well as their sense of 
belonging remained somewhat insulated. 
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 As another pivotal social institution, the farm family has transformed over generations 
similarly in the two cases. Many farm families became non-farming ones, whereby the 
connections between family members and farmland were weakened. Instead of invigorating the 
farming component within a family, they have increasingly outsourced it to others through 
tenancy arrangements. The community-based farming organizations stretched the institutional 
capacity of farming communities to complement that of farm families in managing farmland. In 
this way, the interlocking transitions of farm families and villages have taken place along with 
the progress in tenancy arrangements, wherein many owners have lost their intimate relations to 
farmland.  
 These interlocking transitions of social institutions have progressed in tandem with (and 
even driven) the shift of the MLG model in governing farmland. Historically farmers have 
collectively resisted or cooperated on agricultural policy to secure their livelihood units. A prime 
example of resistance is the collective bargaining of farmers in Village U against the national 
policy of depressing the rice price in the early 1960s. That of cooperation is the reorganization of 
community activities in the 1990s under the slogan “ten villages as one” in District N by 
enhancing the collaborative working relationships with the municipal and prefectural authorities.  
In either of these cases, farmers internalized, expressed and acted on their collective subjectivity 
as a constituent of a farming community to pursue their needs and interests. However, the 
increased stratification and fragmentation of the social institutions led to the latest MLG model 
to allow for new entries into their communities, while making it difficult to motivate farmers to 
forge collective subjectivity and exercise collective action on farmland management. 
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7.1.3 Effects of the FB program  
The FB program has far less attained its ambitious goal of farmland aggregation in spite of the 
generous budgetary support particularly in the form of subsidies to owners and local 
communities. The overriding imperative of program implementation is to achieve the Key 
Performance Index (KPI): 80% share of farmland to be used by ‘responsible farmers’ (i.e., 
farmland aggregation rate) by 2023. The farmland aggregation rate increased from 48.7% in 
2013 (i.e., the baseline) to 55.2% in 2018, but failed to keep up with the ‘annual target’ (i.e., an 
annual increase in aggregation by 150 thousand ha) until 2018. To monitor the progress and 
thereby facilitate implementation, the national government has measured the prefectural 
performance by means of the ‘FB’s contribution ratio’ and ranked the prefectures relative to this 
ratio to ensure public disclosure of performance and allocate budget accordingly to each 
prefecture.  
 As the cornerstone of agricultural ‘structural’ policy, the program primarily aims to 
resolve the fragmented land holdings and promote large-scale farming. Thus, the aggregation 
rate could be reasonable in general as a measurement of program performance rather than some 
other measures of improvement in agricultural production (e.g., volume and values of 
agricultural produce) which marketing strategies and agricultural inputs other than ‘land’ would 
also greatly affect. In particular, rice farming could take better advantage of the program to 
improve productivity due to its land-extensive farming than labor-intensive one. Yet, the 
calculation of the ‘FB’s contribution ratio’ disregards to what extent the program implementation 
contributes to physical farmland consolidation, although consolidation is part of the structural 
policy goal. Also, while there are several other means to farmland aggregation (e.g., use-rights 
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setting under the PIAMF Act without subsidiary support), the calculation takes no account of 
farmland aggregation through other means than FBs. In effect, though the ranking-based 
budgeting instilled competitive spirits among some prefectures to raise performance, the FBs’ 
contribution to ‘the annual target’ continued to be less than 20%, while that to the actual new 
aggregation remained below half.  
 By design, the program gives more discretionary power to prefectural authorities to take 
advantage of regional resources and broaden the tenancy market. At the same time, it allows 
them to mobilize local resources by delegating on-the-ground work to municipal agencies for 
program implementation. While diffusing the state authority to allow for some flexibility in 
governing farmland at the prefectural and municipal levels, with the new legislation it maintains 
the role of the state in guiding and supervising the prefectural authorities through monitoring, 
evaluation and budget allocation. The tenet of this latest MLG model is the separation between 
ownership and usership with an aim to create a fluid tenancy market and expedite farmland 
aggregation so as to secure farmland as ‘national’ and ‘productive’ resources.  
 Nevertheless, the limited attainment suggests that farmers have not been so easily 
disconnected from farmland but rather systematically entangled with it. Being aware of the risks 
arising from forcefully disconnecting farmland from farmers, prefectural authorities rather 
modestly approached the FB program to take care of farmland as ‘regional resources.’ For 
instance, the FBs as prefectural agencies would owe ‘debts’ if they leased farmland from owners 
but failed to sublet it to capable farmers. Thus, they tended to rely on ready-made tenancy 
arrangements at the local level rather than surrendering to economic fluidity. Certainly, the new 
MLG model also brought innovations in tenancy arrangements. The prefectural government in 
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Ishikawa developed a regional fund to support new entries in the unfavorable areas for regional 
revitalization, while it organized three-level working mechanism (i.e., prefectural, regional and 
municipal) to implement the program within the administrative framework. Yet, the nationally 
standardized evaluation system associated with the ranking-based budgeting discouraged the 
unique strategy of the prefecture specific to the regional context.  
 The municipal agencies (e.g., municipal governments, agricultural cooperatives) were 
also cautious about handling farmland as ‘local resources’ since most farmers were their 
jurisdictional constituents and legitimated their authority. Thus, they primarily respected the 
locals’ wills in coordinating tenancy arrangements, while tackling the administrative complexity 
for program implementation. A prime example is that few penalties have been imposed in 
practice on owners who keep farmland fallow, although the agricultural committees at the 
municipal level have been given more responsibilities and authorities to regularly check up and 
administer farmland. Another example is that the Community Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP) 
has ensured merely subsidiary opportunities accessible to farmers, although the municipal 
governments have been given increased discretional power to facilitate local dialogues. 
 The current governance outcome is the modality where farmers as ownership right 
holders are still sanctified to make an autonomous decision of farmland use with a limited 
penalty for abandonment, rather than being forced to renounce their rights for the exercise of 
complete discretionary power of prefectural authorities. Tenancy arrangements have essentially 
built on local social relations. Where locally-based farmers were still available, a handful of large 
farmers have stewarded farmland through tenancy within a geographical territory that 
increasingly extended across several farming villages. Only when a lack of locally available 
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farmers allowed for new entries, did the FB program call for outside farmers. As such, the FB 
program complemented local tenancy arrangements rather than promoted large capitalist farms to 
enter into the tenancy market. Overall, despite a massive budget injection, the FB program has 
only marginally facilitated farmland aggregation. 
 Taking advantage of certain local initiatives, however, the FB program rendered 
exponential progress in both farmland aggregation and consolidation particularly in combination 
with land improvement in some areas like in District N. Communal farming has been politically 
and socially promoted to allow for collective tenancy arrangements, and if incorporated, they 
were further supported with generous subsidies to materialize consolidation and aggregation 
together, wherein the FB program intervened to ensure long-term tenancy contracts. This policy 
intervention facilitated capital investments in large-scale farm management. By setting economic 
incentives and invoking farmers’ commitment to sound farmland management, it has the 
potential to sustain farming and farmland management for a longer term. 
 Nevertheless, this intervention may not guarantee sustainable agriculture and may even 
exacerbate farmland abandonment or conversion. Making communal farming profitable has been 
a long-standing riddle, as it involves transaction costs such as additional efforts in coordination, 
accountability and consultation. Furthermore, scale expansion of farm management (even with 
the initial subsidiary support) has been looming over farm managers’ heads in the face of market 
realities. Large-scale farming, particularly in hilly and mountainous regions, was new to many, 
including the governmental and professional agencies, and involved risk associated with various 
economic, environmental and political uncertainties. 
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 More importantly, the intervention pushed more people away from farmland, and this 
disconnection hindered the nurturing of collective actions and may facilitate land-use changes 
other than farming. Rice farming has historically taken advantage of free or cheap local labor on 
a voluntary basis for collective farmland maintenance, whereas such activities have been 
supported through economic incentives from the governmental subsidies in recent years. Yet, the 
FB program particularly in combination with land improvement utterly disconnected farmland 
owners from paddies and discouraged them to engage in collective land management activities.  
 In the land abandonment context, many people appeared to remain in farming 
communities to receive rather non-economic benefits from farmland, which have been embodied 
through their lived experiences in actively interacting with the paddies there. Being disconnected 
from paddies, even those who have remained may move out to seek better livelihood 
opportunities. Even with improved efficiency of farming, paddies (in connection with irrigation 
and other infrastructural facilities) cannot be viably managed without sufficient population.  
7.2 Theoretical Implications and Future Research 
With a focus on farmers as right holders, the dissertation has unpacked the compounding changes 
in the bundles of rights to farmland made through farmers’ interactions with other right holders 
across different governance levels. With a focus on farmers as social agents, it delved into 
institutional changes across the levels driven by both internal and external forces around social 
agents involved with resource use and abandonment. With a focus on farmers’ perspectives, it 
illuminated the dynamics of their sense of values within and across generations, which were 
nurtured through their tangible and intangible connections with farmland. All these changes and 
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moves had enormous significance for the political outcomes of tenancy arrangements. The 
following text discusses the theoretical implications on these three fronts: rights, institutions, and 
value perspectives. 
Negotiating rights to farmland in MLG 
Socio-institutional approaches to property rights treat ‘land’ as “a socially structured space-time 
continuum,” and direct our attention to a ‘bundle of rights’ in which interested social actors 
bargain, redistribute and reconstitute different kinds of property rights (Bastiaensen and Merlet 
2012; Alexander 2012). In line with these approaches, the dissertation has shown that farmland 
tenancy was negotiated among the interacting social actors not just in economic terms but also in 
the social, political, practical, discursive and emotional senses. Moreover, the regime of tenancy 
arrangements has enormously changed through their negotiation in governing farmland. The 
negotiation on tenancy was not bilateral — neither between owners and tenants, nor between 
owners and the state — but multilateral, involving those who had different roles, responsibilities 
and interests in holding, using and managing farmland across the levels and scales (e.g., 
managers, intermediaries, regulators and beneficiaries). In this regard, the property regime of 
farmland in Japan has transformed the role of farmland from ‘family property’ to the ‘commons.’  
 Beginning with state intervention in leveling the relationship between landlords and 
peasants, the postwar property regime transformed the state control of ownership of an individual 
plot to the multi-level coordination of a collective set of tenancy arrangements. With the 
assumption that ownership of farmland gives power to farmers to secure their livelihoods, the 
earlier interventions aimed to ensure the welfare of farm households by connoting farmland as 
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‘family property.’ Along with the overall decline in the role of farmland in shaping wellbeing of 
farm households, however, the later interventions appeared to mobilize not only farmers but also 
other social actors to engage in farmland use and management through granting them different 
kinds of rights (e.g., management rights for prefectural and municipal authorities, use rights for 
general corporations) so that the benefits from farmland could be sustained and more broadly 
shared. Importantly, the transformation of the farmland property regime exhibits the 
compounding changes in the bundle of rights to farmland.  
 Yet, the state’s assumption did not always accord with farmers’ practices and perspectives 
as well as those of other actors who increasingly joined the property regime. Despite its decline 
in fulfilling the immediate, substantive needs of farm households, the role of farmland extends to 
multiple dimensions of human wellbeing (Díaz et al. 2015). Thus views on tenure, security and 
conservation of farmland remain contested among farmers in tenancy, while certain features of 
tenancy (e.g., temporality, inflexibility) sometimes inhibit farmers from entering into tenancy or 
from committing themselves to long-term investments and land conservation (Rotz, Fraser, and 
Martin 2019; Varble, Secchi, and Druschke 2016).  
 The contestation of tenancy arrangements was primarily based on social relations 
involving owners and tenants (e.g., kinship, friendship, neighborliness), which were hardly 
replaced by economic incentives from the government. On the premise that tenancy guarantees 
family property through continuous social relations, the owners allowed for rendering their 
family property available for the local commons. As such, the FB program as the latest model of 
MLG, has been reshaped through the negotiations between these social actors associated with the 
bundle of rights, where farmers have been actively interacting as alienation-right holders.  
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Negotiating forces for institutional changes in MLG 
Drawing on MLG as an analytical framework, the dissertation elucidated the interactions of 
institutional actors across different levels in bringing about change in the MLG model. Drawing 
on the Type 1 and 2 distinctions of MLG, the study highlighted the challenges that the society 
has faced in the process of transition of the MLG model. The state has increasingly dispersed its 
authority across multiple levels to facilitate cross-level tenancy arrangements for better economy 
of scale. It does so mostly by leveraging ‘durable’ jurisdictional ladders (i.e., national, 
prefectural, and municipal authorities). At the same time, it has given increased discretionary 
power to lower-level authorities to tailor the program design in accordance with regional 
diversity and take advantage of local and regional resources for program implementation. In an 
attempt to coordinate different needs and interests in facilitating tenancy arrangements, it has 
provided templates, guidelines, monitoring schemes, and evaluation systems under the ultimate 
state supervision. In particular, the numerical target of farmland aggregation (i.e., Key 
Performance Index) is the very key imperative of the FB program, leading to the ‘zero-sum’ 
game to redistribute farmland as ‘fixed’ resources.  
 Nevertheless, the focus on the socially and customarily developed institutions illuminated 
the potential (or threat) of positive-sum change in governing farmland as more adaptable or 
malleable resources. The study explicated the transformations of the two key institutions in 
governing farmland: farm families and farm villages. Farm families have aged and shrunk in 
general with the shift from multi-generational to single-generational ones, but continued to serve 
as a life-security unit where the family members changed their livelihoods and lifestyles 
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increasingly on an individual basis. Farm villages have been also graying and depopulating with 
the greater stratification of constituents, but have sustained certain communal activities to 
collectively secure the livelihoods of members. Along with these transformations, some 
functions relevant to farming and farmland in the both institutions (e.g. family-based farming, 
village-based collective land maintenance activities) have been marginalized.  
 These changes were driven by both internal and external forces that emerged through the 
interactions between the institutional actors across different levels in the processes of governing 
farmland. The external forces (e.g., agricultural market, administrative reforms) triggered the 
changes in institutional behavior by widening or narrowing the range of available options for 
individual and collective actions of the constituents (e.g., job and educational opportunities). But, 
internal forces substantially changed the inner nature of these institutions, having long-term 
political effects on farmland governance.  
 As a significant inner force, the critical driver of the institutional changes appeared to be 
farmers’ motivations to secure their livelihoods. Farm families adapted to accommodate the 
livelihood needs of their members, whereas farm villages also metamorphosed to complement 
the life-security functions of farm families through mediating between internal and external 
agents (e.g., households, administrative agencies). The life-security functions spanned all the 
dimensions of human wellbeing, not reducing to economic terms but reaching diverse aspects of 
a way of life. Particularly in the context in which the farmland’s economic contributions to 
livelihoods have been largely declining, the remaining farmers struggled to find different kinds 
of values that could contribute to their livelihoods. Thus, they were increasingly attentive to the 
spiritual, aesthetic, social and constitutional aspects of farmland. Farmers have served as active 
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social agents to change the characters and structures of these institutions and thereby institutional 
arrangements and relationships.  
 At the same time, new forms of farm families and villages have been invented as a result 
of the negotiations between different social agents. A prime example of a new farm family was 
the independently incorporated farm management entities (e.g., private companies), whereas that 
of farm villages was village-based farming organizations. Both of them were politically 
promoted and economically supported with governmental subsidies, but also built on their own 
initiatives. Capital investment gave power to these new organizations to overcome the adverse 
economic conditions. At the same time, the collective subjectivities as a corporation or 
community united different groups of people to generate economies of scale. On the trends of 
farmland abandonment, however, a key resource was people to engage in farming and to 
maintain, revive and nurture the social, economic and environmental viability of farmland. In 
either form of organizations, farmers’ sense of values in farmland was a crucial motivator.  
Negotiating value perspectives to farmland in MLG 
Along with recent scholars who have advocated for the importance of ‘relational values’ in 
resource governance (e.g., Díaz et al. 2015; Chan, Satterfield, and Goldstein 2012), the 
dissertation demonstrated that farmers’ value perspectives have been forged and reshaped 
through their tangible and intangible relations to farmland, and thereby affected their actions in 
the dynamic processes of governing farmland. In particular, through their experiences in certain 
times and spaces — including not only material and practical experiences but also imagined and 
discursive experiences — their subjectivities have been relationally embodied. In this 
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connection, besides the challenges arising from the cognitive gaps between different social 
agents across different jurisdictional levels, my study elucidated the challenges accruing from 
such gaps among farmers in governing farmland. While the study showed contrasting 
perspectives between active farmers and non-farming landowners, it also illustrated conflicting 
views on farmland among the active farmers across different generations. To expand the idea of 
‘scale challenges’ (Cash et al. 2006), the ‘generation’ is one of the key dimensions of scale that 
challenge the formation and operation of MLG. 
 Among active farmers in a farming community, different generations have largely shared 
different kinds of livelihood pathways in a certain span of time and space, leading to distinctive 
worldviews across generations. For instance, the study shows that elder generations appeared to 
have more favorable views on village-based social activities hinged on agrarian lifestyles, 
whereas younger ones tended less to appreciate the same activities. In addition to these 
differences, resources for farming also differed across different generations. On the one hand, 
younger generations had less time available to engage in farming due to their commitment to 
other occupational and social activities, while they were more adaptable to new technologies. On 
the other, elder generations appeared to be less physically and technically adaptable to radical 
changes in farming technologies despite having better place-based knowledge, while they tended 
to have more time-wise commitment but often concern about the years remaining for their 
engagement given their physical capacity. These resource asymmetries did not lead to noticeable 
political subordination within a community, but sometimes elicited silent tensions between the 
generations. 
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 The gaps between the elder and younger generations may extend to those between the 
current and future generations. Even within a family or a community where different generations 
shared space, time and living, handing down farmland and farming has been an enormous 
challenge. Having experienced both hardship and enjoyment, the current generations have had 
ambivalent feelings. Thus, they hesitated to compel their children or younger generations to 
commit to farmland as much as they cared for the wellbeing of younger and future generations, 
including freedom of choice. The current generations do not vocally demand the next generation 
to succeed to farming (though they do wish sometimes secretly without saying to their heirs), 
given their familial or communal care of younger ones based on their own ambivalent and 
uncertain feelings about farming. In such a way, the gaps in farmers’ perspectives were 
increasingly widening over generations in the resource abandonment context. 
 In sum, the study demonstrates that the property regime of farmland has transformed 
incrementally through the interactions among multilateral institutional actors across levels and 
scales, wherein the property values of farmland have been continuously negotiated as the values 
perceived distinctively in accordance with their subject positions associated with social relations, 
politics and material domains specific to a certain time and space. Importantly, it highlights that 
farmers’ subjectivities have been changing and often ambivalent, contradictory and uncertain as 
having been relationally embodied through their material and discursive experiences, but 
enormously contributed to forging their value perspectives on farmland and thereby their 
motivations for their individual and collective actions to secure and improve their wellbeing by 
means of farmland. Such motivations have partially but crucially driven the change in nature and 
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structure of social institutions (i.e., farm families and villages) and then finally overall 
institutional arrangements and relationships in governing farmland.  
 In the process of negotiations, cognitive gaps between different institutional actors across 
times and spaces — which have been also affected by resource asymmetries — have elicited or 
amplified tensions and led to the change in the property regime. At the same time, exogenous 
forces (e.g., market, state) have widened or narrowed the range of available options for 
institutional actors to individually and collectively take. As such, farmers have been actively and 
continuously reshaping the governance model by resisting or conforming to the external forces 
as well as their own contradiction and ambivalence, whereas they have transformed their 
institutional behavior hinging on their subjectivities and value perspectives. 
Limitations and future directions of research 
To expand the knowledge of value perspectives in the processes of MLG, I would extend this 
study mainly in three fronts: case selection, sampling, and approaches to value analyses. First, a 
broader set of cases on the FB program implementation would allow for elaborating the 
processes of governing farmland in association with different performance levels of 
implementation. The dissertation focuses on Ishikawa Prefecture where performance was very 
high. The prefectural government’s commitment to program implementation boosted its 
performance. The regional features (e.g., the rivalry across the neighboring prefectures, the larger 
share of land-extensive farming) also appeared to affect the performance level. Yet, inclusion of 
lower performers and those in different regions would allow for exploring why or why not the 
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program was implemented well and how value perspectives have interacted in the processes of 
implementation at different levels of performance.  
 Also, this study focused on the two farming communities in which the level of program 
adoption was contrasting. This focus offered insights on farmland that was treated as ‘family 
property’ or otherwise as a ‘communal asset’ (whereby a family property was stewarded 
communally) by differently adopting the program. In both communities, tenancy arrangements 
were made between owners and local farmers either directly or indirectly via the FB. A few 
communities, however, adopted the FB program by which owners lent their land to outside 
farmers via the FB, including those newly entered from other sectors. My supplementary 
interviews found that outsiders made considerable efforts to ensure good social relations in the 
absence of locally available tenants, sometimes with the help of coordination by municipal 
agencies. Nevertheless, detail examinations of the cases where outsiders joined in tenancy would 
further explore barriers and opportunities of new entries and account for impacts of outsider 
involvement in tenancy on value perspectives to farmland and governance.  
 Second, the expansion of sample to include more diverse constituents of a family and a 
village would allow for comparison or possibly stylization of value perspectives in accordance 
with more varied population profiles. My study skewed towards family heads of farm 
households, many of whom were still active in farming. It included a few females, younger 
farmers and family heads of non-farming households, but the population of them was limited. 
Although family heads were farmland owners in most households and their decisions were 
primarily important for farmland use, they also interacted with other family members to decide 
and act on their decisions. My study also pointed to the changes in farm families as a key social 
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institution in governing farmland. Thus, intra-family dynamics and diversities of value 
perspectives would be interesting to explore. Furthermore, absentee landowners were excluded, 
although some interviewees informed me on their reactions to the FB program. These interviews 
suggested that the absentees’ perspectives were very different from those residing in the local 
communities, and such differences sometimes adversely affected the existing tenancy 
arrangements or the communal decision-making.  
 Third, this study analyzed farmers’ multiple value perspectives to farmland in connection 
with their involvement in tenancy arrangements. Yet, it limitedly accounted for relative 
importance of these values they placed on farmland as well as the evolving, embodying 
processes of their value perspectives. An extended comparison of relative values that farmers 
attach to farmland would deepen the understanding of any trade-offs and synergies. Such a 
comparative analysis would be beneficial to draw out implications for policy impacts on farmers’ 
wellbeing.  
 Also, a life-course analysis of several farmers would further assess the dynamic 
connections between the historical and socio-economic contexts and individual lives, taking into 
account the socio-historical heterogeneity and gendered roles in farmland governance. My 
analysis of postwar institutional transformations shows the interlocking transitions of farm 
families and villages along with the changes in the MLG model. The study also suggests that 
farmers’ value perspectives have been embodied and evolving through their discursive and 
practical struggles and negotiations. The life-course analysis would elaborate on interactive 
processes of subjectivization in connection with their sense of values by highlighting turning 
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points in their livelihood pathways. This would more exactly account for generational gaps in 
value perspectives to farmland.  
7.3 Policy Implications 
The study suggests several plausible scenarios and ways forward in the two distinctive regional 
contexts. In the hilly and mountainous region, farmland abandonment is a major threat to the 
local communities, which may possibly turn into opportunities. In the face of plausible progress 
in abandonment, some village communities took initiatives of land improvement to consolidate 
and aggregate farmland with capital investment by taking advantage of governmental subsidies. 
The present major challenge for the locals is to nurture entrepreneurship in the enlarged farm 
management by enhancing local resources and/or bringing innovations. Given the limited 
availability of occupational and educational opportunities in the vicinity, however, 
disengagement of a majority of local population from farming might make it difficult to retrieve 
their interest in sustaining and augmenting local agrarian resources (e.g., local labor, cultural 
heritage). 
 Other communities (i.e., the villages excluded from program adoption) did not act to 
reverse the trend and may experience further farmland abandonment if no drastic change occurs. 
One challenge is environmental externalities that would extend to surrounding communities and 
beyond. For instance, the habitat of wild boars was expanding and more frequently causing 
damages on farming in the entire district. Another challenge is the increase in legal and 
administrative complexity to handle the land entitlements. In some extreme cases (e.g., forest 
land), no one knows who owns which plots, and in such areas the land could be exploited for 
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illegal or illicit activities (e.g., illegal damping). One way forward is to facilitate ‘active’ land-use 
planning on abandoned farmland, where land uses other than farming (including rewilding and 
revegetation) could be also explored. Yet, on top of legislative impediments, bringing together 
those interested and entitled to abandoned farmland would be a considerable challenge.  
 In the suburban, flatland region, farmland conversion is another threat or potential in 
addition to abandonment. Building on local social relations, superior farmland has been 
productively used and managed through tenancy arrangements, whereas inferior farmland has 
been increasingly abandoned. One of the key blockages is land-use regulations that control land 
conversion under the zoning system. One way forward is to allow for land-use change in 
accordance with local needs through the change in zoning. Besides the political and 
administrative challenges, however, a long-term planning of land-use with local consent is a 
must: the nature of farmland is hard to undo for a short period of time once it is changed. 
 Another way to the productive use of farmland is through improving farmland and/or 
expanding the management capacities of farmers. In this regard, the FB program may support 
local initiatives, such as land improvement and incorporation of village-based farming, through 
long-term tenancy contracts and economic incentives. Yet, it is again critical to determine who 
would be in charge of farming, to what extent farmland would be preserved for farming, and how 
to share the benefits. The village community may serve as a self-organized unit to facilitate local 
dialogues for a collective decision on land-use despite the individual entitlement to farmland, but 
the community is increasingly stratified and diversified and may make it difficult to attain local 
consent.  The third way might be status quo in land-use, but the ongoing changes around 
farmland (e.g., demographic changes, infrastructural decays) have urged the locals to take action. 
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 The primary goal of the FB program as a keystone to the structural policy is to remedy 
the fragmented farmland holdings for better productivity, whereas other policies are geared to 
preservation and enhancement of different aspects of agricultural multufunctionality (e.g., 
environmentally-friendly farming, value addition to agricultural produce through processing and 
distribution). Thus, the program promotes farmland aggregation and consolidation and its 
progress is measured by the farmland aggregation rate albeit not accounting for consolidation in 
this measurement. Yet, on the trends of abandonment, the accurate status of farmland — 
including ownership, vegetation and land-use — has been hardly updated, while it is socially and 
politically arguable how much farmland should be farmed to secure adequate quantity and 
quality of food for sustaining the entire population in the country. Thus, at least to clarify the 
baseline, the government has allocated considerable amount of budget to survey, update and 
manage farmland data in addition to economic incentives to owners (and local farming 
communities) and administration for program implementation. 
 To reverse the trends of agricultural abandonment, however, it is essential to reconnect 
between people and farmland as “a socially structured space-time continuum.” Current 
agricultural policy has set the goals in volume terms nationally, which are broken down into the 
prefectural and municipal goals. Despite the dispersed state authority alongside the increased 
discretionary power at the multiple jurisdictional levels, the cross-level coordination has been 
guided through the established goals (e.g., the fixed, ambitious numerical target for a decade). 
The community-based planning schemes for farmland use (e.g., Community Agricultural Master 
Plan) have been established. Yet, most of them have effected subsidiary provision, which is again 
based on the national standards. The subsidies have certainly sustained farming and farmers to 
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some extent, but the locals, including the recipients of subsidies, have had little motivation to 
collectively discuss future farmland use and management under the current planning system.  
 The present MLG model largely built on the state rationale that is to redistribute the 
fixed, productive resources through the durable jurisdictional ladders so as to ensure agricultural 
multifunctionality beneficial for the citizens. Though a few innovative initiatives at the 
prefectural and municipal levels were emerging, the hasty, ambitious and uniform imperatives 
with the budgetary control have overridden such administrative entrepreneurship. Despite the 
effort to continuously monitor, evaluate and improve the cross-level mechanism, the state’s 
perspective on farmland disconnected from people has impeded mutual learning and hindered 
overall innovation in governing farmland.  
 Farmers have managed farmland, hinging on their continuous commitment to farmland, 
their family and community. Despite the economic volatility and environmental uncertainties, 
their sense of responsibility for farmland use and management has been nurtured through their 
tangible and intangible connections with it. Their commitment cannot be reduced simply to the 
economic or volume terms, but rather extends to all the dimensions of human wellbeing.  
 As an attempt to actively disconnect ownership and usership, the FB program could be 
detrimental. Despite the legal stipulations on tenants’ responsibilities for sound integration in 
local agriculture, it has not been equipped with a substantial mechanism to enshrine tenants’ 
long-term commitment to farming. Rather, farmers’ commitment to farming as well as good 
social relations in local communities has been developed through spontaneous and ad-hoc local 
practices. By enhancing owners’ detachment or disengagement from farming and farmland 
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management, the program mechanism may invite one-time profit seekers to co-opt farmland-use 
or exacerbate farmland abandonment.  
 Nonetheless, the farmland banking scheme may meaningfully effect nurturing of 
agricultural resources in a sustainable manner if the coordination mechanism is boosted and 
enhanced to revive the connections between people and farmland. In this regard, people need to 
be neither landowners nor locals but could be new actors from outside the farming community 
and sector. As the fate of generational turnover, few local farmers might be available for farming 
and farmland management whereas locals would be increasingly indifferent about farmland use 
and instead may offer a more hospitable environment for outsiders. Yet, farm families and 
villages — not necessarily traditional types but new ones such as independent private companies 
and incorporated cooperatives — are key evolving institutions in governing farmland. These 
institutions care about human wellbeing and allow for negotiations between various value 
perspectives. Further attention to subjective, intangible and cultural aspects of farmland would 
facilitate mutual learning within and across the levels, and thus complement the current 
governance model that skews towards the material, tangible and economic aspects of farmland. 
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Appendix A: List of Interviews 
Table A1. List of Interviews with Farmers 
No Code Date Municipalities (Region) Residence/Headquarters
Preliminary Survey
1 160824-FC-WAST 8/24/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village ST 
Main Survey
2 161107-FA-NNI 11/7/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NI 
3 161108-FA-NNG 11/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NG
4 161108-FA-NNH 11/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NH
5 161108-FA-NNC1 11/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NC
6 161108-FA-NNC2 11/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NC
7 161108-FA-NNI 11/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NI 
8 161109-FA-NNJ1 11/9/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NJ 
9 161109-FA-NNF 11/9/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NF 
10 161109-FA-NNJ2 11/9/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NJ 
11 161109-FA-KKKA 11/9/2016 City A (Noto) District K, Village KKA 
12 161110-FA-KKYA 11/10/2016 City A (Noto) District K, Village KYA 
13 161110-FA-NNI 11/10/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NI 
14 161110-FA-KKYO 11/10/2016 City A (Noto) District K, Village KYO 
15 161110-FA-NNJ 11/10/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NJ 
16 161112-FC-WASZ1 11/12/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village SZ 
17 161112-FC-WASZ2 11/12/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village SZ 
18 161112-FC-WAKY 11/12/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village KY
19 161113-FC-WAHG 11/13/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village HG
20 161113-FC-WAMI 11/13/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village MI
21 161114-FC-SHKO 11/14/2016 City C (Noto) District SH, Village KO
22 161115-FC-SHIZ 11/15/2016 City C (Noto) District SH, Village IZ
23 161115-FC-TDNN 11/15/2016 City C (Noto) District TD, Village NN
24 161116-FC-WAHM 11/16/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village HM
25 161116-FC-WAFK 11/16/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village FK
26 161117-FC-HRUK 11/17/2016 City C (Noto) District HR, Village UK
27 161118-FC-WADB 11/18/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village DB
28 161119-FC-WAKY 11/19/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village KY
29 161120-FE-TE 11/20/2016 City E (Kaga) Village TE
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30 161122-FB-U1 11/22/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
31 161123-FB-U1 11/23/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
32 161123-FB-U2 11/23/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
33 161123-FB-U3 11/23/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
34 161124-FB-U1 11/24/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
35 161125-FB-U1 11/25/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
36 161125-FB-U2 11/25/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
37 161125-FB-U3 11/25/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
38 161125-FB-U4 11/25/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
39 161126-FB-U1 11/26/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
40 161126-FB-E1 11/26/2016 City B (Kaga) Village E
41 161126-FB-U2 11/26/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
42 161127-FB-U1 11/27/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
43 161127-FB-E1 11/27/2016 City B (Kaga) Village E
44 161127-FB-U2 11/27/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
45 161128-FB-S1 11/28/2016 City B (Kaga) Village S
46 161206-FP-LHT 12/6/2016 Prefecture-wide City L,  Village HT
47 161207-FA-KHD 12/7/2016 City A (Noto) District K, Village HD
48 161207-FA-NNC 12/7/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NC
49 161207-FA-NNF 12/7/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NF 
50 161208-FA-NNG1 12/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NG
51 161208-FA-NNC1 12/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NC
52 161208-FA-NNG2 12/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NG
53 161208-FA-NNC2 12/8/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NC
54 161209-FA-NNC 12/9/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NC
55 161209-FA-NNJ 12/9/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NJ 
56 161209-FA-NNH1 12/9/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NH
57 161209-FA-NNH2 12/9/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NH
58 161210-FA-NND 12/10/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village ND
59 161210-FA-NNI1 12/10/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NI 
60 161210-FA-NNF 12/10/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NF 
61 161210-FA-NNI2 12/10/2016 City A (Noto) District N, Village NI 
62 161211-FB-U1 12/11/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
63 161211-FB-U2 12/11/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
Date Municipalities (Region) Residence/HeadquartersNo Code
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64 161212-FB-U1 12/12/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
65 161212-FB-U2 12/12/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
66 161213-FB-U1 12/13/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
67 161213-FB-U2 12/13/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
68 161213-FB-U3 12/13/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
69 161214-FB-U1 12/14/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
70 161214-FB-U2 12/14/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
71 161214-FB-U3 12/14/2016 City B (Kaga) Village U
72 161215-FC-WAST 12/15/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village ST 
73 161215-FC-HKNR1 12/15/2016 City C (Noto) District HK, Village NR 
74 161215-FC-HKNR2 12/15/2016 City C (Noto) District HK, Village NR 
75 161216-FC-HKNR1 12/16/2016 City C (Noto) District HK, Village NR 
76 161216-FC-HKNR2 12/16/2016 City C (Noto) District HK, Village NR 
77 161216-FC-HKNR3 12/16/2016 City C (Noto) District HK, Village NR 
78 161216-FC-HKNR4 12/16/2016 City C (Noto) District HK, Village NR 
79 161216-FC-HKNR5 12/16/2016 City C (Noto) District HK, Village NR 
80 161217-FC-WAST1 12/17/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village ST 
81 161217-FC-WAST2 12/17/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village ST 
82 161217-FC-WAST3 12/17/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village ST 
83 161217-FC-WAST4 12/17/2016 City C (Noto) District WA, Village ST 
84 170113-FP-JTM 1/13/2017 Prefecture-wide Town J, Village TM
85 170117-FD-SC 1/17/2017 City D (Noto) City D, Village SC
86 170122-FB-U1 1/22/2017 City B (Kaga) Village U
87 170123-FF-AH1 1/23/2017 Town F (Kaga) Village AH
88 170123-FF-AH2 1/23/2017 Town F (Kaga) Village AH
89 170123-FF-AH3 1/23/2017 Town F (Kaga) Village AH
90 170123-FB-YY1 1/23/2017 City B (Kaga) Village YY
91 170123-FB-YY2 1/23/2017 City B (Kaga) Village YY
92 180819-FB-U1 8/19/2018 City B (Kaga) Village U
93 180820-FB-E1 8/20/2018 City B (Kaga) Village E
94 180820-FB-U1 8/20/2018 City B (Kaga) Village U
95 180822-FA-NNI 8/22/2018 City A (Noto) District N, Village NI 
96 180823-FC-WAST 8/23/2018 City C (Noto) District WA, Village ST 
Date Municipalities (Region) Residence/HeadquartersNo Code
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Table A2. List of Interviews with Stakeholders 




1 160803-SP-AC1 8/3/2016 Prefectural Chamber of Agriculture Director-General
2 160803-SP-AC2 8/3/2016 Prefectural Chamber of Agriculture Counsellor & Department Chief
3 160803-SP-GV1 8/3/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF)
Group Leader & Division 
Counsellor, Agricultural 
Infrastructural Division (AID)
4 160804-SP-FB1 8/4/2016 Prefectural Ishikawa Agricultural 
Total Support 
Organization (INATO)
Group Leader & Advisor 
5 160804-SP-GV1 8/4/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Group Leader & Assistant Director, 
Agricultural Land Planning Group, 
Agricultural Policy Division (APD)
6 160805-SP-JA1 8/5/2016 Prefectural Unifier of Japan 
Agricultural Cooperatives 
(JA)
Deputy Director-General (JA), 
Farming Strategy Office 
7 160805-SP-JA2 8/5/2016 Prefectural Unifier of JA Deputy Director-General 
(Farmers), Farming Strategy Office 
8 160805-SP-JA3 8/5/2016 Prefectural Unifier of JA Assistant Manager (Farmers), 
Farming Strategy Office 
9 160805-SP-LF1 8/5/2016 Prefectural Land Improvement 
Projects Federation
Project Department Director
10 160805-SP-LF2 8/5/2016 Prefectural Land Improvement 
Projects Federation
General Affairs Department Deputy 
Director & Division Chief
11 160805-SP-LF3 8/5/2016 Prefectural Land Improvement 
Projects Federation
Assistant Director of Replotting 
Division





13 160823-SP-GV1 8/23/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Group Leader, Farm Management 
Strategy Office, Agricultural Policy 
Division (APD)
14 160823-SP-GV2 8/23/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Group Senior Official, Farm 
Management Strategy Office, 
Agricultural Policy Division (APD)
15 160823-SP-GV3 8/23/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government Counsellor
16 160824-SM-DC1 8/24/2016 Municipal  
(City D)
Municipal Government Senior Official, Division of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
17 160824-SM-DC2 8/24/2016 Municipal  
(City D)
Municipal Government Assistant Manager, Division of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
18 160824-SM-DC3 8/24/2016 Municipal  
(City D)
Municipal Government Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
19 160824-SR-ON1 8/24/2016 Regional  
(Oku-Noto: Noto)
DAFF Regional Office Director-General
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20 160824-SR-ON2 8/24/2016 Regional  
(Oku-Noto: Noto)
DAFF Regional Office Department Director
21 160825-SM-CA1 8/25/2016 Municipal  
(City C)
Municipal Government Counselor, Secretariat of 
Agricultural Committee
22 160825-SM-CA2 8/25/2016 Municipal  
(City C)
Municipal Government Senior Official, Secretariat of 
Agricultural Committee
23 160825-SM-CC1 8/25/2016 Municipal  
(City C)
Municipal Government Assistant Manager, Division of 
Industrial Promotion





25 160825-SM-CJ1 8/25/2016 Municipal  
(City C)
JA-CS Department Director
26 160826-SN-NF1 8/26/2016 Private/Non-profit Forestry Association of 
Noto
Conusellor
27 160826-SN-NF2 8/26/2016 Private/Non-profit Forestry Association of 
Noto
Department Director
28 160826-SR-NN1 8/26/2016 Regional  
(Naka-Noto: Noto)
DAFF Regional Office Department Director
29 160826-SR-NN2 8/26/2016 Regional  
(Naka-Noto: Noto)
DAFF Regional Office Division Chief
30 160826-SM-HT1 8/26/2016 Municipal  
(Town H)
Municipal Government Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
31 160826-SM-HT2 8/26/2016 Municipal  
(Town H)
Municipal Government Assistant Section Chief, Division 
of Agriculture and Forestry
32 160829-SR-MK1 8/29/2016 Regional  
(Minami-Kaga: 
Kaga)
DAFF Regional Office Department Director
33 160829-SM-EC1 8/29/2016 Municipal  
(City E)
Municipal Government Senior Official, Division of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
34 160829-SM-EA1 8/29/2016 Municipal  
(City E)
Municipal Government Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
35 160829-SM-BC1 8/29/2016 Municipal  
(City B)
Municipal Government Division Chief of Agricultural 
Policy, Director General of 
Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
36 160829-SM-BC2 8/29/2016 Municipal  
(City B)
Municipal Government Section Chief, Division of 
Agricultural Policy
37 160830-SR-IK1 8/30/2016 Regional (Ishikawa: 
Kaga)
DAFF Regional Office Division Chief
38 160830-SM-IC1 8/30/2016 Municipal  
(City I)
Municipal Government Assistant Director, Division of 
Agricultural Promotion
39 160830-SM-IC1 8/30/2016 Municipal  
(City I)
Municipal Government Senior Official, Division of 
Agricultural Promotion
40 160830-SM-IA1 8/30/2016 Municipal  
(City I)










42 161114-SM-CC1 11/14/2016 Municipal  
(City C)
Municipal Government Assistant Manager, Division of 
Industrial Promotion
43 161115-SM-CA1 11/15/2016 Municipal  
(City C)
Municipal Government Counselor, Secretariat of 
Agricultural Committee





45 161121-SR-MK1 11/21/2016 Regional  
(Minami-Kaga: 
Kaga)
DAFF Regional Office Department Director
46 161121-SR-MK2 11/21/2016 Regional  
(Minami-Kaga: 
Kaga)
DAFF Regional Office Division Director






48 161122-SM-BC1 11/22/2016 Municipal  
(City B)
Municipal Government Division Chief of Agricultural 
Policy, Director General of 
Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
49 161122-SM-BC2 11/22/2016 Municipal  
(City B)
Municipal Government Section Chief, Division of 
Agricultural Policy
50 161124-SM-BJ1 11/24/2016 Municipal  
(City B)
JA-BY President
51 161129-SR-NN1 11/29/2016 Regional  
(Naka-Noto: Noto)
DAFF Regional Office Division Chief
52 161129-SM-AJ1 11/29/2016 Municipal  
(City A)
JA-AW Deputy Director-General, 
Cultivation Support Office
53 161130-SM-AC1 11/30/2016 Municipal  
(City A)
Municipal Government Deputy Chief, Division of 
Agriculture and Forestry
54 161130-SM-AC2 11/30/2016 Municipal  
(City A)
Municipal Government Assistant Manager, Division of 
Secondary Nature Promotion
55 161130-SM-AC3 11/30/2016 Municipal 
(City A)
Municipal Government Senior Technical Manager, 




11/30/2016 Municipal  
(City A)
Municipal Government Senior Technical Manager, 
Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
57 161206-SP-GV1 12/6/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government Conusellor
58 161206-SP-GV2 12/6/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Group Leader, Farm Management 
Strategy Office, Agricultural Policy 
Division (APD)





60 161206-SP-GV3 12/6/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Group Leader & Assistant Director, 
Agricultural Land Planning Group, 
Agricultural Policy Division (APD)
61 161206-SP-GV4 12/6/2016 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Senior Official: Agricultural 
Infrastructural Division (AID)





1/14/2017 Private/Non-profit Non Profit Organization 
Nature School
President
64 170114-SN-ME1 1/14/2017 Private/Non-profit Elderly Group President & Local Historian
65 170115-SN-MT1 1/15/2017 Private/Non-profit Terraced Paddy Fan Club President
66 170115-SP-GV1 1/15/2017 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
Department of 
Environment
Division Counsellor & Farmer 
(City M)
67 170116-SM-CJ1 1/16/2017 Municipal  
(City C)
JA-CS Department Director
68 170116-SR-ON1 1/16/2017 Regional  
(Oku-Noto: Noto)
DAFF Regional Office Director-General
69 170116-SR-ON2 1/16/2017 Regional  
(Oku-Noto: Noto)
DAFF Regional Office Department Director
70 170116-SM-GT1 1/16/2017 Municipal  
(Town G)
Municipal Government Division Chief of Industrial 
Promotion, Director General of 
Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
71 170118-SN-NU1 1/18/2017 Private/Non-profit National University Associate Professor (Geography)
72 170118-SN-NU2 1/18/2017 Private/Non-profit National University Professor (Agronomy - Insect 
Ecology)
73 170119-SN-PU1 1/19/2017 Private/Non-profit Prefectural University Professor (Agronomy - River 
Ecology)
74 170119-SN-PU2 1/19/2017 Private/Non-profit Prefectural University Associate Professor (Agronomy - 
Rural Planning)
75 170119-SN-NU1 1/19/2017 Private/Non-profit National University Professor (Economics)
76 170120-SP-DC1 1/20/2017 Prefectural Agricultural Development 
Corporation 
Vice Chief Director
77 170120-SP-DC2 1/20/2017 Prefectural Agricultural Development 
Corporation 
Board of Director
78 170120-SP-DC3 1/20/2017 Prefectural Agricultural Development 
Corporation 




1/20/2017 National Hokuriku Regional Office, 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Assistant Director, Division of 




1/20/2017 National Hokuriku Regional Office, 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 






81 170120-SN-HA1 1/20/2017 National Hokuriku Regional Office, 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Assistant Manager, Division of 
Farmland Diversion
82 170124-SM-FT1 1/24/2017 Municipal  
(Town F)
Municipal Government Deputy Chief, Division of Industry 
and Economics (Secretariat of 
Agricultural Committee)
83 180820-SM-BC1 8/20/2018 Municipal  
(City B)
Municipal Government Division Chief of Agricultural 
Policy, Director General of 
Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
84 180820-SM-BC2 8/20/2018 Municipal  
(City B)
Municipal Government Section Chief, Division of 
Agricultural Policy
85 180821-SP-FB1 8/21/2018 Prefectural INATO Executive Director
86 180821-SP-FB2 8/21/2018 Prefectural INATO Group Leader & Advisor 
87 180821-SP-FB3 8/21/2018 Prefectural INATO Advisor
88 180821-SP-GV1 8/21/2018 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Division Chief, Agricultural 
Infrastructural Division (AID)
89 180821-SP-GV2 8/21/2018 Prefectural Prefectural Government - 
DAFF
Group Leader & Division 
Counsellor, Agricultural 
Infrastructural Division (AID)
90 180822-SM-AC1 8/22/2018 Municipal  
(City A)
Municipal Government Assistant Director, Division of 
Planning and Finance
91 180822-SM-AC2 8/22/2018 Municipal  
(City A)




8/22/2018 Municipal  
(City A)
Municipal Government Secretariat of Agricultural 
Committee
93 180823-SM-CC1 8/23/2018 Municipal  
(City C)
Municipal Government Assistant Manager, Division of 
Industrial Promotion
94 180824-SP-AC1 8/24/2018 Prefectural Chamber of Agriculture Director-General
95 180824-SP-AC2 8/24/2018 Prefectural Chamber of Agriculture Counsellor & Department Chief
96 180824-SP-AC3 8/24/2018 Prefectural Chamber of Agriculture Official
97 180824-SP-JA1 8/24/2018 Prefectural Unifier of JA Deputy Director-General 
(Farmers), Farming Strategy Office 
98 180824-SP-JA2 8/24/2018 Prefectural Unifier of JA Assistant Manager (Farmers), 





Appendix B: Interview Guides 
B1. Sample Questions for Farmers 
1. Background: The questions are designed to provide background on respondent’s role in 
farming. 
1) Title and affiliation (e.g., types of farms - business corporation (kabushiki-gaisha), limited 
company (yugen-gaisha), corporate farming combination (noji-kumiai-hojin), etc.) [Note: 
this information can be gathered from an interviewee’s business card.] 
2) Background of farming: 
- How long have you been engaged in farming, and how and why did you start farming? 
- How long have you been living in this village, and did you succeed to farming from any 
of your parents and relatives? — If not succeeding from your family, why did you choose 
this place for your farming? 
- Do you fully rely on farming for your livelihoods? If not, what are the income sources 
other than farming, and to what extent do you depend on the income from farming? 
- How is the size of your farming and farmland? (e.g., number of employees, yields, 
farmland area size) 
- How have you trained yourself for farming and farm management?  
2. Farmland Use & Management: The questions focus on respondents’ involvement in tenancy 
arrangements and agricultural landscape management. 
1) Please describe your involvement in tenancy arrangements. 
(a)If you participate in any tenancy arrangements, please let me know:  
i. How long have you been involved in tenancy arrangements? How and why did you get 
involved? 
ii. How did you identify lenders or borrowers of farmland? How did you set up an 
agreement with what terms and conditions?  
iii.How and with whom do you work with to arrange and maintain tenancy? 
iv.What is your objective to pursue tenancy arrangements?  
v. Whether, and if so, how have your tenancy arrangements changed over time? (e.g., 
locations, distributions, area size, crops, types of property rights such as use rights and 
consignation of cultivation practices) — Have you observed any changes in demands 
for tenancy over time? Have your tenancy arrangements been influenced by any policy 
change (e.g., Farmland Bank Program since 2014, and Agricultural Land Act 
amendment in 2009)? 
vi.What are the benefits/advantages as well as the challenges/disadvantages you have in 
engaging in tenancy arrangements? 
vii.What is your plan ahead to manage tenancy arrangements?  
(b)If you do NOT participate in any tenancy arrangements, please let me know:  
i. Have you ever been solicited to be involved in any tenancy arrangements? — if so, 
when and by whom?  
ii. Why not do you participate in any tenancy arrangements? (e.g., any obstacles and 
challenges, availability of preferable tenancy options, any risks you perceive) 
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iii. If there are opportunities available for you to join in a certain kind of tenancy 
arrangements, are you willing to participate in it? — if so, why and what kind of 
tenancy arrangements do you want to join? If not, why not? 
iv.Do you have any benefits/advantages as well as challenges/disadvantages from not 
being involved in tenancy arrangements? 
v. What is your objective to maintain your farmland as it is?  
vi.Has your farmland management been influenced by any policy change (e.g., Farmland 
Bank Program since 2014, and Agricultural Land Act amendment in 2009)? 
vii.What is your plan ahead to manage your farmland? 
2) Please describe your involvement in collective agricultural landscape management. 
i. How and why have you been involved in what collective management? (e.g., roles and 
responsibilities, purposes, scale of activities —  agricultural facilities management, 
agricultural committee, agricultural cooperative activities, etc.) 
ii. Whom do you work closely with in collective management? 
iii.Have your engagement in management changed over time, if so by what? 
iv.What are the challenges/constraints and benefits/advantages in managing your 
farmland and engaging in collective landscape management? 
v. Are there any deliberative processes held among different stakeholders to discuss 
tenancy arrangements and/or farmland and landscape management? — How have you 
been involved in the process of Community Agricultural Master Plan (CAMP)? 
3. Value Perspectives to Farmland: The questions are designed to assess respondent’s values 
attached to farmland — Respondents’ will be asked to illustrate any examples for their 
descriptions.  
1) How “rich” or “poor” do you perceive your farmland? Could you draw on any 
quantifiable measures to describe how rich or poor it is? (e.g., area size, fertility, and water 
scarcity)  — How does such affluence or inadequacy affect the benefits you gain from 
farmland (e.g., yields, land conservation), and how does it influence quality of your life 
(e.g., nutrient/health, social relations)?  
2) How and why is your farmland “important” or “unimportant” to you? (e.g., for meeting 
your livelihood needs, and for keeping it as cultural asset) 
3) Do you have any particular “preference” to (or interests in) your farmland over other 
farmland, and why or why not? (e.g., maintaining inter-generational asset, securing 
livelihoods) 
4) What “principle(s)”(or criteria) do you draw on to make a decision for farmland use or 
abandonment (i.e., holding, using and/or managing your farmland)? (e.g., ancestral 
heritage, needs for rural revitalization, living in harmony with nature, a fulfillment of life) 
4. Conclusion:  
1) Please tell me the biggest challenge/difficulty/most frustrating thing you face? 
2) What do you wish that you could change? 
3) Who do you consider to be the most significant actors pursuing better use of farmland? 
Please provide some examples.  
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4) Who else might you know that I should interview? (Name, Affiliation, Contact 
information, Relevance) 
5) What other questions should I have asked that I did not? 
6) Do you agree to be contacted for any additional questions, if any? 
B2. Sample Questions for Stakeholders 
1. Background: The questions are designed to provide background on respondent’s professional 
role in tenancy arrangements.  
1) Title and affiliation (e.g., professional position, agency and department) [Note: this 
information can be gathered from an interviewee’s business card.] 
2) Professional background:  
- How long have you been in your current position and current agency, and what are your 
main roles and responsibilities in this position?  
- How long have you been engaged in the work related to tenancy arrangements, and what 
role do you play in tenancy arrangements?  
2. Policies: The questions focus on the the current policies and programs facilitating tenancy 
arrangements (i.e., Farmland Bank Program and other relevant policies and programs). 
1) How do you see the features of the Farmland Bank Program in your context? (the policy 
goals, the stakeholders involved in establishing the program, reasons behind the program 
establishment) 
2) How has the Farmland Bank Program influenced your roles and responsibilities in 
facilitating tenancy arrangements as well as agricultural landscape management? 
3) How have the tenancy arrangements been linked to the process of Community Agricultural 
Master Plan (CAMP)? 
4) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Program?  
5) What are the factors that affect the performance of tenancy arrangements? (e.g., social 
integrity, local culture, technical adaptability, economic incentives for lenders and/or 
borrowers) 
6) Are there any other policies or programs that you find influential in tenancy arrangements 
and agricultural landscape management?(e.g., Agricultural Land Act amendment in 2009) 
3. Engagement in Tenancy Arrangements: The questions deal with respondents’ involvement in 
tenancy arrangements. 
1) What kind of tenancy arrangements have you dealt with? 
2) What are the roles and responsibilities of your agency and department in tenancy 
arrangements, and what is the mission in this regard? — what specific tasks do you pursue 
in tenancy arrangements in your professional capacity? 
3) What is the scope/scale of your agency and department in regard to tenancy arrangements? 
(e.g., the jurisdictional scale, the geographical scale, the sectoral scale) 
4) Whom (i.e., organizations and individuals) do your agency and department work closely 
with in pursuing the programs related to tenancy arrangements? 
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5) Have your agency and department been influenced by any policy changes (e.g., Farmland 
Bank Program since 2014, the Agricultural Land Act amendment in 2009)? 
6) Have you observed any changes in demands or needs for tenancy arrangements over time? 
7) What are the challenges and opportunities in dealing with tenancy arrangements?  
8)  Are there any deliberative processes held among different stakeholders to discuss tenancy 
arrangements and/or farmland and agricultural landscape management? 
9)  What is your perspective on the trends of tenancy arrangements for the near future (in 
5-10 years)? 
4. Value Perspectives to Farmland: The questions are designed to assess respondent’s values 
perspectives to farmland under their jurisdiction — Respondents’ will be asked to illustrate 
any examples for their descriptions.  
1) How “rich” or “poor” do you perceive farmland under your jurisdiction? Could you draw 
on any quantifiable measures to describe how rich or poor it is? (e.g., area size, fertility, 
and water scarcity)  — How does such affluence or inadequacy affect the benefits people 
gain from farmland (e.g., yields, land conservation), and how does it influence quality of 
life of the communities under your jurisdiction (e.g., nutrient/health, social relations)? 
2) How and why is farmland “important” or “unimportant” to your agency or communities 
under your jurisdiction? (e.g., for sustaining rural economy, for preserving biodiversity, 
and for keeping it as cultural asset) 
3) Do you have any particular “interests” in (or priorities to) certain area(s) of farmland over 
others under your jurisdiction, and if so, why? (e.g., maintaining cultural asset or 
compensating farmers in a certain area) 
4) What “principle(s)” do you draw on to promote farmland use? (e.g., maintaining land 
conservation, revitalizing rural economy, promoting a cultural asset) — Is there any case 
that you do not promote farmland use or facilitate land use change, if so why? 
5. Conclusion:  
1) Please tell me the biggest challenge/difficulty/most frustrating thing you face? 
2) What do you wish that you could change? 
3) Who do you consider to be the most significant actors pursuing better use of farmland? 
Please provide some examples. 
4) Who else might you know that I should interview? (Name, Affiliation, Contact 
information, Relevance) 
5) What other questions should I have asked that I did not? 
6) Do you agree to be contacted for any additional questions, if any? 
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